The Air War in Ukraine: The First Year of Conflict, Cass Military Series. Edited by Dag Henriksen and Justin Bronk. Routledge, 2025, 250 pp.
Even for those readers familiar with Justin Bronk’s valuable writings on the Russian war in Ukraine, The Air War in Ukraine: The First Year of Conflict offers many new insights and remains extremely useful despite the intervening years that have passed since the air war’s initial year. Bronk is the senior research fellow for airpower and technology at the Royal United Services Institute, while co-editor Dag Henriksen leads the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy’s research and development. Except for the drone war, they argue airpower has often been ignored in discussions of the war, which tend to focus on the land battle above all else. To correct this, they seek to bring together a wide number of recognizable commentators on the war, including military analysts Jack Watling and Michael Kofman, who are supplemented by some lesser-known names whose chapters are equally insightful.
In an introduction, an epilogue, and seven chapters, The Air War in Ukraine covers everything from the air assault at Hostomel Airport to detailed chapters on Russian attempts to conduct the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses. Recognizing how the failure to obtain air superiority has led to the war’s “near stalemate” (3), the contributors steer clear of any definitive predictions because they want to “avoid misleading lessons” about the future of war from this conflict (2).
The book provides a blend of the three levels of war, with most analysis falling in between the tactical and operational. This focus is appropriate, given the limited operational use of airpower by both sides. Russia has not employed operational airpower, as it struggles to do so in ways equivalent to NATO’s complex air operations. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s limited air assets make it difficult to project airpower across the vast theater in a carefully orchestrated manner.
Some of the most interesting chapters carefully consider how trends in Russia’s war in Ukraine might affect the future of airpower, with the authors posing various ideas for consideration while avoiding predictions. Watling’s chapter on long-range fires, for example, notes that nations that have relied heavily on long-range fires have often done so out of weakness. This trend, however, could be changing. For example, although long flight times for cruise missiles are problematic, given the extent to which air defenses seek to remain mobile, the author speculates that long-range fires still may be more useful than manned aircraft in the future because the huge amount of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance required to support the battlefield can provide long-range fires with up-to-date information to allow dynamic targeting. If this is the case, then manned aircraft may become more useful for air denial missions.
The drone war chapter is also interesting, as demonstrated by Samuel Bendett and Leonid Nersisyan’s eschewal of much of the hype surrounding this aspect of the air war. Indeed, the authors even posit that Ukraine may be the last conflict where “commercial drones can be used at such a scale,” given the countermeasures currently being developed (182). They also suggest that many of these drones may be less cost effective than often argued as there are few statistics to substantiate such claims, other than the statistic citing almost 10,000 drone losses each month. In effect, small civilian drones may be most effective as part of an information warfare campaign in convincing observers that their side is being more successful. This critical consideration offers a breath of fresh air in light of the ceaseless commentary highlighting drones’ revolutionary qualities even though they have only added to the battlefield’s attrition rather than enabling maneuver breakthroughs.
The work concludes with the most strategic and operational analysis of the volume, which is unsurprising when considering that the author, Henriksen, is a professor of professional military education. He argues that airpower has largely led to a “renaissance” of what used to be “conventional wisdom during the Cold War” (195). The West has forgotten the importance of dispersal, hardening, and ground-based air defense. Henriksen also sides with traditionalists in the air superiority versus air denial camp by insisting that the notion that the “one controlling the air has a huge military advantage” is not under threat. He also challenges Western military thought that reduces airpower strategy to a “technology-driven, network-centric all-domain ability to establish air superiority” (210). Ultimately, the air war in Ukraine is a reminder of the central lessons the United States has lost sight of—a perspective often lost in views that seek to validate current Western thinking characterized by confirmation bias.
With contributions from some of the leading commentators on Russia’s war in Ukraine, The Air War in Ukraine offers invaluable insights to any Airman looking for extensive tactical and operational details and remains relevant despite focusing solely on the war’s first year. Despite its hefty price tag, it is well worth the read. While some readers might be fortunate to borrow a copy from their local library or service institution, squadrons might chip in for a shared copy, with individuals perhaps reading and briefing chapters over a brown-bag lunchtime series.
Heather P. Venable, PhD