In Strange Company: An American Soldier with Multinational Forces in the Middle East and Iraq by Roland J. Tiso Jr. Casemate Publishers, 2024, 432 pp.
In Strange Company details the lessons learned and mistakes sometimes made during US Army Colonel Roland J. Tiso Jr.’s last 10 years of his military career, from the halls of the Pentagon, US Unified Command, and National Headquarters, to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and Africa, all the way to the deserts of Egypt and Middle East. During that time, Tiso served as a war planner at US Central Command, senior military adviser of the Arab Peninsula Shield Force and Multinational Division (Central-South [MND]), and chief of staff and deputy chief of staff for operations of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team.
His firsthand account focuses primarily on the Polish-led MND task force in Iraq, which was responsible for the rebuilding of Iraq after the official pullout and declaration of “victory.” Tiso outlines the myriad of obstacles—both intrinsic to Iraq and NATO, but also from US leadership—that needed to be overcome to meet the goal of a stabilized and democratic nation from 2003 to 2004. Iraq’s sovereignty and the need to bolster the country and partner with Iraqis are themes throughout his writing.
Tiso opens the book with his overarching thoughts about what he believes is and is not important in other human beings: devotion, rather than skin color or ethnicity. This theme is later revisited in his discussions of the common threads he found throughout the various divisions and ethnicities. He states, “Ultimately, soldiers of all nations want a competent chain of command who cares about them” (21).
From the outset, he decries the short-sightedness of the American plan for post-Sadaam Iraq. He writes, “His actions were typical of numerous military commanders who are slow to accept change and often find themselves using yesterday’s tactics to fight today’s wars.” He also notes that the “American military had not done enough to facilitate the division’s operational effectiveness” (207). Tiso brings up the reality of limited manpower and resources and the shift toward the Korean Peninsula once Iraq was “finished.”
He underscores the fact that the use of might will not always bring about the end goal if soft power is ignored. Cultural competence and past lessons learned allowed Tiso to advise others wisely and effectively in high-stress and high-risk situations. He retells instances of reachback or rewarding discussions with folks that he built personal relationships with that made a strategic difference. For example, he utilized his limited language skills to open the door with El Salvador troops by greeting them in their native Spanish and effectively using interpreters rather than demanding English every time he was present. He writes, “I always left these sessions with an appreciation that Americans do not have a monopoly on military expertise and professionalism and a lot can be learned from allies” (21).
He also took advantage of the power of gifts of remembrance and of honoring colleagues. He participated in multiple memorials for coalition members as well as Americans and worked hard to honor their sacrifice while maintaining the strategic momentum they had fought for.
Yet the book is not a depressing list of failures or finger-pointing. Instead, Tiso intersperses his writing with sage leadership advice—for example, “Events like these reminded me that you do not have to be the best at everything there is to do, but you do need to participate and do your best”—and humorous anecdotes and lessons he learned (23). He is a proponent of doing the little things that one can control, that set the stage for the broader operation. At multiple times he also stresses the importance of brevity and clarity. Another piece of advice offered throughout involves preparedness and being ready for whatever may come. In numerous stories, Tiso cleans and readies his weapon, sometimes to the amusement of his various hosts, before hitting the pillow after an arduous day.
In Iraq, Tiso served as an adviser to the Polish commander, Major General Tyszkiewicz. A significant part of his job was to be constantly ready to make his country’s goals and appeals, bringing honor to America as well as to his host. For example, describing the July 2001 birthday celebration of Queen Elizabeth, held by citizens of the British commonwealth, Tiso observes, “It was yet another event that demonstrated the need for a senior American officer to always be ready to speak in an intelligent, diplomatic, and charming manner” (22). Tiso brings up the vital aspect of tacit communication and lists many attributes that make or unmake a good adviser. A warrior ethos, for example, is essential: “The power of physical training goes beyond attaining physical strength and endurance”(163).
So much of the positive work done by the MND and Tiso was due to preparation. In multiple instances, the tide could have been turned if the appropriate defensive and offensive mandates or use of force had been allowed and employed. The actions—or in many cases, inaction—of various divisions within the MND cost time, resources, targets, and lives, directly or indirectly.
Tiso also includes predominant thoughts regarding various aspects of rebuilding a country. “You cannot impose peace,” he states, making the poignant observation that the tipping point for a successful transition from living under a dictatorship to filling the post-war power vacuum is the willingness and acceptance of the populace whose homeland it is (295). The phrase “quickly but legally” reflects the fact that in the era of post-war transition, as with most, everything was needed at this exact moment (311). Such urgency can quickly turn into an international emergency if not held back by the immediacy of keeping transactions legal.
The intricate dance required of participating in, much less leading, a multinational force with all of its nuances and facets brings forth interesting lessons for future work with partner nations. It was clear to Tiso that “multinational organizations seek approval at all levels up to and including the national level before they execute most tasks above the norm” and “dynamic situations and the dynamic actions they require are not their forte” (29).
Ultimately, Tiso provides a close-up view of the inner workings of a coalition aimed at bringing long-lasting peace to the war-pocked nation of Iraq, sometimes to the point that the reader can almost feel the dripping sweat or a visceral stress reaction. It is a uniquely personal look inside a man’s mind in strange situations, among company much different than himself, set on a backdrop of years of experience in cross-cultural interactions. It provides thoughts on quicksand to avoid and hard obstacles to be tackled in order to appropriately interact in the common goal of the nation as well as a coalition.
Major Rachel J. Stevenson