Book Essay

Europe’s Twentieth-Century Wars

Edwina S. Campbell

Abstract

Five years after V-E Day, there were certainly new ends, including those arising from the Soviet threat, that European statesmen pursued by creating both Atlantic and European institutions. Rapprochement between Bonn and Paris developed in the climate of the Cold War, which determined, not the pursuit of their détente, but many of the specific paths it followed. The initial impetus to reconciliation had been the threat posed to European civilization by a new Franco-German war. As the threat from the Soviet Union began to overshadow that fear, the cultivation of a dialogue between Bonn and Paris took on a new urgency in those capitals, in Washington and in London. But, the Soviet threat alone, although important, was clearly not enough to encourage the kind of lasting rapprochement sought by the two ‘hereditary enemies.

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Security Studies 2013 Symposium on Europe United:


Dr. Edwina Campbell has served as professor of national security studies at Air Command and Staff College (2003–14), professor of grand strategy at National Defense University (1995–2001), and a US Foreign Service Officer. She holds a PhD and two master’s degrees in international security studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and a BA from American University’s School of International Service. She was a Fulbright Fellow (1972–73) and a Robert Bosch Fellow (1985–86) in the Federal Republic of Germany. Her publications include Germany’s Past and Europe’s Future and Consultation and Consensus in NATO.
In a three-month period in 2014, from 4 August to 9 November, Europe commemorated two anniversaries and celebrated a third: the centennial of the First World War, the 75th anniversary of World War II, and the 25th anniversary of the opening of the Berlin Wall. But for many Europeans, the third event, like the first two, was no cause for celebration. Much of the literature on the end of the Cold War—notably, the memoirs of prominent members of the George H. W. Bush administration—understandably prefers to end the story of those dramatic events on 3 October 1990 with Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, the title of the book by Bush National Security Council staffers Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice. Indeed, Europe was transformed, but for the people of Yugoslavia, that transformation was to a decade of war and genocide. The two stories—the unification of Germany and the destruction of Yugoslavia—cannot be properly understood in isolation from each other, and unfortunately, one of the most important links between the two was the feckless foreign policy of the United States. As the self-lionized role of Bush and his principal advisors comes under closer scholarly scrutiny than in the 1990s, a more nuanced view of the strategic successes and failures of 1989–93 is beginning to emerge. The fine book by Josip Glaurdic is a major contribution to that scholarship.

Glaudric tells the story of what happens when the leaders of great powers believe that they only have to be concerned with each other, that what takes place in smaller countries far away doesn’t matter to them; when they allow their wishful thinking about what should be happening to blind them to what is actually happening; and when they indulge a desire for one-upsmanship vis-à-vis their own allies or predecessors in office. The “Western powers” of Glaurdic’s subtitle all provided ample evidence of such behavior in their approach to “the breakup of Yugoslavia,” as his thorough research and lucid writing make clear. The fate of the people of Yugoslavia was nowhere near the top of the priority list of decision makers in London, Bonn, Paris, Brussels, and Washington from 1989 to 1991, if it even made the list at all. They had other things on their mind. What they wanted from Yugoslavia was quiescence; like Afghanistan after 1989, it had no role to play in their calculations once a deal had been done among the great powers. As Glaudic meticulously documents, based on careful reading of multilingual diplomatic archives and interviews with many of the principal actors, their lack of interest in the reality of Slobodan Milosevic’s intentions was the great enabler of his assault on Yugoslavia.

It is only fair to those decision makers to say that they had an exceptionally large number of “close of business” issues—those that required daily attention from political leaders at the highest level—with which to deal
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during those years; even so, their handling of those issues looks increasingly dismal with the passage of time. The pace and importance of events confronting them were certainly no greater than what had faced Western leaders in the first decade after the Second World War, and the strategic context at the start of the 1990s was far more congenial. It had largely been shaped by 40 years of cooperation among the Western powers in both NATO and the European Community/Union (EC/EU), with resulting military and economic capabilities and diplomatic processes in being that those “present at the creation” of the Western alliance would have envied. What was missing in the years after 1989, particularly in London and Washington, was the breadth and depth of strategic thinking and the creativity of the leaders of 1949. On the 20th anniversary of NATO in 1969, Richard Nixon called them “hopeful realists,” but in fact, they were pragmatic idealists who took an activist approach to rebuilding—economically, politically, and morally—post–World War II Western Europe. Truman and Nixon’s successor in 1989 could think of nothing more than the depressing “status quo plus” to characterize his visionless foreign policy for the post–Cold War world, and his secretary of state famously and inelegantly attempted to pass the Yugoslav “buck” to the Europeans by proclaiming that the United States had “no dog in that fight” (Glaudyic, p. 170).

But the leaders of Western Europe in the early 1990s were also unworthy heirs of Schuman, Monnet, Adenauer, Spaak, Bevin, and de Gasperi—an abbreviated list of the statesmen of the 1950s. What characterized “the Edwardians,” the leaders of post-1945 Western Europe who had come of age before World War I, was the combination of idealist convictions about the necessity of cooperation among their states in the post–World War II world with an acute appreciation of its power political realities. Forty years later, despite their much-vaunted and self-proclaimed reputation as practitioners of realism, there were few Realpolitiker in the chancelleries and foreign ministries of the powers manipulated and played against each other by Milosevic. Or perhaps, more accurately, those who imagined themselves that way were singularly inept in practicing what they preached. The last of the Edwardians had departed the stage circa 1970, and their political descendants in Bonn, Paris, and London, as well as in Washington, were overwhelmed—depressingly, not by the threat posed by the Serb leader (which, after all, was miniscule compared to the collective economic and military capabilities of the members of NATO and the EU), but by the emergence of challenges which they had not foreseen and opportunities which they had not expected. As John Lewis Gaddis presciently commented in a May 1989 interview:
Four decades ago, if you could have told those who were “present at the creation” that the outcome was going to be a prosperous and self-confident Western Europe, a prosperous and self-confident Japan, and a Soviet Union that was economically on the skids, they would have been delighted. . . . They might well have welcomed the possibility that NATO, at some point, has served its purpose and no longer is needed. But with the four decades of Cold War . . . the abnormalities of that situation became so normal that now to begin to depart from them, now to begin to go back to what was on our wish list in 1947, is making people intensely uncomfortable. . . . We’re seeing the Soviet-American relationship evolve into a . . . more routine relationship than what we have been used to in the past with the Soviet Union. I think that’s all to the good, but one price of that is that we lack, to an extent, the capacity for vision. . . . What tends to happen is that it leads to mediocrity . . . a brokered, splitting-the-difference strategy, right down the middle, with no great departures from what had been the case in the past. What that leads to is incrementalism . . . a series of small decisions that may have the effect of changing something big ten years down the pike, but it won’t be because you intended to change it, it’ll be as a more or less accidental result of a series of small decisions along the way. . . . What’s unusual about this situation is that there’s great opportunity out there; there doesn’t seem to be great danger out there. It’s a good situation, not a bad situation. It is a favorable situation, not one that poses an imminent sense of threat. And there’s a real question, intellectually, as to whether we’re capable of having a vision to respond to something like that. I hope we can.1

Unfortunately, in their four years in office, George H. W. Bush and his advisors fulfilled all of Gaddis’s fears of incremental mediocrity, with consequences for the people of Yugoslavia that are grippingly described in Glaurdic’s book.

Beginning with Milosevic’s rise to power in Serbia in 1987, Glaurdic describes month by month the strategy and tactics the Serb leader used to destroy Yugoslavia over the next five years and the inability and unwillingness of the Western powers to deal with them. As Glaurdic notes, “The Yugoslav crisis evolved over a long period of time, and its descent toward extreme violence was gradual, often openly preannounced, and thus widely anticipated. Nothing about its development was either sudden or novel” (p. 6). In the author’s view, “Yugoslavia’s violent end was not inevitable” (p. 8). Glaurdic has compiled a wealth of material to tell the story of how and why the end came, and he presents this material in a highly readable narrative. He builds a meticulous case against almost all the leading foreign policy makers of NATO and EU member states who were, supposedly, creators of a “Europe whole and free.” In doing so, Glaurdic maintains “a clear focus on the actions of the political decision makers,” while offering “a chronological interweaving of Yugoslav and international developments” (ibid.). This approach is refreshing and, unfortunately, all too rare in the current literature, which tends to focus on abstract arguments regarding which theory of international relations explains the behavior of state and nonstate actors while simultaneously failing to situate
events in one country or region in a broader international context. Glaurdic will have none of it. In his narrative, real people with names including Bush, Kohl, Mitterrand, and Major make (or fail to make) decisions, and they deal (or fail to deal) with more than one issue at a time. In addressing the crisis of Yugoslavia, these policymakers do not cover themselves with glory, but they are indeed, as Glaurdic shows, policymakers—the men (almost all of them) whose personal qualities, preferences, and abilities mattered. Their actions and inactions shaped events and outcomes that might have turned out differently had different leaders been in power.

There is no hero in the story Glaurdic tells. No Western decision maker rises to the occasion and creates an effective consensus on how to deal with Milosevic’s destruction of the Yugoslav state; but the man who finally realizes what is happening and attempts to do so is, in Glaurdic’s opinion, German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. He and his country acted to shape EU support for Slovenian and Croatian independence in 1991–92, Glaurdic asserts, because of “the challenge that the Serbian aggression presented to the principled ideas of German foreign policy makers,” namely “the idea of peaceful self-determination, . . . the idea of strong anti-expansionism and anti-irredentism, . . . and the idea of a strong commitment to the growing capability of European multilateral institutions” (pp. 306–7). Those ideas were, indeed, three of the lynchpins of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic, but how much the shift in German foreign policy toward Milosevic reflected them is another matter. Elsewhere, in a chapter for a book written while the Yugoslavian wars were ongoing in the 1990s, I wrote more harshly of the motives driving German decision makers (and more sympathetically of French policy) in 1991–92 than does Glaurdic.2

I remain of the opinion, from my interactions with parliamentarians, military officers, diplomats, and journalists in Bonn and Paris at the time, that the German policy shift reflected several factors that had little to do with “principled ideas.” They included the usual intracoalition dynamics of virtually every German government since 1949; domestic postunification economic strains exacerbated by the beginnings of what would become a steady flow of refugees from the Balkans; and the naïve idea that diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would somehow bring Milosevic to his senses, leading him to abandon his sticks for the carrots he might obtain by pleasing the EU. Hans-Peter Schwarz had analyzed this typically bundesdeutsche Machtvergessenheit (German government power oblivion) in a thoughtful book published in the 1980s,3 and in my opinion, it played a dominant role in united Germany’s foreign policy until Joschka Fischer arrived in the Foreign Office in 1998. Bonn had no
strategy to use force if recognition did not have the desired effect on Milosevic. In using the impending decision to create a common currency to pressure its European partners to support Slovenian and Croatian recognition at Maastricht in December 1991, Germany did not so much demonstrate its commitment to multilateral institutions as it did its economic and financial—and therefore political—power within the newly renamed European Union. The Federal Republic was able and willing to use economic coercion against its partners but unable and unwilling to use military coercion against Serbia.

I agree completely, however, with Glaurdic on two more important points: the shameful and self-destructive (to the EU) use by other European countries of Nazi Germany’s ties to Croatian fascists to discredit Bonn’s shift in policy and the disastrous role played by London in shaping Western policy toward Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. One can discuss the factors that influenced Genscher and Kohl to change course in 1991, but a desire to reassert German domination of the Balkans in whatever guise—Hapsburg, Wilhelmine, or National Socialist—was not among them. The insinuations that “Germany’s support for Yugoslavia’s northwestern republics . . . was allegedly grounded in the old regional alliances from the two world wars” (p. 307) served Milosevic’s purpose of dividing the Western powers, but Serbia could not have succeeded in fomenting that division had Bonn’s European partners not been willing instruments in spreading such distrust. As Glaurdic writes, “French and British foreign policy makers took up these allegations with real enthusiasm and used them both publicly and privately” to sow suspicion of the intentions of a newly united Germany. It was bad enough that the European Union could not agree on how to deal with Milosevic, but “such arguments . . . gave the West’s diplomatic effort a particularly unpalatable image” (ibid.).

Even more unpalatable was the nature of British foreign policy in the early 1990s. In my opinion, John Major’s government bears a far greater responsibility than any other European country—equal to that of the United States—for the failure of powerful and influential external actors to thwart Milosevic’s designs. Throughout the first half of the decade until the murderous summer of 1995 when the new French president, Jacques Chirac, finally broke with London and took a direct approach to engaging US military and diplomatic power in what became Operation Deliberate Force and the Dayton Accords, British government and parliamentary leaders preached, at every occasion, in every forum, Western impotence in dealing with Milosevic and in so doing, made that impotence a reality. They were particularly effective at both flattering and frightening decision makers in the White House and Department of State by combining nos-
talagic evocation of the Anglo-American “special relationship” with the specter of a French-led European defense organization that allegedly sought to replace NATO. As Glaurdic writes, “The primary interest of the British foreign policy makers was thus the maintenance of America’s role in European politics and security,” not ending Milosevic’s assault on the people of Yugoslavia (p. 306).

It was painful to watch British machinations—an experience I had regularly in Washington in those years—but even more painful to realize that Bush, Baker, Scowcroft, and company were so susceptible to them because of an egotistical resentment at having come too late to the Oval Office. Yes, the Cold War had ended on their watch, and they did their best to take credit for ending it. But it was clear they knew that the history books would focus on the achievements of the Reagan administration when it told that story. Bush was especially small-minded about the relationship between Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, for whom he did not share his predecessor’s regard, and he initially tried to supplant it by proclaiming a “partnership in leadership” with Helmut Kohl’s (still West) Germany in May 1989. But the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the forced departure of Thatcher from Downing Street that November gave the new British government an opportunity to shift Bush’s attention away from unreliable continental allies (despite the US president’s support for German unification, Kohl’s government rejected participation in the Gulf War coalition), and Major took it.

The central element in the prime minister’s successful attempt to divert Bush from focusing on Franco-American cooperation against Iraq and German-American cooperation in the Two Plus Four process of unification was Milosevic’s aggression. Washington not only allowed itself to accept London’s conviction that “the Yugoslav crisis presented no real challenge to its own interests” (p. 307), but indulged in British-encouraged Schadenfreude at the European Union’s failure to deal with that crisis successfully—a failure made inevitable by British obstructionism in the EU Council. Horrifyingly, as Glaurdic writes, the British government “insisted on giving Milosevic de facto veto power over all expansions of the West’s diplomatic and military effort . . . because it actually wanted Milosevic to use that veto to stop the West from doing more. . . . Britain wanted to make sure that the crisis would not be used by others to expand their own or the EC’s standing in foreign and security policy. . . . The result was a diplomatic and foreign policy effort marked with distrust, disunity, and tragic failures” (pp. 307–8).

Glaudric’s book is essential reading, certainly for those readers who wish to understand what happened to Yugoslavia a quarter-century ago, but
also for those interested in the European Union itself at the moment “when the foundations of Europe’s new political, economic, and security system were being set” (p. 10). Sadly, there is no need to read Sebastian Rosato’s *Europe United*, one of the most disappointing and, in its use of the primary and secondary literature on the origins of the EU, fundamentally dishonest books written about that subject. Rosato states that his “central argument is that the making of the European Community is best understood as an attempt by the major west European states, and especially France and Germany, to balance against the Soviet Union and one another” (Rosato, p. 2). He is a master at insinuating that scholars with whom he disagrees are not trustworthy and at manipulating his presentation of events and the sources he cites to support his own argument. One way in which he does so is by playing fast and loose with dates and by using imprecise words like “making” of the EC. What does Rosato mean by this? Which “major west European states” does he have in mind? Surely Britain belongs in that category, but the UK was not a founding member of the EC, or of its predecessor institution, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Of the six founding ECSC states in 1950–51, the only major one was France. The three Benelux countries did not fit the bill, nor did recently defeated Italy; and the new Federal Republic of Germany was less than a year old, with large aspects of its foreign and defense policies still overseen by the high commissioners of the three Western occupying powers.

The two sentences immediately following the one quoted above are equally misleading: “In the first instance, the Europeans were driven together by their collective fear of Soviet domination. When the guns fell silent on May 8, 1945, the Soviet Union was by far the most powerful state in Europe” (ibid.). This is an astoundingly simplistic and dishonest portrait of the state of Europe on V-E Day. The Red Army was on the Elbe, but so were the formidable Allied armies; the USSR was devastated economically; and the United States was about to become the first nuclear power. Rosato’s dishonesty is compounded by the placement of the two sentences, suggesting that a “collective fear” of Moscow already existed in May 1945. It is hardly a new scholarly contribution to assert that Western European states were ultimately “driven together” by the threat posed by the USSR. They certainly were; the 1948 Marshall Plan and the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty allying 10 European countries with the United States and Canada resulted from a series of Soviet moves in Berlin, Prague, and elsewhere after 1946. But in 1945 the wartime “Big Four” were still fulfilling their mutual obligations in the occupation of Germany and meeting in San Francisco to found the United Nations. The ultimate “cor-
relation of forces,” as the Soviets used to say, remained to be seen. Tele-
scoping dates and using language that willfully misleads the reader, as
Rosato does, is always poor scholarship, but it is especially unacceptable
when discussing the immediate postwar years in Europe. Events happened
virtually day by day to change the decision-making calculus of the actors
involved; only a precise chronology like the one that Glaurdic applies to
his analysis of the destruction of Yugoslavia can provide an honest picture
of what led the decision makers of the time to pursue the policies they did.

There is, unfortunately, no such precision to be found in Rosato, but his
unfounded assertions are certainly bold. Here are three more, a few short
paragraphs removed from the sentences quoted above: “The sheer magni-
tude of the Soviet threat convinced the west Europeans that they must
surrender their sovereignty and construct a military-economic coalition gov-
erned by a central authority” (p. 2, emphasis added). According to Rosato,
“France and West Germany were fairly evenly matched [when? 1945?
1949? 1957?] and therefore agreed to share control of the emerging central-
ized coalition, an arrangement that has come to be known as integration”
(p. 3, emphasis added). One final example: “The decision to surrender
sovereignty and establish a centrally governed coalition was driven by fear of
the overwhelming power of the Soviet Union” (p. 3, emphasis added). Rosato’s continual misapplication of such adjectives as centralized and
military and the noun coalition to the EC, to which the member states
allegedly “surrendered” their sovereignty because of the USSR, is dishonest
and insidious. Rosato apparently believes that if he repeats it often enough,
he will convince his readers that he is accurately describing the origins and
the nature of the European Community. These are not isolated occur-
rences; his book is characterized by a willful misuse of language.

Rosato’s argument that the EC was a “military-economic coalition”
against the USSR lacks all scholarly credibility. Moreover, in Europe United
he makes sweeping statements about the future of the European Union
based on the same dishonest evidence with which he purports to explain
its past. Indeed, Rosato’s handling of the source material on which his
book is based has been so controversial that it was the subject of three ar-
ticles published by the journal, Security Studies, in 2013 (referenced at the
beginning of this essay): a highly critical piece by Andrew Moravcsik;
another by Craig Parsons, also critical; and “a response to my critics,” by
Rosato. The reader who wishes a detailed discussion of the sources and
methodology used in Europe United is referred to these three articles. I
concur with Moravcsik that Rosato’s “analysis contains major errors in the
selection and interpretation of existing scholarly literature and theoretical
arguments, primary sources, and conflicting evidence,” and that “the strik-
ing number of outright misquotations, in which well-known primary and secondary sources are cited to show the diametrical opposite of their unambiguous meaning on major points, should disqualify this work from influencing the debate on the fundamental causes of European integration” (Moravcsik, pp. 789–90).

Despite their disagreements, however, the exchange between Rosato and his critics reflects the fact that they share the apparent fixation of contemporary international relations scholars on asserting that the behavior of states and other international actors can be “explained” by one of their preferred three theories—constructivist, liberal (idealist), or realist—and apparently by only one of them. In the real world of foreign policy decision making, I have never met a head of government, member of a legislature, diplomat, or military officer who gave much thought to the “school” to which his or her decisions belonged. An older generation of scholars, including Bernard Brodie, Harold Jacobson, Inis Claude, Hedley Bull, and Adam Watson, had an appreciation for the practice as well as the theories of international relations. Many of them had been practitioners themselves, if only at a level well below that of president or prime minister. As Claude, my colleague on the faculty of the University of Virginia in the 1980s, once told me when I asked how he came to write his seminal work on the United Nations, Swords into Plowshares, as a young GI lying behind a Normandy hedgerow in 1944, he had thought to himself that there had to be a better way to run the world. He went to Harvard on the GI Bill to see if he could figure out what it might be.

In the 1960s and 1970s, I had the privilege of studying with a generation of international relations scholars who shared this perspective. Many of them had been forced to flee Germany or Nazi-occupied Europe, and almost all of them, whether American or European-born, had worn a US or Allied uniform in the Second World War. The books they wrote, like Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations, were of critical importance because these academics were not divorced from the practical realities of foreign policy decision making. They had experienced the consequences of bad decisions, and particularly after the advent of the nuclear age, they didn’t believe that the world could survive another round of such decisions. This belief did not taint their scholarly integrity—quite the contrary—but it enabled them to convey to their students that the discipline of international relations was like medicine: if you didn’t know what you were doing, why you were doing it, and how to do it, people died. The post–World War II generation of IR scholars certainly had arguments among themselves about “schools,”—of which many of them were, after all, the founders—and some of their disagreements degenerated into attacks as
vicious and unattractive as those among academics today. But their passion resulted from a far more praiseworthy motive than the pursuit of publications and tenure; they wanted to educate, through their writing and teaching, leaders and citizens who could think clearly about the state of the world and make better decisions about its future.

Rosato’s book is a profound disappointment because he so obviously feels no such responsibility. He manipulates his sources in the interest of saying something that he claims has not been said before, and the publication of *Europe United* apparently achieved his goal of promotion and tenure. But the book’s argument is novel for only one reason: it has not been made before because an honest use of the material Rosato offers as evidence will not support it. Even worse, his willingness to manipulate the primary and secondary literature is a symptom of the fact that he has no understanding of the historical consciousness of the leaders of postwar Western Europe. They were certainly politicians, fallible, ambitious, and often ruthless (Konrad Adenauer chief among them), but they had lived through, and some of them had contributed to, the failure of Aristide Briand’s and Gustav Stresemann’s attempt to *organizer la paix* of Europe in the decade after World War I. In 1945, at the end of Europe’s third Franco-German war in 75 years, they knew that their countries could not survive another such failure. Their initial goal was not to build what became the European Community, but to prevent both totalitarian domination (whether Nazism or Soviet communism) of their countries and a third world war. It was not at all clear in the critical decade of 1945–55 that it was possible to do both, and it took courage on their part, and that of their citizens, to try.

The “power politics” of Rosato’s subtitle were, indeed, a factor in “the making of the European Community,” but not in the way that he asserts. He might have written a better and more honest book demonstrating just how important they were if he had not been caught in a straitjacket of his discipline’s own making. Among IR scholars, whatever their disagreements with each other over schools and theories, there is apparently a consensus that creation of the European Union was always an end in itself, not a means to an end. This has perhaps been true for the past half-century, but not in the years that Rosato claims were the only ones that mattered in shaping the EC. In the first two postwar decades, the establishment of European institutions was a means to several ends, the most important of which, Franco-German reconciliation, can only be understood by considering the failures of the interwar years and the determination to avoid a fourth Franco-German war that motivated the partisans of “Europe” long before V-E Day.⁴ Jon Jacobson’s 40-year-old study, *Locarno Diplomacy,*⁵
remains essential reading if one is to understand what Jean Monnet meant when he wrote that “nothing is possible without men, nothing is lasting without institutions.” What Monnet wanted to “last” was Franco-German and European cooperation; the EC was a means to that end, not the other way around.

Five years after V-E Day, there were certainly new ends, including those arising from the Soviet threat, that European statesmen pursued by creating both Atlantic and European institutions. As I wrote in 1989,

Rapprochement between Bonn and Paris developed in the climate of the Cold War, which determined, not the pursuit of their détente, but many of the specific paths it followed. The initial impetus to reconciliation . . . had been the threat posed to European civilization by a new Franco-German war. As the threat from the Soviet Union began to overshadow that fear, the cultivation of a dialogue between Bonn and Paris took on a new urgency in those capitals and in Washington and London.

I do not disagree with Rosato that the USSR was a factor in the “power politics” of postwar Western Europe—or perhaps, more accurately, Rosato does not disagree with me—but recognizing that the Soviet threat mattered in the decisions made by Western leaders is not the same as asserting, contrary to the historical evidence, that the European Community was created to deal with that factor. As I wrote a quarter-century ago, “the Soviet threat alone, although important, was clearly not enough to encourage the kind of lasting rapprochement sought by the two ‘hereditary enemies.’” The path to the EC in the immediate post–World War II years can only be understood by reference to the collapse in the 1930s of the 1920s “spirit of Locarno.” By building multilateral institutions, Western European leaders in the 1950s wanted to create a more enduring framework of Franco-German cooperation than Stresemann and Briand had been able to achieve.

At the end of the Cold War, the existence of these institutions turned out not to be enough, however. The strategic awareness and creativity of the “men” to whom Monnet had referred still mattered, as Europe rediscovered when confronted by Milosevic’s attack on Yugoslavia. Glaurdic’s The Hour of Europe makes no immodest claims about predicting the future of the EU, but it is an important book about decision makers failing to make effective use of the institutions they had themselves created and the consequences of their failure. It deserves the widest possible readership among both foreign policy practitioners and scholars—of whatever school—of international relations.
Notes

7. Edwina S. Campbell, Germany’s Past and Europe’s Future: The Challenges of West German Foreign Policy (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 66.

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