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Indo-Pacific
Perspectives
Indo-Pacific Perspectives
December 2020
from the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs
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3
6
7
4
8
Introduction
Dr. Peter Harris, editor
The Indian Ocean’s Key Role
in the Indo-Pacific…
Nilanthi Samaranayake
Chinese Vision of a Rules-
based Order
Dr. Benjamin Tze Ern Ho
Do Regimes Matter?
Dr. Laura Southgate
A Rules-based Order in the
Indo-Pacific
Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar
Challenges in
Institutionalizing Rules-
based Order…
Dr. Ngaibiakching
India’s Indo- Pacific
Reckoning
Dr. Titli Basu
Next Priorities for Japan’s
FOIP Vision
Dr. Kei Koga
Indo-Pacific Perspective 1
Introduction
A Rules-Based Order
for the Indo-Pacific?
Dr. Peter Harris, editor
t is the policy of the United
States government to ensure that
the Indo-Pacific megaregion re-
mains “free and open.” In no small
part, this vision rests upon the wa-
ger that a single rules-based order
can exist from the western reaches
of the Indian Ocean to the vast ex-
panses of the Asia-Pacific. How-
ever, developing and enforcing a
cohesive international rulebook for
the Indo-Pacific will be far from
simple. For the United States and
its allies, the urgent need to
cement a rules-based order in the
Indo-Pacific is driven, at least in
part, by anxiety surrounding the
rise of Chinayet this ongoing
movement in the balance of power
is also a major reason for why a
stable rules-based system will be
difficult to maintain. Then there is
the question of legitimacy. It is
possible for a rules-based system to
be truly fair and inclusive, or does
international order inevitably re-
flect the interests of some more
than others? Finally, it is not as-
sured that America’s presence in
the Indo-Pacific will continue to be
welcomed by regional govern-
ments.
This, the first “Indo-Pacific Per-
spectives” roundtable from the
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, will
offer some answers to these com-
plex geopolitical (and “geolegal”)
questions. As the name suggests,
this new series of roundtables will
showcase viewpoints from across
the Indo-Pacific megaregion (and
sometimes beyond). The goal is to
facilitate a dialogue between aca-
demics and policy practitioners
that will be of great interestand,
we hope, considerable useto an
international cast of scholars and
decision makers whose work fo-
cuses on the Indo-Pacific. In this
inaugural roundtable, the partici-
pants hail from the United States,
United Kingdom, Singapore, India,
1
Harris
Indo-Pacific Perspective 2
and Indonesia. They are academ-
ics, expert analysts, and seasoned
policy advisers. Tasked with shed-
ding light on the concept of a rules-
based order in the Indo-Pacific,
they have provided a range of per-
spectives to clarify just how
fraught and contentious such an
order-building (and order-defend-
ing) project will be.
The roundtable begins with Nilan-
thi Samaranayake’s keen analysis
of US foreign policy toward the
Indo-Pacific. She points out that,
despite the inclusive rhetoric and
phraseology of a “free and open
Indo-Pacific,” America’s leaders
sometimes betray a preoccupation
with the Asia-Pacific at the ex-
pense of the Indian Ocean. For ex-
ample, US officials sometimes dis-
cuss the entire Indo-Pacific region
as bedeviled by maritime boundary
disputes, whereas such disagree-
ments are much more prominent
and consequential in the Asia-Pa-
cific than the Indian Ocean. If
states from India to Japan are to
remain committed to the idea of
belonging to a single Indo-Pacific
region, it will be important to clar-
ify the interests that these states
are supposed to share in common
with one another.
Benjamin Ho turns to analyze the
foreign-policy motivations of
China, America’s supposed rival in
the Indo-Pacific and another
potential driver of a rules-based
system for the region. According to
Ho, China’s leaders are open to the
broad concept of a rules-based in-
ternational order, even if they (un-
surprisingly) tend to support a dif-
ferent configuration of rules than
that put forward by the United
States. One of Ho’s major insights
is that Chinese leaders desire a
rules-based international system
that will help them to ward off ex-
ternal threats to domestic security.
This is the reverse of how interna-
tional order is discussed in the
Westthat is, as a straitjacket to
prevent domestic actors from up-
ending international security.
Laura Southgate agrees that
China has an interest in using in-
ternational rules as tools to serve
its national interestsand, moreo-
ver, that its growing power means
that Beijing must be taken seri-
ously as a rule-shaper in the re-
gion. This is true whether China
chooses to be an active “maker” of
new rules for the Indo-Pacific or
whether it is expected to be a mere
“taker” of rules made by others.
Simply put, China is so powerful,
and its interests are so expansive,
that China’s willingness to comply
with rules will be a decisive factor
in determining the success of any
rule-based order. Southgate pro-
vides a case study of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of
Introduction
Indo-Pacific Perspective 3
the Seato wit, Beijing’s summary
rejection of a 2016 ruling by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration
that held some of China’s maritime
claims in the South China Sea to
be incompatible with international
lawto illustrate the central im-
portance of China to the success of
rules old and new.
Kei Koga offers a complementary
analysis of Japanese foreign policy
toward the Indo-Pacific. He points
out Japan’s leaders were among
the first to articulate the existence
of a cohesive Indo-Pacific space.
Koga points to the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (“Quad”) as Ja-
pan’s primary means of operation-
alizing and institutionalizing its
commitment to a free and open
Indo-Pacific, but makes the im-
portant observation that Japan
and the other Quad members (Aus-
tralia, India, and the United
States) cannot act imperiously to-
ward smaller regional actors. Koga
emphasizes the special importance
of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), noting
that Southeast Asia is the geo-
graphical center of the Indo-Pa-
cific. Without the endorsement of
ASEAN, Japan’s leaders seem to
have concluded, there can be no
hope of maintaining a rules-based
order to unite the Western Pacific
and Indian Ocean. Such interna-
tional-level considerations have
interacted with domestic politics to
shape Japanese policy toward or-
der-building, Koga argues.
Titli Basu uses her contribution to
bring India into the frame. Basu
makes the incisive point that the
coming multipolar world will be
anchored in a multipolar Asia; how
the competing powers of the Indo-
Pacific can manage to live along-
side one another will, in no small
measure, determine the fate of
global governance and security.
Basu argues that India must be
considered a major player in the
Indo-Pacific (and, by extension, the
rest of the world), but she insists
that India should not be regarded
as a mere “balancer.” This is some-
thing that US analysts are some-
times guilty ofvaluing India in
geopolitical terms as a bulwark
against Chinese expansion, but not
taking the time to consider how
Delhi intends to exert itself as a
shaper of regional and global order
in its own right.
Ngaibiakching provides a sweeping
analysis of the issues facing Indo-
Pacific nations, from the problem
of institutionalizing regional order
to the imperative of avoiding a new
“Cold War” between the United
States and China. She echoes both
Southgate and Basu in observing
the importance of power as a foun-
dation for rule making; agrees with
Koga that small and middle
Harris
Indo-Pacific Perspective 4
powers will play a critical role in
shaping the emerging Indo-Pacific
order; and makes the forceful argu-
ment that multipolarity will not be
kind to the Indo-Pacific if it is not
accompanied by a firm commit-
ment to multilateralism on behalf
of the region’s major powers.
Finally, Dewi Fortuna Anwar of-
fers her unique perspective as not
just an eminent academician but
also a former policy maker in the
Indonesian government. Her de-
scription of ASEAN’s successes at
order-building, rulemaking, and
shared regional governance is an-
other powerful reminder that the
Indo-Pacific zone is far from mono-
lithic. Even if there is ample rea-
son to treat the Indo-Pacific as a
single megaregion, this must
surely be done while paying careful
attention to variation at the sub-
regional level.
What future is there for a rules-
based order in the Indo-Pacific? It
depends. Great powers like the
United States, India, and China;
middle and smaller powers like
Australia, Japan, and Indonesia;
regional blocs like ASEAN all of
these actors will have an impact
upon the development of rules for
the region. The contributions to
this roundtable shed valuable light
on the interests and decision-mak-
ing processes of some of the parties
involved. They suggest that a
rules-based order from the Persian
Gulf to Northeast Asia is possible,
and perhaps even inevitable, but
still as yet undetermined. ■
Dr. Peter Harris
Dr. Harris is an assistant professor
of political science at Colorado
State University, where his teach-
ing and research focus on interna-
tional security, international rela-
tions theory, and US foreign policy.
He serves as the editor for the
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs
new “Indo-Pacific Perspectives” se-
ries. Dr. Harris has two main re-
search projects underway: one fo-
cusing on great-power relations
during periods of major interna-
tional change (with a specific em-
phasis on USChina relations) and
another focusing on the environ-
mental protection of US military
bases, including overseas bases in
the Indo-Pacific, as well as instal-
lations in the US states and terri-
tories. He has conducted extensive
research into Diego Garcia, the
largest island of the Chagos Archi-
pelago (British Indian Ocean Terri-
tory), which is home to one of the
most important US military bases
in the world. He received his PhD
from the University of Texas at
Austin and holds additional de-
grees from SOAS, University of
London, and the University of Ed-
inburgh. His work has appeared in
Introduction
Indo-Pacific Perspective 5
journals such as the Journal of
Indo-Pacific Affairs, African Af-
fairs, Anthropology Today, Asian
Security, Chinese Journal of Inter-
national Politics, Environmental
Policy and Law, International
Journal, International Political So-
ciology, International Politics, Is-
rael Journal of Foreign Affairs,
Journal of Transatlantic Studies,
Marine Policy, National Interest,
Political Quarterly, PS: Political
Science & Politics, and Review of
International Studies. He is news-
letter co-editor for the Interna-
tional History and Politics section
of the American Political Science
Association.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed or implied
in JIPA are those of the authors and should
not be construed as carrying the official
sanction of the Department of Defense, Air
Force, Air Education and Training Com-
mand, Air University, or other agencies or
departments of the US government or their
international equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective 6
The Indian
Ocean’s Key
Role in the
Indo-Pacific
Rules-based
International
Order
Nilanthi Samaranayake
n September 2020, the US secre-
tary of defense gave a speech to
promote the “international rules-
based order, rooted in our shared
values, that has supported
stability and prosperity around the
world for more than seven dec-
ades.”
1
The United States and its
allies and partners have played a
decisive role in establishing inter-
national rules and norms since the
end of World War II. This order,
however, is now being challenged
by a rising China and a resurgent
Russia. The defense secretary re-
ferred specifically to the Indo-Pa-
cific region and Washington’s work
“to focus attention on our priority
theater, the Indo-Pacific. Not only
is this region important because it
is a hub of global trade and com-
merce,” he elaborated, “it is also
the epicenter of great power com-
petition with China. And in the
face of destabilizing activities from
the PLA, particularly in the mari-
time domain, the United States
must be ready to deter conflict, and
if necessary, fight and win at sea.”
Yet, the Indian Ocean is not char-
acterized by rampant territorial
disputes and Chinese assertive-
ness, as the Pacific is. From such
characterizations, it seems clear
that US strategy is still focused on
the Pacific segment of the Indo-Pa-
cific and less so the Indian Ocean,
which remains a secondary theater
for US defense planners. The De-
partment of Defense’s Indo-Pacific
Strategy Report repeated a phrase
that is often stated by US officials:
“The United States is a Pacific
2
The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order
Indo-Pacific Perspective 7
nation.
2
Whereas China has un-
questionably challenged estab-
lished rules and norms in the Pa-
cific, it has, for the most part, been
a lawful actor in the Indian Ocean.
In considering the rules-based in-
ternational order in the wider
Indo-Pacific region, therefore, it is
important to examine the Indian
Ocean on its own terms and con-
sider options for preserving the
rules and norms of this still rela-
tively peaceful maritime region.
Evolving US Policy toward the
Indian Ocean: From the Asia-
Pacific to the Indo-Pacific
The 2017 National Security Strat-
egy identified China and Russia as
the major threats to US interests,
and great-power competition has
since become the organizing princi-
ple behind the implementation of
Washington’s diplomatic
3
and de-
fense
4
policies globally. Since 2017,
Washington has adopted the term
Indo-Pacific to describe the region
stretching from “the west coast of
India to the western shores of the
United States.”
5
This reflects the
evolution of US policy toward this
region over the past decade, espe-
cially the increased importance of
the Indian Ocean. At the beginning
of the decade, the region was re-
ferred to by the long-standing
“Asia-Pacific” term. By 2011-2012,
this geography was prioritized
under the pivot
6
(or “rebalance”)
7
strategy to offset the operational
focus of the United States in the
Middle East. Then, this regional
concept evolved as US diplomats
began to link Southeast Asia with
South Asia under an “Indo-Pacific
Economic Corridor.”
8
Among US
defense officials, in 2013 Admiral
Samuel Locklear, then the Com-
mander of U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM), began to refer to the re-
gion as the “Indo-Asia-Pacific.”
9
The term was used in US military
service documents such as the US
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard strategy in 2015. Finally, in
2017 and 2018, the concept of the
“Indo-Pacific” was adopted in
Washington’s highest-level na-
tional strategy documents. This
was in part due to recognition of
how allies such as Japan and Aus-
tralia had described the wider re-
gion. Even PACOM was renamed
“Indo-Pacific Command” in 2018 as
part of this alignment of terms.
Washington has expanded the ar-
ticulation of its interests in this
wider region over the past decade
through shifts in geographic terms.
Most recently, it has assigned a
normative dimension to the region
as well. By calling the region the
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific,”
10
the
US acknowledges the rules, values,
and norms that it seeks to defend
and promote through the concept.
Samaranayake
Indo-Pacific Perspective 8
Washington applies this vision to
the Indian Ocean segment of the
Indo-Pacific. Yet, even as the In-
dian Ocean has assumed greater
importance in U.S. strategic plan-
ning through the Indo-Pacific con-
cept, the United States continues
to understand the region through a
Pacific lens and risks overlooking
the unique features of the Indian
Ocean.
A Rules-based International Or-
der in the Indian Ocean
As a laboratory for cooperation, the
Indian Ocean has seen many suc-
cesses. This is due largely to the
fact that the Indian Ocean’s strate-
gic importance derives from its eco-
nomics. The region effectively
serves as a highway, connecting
the bustling Pacific waters through
the Malacca Strait and across to
the Middle East and African
straits of the Hormuz and Bab Al-
Mandeb, respectively. The Indian
Ocean sees significant traffic of hy-
drocarbons and container shipping.
Due to the economic significance of
this region, countries increasingly
share a common interest in keep-
ing the sea lanes open and safe.
When piracy in the western Indian
Ocean threatened to disrupt the
stability of these waterways more
than a decade ago, we witnessed a
multinational response to secure
them. Counterpiracy operations
emerged, including from the US-
led coalition Combined Maritime
Forces Task Force 151 and the
NATO alliance’s Operation Ocean
Shield. Meanwhile, China began
its own counterpiracy operations as
an independent deployer, as did In-
dia and Japan. Despite tensions in
other domains, all three countries
coordinate on escort convoys.
In addition to counterpiracy,
search and rescue is another area
where countries have cooperated
for example, in the search for the
missing Malaysia Airlines 370
plane. Beyond military operations,
countries have pursued Indian
Ocean seabed mineral exploration
rights lawfully through the Inter-
national Seabed Authority. This in-
cludes China, South Korea, and In-
dia, among other countries. The
role of international law in the In-
dian Ocean has also been bolstered
by the use of the International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea and
the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion (PCA) to resolve maritime dis-
putes between Bangladesh, India,
and Myanmar.
11
The respect for in-
ternational law in these cases
stands in contrast to China’s disre-
gard for the PCA decision over the
Philippines-China dispute in 2016.
In addition to working within legal
institutions, major extraregional
powers such as the US and China
have pursued membership roles in
The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order
Indo-Pacific Perspective 9
existing venues for cooperation in
the Indian Ocean. This includes re-
gional institutions such as the In-
dian Ocean Rim Association
(IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval
Symposium (IONS). Without ob-
stacles such as major territorial
disputes and with converging eco-
nomic interests to protect the free
flow of commerce, the Indian
Ocean is not as contentious as the
Pacific Ocean.
Connecting US Strategic Goals
in the Indo-Pacific with the In-
dian Ocean Order
This examination of the coopera-
tive successes in the Indian Ocean
does not intend to minimize the
threat of major power rivalry in
this region. In fact, this is a histori-
cal concern among countries in the
Indian Ocean region. During the
late 1960s and early 1970s, smaller
countries promoted their vision for
an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace due
to the Cold War rivalry between
the Soviet Union and the United
States. Resident Indian Ocean
countries face a similar challenge
in a new era of great power compe-
tition.
12
The regional security envi-
ronment is even less stable when
considering the broad-based milita-
rization and increased acquisition
of naval platforms, including in the
undersea domain, by resident
countries themselves.
Yet, while many observers fear the
implications of China’s expanding
footprint through the Belt and
Road Initiative, deployment of sub-
marines to the Indian Ocean, es-
tablishment of a military base in
Djibouti, and even undersea sur-
veillance and exploration for sea-
bed minerals, the reality is that
China is mostly behaving accord-
ing to the laws and norms in the
Indian Ocean. In fact, even actions
that India sees as intrusive, such
as Chinese platforms operating in
its exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
are actually in line with the US in-
terpretation of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). As China becomes a
global deployer, ironically this sta-
tus helps underscore the order that
the US wantsthe freedom of nav-
igation where international law al-
lows. Many Indian Ocean countries
reject the US interpretation of UN-
CLOS that would permit military
activities in EEZs. They include
Bangladesh, Myanmar, India,
Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mauritius, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, and
United Arab Emirates.
13
Still, the United States should be
vigilant about threats by China to
disrupt the Indian Ocean order.
One disturbing demonstration of
this potential lies in the Chinese
military’s lasering of US Air Force
Samaranayake
Indo-Pacific Perspective 10
personnel in Djibouti in 2018. Such
incidents suggest China’s asser-
tiveness in the Pacific could carry
over into the Indian Ocean re-
gionwhich is precisely the fear of
resident Indian Ocean countries
that call for an Indian Ocean Zone
of Peace.
14
As Washington considers its
broader Indo-Pacific strategy, it
should call out the areas where
China wants to benefit across the
board. This is clear when Beijing
seeks to limit international rules
and norms to its advantage in the
Pacific, yet free-ride off the lawful
order and the interpretation of
UNCLOS that the US seeks in the
Indian Ocean. At the same time,
Washington should also recognize
the current strengths that exist to
underpin the lawful order in the
Indian Ocean. More importantly, it
should not ignore the key differ-
ences between this region and the
Pacific while continuing to invoke
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific
concept as another decade begins
in this dynamic region. ■
Nilanthi Samaranayake
Ms. Samaranayake is the Director
of the Strategy and Policy Analysis
program at CNA, a nonprofit re-
search organization in Arlington,
VA. She is the author of numerous
publications on Indian Ocean secu-
rity issues. The views expressed
are solely those of the author and
not of any organization with which
she is affiliated.
The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order
Indo-Pacific Perspective 11
Notes
1 Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper, “Secretary of
Defense Speech at RAND (As Delivered),” September
16, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News-
room/Speeches/Speech/Article/2350362/secretary-of-de-
fense-speech-at-rand-as-delivered/.
2
US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Re-
port: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Net-
worked Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.de-
fense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPART-
MENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-RE-
PORT-2019.PDF.
3 US Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pa-
cific: Advancing a Shared Vision, November 4, 2019,
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-
and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.
4 US Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Na-
tional Defense Strategy, January 19, 2018,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-
National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
5 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States of America, December 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
6 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign
Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpol-
icy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.
7 US Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January
2012, https://archive.defense.gov/news/defense_strate-
gic_guidance.pdf.
8 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Deliver-
ing on the Promise of Economic Statecraft,” Singapore
Management University, November 17, 2012,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clin-
ton/rm/2012/11/200664.htm.
9 Donna Miles, “Locklear Calls for Indo-Asia-Pacific Co-
operation,” American Forces Press Service, February 8,
2013, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsar-
ticle.aspx?id=119243.
10
US State Department, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific:
Advancing a Shared Vision, November 4, 2019,
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-
and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.
11 Cornell Overfield,Reflecting the Law of the Sea: In
Defense of the Bay of Bengal’s Grey Area,” Center for
International Maritime Security, July 22, 2020,
http://cimsec.org/reflecting-the-law-of-the-sea-in-de-
fense-of-the-bay-of-bengals-grey-area/44784.
12 Commodore Kazi Emdadul Haq, “The Indo-Pacific
Strategy and Its Ramification on Weaker Countries,”
Security World, June 22, 2020, http://securi-
tyworldbd.com/the-indo-pacific-strategy-and-its-ramifi-
cation-on-weaker-countries/; P.K. Balachandran, “Presi-
dent Gotabaya reiterates Lanka’s plea to make the In-
dian Ocean a Zone of Peace,” NewsIn.Asia, October 5,
2020, https://newsin.asia/president-gotabaya-reiterates-
lankas-plea-to-make-the-indian-ocean-a-zone-of-peace/;
and Meera Srinivasan, “Indian Ocean Has to Remain a
Zone of Peace: Ajit Doval,” The Hindu, December 1,
2014, https://www.thehindu.com/news/interna-
tional/south-asia/indian-ocean-has-to-remain-a-zone-of-
peace-ajit-doval/article6651325.ece
.
13 Congressional Research Service, U.S.-China Strate-
gic Competition in South and East China Seas: Back-
ground and Issues for Congress, R42784, August 28,
2020, 40, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf.
14
Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Asian Basing in Africa: In-
dia’s Setback in Seychelles Could Be Worse,India in
Transition, Center for the Advanced Study of India at
University of Pennsylvania, September 24, 2018.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed or implied in
JIPA are those of the authors and should not be
construed as carrying the official sanction of the
Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education
and Training Command, Air University, or other
agencies or departments of the US government or
their international equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective 12
Chinese Vision
of a Rules-
based Order
International Order with
Chinese Characteristics
Dr. Benjamin Tze Ern Ho
n recent years, the idea of a
“rules-based order” (RBO) has
been in vogue among scholars
and practitioners of international poli-
tics, particularly in the Asia-Pacific (or
Indo-Pacific) region amid heightened
geopolitical rivalry between the
United States and China. At first
glance, the need for “rules” to ensure
international order is stating the obvi-
ous: to have order, individuals and
states need to operate with some rules.
At the same time, however, what
these rules might be (and ought to be)
remains a vexing problem, particu-
larly given the varying opinions and
views among states regarding who
gets to set the rules and, more funda-
mentally, whose interests the rules
are meant to serve.
To be certain, countries in the
West are far from monolithic; com-
petition for global influence exists
even among states who subscribe
to the liberal tradition. However,
the idea that rules remain neces-
sary to ensure a degree of predicta-
bility and regularity in interna-
tional affairs is generally accepted
by Western powers. From this
view, only with rules can interna-
tional stabilityeven as an ideal-
ized outcomebe sustained and
safeguarded amid shifting domes-
tic-political dynamics.
The rise of China complicates the
Western-centric understanding of
RBO given that the idea of a rules-
based order is not inherently self-
evident within traditional Chinese
political philosophy. Indeed, Bei-
jing’s experience of encountering
RBO (and multilateralism more
generally) is a comparatively re-
cent phenomenon; only after its re-
form and opening-up program in
the 1980s was Beijing more ame-
nable to considering its foreign pol-
icies in such termsand even
then, mostly with an eye to the
3
Chinese Vision of a Rules-based Order
Indo-Pacific Perspective 13
Taiwan issue. It was only after the
200809 global financial crisis,
whereby Chinese leaders perceived
a notable decline in the West and a
reduction of Western (particularly
American) influence in global mul-
tilateral institutions that Beijing
started to court multilateral insti-
tutions with greater deliberation.
As the thinking in China goes, di-
minished American influence
would create an opportunity to
modify the rules governing the in-
ternational system. In addition,
Beijing’s realpolitik vision of inter-
national politics leads it to con-
clude that most countries who
aligned with the United States in
the past did so not because of some
higher ideational motivation (for
instance, to preserve individual hu-
man rights, or believing that de-
mocracy was the best form of gov-
ernance) but because their own na-
tional interestsoften materially
defined—were best served sub-
scribing to the American-led inter-
national order. A Chinese-led order
could therefore expect to command
similar levels of support.
China perceives the present mo-
ment, marked by US domestic dys-
function and the especially the on-
going COVID-19 pandemic, as a
golden opportunity to shape global
norms and values in accordance
with its own preferences. This does
not mean entirely dismantling the
present international structure
and replacing it with a Chinese one
(Beijing is aware that many coun-
tries would not go along with it),
but rather to continue to support a
rules-based order (jiyu guize de
guojizhixu 基于规则的国秩序)
that preserves “Chinese character-
istics” and ultimately Chinese na-
tional interests.
To be clear, the safeguarding of na-
tional interests is hardly unique to
China; most if not all countries
prefer rules that favor themselves.
What is problematic is that China’s
national interests are defined pri-
marily with respect to the preser-
vation of its one-party rule. In lib-
eral democracies, of course, politi-
cal parties vie to see who can best
articulate the national interest. As
observed by Qin Yaqing, who pre-
viously headed the China Foreign
Affairs University, “the most basic
feature of socialism with Chinese
characteristics is the leadership of
the Chinese Communist Party.”
1
Seen this way, it comes as no sur-
prise that many Chinese scholars
equate the pursuit of a rules-based
order as being synonymous with
the pursuit of a liberal interna-
tional order, which runs funda-
mentally at odds with the CCP’s
single-party rule. Indeed, the nar-
rative the CCP frequently touts is
that the pursuit of a liberal order
by the United States is meant to
Ho
Indo-Pacific Perspective 14
make other countries to become
more “Western,” thus fundamen-
tally threatening the CCP’s grip on
power.
Not surprisingly, when Chinese
leaders discuss regional order, they
frequently talk about building “a
more just, equitable, fair, demo-
cratic and representative interna-
tional political and economic order”
in the future tense, a vision that
China aims to have an influential
role in helping to implement.
2
Sim-
ilarly, there is a deeply held belief
among many Chinese scholars and
policymakers that the United
Statesas a hegemonic power
does not practice what it preaches
in terms of living up to the ideals
of the RBO. For instance, China
points to the United States as hav-
ing violated (or opted out of) core
aspects of international order
such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq
or Washington’s nonratification of
the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS)to argue that
hegemons have the privilege of hy-
pocrisy.
3
Again, this suggests that
China perceives the RBO as being
conceived ultimately to preserve
American international primacy
while artificially constraining
China’s own rise.
With this in mind, I contend that
China’s approach to multilateral-
ism is one which seeks not to ac-
quiesce in existing ideas of RBO
(which posits certain universal ide-
als) but rather one which call into
question the relevance of multilat-
eralism as framed by Western
thinking and worldview. China
takes a more flexible approach to
international law by portraying
such rules as less morally (and le-
gally) binding than how the West
views them. In other words, Bei-
jing seeks to relativize the applica-
tion of international rules for rea-
sons of self-interest. Unlike the US
vision of multilateralism and RBO,
which is that international rule-
making can help to preserve inter-
national stability despite changing
domestic-political circumstances,
China’s goal for a revised RBO is
far narrower, more limited, and
conspicuously inverted: to ensure
domestic stability amid a changing
international environment. In sum,
multilateralism and the RBO
means different things to different
state actors: the United States and
the West see multilateralism as a
means of entrenching global leader-
ship and promoting a liberal vision
of world order, while China sees
multilateralism as a diplomatic
tool to preserve China’s national in-
terests and legitimize its one-party
rule.
Moving forward, it will be more
necessary than ever for countries
to demonstrate that their support
for RBO (if indeed they support
Chinese Vision of a Rules-based Order
Indo-Pacific Perspective 15
such an order) is more than just an
outgrowth of their alignment with
the United States or a product of
anti-China politics. In other words,
states will have to articulate how
and why abiding by the tenets of a
RBO is inherently good for them,
or else what the characteristics of a
better, more equitable RBO ought
to be like. Should their dispositions
depart from the preferences of
Washington and Beijing, then per-
haps it is time the international
community come together to exam-
ine what is problematic and how
best to remedy it. On the other
hand, if there are core aspects of
Notes
1 Yaqing Qin, Song Dexing, Zhang Yensheng, Zhang
Xiaotong, Zhu Feng, and Lu Chuan Ying. “Zhuan-
jiabitan: Dabianjuzhong de zhongguo yu shijie” [Ex-
perts in conversation: China and the World in the
Great Game], Shanghai Institute of International
Studies conference, 2019, DOI:
10.13851/j.cnki.gjzw.202001001 (accessed at CNKI),
see 5.
2 See Mira Rapp-Hooper, Michael Chase, Matake Ka-
miya, Shin Kawashima, and Yuichi Hosoya. “Re-
sponding to China’s Complicated Views on Interna-
tional Order.” Carnegie Endowment for International
RBO that speak to broader univer-
sal concerns, than China’s framing
of international order as inherently
biased in favor of the West will be
exposed as self-interested and, in-
deed, irresponsible. ■
Dr. Benjamin Tze Ern Ho
Dr. Ho is an assistant professor in
the China Programme, S. Raja-
ratnam School of International
Studies, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore.
Peace, October 10, 2019, https://carnegieendow-
ment.org/.
3 Rapp-Hooper et al., “Responding to China’s Compli-
cated Views on International Order.”
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed or implied in
JIPA are those of the authors and should not be
construed as carrying the official sanction of the
Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education
and Training Command, Air University, or other
agencies or departments of the US government
or their international equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective 16
Do Regimes
Matter?
Implications of the
2016 UNCLOS South
China Sea Ruling for
a Rules-based order
in the Indo-Pacific
Dr. Laura Southgate
he Philippines’ 2013 decision
to initiate proceedings against
China at the Permanent Court
of Arbitration (PCA) under Article 287
and Annex VII of the 1982 United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) was a result of the on-
going, heated sovereignty dispute
between the two countries over mari-
time territory in the South China Sea.
China claims historical rights to all
territory within the ‘nine-dash line’,
an undefined demarcation that encom-
passes the majority of the South
China Sea. This has created conflict
with a number of small claimant
states in Southeast Asia and other re-
gional powers such as the United
States, Japan, India and Australia.
China’s militarization of islands in the
disputed waters and the assertive tac-
tics it has used to defend its sover-
eignty claims are symptomatic of its
growing status as Great Power in the
international system. These actions
have also increasingly challenged the
existing rules-based order in the Indo-
Pacific. As stated by President Obama
in April 2015, “where we get con-
cerned with China is where it is not
necessarily abiding by international
norms and rules and is using its sheer
size and muscle to force countries into
subordinate positions.”
1
The Philip-
pines’ attempt to have its sovereign
rights in the South China Sea
acknowledged under international law
represents a direct challenge to
China’s regional claims. China’s re-
sponse to the PCA ruling provides a
window through which to examine
both the existence of a rules-based or-
der in the Indo-Pacific and its future
prospects as China increasingly seeks
to exert its influence in the interna-
tional system.
T
4
Do Regimes Matter?
Indo-Pacific Perspective 17
UNCLOS Ruling and Its
Aftermath
China responded dismissively to
the Philippines’ arbitration case by
refusing to participate in proceed-
ings. China’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs released a ‘position paper’
in December 2014 claiming that
territorial sovereignty over mari-
time features was beyond the scope
of the Convention.
2
This did not de-
ter the PCA, which ruled in July
2016 that China’s claim to historic
rights to resources in the South
China Sea were “incompatible with
the exclusive economic zones pro-
vided for in the convention” and
that “there was no legal basis” for
China to claim historic rights
within the nine-dash line.
3
The
groundbreaking ruling had little
immediate impact on the dispute,
however. China dismissed the rul-
ing as a “null and void decision”
and “nothing more than a piece of
paper.”
4
The Philippines’ new Pres-
ident Rodrigo Duterte stated that
he would “set aside the arbitral
ruling” in favor of economic incen-
tives from China.
5
This was con-
firmed by the Philippines’ Foreign
Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr., who
stated that the Philippines “won’t
take any steps against China” and
that he wanted “to make sure that
there will be no further actions
that will heighten the tensions be-
tween the two countries,
particularly in the Scarborough
Shoal.”
6
Yasay concluded: “we can-
not stop China at this point in
time…we will continue to pursue
peaceful means” to the dispute.
7
Despite the brokering of a ‘status-
quo’ between the Philippines and
China, whereby the latter purport-
edly agreed to halt further expan-
sion in the South China Sea,
8
re-
ports from as early as November
2017 suggested that China had
continued to develop facilities in
the Paracel Islands, in addition to
a military buildup in the Spratly
Islands.
9
In the wake of the UNCLOS rul-
ing, China has also pursued a new
legal basis for its territorial inter-
ests in the South China Sea. It has
done so by re-packaging its sover-
eignty claims to appear more con-
sistent with UNCLOS. Employing
a new legal tactic referred to as a
legal warfare, or ‘lawfare’ ap-
proach, China’s ‘nine-dash line’
narrative has been de-emphasized
in favour of a ‘Four Sha’ claim.
10
Translated as ‘four sands’, this new
position sees China asserting sov-
ereignty over four island chains:
the Pratas Islands, Paracel Is-
lands, Spratly Islands and Mac-
clesfield Bank area. In adopting
this approach, China has at-
tempted to strengthen its legal
claims in the South China Sea by
claiming the Four Sha as part of
Southgate
Indo-Pacific Perspective 18
China’s 200-mile Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (EEZ), and by assert-
ing that they are part of China’s
extended continental shelf.
11
As
noted by two prominent interna-
tional legal experts, while “this
new Chinese legal strategy is even
weaker than the Nine-Dash Line
given [that] it clearly violates UN-
CLOS,” China “may have con-
cluded that it can better shape (or
undermine, depending on your
viewpoint) the law of the sea by
adopting UNCLOS terminology.”
12
Thus China’s ‘Four Sha’ claim at-
tempts to circumnavigate existing
law and re-conceptualize the exist-
ing rules-based order in support of
Chinese state interests.
Regimes, Sovereignty and
Power
China’s actions raise a number of
interesting questions regarding the
importance of regimes in the inter-
national system and what happens
when states seek to pursue their
own interests to uphold state sov-
ereignty. According to Hans Mor-
genthau, “international law owes
its existence and operation to two
factors, both decentralized in char-
acter: identical or complementary
interests of individual states and
the distribution of power among
them.”
13
In many respects, power
dynamics are at the center of inter-
national law enforcement, whereby
“it makes it easy for the strong
both to violate the law and to en-
force it, and consequently puts the
rights of the weak in jeopardy.
14
Legal rules therefore only serve to
satisfy the interests of the most
powerful. This is supported by Rob-
ert Gilpin, who argues that “the
primary foundation of rights and
rules is in the power interests of
the dominant group or states in a
social system.”
15
China’s reaction
to the UNCLOS South China Sea
ruling demonstrates how interna-
tional laws exist and operate on
the basis of powerful state inter-
ests. Great Powers will seek to un-
dermine existing laws when con-
flictual matters of state sover-
eignty and territorial integrity are
at stake. The doctrine of sover-
eignty is both an operating princi-
ple enshrined in international law
and a principle that can be used as
a tool to circumvent or manipulate
international law in support of
state interests.
16
Underlying this
argument is the crucial role of
state power and the distribution of
capabilities in the international
system.
China’s largely successful attempts
to reconfigure international law in
the South China Sea is evidence of
its growing regional and interna-
tional power. It is also testament
to the continued applicability of re-
gimes insofar as they can be used
Do Regimes Matter?
Indo-Pacific Perspective 19
to support a state’s agenda. As this
case study shows, a powerful state
will seek to challenge international
law if it is in its interest to do so,
particularly as it relates to a core
security concern such as state sov-
ereignty. This treatment of inter-
national law is certainly not new,
nor limited to actions conducted by
China. However, it is indicative of
the type of behavior we can expect
to see repeated as China seeks to
exert its influence over the Indo-
Pacific as its power rises. If suc-
cessful, a new type of rules-based
order may develop, one that does
not necessarily reflect the existing
status quo. As far as the existing
order reflects US interests, Great
Power security competition cannot
be ruled out. For smaller states in
the international system, the
Notes
1 Obama says China bullying smaller nations in
South China Sea row,The Guardian, April 10, 2015,
https://www.theguardian.com/.
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic
of China, “Position Paper of the Government of the
People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdic-
tion in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by
the Republic of the Philippines,” December 07, 2014,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/.
3 Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, “Press
Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The Re-
public of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of
China,” July 12, 2016, https://pca-cpa.org/.
4 Richard Javad Heydarian, “Has Duterte’s China
engagement backfired?,Asia Times, July 14, 2017,
http://www.atimes.com/.
UNCLOS ruling will undoubtedly
act as a valuable lesson: that while
all states, regardless of their size,
have recourse to the international
courts, little can be done to enforce
a ruling if a powerful state chooses
to ignore it. ■
Dr. Laura Southgate
Dr. Southgate is lecturer in politics
and international relations at As-
ton University, deputy co-director
of the Aston Centre for Europe,
and author of ASEAN Resistance to
Sovereignty Violation: Interests,
Balancing and the Role of the Van-
guard State (Bristol University
Press, 2019).
5 Jim Gomez, “Duterte says he’ll set aside sea feud
ruling against China,” Philstar, December 17, 2016,
http://www.philstar.com/.
6 Gomez, “Duterte says he’ll set aside sea feud ruling
against China.”
7 Ibid.
8 Manuel Mogato, “Philippines says China agrees on
no new expansion in South China Sea,Reuters, Au-
gust 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/.
9 “As attention focuses on North Korean threat, Bei-
jing quietly expanding South China Sea militarisa-
tion,” Japan Times, November 1, 2017,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.
10 Mark J. Valencia, “China, US Both Using Lawfare
in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, October 12,
2017, https://thediplomat.com/.
11 Patricia Lourdes Viray, “South China Sea: China
has new claim to nibble more land from Taiwan, Vi-
etnam, the Philippines? “The Four Sha Claim,
Philstar, September 27, 2017.
Southgate
Indo-Pacific Perspective 20
12 Julian Ku and Chris Mirasola, “The South China
Sea and China’s “Four Sha” Claim: New Legal The-
ory, Same Bad Argument,” Lawfare, September 25,
2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/.
13 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred
Knopf, 1965), 277.
14 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 294.
15 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981), 35.
16 Anthony Clark Arend, “Do Legal Rules Matter?
International Law and International Politics,” Vir-
ginia Journal of International Law 38, no. 2 (1997):
10753, at 142.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed or implied in
JIPA are those of the authors and should not be
construed as carrying the official sanction of the
Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education
and Training Command, Air University, or other
agencies or departments of the US government
or their international equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective 21
Next Priorities
for Japan’s
FOIP Vision
The Quad, ASEAN,
and Institutional
Linkages in the Indo-
Pacific
Dr. Kei Koga
ne of Japan’s most important
diplomatic agendas has be-
come the realization of a
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP),
which was launched by former Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016 to main-
tain and facilitate the existing rules-
based order in the region.
1
And yet, it
was not clear to what extent new
Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga would
emphasize this strategic vision. In
fact, the question of Japan’s commit-
ment to the FOIP has drawn much in-
ternational attention from practition-
ers and foreign policy experts because
of Japan’s potential preoccupation
with a number of domestic issues,
ranging from COVID-19, economic re-
covery, and the 2021 Tokyo Olympics.
2
Indeed, Suga’s political priorities ap-
pear to focus on domestic affairs, such
as unemployment and revising the
small and medium-sized enterprise
basic law. The Prime Minister is also
said to lack diplomatic experience,
which was well illustrated by his
statement during the campaign for
President of the Liberal Democratic
Party in September 2020, when Suga
stated that he cannot emulate Shinzo
Abe’s summit diplomacy and that he
would consult with the Minister and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as
former Prime Minister Abe about Ja-
pan’s diplomacy.
3
As a result of this apparent inertia,
diplomatic continuity has ensued.
Since Suga was inaugurated on
September 16, 2020, he empha-
sized the importance of Abe’s for-
eign-policy agendas. The FOIP re-
mains Japan’s core strategic vi-
sion, with the US-Japan alliance
playing a pivotal role.
4
Japan
hosted the second Japan-Australia-
India-US Foreign Ministers’
O
5
Koga
Indo-Pacific Perspective 22
meeting (the so-called “Quad”) on
October 6 to further coordinate
their policies to realize the FOIP
region.
5
Suga regards Southeast
Asia as the geographical center of
the Indo-Pacific, and he made his
very first diplomatic trips to Vi-
etnam (2020 ASEAN chair) and In-
donesia (the largest Southeast
Asian country) in October. Based
on these early moves, there ap-
pears to be no diplomatic upset:
Suga seems likely to follow
through on what Abe has envi-
sioned for the FOIP.
However, this diplomatic posture is
not sustainable in the long-term.
Eventually, Japan needs to provide
a clear strategy to realize the FOIP
in the context of the rapidly evolv-
ing US-China great power rivalry.
There are three reasons for this.
The Need for Flexible
Adaptation
First, Japan’s FOIP vision is essen-
tially evolutionary, which requires
conceptual updates over time. As
many have already pointed out,
the concept of Japan’s FOIP has
been changing since its inception
in 2016. Initially, Japan aimed to
maintain and strengthen the rules-
based international order in the
Indo-Pacific region, which has been
largely shaped by the United
States in the post-Cold War era.
6
Japan’s interest has been to blunt
China’s increasing political influ-
ence in the region, which is
thought to be detrimental to exist-
ing international rules and norms.
Most notably, China’s rejection of
the 2016 South China Sea Tribu-
nal Award disrespected interna-
tional laws, while China’s “Belt
and Road Initiative” has been re-
sponsible for setting new interna-
tional standards for development.
7
However, Japan’s strategy to pro-
tect the FOIP principles was un-
clear to begin with. Japan initially
emphasized the importance of “fun-
damental rights” such as the rule
of law, human rights, and democ-
racy.
8
Yet, because there are many
non-democratic states in the re-
gion, such an emphasis soon disap-
peared. Moreover, the FOIP vision
was initially called the “Free and
Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” but
Japan eliminated “strategy” from
the phraseology because some
ASEAN member states were con-
cerned about its diplomatic impli-
cationsthat FOIP aimed to coun-
terbalance or contain China, for ex-
ample.
9
As such, Japan flexibly
changed the FOIP concept in ac-
cordance with reactions from other
states.
Currently, Japan’s FOIP vision
consists of “three pillars”: (1) “pro-
motion and establishment of the
rule of law, freedom of navigation,
free trade, etc.”; (2) “Pursuit of
Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision
Indo-Pacific Perspective 23
economic prosperity (improving
connectivity and strengthening
economic partnership including
EPA/FTAs and investment trea-
ties)”; and (3) “Commitment for
peace and stability (capacity build-
ing on maritime law enforcement,
HA/DR cooperation, etc.).”
10
These
are all international rules and
norms that Japan has long sup-
ported. Nevertheless, these pillars
might change in the future, de-
pending on the development of the
region’s strategic environment.
Particularly, as power diffuses
across the region, a renewed rules-
making mechanism may become
necessary. The Suga administra-
tion must prepare for this chal-
lenge in the future.
Navigating Great Power
Rivalry
Second, Japan still seeks a balance
in its diplomatic relations with
both the United State and China.
Currently, Japan’s foremost ally,
the United States, has begun to
take a much tougher stance on
China in terms of COVID-19, eco-
nomics, and technological moderni-
zation. Many in Washington now
believe the past approach of “en-
gagement” to have been a mistake.
The experience of the COVID-19
pandemic has exacerbated this
trend.
11
To be sure, the Trump ad-
ministration’s confrontational
approach toward China faces se-
vere criticism, and there are de-
bates over a means to manage its
relations with China. Neverthe-
less, Washington’s tough posture
toward China has garnered broad
bipartisan support. America’s
FOIP strategy is now part of an
anti-China strategy, designed to
force Beijing to follow existing in-
ternational rules and norms. This
trend will not easily be reversed.
On the other hand, Japan still at-
tempts to engage China. Earlier
this year, Abe invited Xi Jinping to
Japan as a state visit in April and
attempted to draft the “fifth docu-
ment,” the fifth symbolic official
document after the Sino-Japanese
diplomatic normalization in 1972
that highlights the future vision of
Sino-Japanese relations.
12
The
visit was postponed because of the
COVID-19 pandemic, however, and
rising tensions over the East China
Sea mean that both leaders seem
to have lost political traction for bi-
lateral initiatives.
Suga recognizes the importance of
Japan-China relations for national,
regional, and global stability. He
has advocated the need for com-
mon agendas.
13
Even as he main-
tains a firm stance on territorial
sovereignty and the rule of law,
then, Suga has shown interest in
persuading China to follow inter-
national rules and norms by
Koga
Indo-Pacific Perspective 24
maintaining channels of communi-
cation at various levels, including
the summit level.
14
In this sense,
there is a divergence in diplomatic
posture between Japan and the
United States. Yet, since the US-
Japan alliance is the core of the
FOIP vision, it will be necessary
for both states to coordinate how to
maintain consistency between Ja-
pan’s softer and US tougher FOIP
stance vis-à-vis China.
Realigning Institutions
Third, Japan’s institutional strat-
egy in the Indo-Pacific has yet to
be clearly articulated. In the initial
concept, Japan’s emphasis was on
the Quad as a central framework
to realize FOIP.
15
However, given
diplomatic concerns raised by sev-
eral ASEAN member states in
2018, Japan and the Quad mem-
bers began to emphasize the im-
portance of ASEAN unity and cen-
trality.
16
In response, with a strong
push from Indonesia and a diplo-
matic coordination by Thailand as
ASEAN chair, ASEAN issued its
“ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pa-
cific” (AOIP) statement in 2019,
which emphasized the “inclusive-
ness” of regional architecture and
regional cooperation over “ri-
valry.”
17
ASEAN’s priority is thus
to neutralize great power rivalry
and its negative spill-over effect to
Southeast Asia and other sub-
regions of the Indo-Pacific. Japan
immediately supported the AOIP.
That said, it is still not clear what
Japan and the Quad members ex-
pect from ASEAN. If the Quad
members regard ASEAN’s utility
only as a dialogue convenor that
provides multilateral communica-
tion channels, and if they attempt
to create “effective multilateral-
ism” that gets things done as the
US Secretary State Pompeo indi-
cated, some ASEAN member states
would likely view this as diplo-
matic marginalization.
18
To reas-
sure ASEAN and garner its sup-
port for their FOIP vision, Japan
and the Quad members need to
clearly delineate ASEAN’s role in
the Indo-Pacific.
The Future of FOIP
These three factors show that more
work needs to be done to realize
Japan’s FOIP visionconstructing
a new regional rules-based order.
This is the work that the Abe ad-
ministration left out, and that the
Suga administration needs to work
on.
Two tasks should be prioritized.
The first is to evolve the Quad into
the Quad-Plus as an Indo-Pacific
institutional framework. While
agreeing the basic principles of the
FOIP, Quad-Plus member and
partner states will have to under-
stand that there are diverging
Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision
Indo-Pacific Perspective 25
national interests among them,
and that cooperation will not be
possible in all issue areas. Rather,
an expanded Quad-plus could emu-
late the division of labor modeled
by the Japan-Australia-US “Trilat-
eral Partnership for infrastructure
investment in the Indo-Pacific,”
and the partnership between the
United States and Japan on en-
ergy, infrastructure, and digital
connectivity.
19
In short, the Quad(-
Plus) can function best as a forum
to flexibly coordinate policies that
advance the FOIP vision where
possible. This means that the Quad
can also expand its membership to
any states that agree with the
FOIP principles. Accordingly, it is
in Japan’s interests to ensure that
the Quad-Plus formula it utilized
to include more regional states,
such as Vietnam and Indonesia, as
well as European states, such as
the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany, to buttress the provision
of international public goods such
as knowledge-transfer rules, infra-
structure development, and man-
agement of non-traditional security
issues.
The second task is to strike a bal-
ance between ASEAN and the
Quad. As mentioned above, some
ASEAN member states are skepti-
cal about the development of the
Quad framework, which threatens
to diplomatically marginalize
ASEAN and intensify great power
rivalry with China. Without close
consultation, institutionalizing the
Quad could exacerbate ASEAN’s
concerns and skepticism. Also,
given ASEAN’s consensus-based
decision-making process, it is im-
portant to reassure all member
states in this regard. Therefore,
Japan should propose to enhance
ASEAN’s role in the Indo-Pacific
by forming “webs” of regional insti-
tutions. The starting point might
be to create a Quad-ASEAN Track-
II dialogue, as well as to link the
Quad and ASEAN-X formula. The
Quad’s strength is its flexibility: it
should actively engage ASEAN and
its individual member state, offer-
ing reassurance and building part-
nerships. At the same time, in or-
der to enable regional states to en-
gage in deeper multilateral, strate-
gic discussions and prevent great
powers from irreversible political
and economic decoupling, Japan
should encourage ASEAN to fur-
ther institutionalize the East Asia
Summit, such as strengthening its
secretariat functions and conduct-
ing more frequent Senior-Official
level exchanges.
Japan’s FOIP vision under the
Suga administration aims to avoid
an intensive confrontation between
the United States and China by de-
veloping regional rules and norms
that are based on the existing
Koga
Indo-Pacific Perspective 26
international order. This will be a
difficult task given that the consol-
idation of rules and norms will re-
quire a regional consensus. If the
attempt fails, it will result in ex-
posing intraregional divides. How-
ever, such a window of opportunity
has not been closed yet. Japan is in
a good strategic position to bridge
the various regional powers. Proac-
tively taking a normative leader-
ship role in the Indo-Pacific by
evolving the Quad, encouraging
ASEAN to further institutionalize
Notes
1 Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’
Strategy: Tokyo’s Tactical Hedging and the Implica-
tions for ASEAN,Contemporary Southeast Asia 41,
no. 2 (2019): 286-313; Yuichi Hosoya, “FOIP 2.0: The
Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Strategy,Asia-Pacific Review 26, no. 1 (2019): 18
28.
2 See, for example, Zack Cooper and Jeffrey Hor-
nung, “The US-Japan alliance after Abe,Los Angeles
Times, September 8, 2020, https://www.aei.org/.
3 Jiminto sosaisen no kokai toronkaiIshiba, Suga,
Kishida-shi no hatsugen Yoshi” [Public Debated for
the LDP Presidential Electionsummary of state-
ments by Ishiba, Suga, and Kishida]. Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, September 12, 2020, https://www.nik-
kei.com/.
4 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. “Dai nihyakusan
kai kokkai ni okeru suganaikakusouridaijin shoshin
hyomei enzetsu” [203th Diet Session: The Suga ad-
ministration’s Policy Speech], October 26, 2020,
https://www.kantei.go.jp/.
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), “The
Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Minis-
ters’ Meeting,” October 6, 2020,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/.
6 MOFA, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at
the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International
Conference on African Development (TICAD VI),”
EAS, and creating the linkages be-
tween them all of these are
goals worth trying for. ■
Dr. Kei Koga
Dr. Koga is an Assistant Professor
at the Public Policy and Global Af-
fairs Programme, School of Social
Sciences, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore.
August 27, 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.
7 Kei Koga, Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question: Counter-
ing China or Shaping a New Regional Order?” Inter-
national Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020): 4973.
8 MOFA, “State Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishi’s
Speech at the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)
Summit, March 8 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ ;
and MOFA. “Japan-U.S. Working Lunch and Japan-
U.S. Summit Meeting, November 6, 2017,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/ .
9 “Indo taiheiyo, kieta ‘senryaku’ seifu ga ‘koso’ ni
shusei” [Indo-Pacific: Disappeared ‘Strategy’: The
Japanese Government Altered It to ‘Vision’]. Nikkei
Shimbun, November 13, 2018.
10 MOFA, Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” n.d.,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/ .
11 Matthew Lee, “At Nixon library, Pompeo declares
China engagement a failure,The Washington Post,
July 24, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/; and
Alice Su and Tracy Wilkinson, “New Analysis: How
bad could U.S.-China relations get?” Los Angeles
Times, July 26, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/.
12 “Japan, China to craft new political document for
Xi’s state visit,Kyodo News Service, January 9,
2020, https://english.kyodonews.net/.
13 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, “Dai nihyakusan
kai.”
14 MOFA, Japan-China Summit Telephone Talk,
September 25, 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.
15 MOFA, “Priority Policy for Development
Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision
Indo-Pacific Perspective 27
Cooperation FY 2017,9, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.
16 Charissa Yong, “Singapore will not join Indo-Pa-
cific bloc for now: Vivian,The Straits Times, May 15,
2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/; and MOFA. “Ja-
pan-Australia-India-U.S. Consultations,” June 7,
2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.
17 ASEAN Secretariat. “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-
Pacific.” June 23, 2019, https://asean.org/.
18 US Department of State, “Briefing with Senior
State Department Officials on Secretary Pompeo’s
Visit to Japan, October 6, 2020.
https://www.state.gov/.
19 Prime Minister of Australia, “Joint Statement of
the Governments of Australia, Japan and the United
States,” November 17, 2018. https://www.pm.gov.au/;
and White House, “U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on
Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific through En-
ergy, Infrastructure and Digital Connectivity Cooper-
ation,” November 13, 2018,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed or implied in
JIPA are those of the authors and should not be
construed as carrying the official sanction of the
Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education
and Training Command, Air University, or other
agencies or departments of the US government
or their international equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective 28
India’s Indo-
Pacific Reckoning
Dr. Titli Basu
S-China disorder presents a
defining moment in interna-
tional history. A fractured
power structure and contestation
over the rules of the international
system have been sharpened by
the COVID-19 pandemic. Beijing’s
ascent in the international order
and the ensuing disequilibrium in
the balance of power between the
United States and China at the
global level, and China and India
at the regional level, are making
policy elites in Delhi fiercely de-
bate key strategic choices in pur-
suit of the national interest. Stakes
are high with trade, technology,
the fourth industrial revolution,
and infrastructure all defining
great power contestation in the
strategic theatre of the Indo-Pa-
cific.
Disequilibrium in US-China-
India Triangle
China frames its pursuit of power
within the narrative of “great reju-
venation of the Chinese nation,
anchored in an historical interpre-
tation of the Middle Kingdom’s
“century of humiliation” from the
First Opium War through the Sino-
Japanese War. Beijing’s path to
primacy is anchored not only in
military modernization and eco-
nomic statecraft but also soft and
sharp power instruments to ad-
vance grand strategic designs like
the Belt and Road Initiative. With
China’s rise, the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) seeks a rene-
gotiation of the asymmetry that ex-
ists between the distribution of
power and the distribution benefits
in international society. Offering
Chinese solutions to international
problems, Beijing has challenged
the US-led liberal order with alter-
native rules and norms, ideas, and
institutions.
At the regional level, the growing
U
6
India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning
Indo-Pacific Perspective 29
power differential in India-China
relations is manifesting beyond
contested Himalayan borders. Chi-
nese checkers in Pakistan, South
Asia, and the wider Indian Ocean
Region further complicate geopoli-
tics. In the last two decades, Bei-
jing’s defense spending has wit-
nessed around a seven-fold in-
crease, rising from $39.6 billion in
1999 to $266.4 billion in 2019.
1
The
reality of China’s economy being
one-sixth larger than America’s (in
purchasing power parity terms) is
upon us.
2
It is imperative for India
to adjust to the profound impact of
China’s rise in the immediate
neighborhood, and especially when
it comes to addressing Chinese ag-
gression along its land border with
India. In recent times, India has
managed incidents like Doklam,
Chumar, and Depsangbut the
Galwan standoff was the definitive
moment when Beijing has “strate-
gically lost India.”
3
In India, the
debate over China is increasingly
turning in favor of making the cost
of unilaterally altering the status
quo unsustainable for Beijing.
4
Beijing’s Proposition of a
Unipolar Asia in a Chinese
Century
The narrow prism of analyzing In-
dia as a mere “balancer” in great
power game is flawed. Sharper
strategic articulation from Delhi is
positioning India as a leading
power in a multi-polar world.
Delhi’s strategic quest for a multi-
polar world was shaped amid ap-
prehension of US hegemony in the
post-Cold War years. India believes
that a multipolar world should be
anchored by a multipolar Asia at
its core.
5
But today, the prospect of
a unipolar Asia has become more
pronounced with President Xi
Jinping’s “China Dream.” While
India is seeking strategic equilib-
rium, China is relentless in its pur-
suit of engineering a hierarchical
Asian order, with Beijing at top,
6
fueling its vision of a Chinese cen-
tury as opposed to an Asian cen-
tury.
7
Judging from key policy pro-
nouncements, India aspires to be a
stabilizing power bringing its ca-
pacities to bear on the interna-
tional system for the purpose of
promoting the global good.
8
It
wants to be a net-security provider
rather than a disruptionist power
in the Indo-Pacific. India’s Foreign
Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar has
deftly articulated that today’s
multi-polar world reflects strong
bipolar characteristics, with not all
the poles being of the same size,
and the United States and China
being relatively more influential
than other players.
9
Shaking off “hesitations of his-
tory”
10
and debunking the
Basu
Indo-Pacific Perspective 30
narrative of India as a reluctant
power, Delhi aims to be a rules-
shaper and not an abstainer rec-
ognizing that “rule of force” under-
writes the “rule of law.” At the
Shangri-La Dialogue, India has ar-
gued that the Indo-Pacific should
be anchored in rules and norms
based on the consent of all and not
the power of a few. Strategic con-
versations have urged for a New
Delhi Consensus, characterized by
a call for a more inclusive, equita-
ble, and participatory world or-
der.
11
The experience of the liberal
rules-based order was “neither lib-
eral, nor particularly orderly”
12
for
all. History shows that great pow-
ers have often customized rules of
the international system and have
taken an a la carte approach in
pursuit of their national interest
and strategic ambitions. Rules-
based order has at times been over-
ridden by power-based order.
The rules of the international sys-
tem need to be overhauled and In-
dia cannot afford to be a passive
player. India largely has a rule-
taker instinct. For instance, unlike
Beijing’s disregard for the PCA’s
ruling in favor of the Philippines,
Delhi respected the ruling by a
PCA-established tribunal in favor
of Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal
Boundary Arbitration. But India’s
rising political capital as a rule-
shaper makes it imminent for
Delhi to make tough policy choices
and shape global conversations set-
ting standards on pertinent issues,
for instance, global trade rules,
tech rules and digital governance.
Dividends of India’s Doctrine
India’s search for solutions in man-
aging differences and protecting
strategic equities has renewed the
debate on strategic autonomy ver-
sus alliances. The strategic assess-
ment in Delhi is that “the more In-
dia rises, the more it must expect
Chinese opposition.”
13
With the
Galwan misadventure, Beijing has
incentivized Delhi’s pivot to Wash-
ington, but the current border cri-
sis might not fundamentally reori-
ent Indian policy towards alliance,
but it may rebalance some of its
priorities.
14
Sieving the conversation in Delhi
shows that, while alliance contin-
ues to remain the “wrong answer”
for India, greater “realism” is per-
meating policymaking. Political
discourse suggests that while India
cannot give any other country a
veto over its policy options, there is
a need to look beyond dogma and
enter the real world of conver-
gences.
15
Today, military alliances
are neither being offered to nor
sought by Delhi. The very dis-
course in India has pivoted to en-
compassing issue-based multi-
alignments and coalitions in
India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning
Indo-Pacific Perspective 31
pursuit of shared strategic inter-
ests and leveraging partnerships to
further India’s national interests.
Indeed, this new discourse has ech-
oes in India’s history of trysts with
various shapes and forms of alli-
ances, all of which were influenced
by the evolving nature of interna-
tional threats.
16
While the Trump administration
has treated Delhi relatively more
gently than Beijing and even some
of its formal allies,
17
India is
keenly aware that the United
States has fed the rise of China
and that a US-China “grand bar-
gain” at some point is not impossi-
ble. To date, India’s strategy of en-
gagement-with-all without having
to choose between rival great pow-
ers paid rich dividends in terms of
sourcing capital and technology.
“Balance of interest” has remained
the guiding principle of Indian for-
eign policy.
Between National Interests and
International Responsibilities
India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, while
being a critical component of
Delhi’s China policy, also enumer-
ates an open, inclusive, and cooper-
ative construct to maximize geopo-
litical advantages and geo-eco-
nomic guarantees in advancing In-
dia’s global influence.
Maritime security is at the heart of
Indo-Pacific construct. While the
geography extends from the
“shores of Africa to that of the
Americas,” the India Ocean re-
mains the primary theater for
Delhi. Despite the natural geo-
graphic advantages in the littoral,
India’s policy elites have long had
a continental orientation. But
China’s strategic ambition in the
Indian Ocean, manifested in its ex-
panding military footprint and the
21
st
Century Maritime Silk Road
projects, has compelled Delhi to re-
orient its focus. As such, island na-
tions and smaller littoral states sit-
uated in the strategic geography
across Indian Ocean, Pacific
Ocean, and even the Caribbean are
gaining more attention in New
Delhi’s strategic thinking.
18
Securing a stable maritime order -
and the rule of law at sea - has
driven Indian maritime diplomacy.
To uphold rule of law and freedom
of seas, Delhi is weaving a deeper
security-cooperation network
among Indo-Pacific stakeholders.
This is taking the form of a grow-
ing number of logistics agree-
ments, intelligence sharing ar-
rangements, advancing maritime
capacity building, maritime do-
main awareness, and strengthen-
ing interoperability between navies
through joint drills like the Mala-
bar exercise in key theatres. India
has conceived the Indo-Pacific
Ocean Initiative (IPOI), building
Basu
Indo-Pacific Perspective 32
on the Security and Growth for All
in the Region (SAGAR) doctrine, in
its quest for securing maritime
global commons and present gov-
ernance solutions to shared mari-
time challenges. In designing a
rules-based regional architecture,
India’s IPOI rests upon the seven
pillars of maritime security, mari-
time ecology, maritime resources,
capacity building and resource
sharing, disaster risk reduction
and management, science, technol-
ogy and academic cooperation, and
trade connectivity and maritime
transport.
19
This has gained trac-
tion with other maritime democra-
cies like Japan and Australia, and
also features in the India-ASEAN
Plan of Action (2021-2025).
Strategic pursuit of a free, open,
and inclusive Indo-Pacific is shap-
ing India’s issue-based alignments
with various Indo-Pacific stake-
holders, especially the United
States, Japan, Australia, and
France in addition to ASEAN and
the European Union in bilateral,
trilateral, quadrilateral and “Quad
plus” strategic geometries. While
the Quadrilateral Security dia-
logue (“Quad”) is anchored by a de-
sire to keep maritime highways
free and open, coordination under
the India-Japan-Australia Supply
Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI)
is driven by the need to map and
manage supply-chain
vulnerabilities in key sectors like
pharmaceuticals, medical devices,
semiconductors, automotives, and
chemicals. India’s recent involve-
ment along with Japan in the Five
Eyes intelligence-sharing frame-
work is designed to navigate ten-
sions between law enforcement
and the encryption policies of tech
companies another demonstra-
tion of Delhi’s rising interest in
forming global coalitions.
India accords primacy to advancing
regional connectivity and infra-
structure across the Indo-Pacific.
Doing so not only connects the eco-
nomic growth poles and advances
regional economic linkages, pro-
duction networks and value chains,
but also acts as strategic leverage
in the great power game. As host
nations today have several financ-
ing options, including BRI, India
advocates infrastructure projects
underpinned by consultative prac-
tices involving local stakeholders.
India’s infrastructure outreach is
driven by compliance with global
governance standards, including
respect for sovereignty, responsible
debt financing practices, and eco-
logical sustainability. As such, In-
dia has steered a Coalition for Dis-
aster Resilient Infrastructure and
International Solar Alliance.
Infrastructure financing is a vital
geo-economic instrument of state-
craft and India is catching up by
India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning
Indo-Pacific Perspective 33
tapping into the joint capacities of
strategic partners like Japan and
the United States to deliver on the
shared responsibility of addressing
the infrastructure gap. The Indo-
Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral
Forum aims to channel the assets
and resources of the India-Japan-
United States private sectors to ad-
dress the infrastructure gap. More-
over, India is inching towards join-
ing forces with the US-Japan-Aus-
tralia-led Blue Dot Network
(BDN), seeking to advance high
quality infrastructure. Japan has
emerged as India’s preferred part-
ner in third country co-operation
with a few success stories to boast
in the Bay of Bengal.
Beyond hard infrastructure, strate-
gic competition also centers on
technology and data. Given the vi-
tality of digital connectivity and se-
cured networks, India is coordinat-
ing with like-minded partners at
the D-10 on strategic vulnerabili-
ties and national-security chal-
lenges posed by critical technolo-
gies including 5G. The Open Radio
Access Network (O-RAN) is driving
the discourse and an O-RAN Policy
Coalition is formed to advance
open and interoperable solutions
aimed at enabling innovation. Mu-
tual interests could drive momen-
tum on key verticals including arti-
ficial intelligence, quantum tech-
nologies, space technologies and in
strategic metals and minerals.
Revisiting the global economic or-
der became apparent following
Covid-19. The pandemic unleashed
severe economic contraction across
the world, and tentatively dialed
down India’s growth story. The dis-
ruption has made Delhi devise the
Atmanirbhar Bharat strategy
which has sparked a fierce debate
on globalization versus economic
autarky. To be clear, Prime Minis-
ter Modi’s self-reliance policy is not
about being self-contained or being
closed to the world but is driven by
India’s determination to enhance
its economic contribution to the
global economy. India’s exit from
the Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership (RCEP) pact,
which took place even before the
COVID-19 pandemic struck, un-
derscores the domestic compul-
sions and urgent need to accelerate
structural reforms and enhance
competitiveness.
India’s ability to economically en-
gage with the region remains im-
perative since economic isolation is
not an option. But the RCEP nego-
tiations proved that the world is
perhaps unwilling to accommodate
India’s interest despite the size of
its market. India’s target of becom-
ing a US$5 trillion economy is con-
tingent on becoming able to with-
stand global competition and seize
benefits from export opportunities
Basu
Indo-Pacific Perspective 34
that external markets offer. Multi-
lateral agreements create such ex-
panded opportunity.
20
Walking the Talk
While the Indo-Pacific is dominat-
ing the political lexicon and strate-
gic thinking in Delhi, the biggest
challenge will be matching political
intent with material and national
capacity. The conversation on the
Indo-Pacific gained traction with
Japanese Prime Minister Abe
Shinzo’s landmark speech in the
Indian Parliament “Confluence of
the Two Seas” - capturing the dy-
namic coupling of the Indian and
Pacific Oceans as seas of freedom
and prosperity. India’s “Look East
Policy,” meanwhile, pivoted to “Act
East” and subsequently the idea of
a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” If
geopolitical churning in the major
capitals of the world have posi-
tioned India at the heart of their
respective Indo-Pacific strategy,
India has, for its part, shed its
Notes
1 “What Does China Really Spend on its Military?,
CSIS China Power, September 15, 2020,
https://chinapower.csis.org/.
2 Graham Allison, “China Is Now the World’s Largest
Economy. We Shouldn’t Be Shocked,National Inter-
est, October 15, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/.
3 Ananth Krishnan, “For Minor Tactical Gains on the
Ground, China has Strategically Lost India, Says
Former Indian Ambassador to China,The Hindu,
June 21, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/.
4 Brahma Chellaney, “China Alone,Project
initial reluctance and is ready to
step up to the challenge. Structural
organization in the Indian foreign
ministry (the creation in 2019 of an
Indo-Pacific division) and institu-
tion of key 2+2 dialogues with ma-
jor Indo-Pacific powers like the US,
Japan, and Australia; elevating the
Quad’s profile; and the rise of Indo-
Pacific trilaterals with India-Ja-
pan-US, India-Japan-Australia, In-
dia-Australia-France, and India-
Indonesia-Australia all of these
developments demonstrate Delhi’s
quest to engage in a collaborative
and cooperative framework to de-
sign a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Without doubt, India is now walk-
ing the walk when it comes to
Indo-Pacific order.
Dr. Titli Basu
Dr. Basu is an associate fellow at
the Manohar Parrikar Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses.
Syndicate, August 21, 2020, https://www.project-syn-
dicate.org/.
5 “Multipolar World Should Include Multipolar Asia:
Jaishankar,The Hindu, September 19, 2020,
https://www.thehindu.com/.
6 S D Muni, “While seeking equilibrium with China,
diplomatic adjustments through give-and-take must
be explored,” Indian Express, August 25, 2020,
https://indianexpress.com/.
7 Raja Mohan, “China’s hegemonic ambitions mean
that Beijing’s focus is now on building Chinese cen-
tury,Indian Express, July 7, 2020, https://indianex-
press.com/.
India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning
Indo-Pacific Perspective 35
8 Ministry of External Affairs, “External Affairs Min-
ister in Conversation at Raisina Dialogue 2020: The
India Way, January 16, 2020,
https://www.mea.gov.in/.
9 Ministry of External Affairs, “Geopolitics of Oppor-
tunity: As World Rebalances, How should India Capi-
talise?,YouTube, July 20, 2020,
https://www.youtube.com/ .
10 Ministry of External Affairs,External Affairs
Minister's speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lec-
ture, 2019,” November 14, 2019, https://mea.gov.in/.
11 Shashi Tharoor and Samir Saran, “The New
World Disorder and The Indian Imperative - an ex-
tract,World Economic Forum, January 22, 2020,
https://www.weforum.org/.
12 Shivshankar Menon, “China-US Contention Has
Opened Up Space for Other Powers, Including India,
The Wire, December 24, 2018, https://thewire.in/.
13 Shinvshankar Menon, “India’s Foreign Affairs
Strategy,” Impact Series, Brookings Institution, May
2020, https://www.brookings.edu/.
14 Arzan Tarapore, “India does not need a Cold War
alliance,East Asia Forum, July 27, 2020,
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/.
15 Ministry of External Affairs,EAM's interaction at
USIBC India Idea Summit,” July 22, 2020,
https://www.mea.gov.in/.
16 C. Raja Mohan, “Confusion reigns on what the
Quad is and its future in India’s international
relations,Indian Express, October 6, 2020,
https://indianexpress.com/.
17 Suhashini Haidar, “More ups than down, and
many surprise turns in Trump’s foreign policy for In-
dia,The Hindu, November 1, 2020, https://www.the-
hindu.com/.
18 Darshana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific:
New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity,” Carnegie Work-
ing Paper, June 2020, https://carnegieendow-
ment.org/.
19 Harsh Vardhan Shringla,More and more coun-
tries now share India’s vision for the region,Indian
Express, November 7, 2020, https://indianex-
press.com/.
20 Pradeep S. Mehta and Amol Kulkarni,Why India
Shouldn’t View its Refusal to Join RCEP as a Vic-
tory,The Wire, November 6, 2019,
https://thewire.in/.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA
are those of the authors and should not be construed
as carrying the official sanction of the Department of
Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Com-
mand, Air University, or other agencies or depart-
ments of the US government or their international
equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective 36
Challenges in
Institutionalizing
Rules-based
Order in the Indo-
Pacific
Defending or Reordering
the Status Quo
Dr. Ngaibiakching
he rules-based international
order led by the West is under-
going a crisis, with post-World
War II (“liberal international”) in-
stitutions seeming particularly vul-
nerable to the relative decline of
the United States. Meanwhile, the
tectonic shift of power from the
West to Asia has intensified the ge-
opolitical and strategic relevance of
the Indo-Pacific,
1
with China’s
challenge to US leadership (along-
side the rise of regional middle
powers) amplifying existing criti-
cisms of the international rules-
based order as inadequate or bi-
ased. Indeed, what is happening in
the Indo-Pacific region can be con-
sidered a microcosm of global poli-
tics, underscoring the need for a re-
inforced yet reshaped rules-based
order.
The Importance of Rules in
the Indo-Pacific
Rules-based order is a “system”
the basic principles and standards
of conduct in a “society of states”
where members share a “sense of
common interest,” rules and insti-
tutions, and seek to facilitate these
rules effectively in the form of in-
ternational organizations, treaties,
and law.
2
In other words, rules-
based order is a shared commit-
ment by states based on consensus.
The rules-based international or-
der formulated under the United
Nations and the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions seven decades ago
brought much prosperity and or-
der. In Asia, the West assumed
that as China opened up to the
world, it would slowly embrace lib-
eral and democratic values. How-
ever, this turned out not to be the
case: China has kept its core
T
7
Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific
Indo-Pacific Perspective 37
traditional values intact despite
embracing capitalism, and now
represents a challenge to America’s
vision of regional and global order.
3
Dissensus seems to have replaced
consensus: China’s exponential
rise, a growing US-China rivalry,
widespread unwillingness or ina-
bility to enforce rules, the waning
of US leadership - all these factors
and more have the rules-based or-
der to the test. In such a volatile
environment, sustaining a rules-
based Indo-Pacific has become crit-
ical to attaining a rules-based glob-
ally.
4
Paradoxically, the United States -
the key proponent of rules-based
order—retreated from multilater-
alism under the Trump admin-
istration,
5
leaving regional part-
ners on tenterhooks. Meanwhile,
the Chinese Communist Party un-
der President Xi Jinping became
more nationalistic, assertive, and
expansionist. The signal that
China sends out concerning power
projection is perplexing, at times
displaying “Wolf Warrior diplo-
macy”
6
while, on other occasions,
appearing to operate within the ex-
isting rules-based order. The result
is that most maritime nations in
the littorals of the Indo-Pacific har-
bor at least some apprehension
about China’s assertiveness.
Malcolm Jorgensen has observed
that, rather than overturning
existing international laws, China
has preferred to “fragment” the
rules, furthering its own “security
and strategic interest” by slicing
out a new “geolegal” space. What is
more, some small states are ready
to concede to China because of the
incentives and inducements that
Beijing provides.
7
In a similar vein,
Vijay Gokhale opines that China
(perhaps the highest beneficiary of
economic globalization and West-
ern-led multilateral institutions)
need not overthrow the global or-
der when it can simply take over
the order instead.
8
From this view,
reinventing a new system of order
or rules would not be necessary for
China to serve its self-interest.
9
As
Fu Ying has argued, China’s ac-
tions are “complementary to the
existing international system,”
helping to facilitate a “gradual evo-
lution into a fairer and more inclu-
sive structure.”
10
It is to be ex-
pected, after all, that emerging
powers will seek to attain “greater
voice and weight” within the rules-
based system.
11
Seen from another lens, however,
China’s ambitions have ideological
underpinnings and are directed to-
ward changing the status quo.
Consider, for example, the estab-
lishment of the Asian Investment
and Infrastructure Bank and the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
When a country accumulates
Ngaibiakching
Indo-Pacific Perspective 38
enough wealth and influence, it
eventually desires political clout
commensurate with its economic
power. In China’s case, its at-
tempts to expand political and eco-
nomic influence have attracted
criticisms; the BRI faced a back-
lash for “debt-trapping” poorer na-
tions as a new form of colonialism
with exploitative practices, for ex-
ample.
12
The overall picture is that China
observes the existing rules-based
order where it suits the Chinese
national interest but will seek to
change rules and laws that do not
align with its needs and wants.
There is a risk that smaller states
will accede to China’s revisionism
out of fear of punishment or desire
for material benefits (induce-
ments), which result in a “snow-
ball” effect: Beijing would become
emboldened, its ambitions to alter
the status quo might expand, and
other states would be put in the po-
sition of choosing whether to vali-
date China’s demands or put up a
costly fight to preserve the existing
order.
Institutionalizing Rules-
Based Order in Indo-Pacific
In the Indo-Pacific megaregion,
charting out rules-based order is a
colossal task. The region is multi-
layered with several major stake-
holders at play, such as ASEAN, at
geographic the core of the Indo-Pa-
cific region; the “Quad” of Aus-
tralia, India, Japan, and the
United States; and regional powers
like South Korea. The viability of
the Free and open Indo-Pacific
(FOIP) strategy in upholding rules-
based order rests on how (or
whether) regional stakeholders
like ASEAN can fully embrace the
FIOP strategy put forward by the
Quad countries.
13
There is reason
to believe that a broad agreement
can be found, for despite some com-
peting agendas and diversity in
how the “Indo-Pacific” narrative is
being interpreted, all of the afore-
mentioned regional stakeholders
are confronted with the same
China threat and, as such, seem to
be advocating a rules-based order
in response.
In the current international con-
text, the concept of a global
“hegemon” has become anachronis-
tic.
14
There are several stakehold-
ers and middle powers that now
help to shape international poli-
tics, which is quite unlike the ear-
lier Cold War-era of bipolarity.
Even the concept of the
“Indo-Pacific” is at a nascent stage:
“the litmus test for the Indo-Pacific
[…] is whether it can be institu-
tionalized; that is, whether states
are willing to develop meaningful
institution-building mechanisms
on the basis of Indo-Pacific
Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific
Indo-Pacific Perspective 39
concept.”
15
The fact is, there is no monolithic
consensus on the rules-based or-
der; it is entirely subject to inter-
pretation. Rules often work on the
terms and dictates of the majority
and the powerful, given that, at
some point, all great powers flout
the rules whenever such rules do
not align with their interest
China’s disregard for the United
Nations Convention on the law of
Sea (UNCLOS) ruling in 2016, for
example. If Louis Henkin’s famous
statement is true that “almost all
nations observe almost all princi-
ples of international law and al-
most all of their obligations almost
all of the time,” it is partly because
powerful states that fail to adhere
to rules and obligations are often
successful at justifying their viola-
tions.
16
If the existing norms are compro-
mised, does rules-based order
mean anything? According to Ian
Hall and Michael Heazle, “the
rules-based order is […] neither
fixed nor uncontested.”
17
States fol-
low the rules because one way or
another, it benefits them - or, at
least, does not compromise their
interests. Besides, rules create an
“element of stability and predicta-
bility.”
18
For Ben Scott, “rules mat-
ter even when they are violated.”
Along similar lines, Greg Raymond
maintains that it is an
overstatement to assume that
rules are made purely at the
whims of great powers, as all inter-
national rules need some “consen-
sus and legitimacy.” Even con-
certed attempts by small “like-
minded states” can go a long way
toward achieving reform.
19
And of
course, great powers face at least
some reputational costs whenever
they flout rules. In sum, rules are
better than no rules despite the
shortcomings of multilateral inter-
national organization.
In the evolving region of the Indo-
Pacific, the need for new rules is
evident in areas such as climate
change, cybersecurity, and non-tra-
ditional security threats such as
terrorism, infectious disease pan-
demics, and more.
20
Along with the
challenges brought by globaliza-
tion, all countries big and small
face common challenges, which
makes inclusive collaborative ef-
forts necessary. It is an opportune
moment to see the relevance of the
existing rules and then reshape
and reorder those rules to cater to
the current exigencies.
Conclusion
The feasibility of a rules-based or-
der in the Indo-Pacific depends on
the degree to which regional states
can come up with a concerted re-
sponse. Rules and norms are indis-
pensable, as is compliance with
those rules and norms.
Ngaibiakching
Indo-Pacific Perspective 40
Multipolarity with shared commit-
ment to multilateralism has the
potential to make the Indo-Pacific
peaceful, predictable, and rules-ori-
ented. The task of the new US
President Joe Biden is to undo
Trump’s legacy, which undermined
the cause of a rules-based order in
the Indo-Pacific; salvage US lead-
ership and influence; and resusci-
tate multilateralism for the com-
mon good. At the same time, it is
necessary for other powers to en-
gage both the United States and
Notes
1 The Indo-Pacific is a regional construct that in-
cludes Northeast Asia, the South China Sea, and the
extensive sea lines of communication in the Indian
and Pacific Oceans. The geographical realm of Indo-
Pacific region represents over 50 percent of global
GDP and population.
2 Stewart Patrick, “World Order: What, Exactly, are
the Rules?” The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 1
(2016): 7–27.
3 Tarik Oğuzlu,Understanding Chinas Challenge
to the International Order,” Daily Sabah, 23 July
2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/.
4 Harsh Vardhan Shringla, “More and more countries
now share India’s vision for the region,” Indian Ex-
press, 7 November 2020, https://indianexpress.com/.
5 Trump has an apparent aversion to and disdain for
the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and
NATO. He withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Iran Nuclear
Deal. See: Alex Pascal, “Against Washington’s ‘Great
Power’ Obsession,23 September 2019,
https://www.theatlantic.com/.
6 Zhiqun Zhu, Interpreting China’s ‘Wolf-Warrior
Diplomacy’,” The Diplomat, 15 May 2020, https://the-
diplomat.com/.
7 Malcolm Jorgensen, “International law cannot save
the rules-based order,Lowy Institute, 18 December
2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/.
China to prevent the Indo-Pacific
region from becoming a theater of
the “new cold war,” and to ensure
that freedom and openness across
the region are enough to abate the
risk of coercion and instability. ■
Dr. Ngaibiakching
Dr. Ngaibiakching is a researcher
in Indo-Pacific Studies at Jawa-
haral Nehru University.
8 Vijay Gokhale,China Doesn’t Want a New World
Order. It Wants This One,New York Times, 4 June
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/.
9 Greg Raymond, Hitoshi Nasu, See Seng Tan, and
Rob McLaughlin, “Prospects for the Rules-Based
Global Order,” ANU College of Asia & the Pacific,
June 2017, http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/.
10 Fu Ying, “Is China’s Choice to Submit to the U.S.
or Challenge It?” Huffington Post, 26 May 2015,
https://www.huffpost.com/.
11 Patrick, “World Order.”
12 Caitlin Byrne, “Securing the ‘Rules-Based Order
in the Indo-Pacific,” Security Challenges 16, no. 3
(2020): 1015.
13 Ryosuke Hanada,ASEAN’s Role in the Indo-Pa-
cific: Rules-Based Order and Regional Integrity” in
Mind the Gap: National Views of the Free and Open
Indo-Pacific, ed. Sharon Sterling, (Washington, DC:
German Marshall Fund of the United States Report,
2019): 7–12.
14 Maja Groff and Joris Larik, “Strengthening the
Rules-Based Global Order: The Case for an Interna-
tional Rule of Law Package,” Stimson Center, Sep-
tember 2020, https://www.stimson.org/.
15 Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “The Institutionaliza-
tion of the Indo-Pacific,” International Affairs 96, no.
1 (2020): 14968.
16 Patrick, “World Order.”
17 Ian Hall and Michael Heazle, “The Rules-Based
Order in the Indo-Pacific: Opportunities and
Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific
Indo-Pacific Perspective 41
Challenges for Australia, India and Japan,” Griffith
Asia Institute, Regional Outlook Paper No. 50 (2017),
https://www.griffith.edu.au/ .
18 Hall and Heazle,The Rules-Based Order in the
Indo-Pacific.”
19 Raymond, Nasu, Tan, and McLaughlin, “Prospects
for the Rules-Based Global Order.”
20 Byrne, “Securing the ‘Rules-Based Order’ in the
Indo-Pacific.”
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA
are those of the authors and should not be construed
as carrying the official sanction of the Department of
Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Com-
mand, Air University, or other agencies or depart-
ments of the US government or their international
equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective 42
A Rules-based
Order in the
Indo-Pacific
A View from Jakarta
Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar
n In recent years, there has been
a lot of talk about the importance
of ensuring a rules-based inter-
national order in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion. The increasing use of the “Indo-
Pacific” terminology to replace the
more familiar “Asia-Pacific” has been
promoted by the United States, Japan,
India, Australia, and Indonesia among
others in recognition of the integration
of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a
single geostrategic theater and the
growing importance of the maritime
domain. Various initiatives proposed
by different countries to promote a co-
operative framework in the Indo-Pa-
cific, such as a “Free and Open Indo-
Pacific” (FOIP) by Japan and the
United States and the “ASEAN Out-
look on the Indo-Pacific” by the Associ-
ation of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), each stress the importance
of adherence to international laws and
a rules-based international order. On
the one hand, this emphasis on a
rules-based international order could
be seen as nothing out of the ordinary,
since naturally all regional and inter-
national initiatives would and should
be based on commonly accepted inter-
national conventions and laws that
regulate international relations. On
the other hand, however, it also re-
flects the growing concerns that a
rules-based international order in the
Indo-Pacific is being threatened by
certain events and actions.
The current rules-based interna-
tional order is understood as a
broad architecture of global gov-
ernance which has developed since
the end of World War II.
1
This
rules-based international order is
centered on multilateral organiza-
tions, with the United Nations
(UN) as its primary custodian; a
set of universal norms, values and
principles; and international laws
all designed to maintain interna-
tional peace, prevent conflicts, and
promote common prosperity. In an
inherently anarchical international
8
A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific
Indo-Pacific Perspective 43
system where nation-states tend to
maximize their respective power
and compete with each other to
gain relative advantage, a rules-
based international order is aimed
at constraining power and curbing
the illegitimate use of power. The
UN Security Council has the ulti-
mate, and in the eyes of most
states, the only legitimate author-
ity to enforce compliance to the
rules-based international order by
punishing violations of the princi-
ples of the UN Charter and other
international laws. As a comple-
ment to the UN system, regional
organizations have played im-
portant roles in acting as early
warning systems, and in promoting
regional cooperation that help
maintain peace and stability in
their immediate neighborhoods.
It must be admitted that a rules-
based international order has re-
mained more of an aspiration than
a reality. Since the establishment
of the UN in 1948, world politics
was first dominated by the Cold
War between two opposing ideolog-
ical blocs led by the United States
and the Soviet Union respectively
(1948-1990), while in the post-Cold
War period there has been a prolif-
eration of interstate and intrastate
conflicts. Great power competition
has made a rules-based interna-
tional order difficult to achieve, as
adherence to international laws
has often been subjected to the
vested interests and military might
of major powers. In Southeast
Asia, international laws could not
protect the sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity of regional states, as
major powers used the former as
proxies in the Cold War. At the
multilateral level, the interna-
tional community has often found
it difficult to take collective actions
to maintain a rules-based interna-
tional order as the veto-wielding
powers on the UN Security Coun-
cil, particularly the United States
on the one hand, and China and
Russia on the other, have taken op-
posite positions in dealing with in-
ternational crises and supported
different sides in conflicts. Moreo-
ver, unilateral actions carried out
by major powers also often under-
mine the multilateral system un-
derpinning the rules-based inter-
national order.
The Indo-Pacific is a vast and di-
verse region with many security
flash points, such as the India-
China border dispute, the India-
Pakistan conflict over Kashmir,
North Korea’s nuclear threat, the
Taiwan issue, and the East China
Sea and South China Sea territo-
rial disputes. At the same time,
there are also myriad nontradi-
tional threats to security such as
transnational crimes carried out by
nonstate actors including
Anwar
Indo-Pacific Perspective 44
terrorism, people-smuggling, drug-
trafficking, and illegal fishing. De-
spite all these traditional and non-
traditional security threats, how-
ever, a rules-based international
order has overall prevailed in the
Indo-Pacific region. This region has
become a dynamic center of eco-
nomic growth, made possible by
the existence of relative regional
peace and stability which has ena-
bled countries to devote their
scarce resources to more produc-
tive uses and to engage in interna-
tional trade, investment, tourism
and other economic activities. The
relations between peace and devel-
opment are shown to be inextrica-
bly linked. In East Asia since the
1979, there have been significant
reductions in deaths from inter-
state conflicts as countries priori-
tized economic development as the
primary strategy for achieving
their national objectives, resulting
in the so-called “developmental
peace.”
2
While many intractable disputes
remain unresolved, regional states
have for the most part acted with
restraint to prevent open conflicts
and respect international laws,
while devoting their energies to
pursue economic development and
improve the welfare of their citi-
zens. ASEAN has succeeded in de-
veloping norms, values, principles,
and promoting ever widening and
deepening regional cooperation
that has transformed the formerly
conflict-ridden Southeast Asian re-
gion into a security community
where wars between the member
states are becoming unthinkable.
3
The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast
Asia has played an important role
as a regional code conduct which
stresses the importance of adher-
ence to international laws, peaceful
settlements of disputes, and the re-
jection of the use or threat of use of
force in resolving conflicts. ASEAN
has also tried to promote the prin-
ciples of the TAC to other countries
and, in fact, made accession to the
TAC as one of the conditions for
the dialogue partners to be ac-
cepted in the ASEAN-driven East
Asia Summit, now comprising the
10 ASEAN member states, Aus-
tralia, China, India, Japan, New
Zealand, South Korea, the United
States, and Russia.
In the past few years, however, the
rules-based international order has
come under greater challenge due
to the intensifying rivalry between
the China and the United Sates -
the ascending and incumbent su-
perpower, respectively - and
China’s increasingly assertive pol-
icy in the East and South China
Seas to enforce its territorial
claims. While the 1982 United Na-
tions Convention on Law of the Sea
A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific
Indo-Pacific Perspective 45
(UNCLOS) has provided the legal
basis for maritime governance,
particularly the extent of waters
and continental shelves that come
under the sovereignty and jurisdic-
tion of littoral states, it has also
engendered new disputes due to
overlapping claims between coun-
tries separated by narrow seas.
Several ASEAN countries have not
fully demarcated their maritime
boundaries, but they accept the
1982 UNCLOS without reserve,
carrying out drawn-out bilateral
negotiations to achieve mutually
satisfactory agreements, and in
certain cases submitting their dis-
putes to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and accepting the
Court’s decisions. For instance,
Malaysia accepted the ICJ’s deci-
sion to award the disputed island
Pedra Blanca to Singapore in 2008,
while Indonesia accepted the ICJ’s
ruling which favored Malaysia over
the disputed islands Sipadan and
Ligitan in 2002.
Based on UNCLOS, the Spratly Is-
lands in the South China Sea are
claimed in parts by four ASEAN
countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Vietnam) whose
claims do not overlap, and by Tai-
wan. China, on the other hand,
claims the entirety of the South
China Sea, based on historical and
traditional rights not recognized by
UNCLOS, which has become the
major focus of contention in the
area. Although Indonesia is not a
claimant in the Spratlys, China’s
so-called “nine-dash line” impinges
on Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna
Sea. While relations between
China and ASEAN countries have
become increasingly close, and
both sides try to manage conflicts
in the South China Sea through
the nonbinding 2002 Declaration of
the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC) and are currently
negotiating a binding Code of Con-
duct (COC), China has reclaimed
and militarized islands while its
navy and coast guards enforce
China’s claims through displays of
force. China has also refused to
recognize the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA) ruling of 2016
which affirmed the Philippines
rights to its claims in the Spratlys
based on the 1982 UNCLOS. Alt-
hough it has ratified the 1982 UN-
CLOS, China clearly does not feel
bound by it in pursuing its claim in
the South China Sea, while its
growing economic and military
prowess has given China the confi-
dence to flout the UNCLOS openly.
The United States, while it still
has not ratified the 1982 UNCLOS,
has played a leading role in pro-
moting the concept of a rules-based
international order in the Indo-Pa-
cific, joining others in adopting the
Anwar
Indo-Pacific Perspective 46
language of a FOIP strategy, such
as that proposed by President
Trump in 2017. The United States
is particularly concerned about dis-
ruptions to the freedom of naviga-
tions and overflights in the dis-
puted areas in the East and South
China Seas due to China’s military
actions. Under the Trump admin-
istration, the United States in-
creased the frequency of Freedom
of Navigation Operations (FONOP)
in the South China Sea and revi-
talized the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (the Quad) between the
United States, Japan, India, and
Australia as a deterrent to China’s
military actions. China undoubt-
edly regards the emphasis on a
rules-based international order
propounded by the United States
and the other Quad members as a
strategy to contain China, thus
perceiving this concept to be exclu-
sive rather than inclusive.
Southeast Asia as the frontline in
the US-China rivalry has no desire
to see the region being forced to
take side and divided again as had
happened during the Cold War.
Both China and the United States
are important partners of ASEAN
and its member states. While most
tacitly accept that the US initia-
tives in promoting a rules-based
order in the Indo-Pacific can play
an important role in deterring
China’s hegemonic ambitions in
the region, Southeast Asian coun-
tries do not wish to see the rivalry
between the existing superpowers
escalate and destabilize the region
as a whole, which could disrupt the
peace, stability and economic de-
velopment that the ASEAN region
has enjoyed. ASEAN has played an
important role as the primary re-
gional convenor in bringing to-
gether all the main stakeholders in
the Indo-Pacific region into
ASEAN-led regional mechanisms
such as the ASEAN Regional Fo-
rum (ARF) and the EAS. In 2019,
ASEAN launched the ASEAN Out-
look on the Indo-Pacific, which em-
phasized openness, transparency,
inclusiveness, and adherence to in-
ternational laws, including the UN
Charter and the UNCLOS, and the
principle of ASEAN centrality.
4
Faced with increasing major power
competitions, ASEAN has tried to
put itself as a bridge to promote di-
alogues and cooperation within an
inclusive regional architecture to
build trust, foster preventive diplo-
macy, and resolve conflicts through
peaceful means, that in turn may
contribute to a more inclusive
rules-based order in the Indo-Pa-
cific region. ■
Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar
Dr. Anwar is a research professor
at the Indonesian Institute of Sci-
ences.
A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific
Indo-Pacific Perspective 47
Notes
1
Ben Scott, Madeleine Nyst, Sam Roggeven, Aus-
tralia’s Security and The Rules-Based Order. Track-
ing a Decade of Policy Institution, https://interac-
tives.lowyinstitute.org/.
2
Stein Tønnesson, “Explaining East Asia’s Develop-
mental Peace: The Dividends of Economic Growth”,
Global Asia 10, no. 4 (December 2015),
https://www.globalasia.org/.
3
Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng, The ASEAN
Miracle. A Catalyst for Peace (Singapore: NUS Press,
2017).
4
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN
Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,International Affairs 96,
no. 1 (2020): 11129.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA
are those of the authors and should not be construed
as carrying the official sanction of the Department of
Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Com-
mand, Air University, or other agencies or depart-
ments of the US government or their international
equivalents.
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and informs decision makers and academicians around the globe.
Articles submitted to the journal must be unclassied, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. Features represent fully
researched, thoroughly documented, and peer-reviewed scholarly articles 5,000 to 6,000 words in length. Views articles
are shorter than Features—3,000 to 5,000 words—typically expressing well-thought-out and developed opinions about
regional topics. e Commentary section oers a forum about current subjects of interest. ese short posts are 1,500 to
2,500 words in length. Submit all manuscripts to JIPA@au.af.edu.
e views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the
ocial sanction of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, Air Education and Training Command,
Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government.
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Air University Press
Call for Articles and Manuscripts
Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)
Air University Press is soliciting manuscripts, journal articles,
and short papers that focus on Joint All Domain Operations
(JADO—see LeMay Doctrine Note 1-20). More specically,
Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2), is dened as
“The art and science of decision making to rapidly translate
decisions into action, leveraging capabilities across all
domains and with mission partners to achieve operational
and information advantage in both competition and conict.
Products could be historical case studies, lessons learned
from ongoing initiatives, or suggestions for future constructs.
Length may vary from journal articles (typically under
15,000 words), papers (15,000-75,000 words), or full-length
book manuscripts (over 75,000 words). Submit works to the
Director of Air University Press. Digital submissions and
inquiries are also welcome through our organizational email
at AirUniversityPress@au.af.edu.
Indo-Pacific Perspectives series
The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs' Indo-Pacific
Perspectives series, edited by Dr. Peter Harris, brings to
publication roundtable discussions offering answers to
complex geopolitical (and “geolegal”) questions. As the
name suggests, this new series will showcase viewpoints
from across the Indo-Pacific megaregion (and sometimes
beyond). The goal is to facilitate a dialogue between
academicians and policy practitioners that will be of great
interest to readers, policy makers, and decision makers.
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