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Original Sin: Power, Technology and War in Outer Space

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Original Sin: Power, Technology and War in Outer Space by Bleddyn E. Bowen. Oxford University Press, 2023, 180 pp.

Bleddyn Bowen, associate professor of astropolitics at Durham University, United Kingdom, has established himself as one of the leading contemporary minds concerning war in space, the impact of space on international relations, and space policy. His previous work, War in Space: Strategy, Spacepower, Geopolitics (Edinburgh University Press, 2020) provided original insight into the advantages of spacepower and limitations imposed on Earth by space capabilities and on conducting war against orbiting space assets, which Bowen developed into a proposed spacepower theory.

Original Sin: Power, Technology and War in Outer Space is his second book exploring war in space. With this volume, Bowen reacted to pronouncements made in the United States by then-President Donald Trump that space “as the ultimate high ground” is a warfighting domain that necessitated the creation of a space force to defend and exploit it. When the United States made this a priority in 2019, NATO and other European nations quickly followed suit. Satellite imagery showing Russia’s military buildup prior to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine reinforced to the public eye the fact that space was now being used for military intelligence purposes rather than primarily for scientific inquiry and commercial purposes.

Bowen’s purpose in Original Sin is to point out to a wider audience, particularly those who study international relations, that space has long been militarized. His argument is that technological advances in space all stem from World War II V-1 and V-2 rocket technology developed by Nazi Germany to launch bombs at the adversary—the original sin. This became the rationale for developing more powerful rockets to launch nuclear weapons across ever greater distances. Rocket development led to the ability to put satellites in orbit for a variety of purposes including early warning of attack, better command and control of military forces, intelligence gathering, and weather prediction. These capabilities are not somehow novel or recent but instead mature technologies that have been employed for over fifty years. As such, they should be part of the conversation of international politics, deterrence theory, and economics.

Reminiscent of Walter A. MacDougall’s The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (Basic Books, 1985), Bowen points out that for the most part, space capabilities and limitations are only understood by a technological elite. Given that the Earth’s orbit is shared with all nations, discussion of space policy should become a part of international relations study and global policy discussions rather than dictated by a more technologically imbued few. Space capabilities must be more widely understood in academia and government. That goal sets Original Sin apart from the burgeoning literature on space and spacepower that is generally devoted to shaping military thinking about space and United States’ policy and strategy decisions on the use of Earth’s orbits.

MacDougall published The Heavens and the Earth in 1985, focusing on the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Bowen’s Original Sin goes well beyond that to encompass developments in the 1990s through the early 2020s among all spacepowers, with emphasis on the United States, Russia, China, and Europe but also Japan, India, Brazil, and several other nations. For readers who are curious about space technology but have little prior knowledge, this comprehensive work would make them well informed. Once again, Bowen has done commendably thorough research, making exhaustive use of secondary sources, books, journal articles, news articles, magazines, theses, and websites. He also references unclassified primary sources including reports, think tank studies, lectures, and government documents.

Original Sin’s organization is straightforward chronological history broken into categories by major developments and specific nations. The book has three parts: 1) The Original Sin of Space Technology, 2) The Maturation of Spacepower, and 3) Strategy in the Global Space Age. Within each of these, the narrative proceeds in chronological sections, divided by nation. The first nations discussed are the United States, then Russia, then China, followed by others, which includes parallel and subsequent commercial development. This aids the reader by keeping all developments in context. One can also readily find and follow the developments in a specific country if that were of particular interest.

 In part 1, Bowen argues that rocket technology developed by scientists and engineers working for Nazi Germany during World War II was readily adopted by Allied powers to create their own enormously destructive weapons. Rockets used to deliver warheads were soon adapted to boost payloads into space. The gist of this section is that great power rivalry drove rocket technology and the space race rather than the idea of manned space flight for scientific purposes. Even among friendly nations, an unwillingness to becoming dependent on the United States for the advantages offered by command of space drove them to develop their own rocket boosters and satellite constellations.

Manned space flight, space stations, and celestial observations were then and remain now a sideshow compared to the unmanned uses of space developed for military and intelligence purposes. The direction that spacepower took to create military dominance is convincingly presented. The argument that the Third Reich is the origin of using rockets for military purposes is not well established. China, for example, used rockets in battle as early as the thirteenth century. Additionally, the idea that the public was infatuated with putting a man on the moon and with the space shuttles but remained generally unaware that rocket technology being developed for space also allowed for intercontinental ballistic missiles and that satellites in space were used for military purposes is not supported by ample evidence.

Part 2 aptly explains the development of space technology over the last several decades, showing how space technology has spread not only among rich nations but also developing nations and has reached maturity. Capabilities have gone far beyond the original intent of early warning and intelligence to include precise navigation, atmospheric monitoring, and rapid communications. Space capabilities are used not just for national interest but globally by the general public for commercial purposes.

The implications of spacepower in its current disposition on strategy and policy is fully developed in part 3. This is not speculative; Bowen’s analysis is based solidly on what physics allows and what is feasible given the consequences for interested commercial parties and nations. The current orbits and constellations dictate the vulnerability, timing, and characteristics of potential attacks. Discussed in this part are ground-based attacks on orbiting bodies, attacks on supporting infrastructure, space-based attacks on Earth terrain, and space-to-space attacks. Of note, Bowen points out that space is not immune to jamming, spoofing, or cyberattacks—ideas he thoroughly develops in his War in Space.

Does Bowen succeed in bringing space awareness to a larger audience? Yes—with qualifications. This book is unlikely to appeal to a general audience as there is no human-interest aspect to it. The technocratic space elite, military, and intelligence end-users might find it of interest to expand their knowledge of developments in nations and the commercial sector beyond what they experience every day. It is unlikely to enlighten their understanding of the path that spacepower took or its current capabilities. Military and diplomatic historians and those who specialize in the history of science and technology will find this valuable as would political scientists who specialize in this area. Most historians and international relations theorists today, however, have their favorite niches, which means that the academic audience that this volume will reach is limited—but it is a start. That said, Bowen demonstrates once again that he is one of the foremost space experts within academia with this commendable, scholarly work.

Dr. Phillip G. Pattee, Commander, USN, Retired

The views expressed in the book review are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense.

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