1 00:00:02,240 --> 00:00:04,410 Hello and welcome back to the CAssie 2 00:00:04,410 --> 00:00:06,077 series on the fundamentals of 3 00:00:06,077 --> 00:00:08,970 competition with china . In this video 4 00:00:08,980 --> 00:00:10,813 we will look at how the People's 5 00:00:10,813 --> 00:00:12,620 Liberation Army or P . L . A . 6 00:00:12,630 --> 00:00:15,140 Exercises authority and direction over 7 00:00:15,140 --> 00:00:17,196 its forces to accomplish a mission . 8 00:00:17,740 --> 00:00:20,080 Because command and control or c . two 9 00:00:20,080 --> 00:00:22,790 for short can be a loaded term at times . 10 00:00:23,110 --> 00:00:25,180 Let us narrow our focus to three 11 00:00:25,180 --> 00:00:28,220 specific questions who commands forces 12 00:00:28,220 --> 00:00:30,350 in the P . L . A . Where do certain 13 00:00:30,350 --> 00:00:32,970 command elements have authority ? And 14 00:00:32,970 --> 00:00:35,137 how do those command elements exercise 15 00:00:35,137 --> 00:00:37,710 authority over subordinate forces ? We 16 00:00:37,710 --> 00:00:39,850 will also explore some unique C . Two 17 00:00:39,850 --> 00:00:43,280 cases in the P . L . A . Namely C . Two 18 00:00:43,290 --> 00:00:46,450 of nuclear space and network operations . 19 00:00:47,540 --> 00:00:50,700 Let us look first to who commands to 20 00:00:50,700 --> 00:00:53,010 understand who commands what in the P . 21 00:00:53,010 --> 00:00:55,760 L . A . We need to look at what types 22 00:00:55,770 --> 00:00:58,290 of authorities exist and the levels of 23 00:00:58,290 --> 00:01:00,123 authority across the P . L . A . 24 00:01:01,140 --> 00:01:03,310 Understanding the types of authority 25 00:01:03,320 --> 00:01:05,376 within the P . L . A . Is not hard . 26 00:01:05,480 --> 00:01:07,647 The P . L . A . Has a very similar set 27 00:01:07,647 --> 00:01:09,758 of authorities compared to the United 28 00:01:09,758 --> 00:01:11,758 States . In fact they draw specific 29 00:01:11,758 --> 00:01:13,770 parallels between their command 30 00:01:13,770 --> 00:01:16,240 authorities and those found in the U . 31 00:01:16,240 --> 00:01:19,250 S . Military . The five types of a 32 00:01:19,250 --> 00:01:21,730 command authority that supports the P . 33 00:01:21,730 --> 00:01:24,830 L . A . R . One operational command 34 00:01:24,830 --> 00:01:27,390 authority which is roughly analogous to 35 00:01:27,390 --> 00:01:29,650 the USS combatant command authority . 36 00:01:30,440 --> 00:01:33,570 To centralized control authority which 37 00:01:33,570 --> 00:01:35,792 is roughly analogous to the U . S . S . 38 00:01:35,792 --> 00:01:38,850 Operational control authority . Three 39 00:01:39,240 --> 00:01:42,190 task control authority analogous to the 40 00:01:42,190 --> 00:01:44,468 U . S . S . Tactical control authority . 41 00:01:45,240 --> 00:01:48,160 Four Support authority similar to the 42 00:01:48,160 --> 00:01:50,850 US Support Authority and five 43 00:01:51,340 --> 00:01:53,507 coordinate authority which is like the 44 00:01:53,507 --> 00:01:56,270 USS coordinate authority . The PLS 45 00:01:56,280 --> 00:01:58,640 Operational command authority allows 46 00:01:58,640 --> 00:02:01,050 for an entity to issue orders and 47 00:02:01,050 --> 00:02:03,500 direct forces , organized forces and 48 00:02:03,500 --> 00:02:05,111 subordinate command elements 49 00:02:05,140 --> 00:02:07,251 established command relationships for 50 00:02:07,251 --> 00:02:09,390 subordinate units , organized unit 51 00:02:09,390 --> 00:02:11,250 training , direct logistics and 52 00:02:11,250 --> 00:02:13,370 equipment . Support , appoint and 53 00:02:13,370 --> 00:02:15,592 dismiss subordinate commanders in a war 54 00:02:15,592 --> 00:02:18,830 time and issue operational requirements . 55 00:02:19,740 --> 00:02:21,962 The next level of authority is what the 56 00:02:21,962 --> 00:02:24,073 P . L . A . Calls centralized control 57 00:02:24,073 --> 00:02:26,870 authority . This provides a commanding 58 00:02:26,870 --> 00:02:29,220 entity with the authority to issue 59 00:02:29,220 --> 00:02:31,760 orders and direct forces , organize 60 00:02:31,760 --> 00:02:34,120 subordinate forces and execute 61 00:02:34,130 --> 00:02:36,720 operations within a defined time or 62 00:02:36,720 --> 00:02:39,980 mission scope . However , entities with 63 00:02:39,990 --> 00:02:42,170 centralized control authority do not 64 00:02:42,170 --> 00:02:43,614 have the authorities over 65 00:02:43,614 --> 00:02:45,559 administrative functions regarding 66 00:02:45,559 --> 00:02:48,160 personnel , training and logistics . 67 00:02:49,040 --> 00:02:51,850 Down one more level is the Task Control 68 00:02:51,850 --> 00:02:54,310 Authority . This is nearly identical to 69 00:02:54,310 --> 00:02:57,000 the U . S . Tactical control or take on 70 00:02:57,000 --> 00:02:59,810 authority in a task control authority 71 00:02:59,810 --> 00:03:01,950 command relationship , the commanding 72 00:03:01,950 --> 00:03:04,630 element can issue specific tasks and 73 00:03:04,630 --> 00:03:07,580 plans but does not have the ability to 74 00:03:07,580 --> 00:03:09,990 reorganize those forces or deal with 75 00:03:10,000 --> 00:03:12,160 administrative or logistics matters . 76 00:03:13,240 --> 00:03:15,760 Next , we had the support authority 77 00:03:16,240 --> 00:03:18,590 Once a command element establishes a 78 00:03:18,590 --> 00:03:20,701 support command authority between two 79 00:03:20,701 --> 00:03:22,960 units , the supported unit can issue 80 00:03:22,960 --> 00:03:25,240 tasks and operational requirements to 81 00:03:25,240 --> 00:03:28,110 the supporting unit . The generally 82 00:03:28,110 --> 00:03:30,620 categorizes support in several ways . 83 00:03:30,990 --> 00:03:34,140 The first is direct versus indirect . 84 00:03:34,240 --> 00:03:36,462 Based on the closeness of the support . 85 00:03:36,940 --> 00:03:39,010 For example , an air force unit 86 00:03:39,020 --> 00:03:41,242 providing close air support to a ground 87 00:03:41,242 --> 00:03:43,380 combat unit would be an example of 88 00:03:43,390 --> 00:03:45,880 direct support . Whereas an air force 89 00:03:45,880 --> 00:03:48,890 unit attacking enemy ground targets far 90 00:03:48,890 --> 00:03:51,001 from the supported ground combat unit 91 00:03:51,340 --> 00:03:53,750 but still in support of that ground 92 00:03:53,750 --> 00:03:56,600 combat units , mission would be in 93 00:03:56,600 --> 00:03:59,140 direct support . The P . L . A . Also 94 00:03:59,140 --> 00:04:01,307 clarifies that support can come in the 95 00:04:01,307 --> 00:04:03,540 form of intelligence , additional 96 00:04:03,540 --> 00:04:06,280 forces of the same type fires , 97 00:04:06,530 --> 00:04:09,360 logistics and administrative support . 98 00:04:10,640 --> 00:04:13,460 Lastly we had to coordinate authority . 99 00:04:14,140 --> 00:04:16,251 This command relationship is intended 100 00:04:16,251 --> 00:04:18,480 to strengthen cooperation between two 101 00:04:18,480 --> 00:04:21,260 parallel units and accomplish their 102 00:04:21,270 --> 00:04:24,960 respective tasks . Inherently the units 103 00:04:24,970 --> 00:04:27,840 must be of the same seniority and must 104 00:04:27,850 --> 00:04:30,120 be trying to accomplish similar tasks . 105 00:04:30,740 --> 00:04:32,962 This command relationship can either be 106 00:04:32,962 --> 00:04:35,510 a mutual relationship wherein both 107 00:04:35,510 --> 00:04:38,200 units are equal partners or a 108 00:04:38,200 --> 00:04:40,550 relationship where in one unit is the 109 00:04:40,550 --> 00:04:44,200 primary actor bearing in 110 00:04:44,200 --> 00:04:46,710 mind that the types of authorities that 111 00:04:46,710 --> 00:04:48,940 exist in the P . L . A . Let us now 112 00:04:48,940 --> 00:04:51,500 look to the levels of force within the 113 00:04:51,500 --> 00:04:53,170 P . L . A . And what command 114 00:04:53,170 --> 00:04:56,970 authorities they have at the very top 115 00:04:57,200 --> 00:04:59,480 is the Central Military Commission or 116 00:04:59,480 --> 00:05:03,040 CMC . For short , we will go into more 117 00:05:03,040 --> 00:05:05,250 details about the CMC in our 118 00:05:05,260 --> 00:05:07,900 organization and personnel video , but 119 00:05:07,900 --> 00:05:10,990 as a recap , the CMC is the senior most 120 00:05:11,000 --> 00:05:13,460 decision making body for the military 121 00:05:13,470 --> 00:05:17,270 in the PRC . The CMC likely conducts 122 00:05:17,280 --> 00:05:19,340 strategic level military decision 123 00:05:19,340 --> 00:05:22,780 making through consensus of CMC members . 124 00:05:22,790 --> 00:05:26,220 Although the CMC chairman currently CCP 125 00:05:26,230 --> 00:05:29,480 Secretary general Xi Jinping likely has 126 00:05:29,480 --> 00:05:33,240 a greater if not final say not 127 00:05:33,240 --> 00:05:36,140 surprisingly , the CMC almost certainly 128 00:05:36,140 --> 00:05:38,660 reserves the right to exercise direct 129 00:05:38,660 --> 00:05:41,020 control over tactical formations , 130 00:05:41,030 --> 00:05:44,030 although this is likely also the case 131 00:05:44,130 --> 00:05:46,620 for some command elements beneath the 132 00:05:46,620 --> 00:05:50,130 CMC oversight of day to day 133 00:05:50,130 --> 00:05:52,480 operations is almost certainly the 134 00:05:52,480 --> 00:05:55,280 responsibility of a designated duty 135 00:05:55,280 --> 00:05:57,770 officer running the CMC . S Joint 136 00:05:57,780 --> 00:06:00,740 Operations command center . It's 137 00:06:00,750 --> 00:06:03,300 unclear what authorities that duty 138 00:06:03,300 --> 00:06:06,180 officer in charge has versus what 139 00:06:06,190 --> 00:06:08,950 requires approval from the full CMC , 140 00:06:09,540 --> 00:06:11,770 but it is safe to assume that should 141 00:06:11,770 --> 00:06:14,350 something unexpected occur , the duty 142 00:06:14,350 --> 00:06:16,440 officer would have a set of 143 00:06:16,450 --> 00:06:18,650 predetermined authorities which would 144 00:06:18,650 --> 00:06:21,660 allow for an immediate response rather 145 00:06:21,660 --> 00:06:23,980 than forcing the P . L . A . To idly 146 00:06:23,980 --> 00:06:26,750 wait for the CMC to convene and 147 00:06:26,750 --> 00:06:30,410 determine a course of action . The 148 00:06:30,410 --> 00:06:32,500 next level of force is the theater 149 00:06:32,500 --> 00:06:35,340 level . This consists of the Dallas 150 00:06:35,350 --> 00:06:37,980 theater commands , functional commands 151 00:06:38,210 --> 00:06:41,060 and service Headquarters . These 152 00:06:41,070 --> 00:06:44,700 entities all likely have some variation 153 00:06:44,710 --> 00:06:47,790 of operational command authority or 154 00:06:47,800 --> 00:06:50,360 cocom authority in US parlance 155 00:06:52,340 --> 00:06:54,710 the PLS four Service Headquarters , 156 00:06:54,720 --> 00:06:58,260 specifically the Army , Navy Air 157 00:06:58,260 --> 00:07:01,370 Force and Rocket Force likely play 158 00:07:01,370 --> 00:07:03,640 little role in the command and control 159 00:07:03,640 --> 00:07:06,710 of operations . In the PLS post reform 160 00:07:06,720 --> 00:07:08,880 era . These entities mostly filled a 161 00:07:08,880 --> 00:07:11,500 man trained and equipped role . In 162 00:07:11,500 --> 00:07:13,550 other words , they are the force 163 00:07:13,550 --> 00:07:15,550 providers to the theater commands . 164 00:07:16,240 --> 00:07:19,200 That being said they may not be 165 00:07:19,210 --> 00:07:21,930 entirely removed from the operational 166 00:07:21,930 --> 00:07:25,280 side of things . Soon after the pla 167 00:07:25,280 --> 00:07:27,558 stood up the theater command structure , 168 00:07:27,740 --> 00:07:30,280 there were still some indications that 169 00:07:30,280 --> 00:07:32,860 the Navy and Air Force still played a 170 00:07:32,860 --> 00:07:35,200 role in overseeing operational 171 00:07:35,200 --> 00:07:38,620 activities . However , There has been 172 00:07:38,620 --> 00:07:40,920 little indication of continued service 173 00:07:40,920 --> 00:07:43,650 headquarters involvement in operations . 174 00:07:43,750 --> 00:07:47,730 Since at least 2020 . The P . L . A . 175 00:07:47,730 --> 00:07:50,500 Currently exercises C two over 176 00:07:50,500 --> 00:07:53,260 operations through the theater command 177 00:07:53,260 --> 00:07:56,840 structure as discussed in the P . L . A . 178 00:07:56,850 --> 00:07:59,380 Organization and personnel video . The 179 00:07:59,380 --> 00:08:02,150 PLS five theater commands are aligned 180 00:08:02,150 --> 00:08:04,570 against land and were applicable 181 00:08:04,620 --> 00:08:07,360 maritime security challenges in their 182 00:08:07,360 --> 00:08:10,530 respective geographic areas around 183 00:08:10,530 --> 00:08:13,960 china's periphery . Given that mission , 184 00:08:14,440 --> 00:08:17,010 each theater commander has operational 185 00:08:17,010 --> 00:08:19,650 command authority over most forces 186 00:08:19,730 --> 00:08:23,020 within their theater and operations in 187 00:08:23,020 --> 00:08:26,460 their strategic direction . For example , 188 00:08:27,040 --> 00:08:29,310 the Eastern Theater Command has the 189 00:08:29,310 --> 00:08:31,310 authority to plan and execute 190 00:08:31,320 --> 00:08:34,760 operations related to Taiwan , oversee 191 00:08:34,760 --> 00:08:36,649 joint training within its area of 192 00:08:36,649 --> 00:08:39,110 responsibility and organized 193 00:08:39,120 --> 00:08:41,120 subordinate forces to meet regional 194 00:08:41,120 --> 00:08:45,050 security challenges under each Theater 195 00:08:45,050 --> 00:08:48,350 command is a Theater Army , a theater 196 00:08:48,350 --> 00:08:50,730 Air force and for theaters with 197 00:08:50,730 --> 00:08:53,380 maritime areas of responsibility at 198 00:08:53,380 --> 00:08:56,710 Theater Navy . There's also a theater 199 00:08:56,710 --> 00:08:58,780 subordinate Rocket Force command . 200 00:08:58,790 --> 00:09:00,846 Although they are not called theater 201 00:09:00,846 --> 00:09:03,670 Rocket forces . These theaters service 202 00:09:03,680 --> 00:09:05,690 component commands , exercise 203 00:09:05,800 --> 00:09:09,790 centralized control authority or con in 204 00:09:09,790 --> 00:09:12,790 US parlance over forces assigned by the 205 00:09:12,790 --> 00:09:15,940 theater command . These entities likely 206 00:09:15,940 --> 00:09:18,550 act in a similar fashion as US 207 00:09:18,550 --> 00:09:21,060 combatant command service components . 208 00:09:21,940 --> 00:09:24,480 For example , the Eastern Theater 209 00:09:24,480 --> 00:09:27,250 Command Air Force is to the Eastern 210 00:09:27,250 --> 00:09:30,600 Theater Command as Pak app is to indo 211 00:09:30,600 --> 00:09:33,680 pay call . Similarly , the Eastern 212 00:09:33,680 --> 00:09:35,820 Theater Command Air Force Commander 213 00:09:36,070 --> 00:09:38,530 acts as the Theater Command . Air 214 00:09:38,530 --> 00:09:41,430 Operations Group Commander just as the 215 00:09:41,430 --> 00:09:44,220 pack of commander often will serve as 216 00:09:44,220 --> 00:09:46,800 the indo pay com Joint forces . Air 217 00:09:46,800 --> 00:09:50,700 component Commander . Sometimes the P . 218 00:09:50,700 --> 00:09:52,730 L . A . May opt to establish an 219 00:09:52,730 --> 00:09:55,660 additional level of force at this sub 220 00:09:55,660 --> 00:09:58,830 theater command level . Again , similar 221 00:09:58,830 --> 00:10:01,670 to the US approach to sub theater level 222 00:10:01,670 --> 00:10:05,120 components . These sub theater commands 223 00:10:05,130 --> 00:10:07,620 likely have task control authorities , 224 00:10:07,830 --> 00:10:11,000 support authorities and coordinating 225 00:10:11,000 --> 00:10:14,160 authorities with relevant units in the 226 00:10:14,160 --> 00:10:16,420 P . L . A . These will likely be 227 00:10:16,420 --> 00:10:19,380 standing or temporary command elements 228 00:10:19,390 --> 00:10:22,460 assigned to oversee operations that are 229 00:10:22,460 --> 00:10:26,170 smaller in span or scope than a full 230 00:10:26,170 --> 00:10:29,140 theater or when there are highly 231 00:10:29,140 --> 00:10:32,450 dynamic operations involved . For 232 00:10:32,450 --> 00:10:34,710 example , the P . L . A . Has a 233 00:10:34,710 --> 00:10:37,230 standing sub theater component for 234 00:10:37,230 --> 00:10:40,150 defensive operations around china's 235 00:10:40,150 --> 00:10:43,760 periphery as well as one specifically 236 00:10:43,920 --> 00:10:47,040 for operations occurring in the PRC's 237 00:10:47,050 --> 00:10:49,260 east china sea Air Defense 238 00:10:49,270 --> 00:10:53,180 identification zone . Now that we 239 00:10:53,190 --> 00:10:56,280 understand levels of force and what 240 00:10:56,290 --> 00:11:00,030 authorities each level has let us move 241 00:11:00,040 --> 00:11:02,620 on to where they command forces . 242 00:11:03,940 --> 00:11:07,100 Each theater command has a specific 243 00:11:07,110 --> 00:11:09,900 area of responsibility built around a 244 00:11:09,900 --> 00:11:12,830 strategic direction . The Eastern 245 00:11:12,830 --> 00:11:16,050 Theater Command covers Japan , the east 246 00:11:16,050 --> 00:11:19,670 china sea and Taiwan . They also 247 00:11:19,680 --> 00:11:23,060 appear to have some responsibility for 248 00:11:23,060 --> 00:11:25,480 some portion of the western pacific 249 00:11:25,560 --> 00:11:29,140 beyond the first island chain . The 250 00:11:29,140 --> 00:11:31,330 Southern Theater Command oversees 251 00:11:31,640 --> 00:11:34,460 Southeast Asia , the south china sea 252 00:11:34,840 --> 00:11:37,330 and a large swath of the western 253 00:11:37,330 --> 00:11:39,960 pacific as well as indian ocean . 254 00:11:41,240 --> 00:11:43,240 The Western theater command area of 255 00:11:43,240 --> 00:11:46,130 responsibility covers South and Central 256 00:11:46,130 --> 00:11:48,200 Asia as well as china's border with 257 00:11:48,210 --> 00:11:51,760 India . The Northern Theater Command is 258 00:11:51,760 --> 00:11:54,860 responsible for areas bordering Russia , 259 00:11:55,340 --> 00:11:58,820 Korea , the Yellow Sea and the sea of 260 00:11:58,820 --> 00:12:02,530 Japan . And lastly we had the 261 00:12:02,530 --> 00:12:05,140 Central Theater Command that exercises 262 00:12:05,140 --> 00:12:07,780 C two over forces around the Beijing 263 00:12:07,780 --> 00:12:10,460 capital region and Central china . 264 00:12:12,640 --> 00:12:14,807 Below the theater commands , there are 265 00:12:14,807 --> 00:12:17,740 several regionally focused sub theater 266 00:12:17,750 --> 00:12:21,080 elements . The most notable of these 267 00:12:21,090 --> 00:12:23,890 sub theater elements is a joint command 268 00:12:23,910 --> 00:12:26,780 assigned to oversee operations in the 269 00:12:26,790 --> 00:12:30,550 east China sea called the east China 270 00:12:30,550 --> 00:12:32,520 sea . Joint Operations Command , 271 00:12:32,520 --> 00:12:35,360 subordinate it is subordinate to . 272 00:12:35,370 --> 00:12:38,210 Although it predates the Eastern 273 00:12:38,210 --> 00:12:41,490 Theater Command . This command element 274 00:12:41,490 --> 00:12:44,670 likely exists due to the highly fluid 275 00:12:44,680 --> 00:12:47,190 and sensitive nature of china's 276 00:12:47,190 --> 00:12:49,790 territorial dispute with Japan over 277 00:12:49,790 --> 00:12:53,480 parts of the East China sea . This has 278 00:12:53,480 --> 00:12:57,190 been predominantly a navy led but is 279 00:12:57,200 --> 00:13:00,720 ostensibly a joint command that likely 280 00:13:00,720 --> 00:13:03,670 has tasked control and support 281 00:13:03,670 --> 00:13:06,210 authorities over select Eastern Theater 282 00:13:06,210 --> 00:13:09,170 Command units as delegated by the 283 00:13:09,180 --> 00:13:12,390 Eastern Theater Command to 284 00:13:12,400 --> 00:13:15,620 oversee regional defensive operations . 285 00:13:15,740 --> 00:13:17,700 The P . L . A . Has several based 286 00:13:17,700 --> 00:13:21,320 commands as a quick note in the P . L . 287 00:13:21,320 --> 00:13:23,940 A . As a whole . They used the term 288 00:13:23,940 --> 00:13:27,540 base with a capital B . To indicate an 289 00:13:27,550 --> 00:13:30,680 organizational structure . These may in 290 00:13:30,680 --> 00:13:33,310 fact include a number of physical 291 00:13:33,310 --> 00:13:36,370 locations A . K . A . Bases with a 292 00:13:36,370 --> 00:13:40,120 small B . The operational basis that 293 00:13:40,120 --> 00:13:43,620 we are talking about here today are big 294 00:13:43,630 --> 00:13:46,660 b organizational structure basis . 295 00:13:47,840 --> 00:13:51,700 These bases Exercise C2 296 00:13:51,710 --> 00:13:55,450 over basic defensive operations in the 297 00:13:55,460 --> 00:13:59,140 air and sea domain that do not require 298 00:13:59,140 --> 00:14:01,360 the full attention of the theater . 299 00:14:02,040 --> 00:14:05,060 These bases likely have a blend of 300 00:14:05,060 --> 00:14:07,860 select operational command authorities 301 00:14:08,340 --> 00:14:11,660 in that they also exercise limited 302 00:14:12,140 --> 00:14:15,410 administrative and logistics functions 303 00:14:15,840 --> 00:14:18,560 over organic forces assigned to them . 304 00:14:19,340 --> 00:14:22,250 But these bases also exercise command 305 00:14:22,250 --> 00:14:24,970 functions to oversee coastal defense 306 00:14:24,970 --> 00:14:26,760 missions within their area of 307 00:14:26,760 --> 00:14:30,680 responsibility . Defense of China's 308 00:14:30,690 --> 00:14:33,690 littoral areas is controlled by eight 309 00:14:33,700 --> 00:14:36,760 coastal defense bases . Lucian , 310 00:14:37,140 --> 00:14:40,550 Qingdao , shanghai , Fucko , 311 00:14:41,040 --> 00:14:44,560 Guangzhou , yulan in nan shock . 312 00:14:45,640 --> 00:14:48,620 These coastal defense bases reports to 313 00:14:48,620 --> 00:14:51,550 a theater command Navy and exercise 314 00:14:51,550 --> 00:14:54,680 limited centralized control authorities 315 00:14:54,690 --> 00:14:58,040 in defending china's claimed maritime 316 00:14:58,040 --> 00:15:01,000 space predominantly within the first 317 00:15:01,010 --> 00:15:04,630 island chain . Although some evidence 318 00:15:04,910 --> 00:15:06,910 suggests that they are pushing that 319 00:15:06,910 --> 00:15:10,750 boundary outwards . Defense of 320 00:15:10,750 --> 00:15:13,100 china's airspace is managed through a 321 00:15:13,100 --> 00:15:15,860 similar structure of air defense bases . 322 00:15:16,440 --> 00:15:19,750 Shanghai Fucko Nanning , 323 00:15:20,340 --> 00:15:23,950 kunming , Lanzhou Lhasa , 324 00:15:24,340 --> 00:15:27,880 a room key italian gene 325 00:15:27,880 --> 00:15:31,160 in Datong and Wuhan 326 00:15:32,040 --> 00:15:34,730 that report to theater command air 327 00:15:34,730 --> 00:15:38,330 forces . These air defense bases have 328 00:15:38,340 --> 00:15:41,370 limited centralized control authorities 329 00:15:41,690 --> 00:15:44,420 to oversee the defense of designated 330 00:15:44,430 --> 00:15:47,710 airspace regions within and around 331 00:15:47,710 --> 00:15:50,980 china . A noteworthy 332 00:15:50,990 --> 00:15:53,990 exception in the C two of air defense 333 00:15:54,000 --> 00:15:56,690 is that the P . L . A . Navy likely 334 00:15:56,690 --> 00:15:59,760 acts as a supported element in air 335 00:15:59,760 --> 00:16:02,080 defense of the south china sea , with 336 00:16:02,080 --> 00:16:04,080 the P . L . A . Air force being the 337 00:16:04,080 --> 00:16:06,890 supporting element . This is because 338 00:16:06,890 --> 00:16:09,130 there are no plans integrated air 339 00:16:09,130 --> 00:16:11,700 defense systems in the region and the 340 00:16:11,700 --> 00:16:14,360 plan operates virtually all fixed wing 341 00:16:14,370 --> 00:16:18,150 assets in the region . One might notice 342 00:16:18,150 --> 00:16:20,610 at this point that the geography of the 343 00:16:20,610 --> 00:16:23,360 P . L . A . C two is very china centric . 344 00:16:24,340 --> 00:16:27,040 This is very much a function of the PLS 345 00:16:27,040 --> 00:16:31,010 intent to fight a home game as such . 346 00:16:31,040 --> 00:16:33,490 The boundaries between theater commands 347 00:16:33,500 --> 00:16:36,410 have unique characteristics . For 348 00:16:36,410 --> 00:16:39,110 example , the boundary between the 349 00:16:39,120 --> 00:16:41,420 Eastern and Northern Theater commands 350 00:16:41,670 --> 00:16:45,400 is somewhere near the 35 North line in 351 00:16:45,400 --> 00:16:47,500 the line between the Eastern and 352 00:16:47,500 --> 00:16:50,720 Southern theater commands is this line 353 00:16:50,880 --> 00:16:54,630 south of the Taiwan strait . However , 354 00:16:54,750 --> 00:16:57,450 the PRC centric boundaries become less 355 00:16:57,450 --> 00:17:00,330 clear . The further away you get from 356 00:17:00,330 --> 00:17:04,300 PRC territory , for example , how far 357 00:17:04,300 --> 00:17:06,680 out does the eastern and Northern 358 00:17:06,680 --> 00:17:10,070 Theater command line go ? Does the 35 359 00:17:10,070 --> 00:17:12,760 North Line run until it hits California ? 360 00:17:13,240 --> 00:17:15,630 And how far south does this Southern 361 00:17:15,630 --> 00:17:18,070 Theater command line go ? Does it 362 00:17:18,070 --> 00:17:20,670 encompass the entire southern pacific . 363 00:17:21,340 --> 00:17:23,900 Unfortunately , we simply don't have 364 00:17:23,900 --> 00:17:26,290 enough data to make an educated 365 00:17:26,300 --> 00:17:29,840 estimate . The best guess we have based 366 00:17:29,850 --> 00:17:32,770 on what information is available is 367 00:17:32,770 --> 00:17:35,650 that the second island chain acts as 368 00:17:35,650 --> 00:17:38,380 the eastern boundary for theater level 369 00:17:38,390 --> 00:17:41,650 operations and the eastern indian ocean 370 00:17:41,660 --> 00:17:44,220 acts as the western boundary for 371 00:17:44,220 --> 00:17:46,950 theater level maritime operations . 372 00:17:47,740 --> 00:17:50,370 What is more certain is that these 373 00:17:50,370 --> 00:17:53,350 boundaries will likely expand as the P . 374 00:17:53,350 --> 00:17:55,700 L . A . Becomes more comfortable with 375 00:17:55,710 --> 00:17:58,450 operations further from china . 376 00:18:00,440 --> 00:18:02,960 So how does each level of force 377 00:18:03,230 --> 00:18:06,040 exercise authorities within their 378 00:18:06,110 --> 00:18:09,460 assigned areas of responsibility for 379 00:18:09,460 --> 00:18:11,810 decades ? The P . L . A . Has invested 380 00:18:11,810 --> 00:18:15,670 heavily in the suite of command control , 381 00:18:16,040 --> 00:18:18,350 communications , computers , 382 00:18:18,840 --> 00:18:21,560 intelligence , surveillance , and 383 00:18:21,560 --> 00:18:24,470 reconnaissance , or C . Four I . S . R . 384 00:18:24,480 --> 00:18:28,280 Systems . And since 2016 , it has 385 00:18:28,280 --> 00:18:30,820 worked diligently to stand up an 386 00:18:30,830 --> 00:18:33,940 institutional system that is capable of 387 00:18:33,950 --> 00:18:37,490 exercising Setu over modern joint 388 00:18:37,500 --> 00:18:41,400 operations on the C . Four I . S . 389 00:18:41,400 --> 00:18:44,380 R . Systems side . We can't get into 390 00:18:44,380 --> 00:18:46,920 that much detail at the unclassified 391 00:18:46,920 --> 00:18:50,730 level but what we can at least provide 392 00:18:51,020 --> 00:18:54,010 is a broad brush understanding of where 393 00:18:54,010 --> 00:18:57,660 the P . L . A . Is today . All command 394 00:18:57,660 --> 00:19:00,670 decisions made at each level of force 395 00:19:01,040 --> 00:19:03,980 is to be informed by both qualitative 396 00:19:03,980 --> 00:19:07,770 analysis in quantitative calculations . 397 00:19:08,240 --> 00:19:10,580 To meet that requirement . Command 398 00:19:10,580 --> 00:19:13,640 staff at the sub theater and above 399 00:19:13,640 --> 00:19:16,750 level have access to a wide array of 400 00:19:16,750 --> 00:19:19,820 command decision making aids that help 401 00:19:19,820 --> 00:19:23,230 make calculations regarding assessed 402 00:19:23,240 --> 00:19:26,390 enemy disposition , predicted loss 403 00:19:26,400 --> 00:19:29,500 exchange ratios , necessary force 404 00:19:29,500 --> 00:19:32,360 disposition and shot allocation . 405 00:19:33,240 --> 00:19:36,140 The technical specifics of how these 406 00:19:36,140 --> 00:19:39,320 command decision making aids work where 407 00:19:39,320 --> 00:19:41,420 they get their data from and the 408 00:19:41,430 --> 00:19:44,030 algorithms behind them are obviously 409 00:19:44,030 --> 00:19:47,370 not available to us . But with the pls 410 00:19:47,370 --> 00:19:50,440 embracing of information and automation 411 00:19:50,450 --> 00:19:54,190 as keys to winning wars . It command 412 00:19:54,190 --> 00:19:56,740 elements ability to quickly process 413 00:19:56,750 --> 00:19:59,620 vast amounts of information is 414 00:19:59,630 --> 00:20:02,380 increasing reliance on algorithms 415 00:20:02,390 --> 00:20:06,170 versus people That being said . 416 00:20:06,640 --> 00:20:09,080 These command decision making aids are 417 00:20:09,080 --> 00:20:12,780 not intended to replace human decision 418 00:20:12,780 --> 00:20:15,400 making . They simply provide the 419 00:20:15,400 --> 00:20:18,350 command staff with the best information 420 00:20:18,350 --> 00:20:22,030 possible on which they can base a human 421 00:20:22,160 --> 00:20:25,540 decision to transmit 422 00:20:25,550 --> 00:20:28,960 information across units and commands . 423 00:20:29,540 --> 00:20:31,970 The play continues to build out an 424 00:20:31,970 --> 00:20:34,940 extensive communications network with 425 00:20:34,940 --> 00:20:38,360 multiple redundancies in place through 426 00:20:38,360 --> 00:20:41,580 a combination of space based trappist 427 00:20:41,580 --> 00:20:44,550 scatter VHF and U . H . F . 428 00:20:45,040 --> 00:20:48,800 Hardwired commercial and even 429 00:20:48,810 --> 00:20:52,200 obsolescent communication systems . The 430 00:20:52,200 --> 00:20:55,530 peeling has built a network designed to 431 00:20:55,530 --> 00:20:58,840 pass information to wherever it may be 432 00:20:58,840 --> 00:21:02,030 needed . Many of these communication 433 00:21:02,030 --> 00:21:05,270 nodes are hardened against both kinetic 434 00:21:06,040 --> 00:21:09,960 and electromagnetic attacks , notably 435 00:21:10,540 --> 00:21:14,130 most of the pLS fiber optics network is 436 00:21:14,130 --> 00:21:16,990 dug in and protected with limited 437 00:21:16,990 --> 00:21:19,860 concrete lining and above ground nodes 438 00:21:19,870 --> 00:21:22,130 are protected against electromagnetic 439 00:21:22,130 --> 00:21:25,930 pulses . This ensures that even in the 440 00:21:25,930 --> 00:21:28,830 face of adversary fires the P . L . A . 441 00:21:28,830 --> 00:21:31,170 Can still retain sufficient 442 00:21:31,290 --> 00:21:34,050 communications across the force . 443 00:21:36,040 --> 00:21:38,820 Feeding into this communication network 444 00:21:39,050 --> 00:21:41,480 is a huge network of I . S . Our 445 00:21:41,480 --> 00:21:45,380 sensors . Hundreds if not thousands of 446 00:21:45,380 --> 00:21:47,660 space based I . S . AR platforms , 447 00:21:48,040 --> 00:21:51,260 ground based radars , passive detection 448 00:21:51,260 --> 00:21:55,030 systems and weapons platforms feed into 449 00:21:55,030 --> 00:21:57,730 the broader information network using 450 00:21:57,730 --> 00:22:00,720 the PLS joint information distribution 451 00:22:00,720 --> 00:22:04,490 system and other data links to create a 452 00:22:04,500 --> 00:22:08,070 common operating picture . This data is 453 00:22:08,070 --> 00:22:10,480 then passed across the force to 454 00:22:10,480 --> 00:22:12,920 tactical formations and command 455 00:22:12,920 --> 00:22:16,210 elements alike . Of course all of this 456 00:22:16,210 --> 00:22:18,990 hardware is useless if there is not an 457 00:22:18,990 --> 00:22:21,280 institutional system in place to 458 00:22:21,280 --> 00:22:24,140 translate that data into actionable 459 00:22:24,150 --> 00:22:27,590 information . At the center of the 460 00:22:27,590 --> 00:22:30,650 CMC and theater commands are joint 461 00:22:30,660 --> 00:22:34,590 operations command centers or jocks for 462 00:22:34,590 --> 00:22:37,610 short , it is through the jocks that 463 00:22:37,610 --> 00:22:41,330 the CMC and theater commands exercise 464 00:22:41,330 --> 00:22:43,360 their defined authorities over 465 00:22:43,360 --> 00:22:47,250 subordinate units . The jocks , poll 466 00:22:47,250 --> 00:22:49,720 staff officers from various departments 467 00:22:49,860 --> 00:22:52,560 and offices from that command entity 468 00:22:53,040 --> 00:22:55,820 for example , the CMC jock pulls from 469 00:22:55,820 --> 00:22:58,000 the Joint Staff Department , Political 470 00:22:58,000 --> 00:23:00,010 work department , logistics support 471 00:23:00,010 --> 00:23:02,720 department etcetera . The Jock is 472 00:23:02,730 --> 00:23:05,270 organized into four broad elements , 473 00:23:05,640 --> 00:23:08,350 command control and coordination 474 00:23:08,740 --> 00:23:12,020 support and political work . Each 475 00:23:12,030 --> 00:23:13,960 element is comprised of multiple 476 00:23:13,960 --> 00:23:16,180 groupings such as the control and 477 00:23:16,180 --> 00:23:17,960 coordination element of an air 478 00:23:17,970 --> 00:23:21,460 operations group . Each group consists 479 00:23:21,470 --> 00:23:24,280 of a small number of specific seats 480 00:23:24,600 --> 00:23:26,860 that are manned by staff officers 481 00:23:27,940 --> 00:23:30,230 within a jock . There can be a number 482 00:23:30,240 --> 00:23:32,990 of sub centers such as the intelligence 483 00:23:33,000 --> 00:23:35,950 Sub center nested within theater jocks 484 00:23:35,960 --> 00:23:38,180 are several functional command and 485 00:23:38,180 --> 00:23:40,540 control centers . The addition of 486 00:23:40,540 --> 00:23:43,280 control to the term command and control 487 00:23:43,280 --> 00:23:46,430 center likely indicates that these 488 00:23:46,440 --> 00:23:49,020 entities focus on centralized control 489 00:23:49,020 --> 00:23:51,650 authorities . Whereas theater Joint 490 00:23:51,660 --> 00:23:54,310 Operations command centers focus on 491 00:23:54,320 --> 00:23:57,020 exercising operational command 492 00:23:57,030 --> 00:24:00,270 authorities . These are domain centric 493 00:24:00,500 --> 00:24:04,370 ground , maritime , air and 494 00:24:04,370 --> 00:24:06,480 conventional missile sub command 495 00:24:06,480 --> 00:24:09,000 centers that are essentially the 496 00:24:09,000 --> 00:24:11,410 command elements from theater service 497 00:24:11,410 --> 00:24:14,500 components . These appear to be co 498 00:24:14,500 --> 00:24:16,333 located with the theater service 499 00:24:16,333 --> 00:24:18,810 headquarters rather than the theater 500 00:24:18,810 --> 00:24:21,730 jock and are manned by staff officers 501 00:24:21,730 --> 00:24:23,640 drawn from the theater Service 502 00:24:23,650 --> 00:24:27,410 headquarters . Everything we have just 503 00:24:27,410 --> 00:24:29,632 talked about covers how the P . L . A . 504 00:24:29,632 --> 00:24:31,970 Exercises C . Two over most 505 00:24:31,970 --> 00:24:34,550 conventional operations . However , 506 00:24:34,750 --> 00:24:37,550 there are several unique cases that do 507 00:24:37,550 --> 00:24:39,760 not fall neatly into the structure we 508 00:24:39,760 --> 00:24:42,770 have just discussed . Let's now address 509 00:24:42,770 --> 00:24:45,610 these special case operations namely 510 00:24:45,610 --> 00:24:49,450 nuclear network and space operations . 511 00:24:50,240 --> 00:24:53,030 We will discuss nuclear C2 issues in a 512 00:24:53,030 --> 00:24:55,860 dedicated video on the pls nuclear 513 00:24:55,860 --> 00:24:59,260 forces . But here's a brief overview of 514 00:24:59,260 --> 00:25:02,810 Nuclear C2 , virtually all pl a 515 00:25:02,810 --> 00:25:05,560 sources state directly that the CMC 516 00:25:05,560 --> 00:25:08,220 retains the sole direct command 517 00:25:08,220 --> 00:25:10,180 authority over the P . L . A . S . 518 00:25:10,190 --> 00:25:13,510 Nuclear forces . It is possible that 519 00:25:13,510 --> 00:25:16,150 the CCPS politburo standing committee 520 00:25:16,310 --> 00:25:19,280 is somehow involved in the process but 521 00:25:19,280 --> 00:25:21,600 no C . C . P . Or P . L . A document 522 00:25:21,610 --> 00:25:25,500 has overtly stated this upon the 523 00:25:25,500 --> 00:25:28,280 CMC issuing a warning order to peel a 524 00:25:28,280 --> 00:25:30,870 nuclear forces nuclear launch and 525 00:25:30,870 --> 00:25:33,240 support units will begin the process of 526 00:25:33,240 --> 00:25:35,560 bringing china's nuclear arsenal into a 527 00:25:35,560 --> 00:25:38,330 state of readiness that allows the 528 00:25:38,330 --> 00:25:41,310 units to launch soon after the order is 529 00:25:41,310 --> 00:25:45,000 given . The CMC is issuing of a warning 530 00:25:45,000 --> 00:25:47,900 order is typically preconditioned on 531 00:25:47,910 --> 00:25:50,840 early warning that the adversary is on 532 00:25:50,840 --> 00:25:53,520 the brink of or has already used 533 00:25:53,520 --> 00:25:56,840 nuclear weapons . Once the CMC 534 00:25:56,850 --> 00:25:59,480 authorizes nuclear strikes , they will 535 00:25:59,480 --> 00:26:02,640 relay that command down the missile 536 00:26:02,640 --> 00:26:05,320 launch and support bases that exercise 537 00:26:05,440 --> 00:26:07,950 centralized control authorities over 538 00:26:07,950 --> 00:26:11,620 nuclear related units . Or the CMC will 539 00:26:11,620 --> 00:26:13,760 reach down directly to those units , 540 00:26:13,950 --> 00:26:15,760 skipping the base command layer 541 00:26:15,760 --> 00:26:19,330 entirely . It is unclear what 542 00:26:19,330 --> 00:26:21,600 role the playoffs service headquarters 543 00:26:21,600 --> 00:26:23,530 plays in this process , although 544 00:26:23,530 --> 00:26:26,490 presumably at least plays an advisory 545 00:26:26,490 --> 00:26:28,260 role to the CMC . 546 00:26:30,340 --> 00:26:32,630 The way that the P . L . A exercises C . 547 00:26:32,630 --> 00:26:34,850 Two over network operations is 548 00:26:34,850 --> 00:26:38,030 extremely opaque . Although the P . L . 549 00:26:38,030 --> 00:26:40,920 A clearly intends for the creation of 550 00:26:40,920 --> 00:26:42,980 the P . L . A . S . S . F . To 551 00:26:42,980 --> 00:26:46,170 streamline C two over such operations , 552 00:26:46,540 --> 00:26:49,110 they have never disclosed how exactly 553 00:26:49,110 --> 00:26:51,910 the system works . Our best 554 00:26:51,920 --> 00:26:54,310 understanding is based on the assessed 555 00:26:54,310 --> 00:26:58,050 role of various Ssf . Network systems 556 00:26:58,050 --> 00:27:01,030 department units commonly known as the 557 00:27:01,030 --> 00:27:04,760 cyberspace force . Our best guess 558 00:27:04,780 --> 00:27:07,660 is that the primary operational command 559 00:27:07,660 --> 00:27:10,290 authority for network operations is a 560 00:27:10,290 --> 00:27:13,010 command element within the network 561 00:27:13,010 --> 00:27:15,450 system department , let's call it a 562 00:27:15,450 --> 00:27:17,560 Network Operations command center . 563 00:27:18,540 --> 00:27:20,970 This command center is likely manned 564 00:27:20,980 --> 00:27:23,360 predominantly by network Systems 565 00:27:23,360 --> 00:27:25,580 Department staff officers and reports 566 00:27:25,590 --> 00:27:27,860 directly to the CMC . 567 00:27:29,640 --> 00:27:31,600 Underneath this notional network 568 00:27:31,610 --> 00:27:34,820 Operations command center likely exists . 569 00:27:34,830 --> 00:27:37,870 Several operations group built around 570 00:27:38,060 --> 00:27:41,460 major CSF commands , specifically 571 00:27:41,940 --> 00:27:44,310 the network security base and the 572 00:27:44,310 --> 00:27:46,670 theater technical reconnaissance bases . 573 00:27:47,140 --> 00:27:49,640 These bases presumably would have 574 00:27:49,650 --> 00:27:52,380 centralized control authorities over 575 00:27:52,380 --> 00:27:56,210 specific missions . Given that many 576 00:27:56,220 --> 00:27:59,870 of the CSF high end units belong to the 577 00:27:59,870 --> 00:28:02,800 Network security base . This is likely 578 00:28:02,970 --> 00:28:05,160 the primary offensive network 579 00:28:05,170 --> 00:28:07,760 operations group that oversees all 580 00:28:07,760 --> 00:28:11,490 strategic level network operations . We 581 00:28:11,490 --> 00:28:13,434 don't know exactly what that might 582 00:28:13,434 --> 00:28:16,370 include , but offensive operations 583 00:28:16,380 --> 00:28:18,160 against network targets in the 584 00:28:18,160 --> 00:28:20,770 continental United States would likely 585 00:28:20,770 --> 00:28:22,970 qualify as a strategic network 586 00:28:22,970 --> 00:28:26,860 operation . The network security 587 00:28:26,860 --> 00:28:30,120 base would exercise centralized control 588 00:28:30,120 --> 00:28:32,510 authorities over subordinate bureaus 589 00:28:32,840 --> 00:28:35,260 and offices , which in turn would 590 00:28:35,270 --> 00:28:38,170 execute the desired network operations . 591 00:28:39,040 --> 00:28:41,096 The theater technical reconnaissance 592 00:28:41,096 --> 00:28:43,310 bases , on the other hand , likely 593 00:28:43,320 --> 00:28:45,560 oversea network operations against the 594 00:28:45,560 --> 00:28:48,480 PRC's neighbors . The connection 595 00:28:48,480 --> 00:28:50,860 between the theater commands and the 596 00:28:50,860 --> 00:28:53,170 theater technical reconnaissance basis 597 00:28:53,180 --> 00:28:55,820 is unclear , but given the similar 598 00:28:55,820 --> 00:28:58,240 nomenclature and rough geographic 599 00:28:58,240 --> 00:29:00,440 alignment , the theater commands may 600 00:29:00,440 --> 00:29:03,540 have some ability to directly exercise 601 00:29:03,540 --> 00:29:07,020 centralize control authorities over the 602 00:29:07,020 --> 00:29:09,298 theater technical reconnaissance basis . 603 00:29:09,840 --> 00:29:12,890 However , the overarching network 604 00:29:12,900 --> 00:29:15,390 operations command center almost 605 00:29:15,390 --> 00:29:17,840 certainly retains a direct reach down 606 00:29:17,840 --> 00:29:20,270 authority to task the theater technical 607 00:29:20,270 --> 00:29:22,860 reconnaissance bases with specific 608 00:29:23,240 --> 00:29:26,800 operations . Using a similar 609 00:29:26,800 --> 00:29:29,800 approach . We can try to decipher how 610 00:29:29,800 --> 00:29:32,090 the P . L . A . Exercises C two over 611 00:29:32,090 --> 00:29:36,090 space operations as well . The SSF 612 00:29:36,260 --> 00:29:38,540 Aerospace Systems Department , more 613 00:29:38,540 --> 00:29:40,820 commonly known as the Aerospace Force 614 00:29:41,240 --> 00:29:43,360 would likely stand up a Space 615 00:29:43,370 --> 00:29:46,870 Operations command center . This entity 616 00:29:47,000 --> 00:29:49,190 which almost certainly would report 617 00:29:49,190 --> 00:29:52,220 directly to the CMC , would act as a 618 00:29:52,220 --> 00:29:54,720 national command element that exercises 619 00:29:54,730 --> 00:29:57,340 operational command authorities over 620 00:29:57,340 --> 00:30:00,410 the pLS space and counter space 621 00:30:00,420 --> 00:30:04,280 operations underneath . This element 622 00:30:04,290 --> 00:30:06,530 would be several operational groups 623 00:30:06,540 --> 00:30:10,430 built around major SF commands . These 624 00:30:10,440 --> 00:30:12,440 operations groups would provide the 625 00:30:12,440 --> 00:30:15,660 bulk of the forces and exercise 626 00:30:15,670 --> 00:30:18,410 centralized control authorities over 627 00:30:18,410 --> 00:30:21,180 different types of space or counter 628 00:30:21,180 --> 00:30:25,170 space operations . For example , The S . 629 00:30:25,170 --> 00:30:28,890 S . Base 36 would likely become one of 630 00:30:28,890 --> 00:30:30,940 the major counter space operations 631 00:30:30,940 --> 00:30:33,920 groups that at least oversees the 632 00:30:33,920 --> 00:30:36,770 employment of higher end counter space 633 00:30:36,770 --> 00:30:39,960 jammers and directed energy Weapons 634 00:30:40,940 --> 00:30:43,960 Base 37 on the other hand , would act 635 00:30:43,970 --> 00:30:46,570 as an IS Our operations group that is 636 00:30:46,570 --> 00:30:49,160 responsible for providing other space 637 00:30:49,170 --> 00:30:51,380 operations groups and the Space 638 00:30:51,390 --> 00:30:54,390 Operations command center with space 639 00:30:54,470 --> 00:30:57,950 situational awareness . Of course there 640 00:30:57,950 --> 00:31:00,590 are some gray areas between the network 641 00:31:00,600 --> 00:31:03,680 and space domains . For example , do 642 00:31:03,680 --> 00:31:05,950 network operations intended to create 643 00:31:05,950 --> 00:31:08,680 effects in space fall under the purview 644 00:31:08,690 --> 00:31:11,500 of the Space or network Operations 645 00:31:11,500 --> 00:31:13,870 command center ? We have no good 646 00:31:13,870 --> 00:31:16,450 answers but we can at least speculate 647 00:31:17,440 --> 00:31:19,960 one possibility is that the P . L . A . 648 00:31:19,960 --> 00:31:23,290 Simply doesn't know itself . The P . L . 649 00:31:23,290 --> 00:31:26,240 A . Is a major advocate of trialing 650 00:31:26,240 --> 00:31:28,630 concepts in the operational force 651 00:31:28,630 --> 00:31:30,960 before settling on a specific concept . 652 00:31:31,840 --> 00:31:35,180 As of 2021 , we know that the P . L . A . 653 00:31:35,180 --> 00:31:37,340 Split , its strategic counter space 654 00:31:37,340 --> 00:31:40,810 jammers in both parts of the ssf . So 655 00:31:40,820 --> 00:31:44,460 both the cyberspace and aerospace force 656 00:31:44,470 --> 00:31:48,070 have them . The plot could be testing 657 00:31:48,070 --> 00:31:51,100 out what works best having both 658 00:31:51,100 --> 00:31:53,460 components operate these capabilities 659 00:31:53,940 --> 00:31:57,870 or only a single component . A second 660 00:31:57,870 --> 00:32:00,520 possibility is that the P L . A assigns 661 00:32:00,520 --> 00:32:03,420 authorities based on effects . For 662 00:32:03,420 --> 00:32:06,850 example , the P L . A wants the CSF to 663 00:32:06,850 --> 00:32:09,720 have counter space jammers to degrade 664 00:32:09,730 --> 00:32:13,000 US space based information networks but 665 00:32:13,010 --> 00:32:16,180 also wants a S . F . To have counter 666 00:32:16,180 --> 00:32:19,410 space jammers to degrade US space based 667 00:32:19,420 --> 00:32:22,780 situational awareness assets . In both 668 00:32:22,780 --> 00:32:25,680 cases , the type of unit executing the 669 00:32:25,690 --> 00:32:28,660 operation is the same , but the target 670 00:32:28,870 --> 00:32:32,560 and desired effect is different . This 671 00:32:32,560 --> 00:32:34,760 is essentially the same argument for 672 00:32:34,760 --> 00:32:37,520 the Navy and Air Force , both having 673 00:32:37,520 --> 00:32:41,470 fighters . Another possibility is that 674 00:32:41,480 --> 00:32:44,670 the C2 of such operations are based on 675 00:32:44,670 --> 00:32:47,490 unit function . This does not appear to 676 00:32:47,490 --> 00:32:50,010 be the case with the presence of 677 00:32:50,010 --> 00:32:52,360 counter space jammers at both the CSF 678 00:32:52,740 --> 00:32:55,890 and A S . F . But looking at the PLS 679 00:32:55,900 --> 00:32:58,500 testing of cyber capabilities against 680 00:32:58,510 --> 00:33:01,080 indian satellites . Perhaps all network 681 00:33:01,080 --> 00:33:03,680 related capabilities fall under the CSF , 682 00:33:03,690 --> 00:33:05,801 regardless of what domain the effects 683 00:33:05,801 --> 00:33:09,780 are created in The PLAC two 684 00:33:09,780 --> 00:33:13,020 system may be complex , but it is not 685 00:33:13,030 --> 00:33:16,610 entirely unfamiliar in typical fashion . 686 00:33:16,640 --> 00:33:19,240 The P L . A has adopted many lessons 687 00:33:19,240 --> 00:33:21,410 learned by the United States in trying 688 00:33:21,410 --> 00:33:23,550 to develop its own Joint Command 689 00:33:23,550 --> 00:33:27,300 construct Even before the full 690 00:33:27,310 --> 00:33:29,310 implementation of the Joint Theatre 691 00:33:29,310 --> 00:33:31,950 Command System in 2016 . The peeling 692 00:33:31,950 --> 00:33:34,950 had already on paper established a 693 00:33:34,950 --> 00:33:37,810 notional wartime command structure that 694 00:33:37,810 --> 00:33:40,230 strongly resembles what they have today 695 00:33:40,230 --> 00:33:43,860 in peacetime . As the P L . A continues 696 00:33:43,860 --> 00:33:46,650 to modernize , we will see improvements 697 00:33:46,790 --> 00:33:49,280 to their C two system as well . One 698 00:33:49,280 --> 00:33:51,336 should not necessarily expect things 699 00:33:51,336 --> 00:33:53,940 like decentralized control or mission 700 00:33:53,940 --> 00:33:56,260 command to become hallmarks of the 701 00:33:56,260 --> 00:33:59,360 system , As you probably recognize 702 00:33:59,360 --> 00:34:01,416 already , from our discussion of the 703 00:34:01,416 --> 00:34:04,270 PLAC two , they value centralization 704 00:34:04,270 --> 00:34:06,680 and control , and their modernization 705 00:34:06,680 --> 00:34:08,736 efforts will strive to improve those 706 00:34:08,736 --> 00:34:11,520 tenants . New technologies like machine 707 00:34:11,520 --> 00:34:14,220 learning , automation and advanced 708 00:34:14,220 --> 00:34:17,040 computing will push the P L . A C two 709 00:34:17,040 --> 00:34:20,910 system to become faster and more agile , 710 00:34:20,990 --> 00:34:23,880 but it will also push them to become 711 00:34:23,890 --> 00:34:25,670 even more centralized .