Strategic Horizons --
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Abstract
China has developed the world’s most expansive diplomatic network, underpinned by a strategy of “deep bench” diplomatic strength: deploying highly trained, flexible delegations across a growing array of multilateral and bilateral forums. This article explores how Beijing combines smart, sharp, discourse, and geoeconomic power to shape the global order, often outmaneuvering Western competitors through modular diplomatic teams and strategic investments in institutions like the Belt and Road Initiative and the International Seabed Authority. Case studies, including negotiations in the Solomon Islands and rule making in deep-sea mining, illustrate China’s capacity to integrate expertise and influence outcomes. The authors argue that China’s model—anchored in party-state discipline and centralized strategy—contrasts with US diplomatic decentralization. To compete effectively, the United States must enhance its own diplomatic capacity by expanding Track 2 networks, fostering multilateral alliances, and deploying strategic ambiguity. Understanding and countering China’s diplomacy-as-power model is essential to preserving US influence in a shifting global landscape.
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China has overtaken the United States in building the world’s most expansive diplomatic network. While Washington clings to a narrow lead in Europe, Central America, and South Asia, Beijing is poised to eclipse it in each of these regions. Over the past two decades, China has transformed its foreign policy from a peripheral, Asia-Pacific focus into a global strategy spanning regions once dominated by US influence. Now openly pursuing great-power status, Beijing has deployed a multilayered approach—melding economic outreach, bilateral ties, and emerging regional regimes.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 disrupted Beijing’s omnidirectional diplomacy, forcing China to pay a diplomatic price for its calculated ambivalence. Refusing to condemn Moscow or join Western-led sanctions, Beijing instead adopted a veneer of neutrality—while echoing Russian claims that NATO, not the Kremlin, bears responsibility for the war. This stance rendered China complicit in Western eyes, complicating its global outreach and exposing the cost of strategic hedging in an increasingly polarized world.
China’s claimed neutrality on Ukraine—what many experts aptly call “pro-Russian pseudo-neutrality”—has reshaped its global diplomatic posture. While paying lip service to Ukraine’s sovereignty, Beijing routinely abstains from UN resolutions condemning Russia and gives credence to Moscow’s grievances over NATO expansion. This calibrated ambiguity preserves its strategic alignment with the Kremlin while avoiding full diplomatic rupture with the West.
The result is a balancing act that has frayed—but not broken—China’s ties with the European Union, where leaders have grown more vocal on issues ranging from human rights to economic coercion. Even as Beijing refrains from directly breaching Western sanctions, it continues to shield Moscow through rhetorical and diplomatic cover.
Simultaneously, China actively courts developing nations with peace proposals that critics—including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy—argue tilt unmistakably toward Russian interests. Beijing’s outreach in the Global South and at the UN General Assembly reflects less a quest for resolution than a bid for influence, cloaked in the language of neutrality.
The question of China’s role as mediator divides analysts. Some see diplomatic potential, citing Beijing’s economic clout and the widening rift between the United States and Europe. Others dismiss the overtures as tactical, designed less to broker peace than to ease European pressure and reframe the conflict on China’s terms.
The fallout has gone global. Sino-American relations have grown more brittle, while Western allies in Asia and Europe are abandoning ambiguity. They are hedging more openly, building diplomatic and security bulwarks against a China that increasingly treats peace as performance and diplomacy as strategic theater.
Nonetheless, the invasion has enabled China to capitalize on its diplomatic gains across much of the nonaligned world. Beijing has turned its focus toward what it calls an emerging “southern moment” (nanfang shike 南方时刻), a period when non-Western governments can assert their interests more openly. China claims its position on Ukraine aligns with that of other non-Western powers—especially BRICS+ members—who have avoided taking sides and instead adopted a variety of hedging strategies.
At the same time, Beijing has sharpened its diplomatic engagement with European capitals, anticipating turbulence in transatlantic relations. This recalibration has fueled an aggressive push for influence at a time when American diplomacy faces mounting scrutiny, both from abroad and at home. Washington’s strategic coherence appears increasingly in doubt amid revived fears of US isolationism.
After years of setbacks driven by Western pressure and the global pandemic, Beijing now sees fresh openings to expand its already far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative. These ambitions require meticulous planning, often led by the instruments of diplomacy. The approach reflects China's status as a latecomer to global geopolitics—but one that is rapidly gaining ground.
Efforts to cast China as a clear adversary have sparked sharp debate in the United States and across the West. Beijing has pushed back, framing the so-called “China threat” as a projection of American self-interest—a sign, it argues, of a retreat into exclusionary “small circle” (xiao kuanzi 小圈子) alliances and a lingering Cold War mentality (lengzhan siwei 冷战思维) that denies the strategic realities of a shifting global order.
Washington now acknowledges China as a comprehensive challenge—military, economic, and technological—but disagreements remain over how to define the threat and manage its consequences. The risks have become starkly visible in global trade. Despite a decade of American efforts to “decouple” from China, bilateral trade reached USD 575 billion in 2023. The renewed trade war, reignited by Washington in early 2025, culminated in a 145-percent tariff on Chinese goods—a de facto embargo. Beijing saw the move not as a setback but as an opening to deepen trade ties with Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa.
The challenge of China’s rise demands more than reflexive confrontation. It requires strategic clarity, sober analysis, and a recognition of the combustible intersection between economic rivalry and military risk.
The 2022 US National Security Strategy offered a striking characterization: it labeled China as the top “pacing challenge” to the United States—a designation that amounts to a formal recognition of China as the chief long-term threat. Yet the term pacing, despite its frequent use, remains frustratingly vague. If Washington intends to marshal a genuine whole-of-nation response, the concept must be clarified and rigorously examined.
Congress has taken initial steps. Legislative initiatives—including a proposed Senate framework for a national strategy to compete with China, along with bipartisan efforts by the US House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party—reflect growing recognition of the scope of the challenge. But momentum alone is not enough; these efforts must produce concrete mechanisms for sustained economic and technological competition.
The Biden administration’s response has focused heavily on industrial policy and export control. The 2022 CHIPS and Science Act aimed to shore up domestic semiconductor production and blunt China’s technological ambitions. Executive Orders 14083 and 14034 sought to strengthen data protections and critical infrastructure safeguards. Meanwhile, updated applications of Section 301 tariffs extended the economic front of the confrontation.
These measures acknowledged that strategic competition has moved beyond tanks and warships—it now runs through supply chains, codebases, and investment flows. Yet the implications of the reignited trade war remain uncertain. The effectiveness of these policies may hinge not on their ambition, but on their execution under the shifting pressures of global markets.
In light of these changes, the very definition of “China risk” must be revisited. Before policy makers can propose durable solutions, they must first come to terms with the full spectrum of the threat—military, economic, technological, and ideological.
Power Paths and How to Address Them
Despite some initial steps to counter China’s growing influence, current US efforts remain preliminary—insufficient to match the scale of the strategic challenge ahead. If Washington intends to safeguard its domestic and foreign policy goals, it must move beyond posturing and invest in the full spectrum of national power. At its core, this means preparing to compete through the disciplined development of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools—the so-called DIME model.
To meet the pacing challenge posed by China, the United States must first define it with clarity. But it must also understand the mechanisms through which Beijing projects power. Several analytical frameworks can help illuminate this competition—most notably the concept of smart power: the strategic blend of attraction (soft power) and coercion (hard power). As one definition puts it, smart power is “the exercise of good statecraft,” in which a nation deploys its resources to achieve strategic objectives with optimal efficiency.
China has embraced this model. With expanding economic clout and political reach, Beijing has steadily refined its use of smart power. The 2016 creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), positioned as a rival to the Western-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund, exemplifies this approach. Through the AIIB, China has attracted investors and expanded global buy-in using soft power—while retaining the ability to exert fiscal pressure and coercive leverage when required.
At the same time, Washington must recognize and counter two other, more insidious forms of power increasingly deployed by Beijing. The first is sharp power—the covert manipulation of political and information systems through disinformation, censorship, and infiltration. Unlike soft power, which persuades, sharp power deceives. It is the preferred instrument of authoritarian regimes intent on corroding democratic institutions from within.
Secondly, China has also turned its attention to a more subtle but equally potent arena: discourse power. Drawing from the Foucauldian notion of discourse as a tool of social control, Beijing has placed a modern, strategic spin on the concept. For decades, Chinese leaders have recognized the influence of the global information ecosystem and have sought to assert China’s huayu quan (话语权)—its “right to speak” in international affairs. The stated goal: to “tell China’s story well” (jianghao Zhongguo gushi 讲好中国故事) and counter what it views as Western distortions of its image, interests, and identity.
This campaign has taken many forms. Beijing has attempted to shape global media narratives, influence civil society discourse, and deploy a now-notorious brand of aggressive rhetoric known as wolf-warrior diplomacy (zhanlang waijiao 战狼外交). This approach aims to deflect, with sharp and public rebuke, any perceived slights against China (ruHua 辱华), often with theatrical flair.
Yet signs of internal friction have emerged. Recent research points to internal debates within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where directives have advised embassies to “avoid unnecessary confrontations” online. Analysts have identified a growing divide between “combatist” and “persuasionist” factions. The sidelining of high-profile spokespeople and the July 2023 reinstatement of veteran diplomat Wang Yi as foreign minister marked a recalibration. Beijing now signals a more measured “dialogue first” approach—though one still laced with nationalist messaging tailored to domestic audiences.
By the end of 2023, the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference had formally endorsed a turn away from the more abrasive wolf-warrior tactics. Still, this rhetorical softening does not signal a retreat. Chinese diplomats remain assertive, and Xi Jinping’s strategic communications push continues unabated. The objective remains the same: shape the international narrative to reflect China’s worldview and legitimacy.
As Jake Sullivan and Wang Yi have both observed, the interaction between official diplomacy and online nationalist fervor produces a feedback loop—one that escalates the tone and intensity of China’s foreign policy messaging. More aggressive methods, officials argue, are required to defend China’s discourse power from what they see as hegemonic Western narratives. To many in the West, this is simply propaganda or sharp power by another name.
Beijing has shown little hesitation in wielding geoeconomic power to discipline states it deems noncompliant. Through targeted economic coercion, it has punished smaller countries for actions perceived as politically offensive. The list is telling: Norway, for awarding the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to dissident Liu Xiaobo; Canada, for detaining a Chinese telecom executive in 2018; Sweden, for criticizing China’s human rights record; South Korea, for deploying US missile defense systems; and Lithuania, for permitting the establishment of a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius in 2021.
These are not isolated incidents—they are part of a calculated pattern. And with the Sino-American trade war now reignited, the scale and frequency of China’s economic coercion will likely intensify.
Africa offers a broader example of this strategy cloaked in soft power. While Beijing frames its investments on the continent as fair and mutually beneficial, they often create economic dependencies ripe for exploitation. Nowhere is this clearer than in Sub-Saharan Africa, where China has embedded itself through large-scale infrastructure financing. Kenya serves as a cautionary tale: the country owes 72 percent of its external debt to China and faces the real risk of forfeiting control over Mombasa port in the event of default.
A similar pattern has emerged in Latin America. Between 2005 and 2020, China funded more than 138 infrastructure projects across the region, totaling more than USD 94 billion. These projects are marketed as symbols of cooperation. Yet US officials have warned that they serve Beijing’s broader aim: to foster economic dependence and exert strategic leverage under the guise of development.
This contradiction lies at the heart of China’s geoeconomic playbook. As one scholar put it, globalization has shifted the strategic paradigm—from the modern world of raw geopolitical power to the postmodern world of images and influence. In this new landscape, the line between attraction and coercion has blurred. Beijing has learned to exploit that ambiguity. Its diplomatic toolkit now fuses soft-power optics with hard-power outcomes, masking coercion in the language of partnership.
The initial US–China trade war in 2018 inflicted real economic damage on the American economy while achieving little in the way of meaningful policy change in Beijing. That scenario has now materialized. In retrospect, the post-2018 trade war acted less as a resolution than as a warning light—amber, not red—spurring Beijing to accelerate its economic repositioning. Under the banner of “dual circulation” (shuang xunhuan 双循环), China began shifting its strategic priorities. The emphasis moved inward, toward what officials call “domestic great circulation” (guonei da xunhuan 国内大循环): a bid to stimulate internal growth while retaining a robust footprint in global trade.
These self-reliance measures are about to face their most serious test. The second phase of the trade war—now underway—will reveal whether Beijing’s hedging strategy can withstand the full weight of US economic pressure. The decoupling it feared is no longer theoretical. It has arrived.
Adding to Deep-Bench Strength
The forms of power Beijing now exercises—economic, discursive, and diplomatic—are increasingly shaping the rules of great-power engagement. At the center of this shift lie Sino-American relations, but equally important is the human infrastructure behind China’s rise: the diplomatic corps itself. Personnel, after all, is policy.
Beijing’s diplomatic strategy hinges not just on policy goals but on the caliber of the individuals tasked with advancing them. Delegations are no longer mere formalities—they are competitive teams built with precision. Technical expertise, strategic acumen, negotiation savvy, and cultural fluency now define the new standard. Add to this emotional intelligence, communication skills, and a deep sensitivity to cross-cultural nuance, and the result is a cadre designed for twenty-first-century statecraft.
But temperament matters, too. Traits such as patience, deliberation, resilience, pragmatism, and intellectual curiosity are increasingly prized. This is why the post-2019 wolf-warrior approach, while popular with nationalist audiences, often proved counterproductive on the world stage. Bluster erodes trust. Diplomacy, at its core, demands credibility.
China’s growing edge lies in its ability to assemble high-functioning, mission-specific delegations capable of operating across the full spectrum of global diplomacy. Whether in multilateral forums or bilateral engagements, Beijing now fields teams that compete—and increasingly prevail—not by chance, but by design.
This strategic advantage begins with a vast reservoir of technically skilled professionals. Through sweeping institutional reforms, Chinese ministries and agencies have developed reliable pipelines to feed the state’s diplomatic machine. From this pool, officials handpick delegates not only for subject-matter expertise but for strategic fit: familiarity with the host country, regional dynamics, linguistic fluency, and a working knowledge of opposing delegations. The result is a form of modular diplomacy—custom-built teams calibrated to the terrain.
China’s diplomatic delegations are no longer merely present. They are often the best prepared actors in the room. As Beijing continues refining this model, its capacity to outmaneuver rivals—through precision, not posture—will only deepen. Two recent cases illustrate how this playbook works in practice.
Case 1: The Solomon Islands Security Pact
In April 2022, Beijing’s negotiations with the Solomon Islands produced a landmark security pact—one that blindsided Western observers and displayed China’s capacity for swift, coordinated diplomacy. The Pacific island nation had switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 2019, but the speed and scope of the 2022 engagement surprised even seasoned analysts.
A Chinese delegation, reportedly 22 officials strong, landed in Honiara with personnel drawn from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, and key state-owned infrastructure firms. Within days, the team finalized and signed a draft agreement—leaked in March—before informing rival governments. The move preempted ongoing US and Australian efforts to influence the Solomon Islands’ security choices, effectively shutting them out of the decision-making window.
The delegation’s structure reflected China’s strategic method: integrated, modular, and built for speed. It fused law enforcement cooperation, naval considerations, and infrastructure investment—ports, communications, logistics—into a single, coordinated offer. The pact’s quiet finalization and the deliberate exclusion of foreign actors underscored China’s new standard for expeditionary diplomacy: deploy expertise, move fast, and leave competitors scrambling.
Case 2: Deep-Sea Mining at the International Seabed Authority
China’s ambitions beneath the ocean floor offer another window into its quiet strategic advance. At the International Seabed Authority (ISA), headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica, Beijing holds more exploration contracts than any other nation. It is using that leverage to shape the future of seabed mining—one regulation at a time.
During the ISA’s July 2023 Assembly session, convened shortly after the expiration of the “two-year rule” deadline to finalize a mining code, China’s delegation played a pivotal role. Aligning with states like Nauru that sought to push forward, Beijing opposed efforts by a coalition of Western, Latin American, and Pacific nations to impose a moratorium on mining. The Chinese team ensured that negotiations continued—delaying regulatory roadblocks and preserving momentum toward eventual exploitation.
But technical prowess is only part of the strategy. Beijing has built diplomatic influence through sustained capacity-building efforts, including the ISA–China Joint Training and Research Centre in Qingdao, which educates developing-state personnel and cultivates future allies. At the same time, China’s contractors hold privileged environmental and geological data that many other states lack—creating an asymmetry that Beijing exploits to dominate technical drafting, such as for environmental management plans in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. This data-driven advantage places many other delegations in a reactive position.
Together, these moves reflect a larger strategy: use legal and technical expertise to shape global rules, quietly build coalitions through training and outreach, and maintain a firm grip on information flows. In a low-visibility forum like the ISA, where few headlines are written, China has mastered the art of winning by accumulation—stacking small victories until the outcome is inevitable.
As the preceding case studies make clear, China is increasingly mastering what might be called a “deep bench” strategy—a concept borrowed from sports but fully applicable to diplomacy. At its core, this refers to Beijing’s ability to field not only active experts but also reserve personnel with targeted specializations, ready to be deployed as needed. The result is greater flexibility, faster adaptation, and a broader capacity to shape outcomes.
This delegation depth enables another strategic capability: the formation of multinational coalitions that tilt decision-making bodies in China’s favor. By cultivating technical allies and aligning with like-minded states, Beijing can quietly assemble majority voting blocs or working group majorities within international institutions—often outpacing rivals without fanfare. Understanding this institutional maneuvering is essential to refining assessments of Beijing as a pacing challenge. It broadens the lens beyond conventional hard or military power and brings into focus China’s systemic and procedural advantages.
The United States, to be clear, also maintains deep benches of its own—especially in defense, trade, and multilateral negotiations. Yet matching China’s delegation efficiency remains difficult. One key reason lies in structural differences. Beijing’s system ensures that priorities are centrally aligned and rigorously enforced. Delegates operate with clear mandates and unified messaging—hallmarks of the party-state model. US diplomats, by contrast, operate within a pluralist framework shaped by interagency coordination, congressional oversight, and democratic constraints. These features rightly favor deliberation and accountability, but they can slow decision-making in the field.
This divergence is not strictly a weakness—it is situational. In some contexts, the US approach provides strategic patience, moral authority, and room for recalibration. But in fast-paced environments, China’s ability to act swiftly—knowing when to close a deal or walk away—can offer a tactical edge.
Europe, meanwhile, presents a more distributed model of diplomacy. While EU member states maintain capable foreign services, they often lack fully staffed, issue-specific delegations. Many European officials carry overlapping portfolios, which can lead to thin coverage in technical negotiations or underperformance in niche forums. In such settings, delegation depth is not just a matter of numbers—it is a matter of sustained strategic investment.
As China’s foreign policy apparatus has matured, so too has its willingness—and capacity—to employ a layered mix of diplomacy and para-diplomacy. Drawing from deepening expertise, Beijing now actively leverages both Track 1 (official, state-to-state relations) and Track 2 (nongovernmental interactions involving think tanks, academic institutions, and cultural organizations) channels to broaden its diplomatic reach.
While China continues to invest heavily in traditional Track 1 diplomacy, it has simultaneously cultivated a sophisticated Track 2 infrastructure. This dual-track strategy allows Beijing to advance influence, shape narratives, and gather intelligence through multiple parallel pathways. Track 2 mechanisms in particular offer Beijing an arena to “test-drive” ideas too sensitive for official channels—creating plausible deniability while laying groundwork for future state policy.
Chinese universities, think tanks, and affiliated institutions often engage in preliminary conversations on geopolitically charged issues, offering unofficial platforms for dialogue that can later be formalized. These engagements are not peripheral—they often form the conceptual scaffolding for formal diplomatic action. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers a telling example: academic exchanges, research partnerships, and cultural diplomacy frequently precede infrastructure or investment agreements, priming environments for acceptance and reducing friction at the official level.
This coordinated interplay between Tracks 1 and 2 reflects a high degree of strategic planning. Beijing’s ability to align messaging, advance discourse power, and sustain consistent objectives across formal and informal channels—while maintaining necessary compartmentalization—demonstrates a level of diplomatic sophistication that many Western governments struggle to match. Where others separate public diplomacy from statecraft, China integrates the two into a cohesive apparatus aimed at systemic global influence. As Beijing continues its effort to displace the United States as the preeminent global power, this dual-track model will remain a core tool in its diplomatic arsenal.
Effective diplomacy increasingly hinges not on any single instrument, but on the breadth and strategic deployment of multiple forms of power. The most successful delegations arrive equipped with a full spectrum of capabilities—carefully selected, deeply coordinated, and tailored to specific objectives. In this context, Joseph Nye’s enduring concept of soft power—particularly his framing of “co-optive power,” or the ability to structure situations so that others adopt preferences aligned with one's own—remains foundational. The ability to shape agendas and frame debates, often subtly, is among the most powerful tools any delegation can wield.
China has demonstrated a growing aptitude for exactly this kind of influence. As Beijing’s capacity to establish and normalize alternative norms expands, its diplomatic toolkit grows more refined. Beyond merely responding to global developments, Chinese diplomats increasingly help define which issues are discussed, how they are framed, and which rules are seen as legitimate.
This is not solely a function of policy. China’s growing bench of expert personnel—supported by institutional reforms, long-term planning, and significant resource allocation—provides remarkable flexibility across both substance and setting. Whether in bilateral negotiations, multilateral forums, or technical working groups, Beijing can calibrate its approach to suit the environment: projecting soft power to build coalitions, using persuasive authority to reframe contested narratives, or applying sharper measures when core interests are at stake.
This capacity for tailored, situation-specific engagement represents a critical advantage. The ability to choose the right tool at the right moment—whether to attract, persuade, deter, or compel—gives Chinese delegations a level of tactical versatility that few states can match. As China continues to refine this approach, it significantly increases its chances of shaping outcomes across the global diplomatic landscape.
In the realm of soft power, the United States retains enduring structural advantages—chief among them its decentralized, bottom-up character. Unlike China’s largely state-driven approach, American soft power tends to emerge organically from civil society, private enterprise, and individual relationships. This spontaneous quality fosters greater credibility abroad, as influence is not perceived as a coordinated instrument of statecraft but as a reflection of values, creativity, and pluralism. Cultural attraction that arises naturally—through film, education, innovation, or people-to-people connections—is generally viewed as more authentic and trustworthy than top-down messaging orchestrated by government entities.
By contrast, China’s soft power remains predominantly state-directed. Though Beijing has sought to amplify its global appeal, much of its perceived influence is tied to material inducements—especially those stemming from its economic resilience. In this context, commercial diplomacy, including loans, grants, and infrastructure development, has often been framed as soft power. However, such efforts arguably fall closer to what might be described as “carrot-based” coercive tools—forms of geoeconomic leverage rather than attraction in the Nyean sense.
Nevertheless, Beijing has proven highly adept at positioning itself as an alternative financial and diplomatic partner in regions historically underserved or overlooked by the West. In Sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Southeast Asia, and increasingly in Latin America, China has cultivated a reputation as a responsive and pragmatic actor. The BRI, despite facing notable headwinds in Europe, continues to function as a hybrid platform for both hard- and soft-power projection elsewhere. Today, China stands as South America’s largest trading partner and a significant source of foreign direct investment, especially in energy, infrastructure, and logistics. It has deepened engagement in sensitive sectors such as critical minerals, renewable energy, digital services, and space collaboration, while expanding military ties with select countries, particularly Venezuela.
Additionally, Chinese and Hong Kong–domiciled firms now hold dominant positions across several strategic sectors in Latin America, including critical mineral extraction, port operations, digital infrastructure, logistics, and renewable energy. These investments frequently align with Beijing’s broader strategic objectives and, in certain cases, overlap with infrastructure projects that carry potential dual-use implications. Notable examples include Chinese-funded port developments in Sri Lanka and Cambodia—both cited in US and allied reporting as possible future nodes for naval access—as well as prospective facilities in West Africa, with Equatorial Guinea and Gabon often mentioned as candidate sites.
Concerns over dual-use infrastructure have intensified with the November 2024 opening of the Chancay Port in Peru—a major Beijing-financed deep-water facility on the Pacific coast. Though nominally commercial, the port’s scale, control structure, and proximity to US regional interests have raised questions about its potential military utility in the event of future strategic competition.
Despite the passage of more than a decade since the launch of the BRI, the United States has yet to present a sustained, comprehensive alternative. Going forward, Washington will need to remain alert to Beijing’s expanding geoeconomic footprint and the structural leverage it affords. Equally important will be the ability to recognize and act upon future strategic openings—jihui zhi chuang (机会之窗)—that Beijing will likely exploit if US diplomatic and developmental tools are not fully and effectively deployed.
In addition to serving as a prominent example of Chinese capabilities within the virtual domain and broader information ecosystem, China’s growing emphasis on discourse power represents a key frontier in its strategic competition with the United States. Countering this effort will require Washington not only to cultivate a deeper bench of expertise on Chinese political narratives but also to respond swiftly and credibly when those narratives distort facts or undermine US interests.
Beijing has used a range of state-aligned media platforms to promote its own interpretations of global events—casting China as a stable, rising alternative to what it depicts as a fragmented and declining West. At its core, the push for greater discourse power is framed domestically as a defensive necessity, not an offensive ambition. From Beijing’s perspective, narrative control is essential to protecting regime legitimacy against what it views as a sustained US-led strategy to weaken the party-state from within.
Chinese analysts often interpret US efforts to promote democratic values and transparency as thinly veiled attempts at discourse checks and balances (huayu zhiheng 话语制衡), designed to expose vulnerabilities in Chinese political and social systems. In more pointed assessments, such activities are associated with the orchestration of color revolutions (yanse geming 颜色革命), drawing parallels to US policies in the post-Soviet space over the past two decades.
What has changed is the increasingly sophisticated digital infrastructure available to China for projecting and defending its preferred narratives. The information realm has been fully securitized in Chinese strategic thinking, transforming discourse power into a critical domain of statecraft—no less important than traditional tools of diplomacy or defense.
Recommendations: Leading While Defending
The United States must continue to posture itself for long-term strategic competition with China by harnessing the full spectrum of national power—diplomatic instruments included. As foreign affairs agencies play a central role in advancing national security objectives, it is imperative that US diplomacy be sufficiently resourced, institutionally empowered, and operationally agile. This requires not only a firm grasp of the nature and strengths of Chinese diplomatic practices but also the development of American delegations capable of contending with Beijing’s increasingly effective teams.
While the contours of Sino-American rivalry are often most visible within the framework of the BRI, they extend well beyond infrastructure alone. The BRI’s associated mechanisms—ranging from infrastructure diplomacy and the politics of concessionary loans to so-called “debt-trap diplomacy,” economic coercion, strategic port development, and regional influence-building—have created a competitive landscape that demands nuanced and assertive US responses. These initiatives often serve to entrench economic dependency and reinforce China’s geopolitical positioning in key regions.
As the US Department of State expands its capabilities and alliances to counter these moves, sustained investment in diplomatic talent and tools will be essential. Strategic communication—both in messaging and action—must reinforce American commitment, credibility, and intent.
To that end, the authors propose three core recommendations to strengthen the US diplomatic posture vis-à-vis China:
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Transform, expand, and institutionalize Track 2 diplomacy networks to enable parallel channels of engagement, policy incubation, and early signaling.
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Build and reinforce a multilateral system of regional alliances that is resilient, interoperable, and adaptable to new challenges.
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Employ strategic ambiguity in targeted diplomatic engagements to retain flexibility, manage escalation thresholds, and avoid premature policy exposure.
Together, these steps can help the United States compete more effectively in an environment where diplomacy itself has become a core arena of strategic contestation.
Transform, Expand, and Institutionalize Track 2 Diplomacy Networks
The United States should deepen its strategic investment in Track 2 diplomacy with China, particularly in areas where official channels remain strained or inoperative. Unofficial dialogues—led by academics, former officials, policy experts, and civil society actors—have consistently proven their utility in navigating sensitive issues such as maritime disputes, human rights, and commercial relations, all without the rigidity or risk of formal diplomatic engagement.
Priority should be given to establishing structured, issue-specific mechanisms that address high-risk domains. One such area is cross-strait security. Creating dedicated dialogue platforms involving American, Taiwanese, and Chinese scholars can foster authoritative exchanges on strategic signaling, crisis management, and military posture—reducing the likelihood of escalation driven by misperception or miscommunication.
In parallel, Track 2 initiatives should be expanded to encompass areas of technical or transnational overlap, including climate change, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and global health. These dialogues offer rare but critical windows for pragmatic cooperation, even amid systemic rivalry.
Effective implementation will require sustained congressional funding—specifically targeted at nongovernmental military diplomacy and strategic risk reduction. Resources must also account for the growing difficulty of sustaining such engagement in a climate of deepening bilateral mistrust. Where feasible, support should prioritize in-person exchanges to preserve the human element of diplomacy and to build durable networks of trust and knowledge across expert communities.
Build and Reinforce a Multilateral System of Regional Alliances
The United States must shift from its long-standing “hub-and-spokes” model of bilateral alliances in the Indo-Pacific to a more integrated “latticework” of multilateral security partnerships—an evolution that Beijing increasingly views as a strategic constraint on its regional ambitions. This transformation is already underway, with initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) trilateral serving as foundational pillars of a more networked regional architecture.
To advance this model, the United States must deepen diplomatic efforts that go beyond bilateral ties and actively promote greater coordination among allies and partners. Implementation should include establishing regular ministerial-level dialogues, expanding joint military exercises, enhancing intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and crafting unified diplomatic responses to Chinese coercion. These efforts should encourage US partners to cultivate their own horizontal security relationships, reducing overreliance on Washington and enhancing regional resilience.
Equally important is the inclusion of emerging partners—particularly states experiencing growing pressure from Beijing—into this multilateral framework. Rather than reacting reflexively to every Chinese initiative, US diplomacy should distinguish between proposals that constructively contribute to regional development and those that erode international norms or foster dependency. Where appropriate, Washington should affirm shared interests, while reinforcing regional consensus against destabilizing or coercive behavior.
This approach—anchored in shared values, mutual interests, and distributed responsibility—will strengthen US credibility in the Indo-Pacific and present a compelling alternative to China’s vision of regional order.
Employ Strategic Ambiguity in Targeted Diplomatic Engagements
US diplomacy toward China must blend strategic ambiguity with calibrated clarity—an approach that enables Washington to maintain flexibility while preserving firm commitments where necessary. Particularly during administration transitions or periods of policy recalibration, a degree of unpredictability can be advantageous. As noted by analysts, “Beijing craves clarity from Washington” to shape its responses; ambiguity, when used judiciously, can therefore serve as a valuable strategic tool.
This posture should be implemented through a refined diplomatic strategy that clearly signals unwavering positions on key issues such as Taiwan’s security, freedom of navigation, the integrity of foreign direct investment, and protection of intellectual property rights. At the same time, it should retain flexibility in areas where mutual accommodation remains possible. Revitalizing long-standing frameworks—such as the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, the first bilateral treaty signed following normalization in 1979—can help sustain institutional continuity even amid rising tensions.
Such engagement must also address critical vulnerabilities, particularly in domains like cybersecurity, where dedicated channels should be established to confront persistent Chinese targeting of US government systems, private sector assets, and critical infrastructure. A fully integrated diplomatic strategy must also align economic and security considerations, recognizing that the geoeconomic dimension of US–China rivalry is likely to shape the long-term strategic landscape.
As Beijing continues to leverage its massive human capital through deep-bench delegations that can outnumber and outmaneuver smaller foreign missions, the United States faces mounting disadvantages, particularly in regions like the Global South. These gaps in diplomatic presence and capacity increasingly undermine Washington’s ability to compete effectively. The traditional “West” as a source of unified diplomatic weight has eroded, and all indications suggest continued fragmentation.
To confront this challenge, the United States must commit to a significant expansion and reinforcement of its diplomatic corps. Effective delegation teams—resourced, empowered, and strategically deployed—remain central to advancing American interests in a competitive environment. The concept of “US-led” still carries substantial influence, and it must be animated by bold diplomacy and principled leadership—attributes that have long defined American engagement on the world stage. ♦
Dr. Troy J. Bouffard
Dr. Bouffard is the director of the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience (CASR) at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF). He is a recognized expert in Arctic security, geopolitics, and defense policy. His work focuses on understanding the complex security dynamics emerging in the rapidly changing Arctic region, including great-power competition, infrastructure, logistics, and regional governance. Dr. Bouffard often instructs courses related to Arctic security and international relations at UAF. As director of CASR, he leads efforts in research, education, and engagement to address critical Arctic security issues.
Prof. Marc Lanteigne
Professor Lanteigne is an associate professor of political science at UiT: The Arctic University of Norway in Tromsø. His research focuses on Chinese politics and foreign policy, East Asian international relations, and the politics and political economy of the Polar Regions. Professor Lanteigne has an extensive academic background, having previously taught in Canada, China, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. He has also conducted research across the Arctic region and on Antarctic politics and legal issues. He is the author of Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction, which is now in its fourth edition, and the co-editor of the Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security. His work includes numerous articles and books on Chinese and Asian international affairs, with a particular emphasis on polar diplomacy. He is also the chief editor of the Arctic news blog, Over the Circle.
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