Historical Analysis of The Defense and Restoring Dominance in Counter-Mobility

How have armies historically layered reconnaissance, fires, and maneuver in defense-in-depth operations, particularly against mass and momentum in warfare? Conversely, how have adversaries historically bypassed or degraded defensive lines? What lessons can NATO draw from these historical defensive operations, and how can these lessons inform the Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative?

To apply these historical lessons to modern defense-in-depth, the military must examine current counter-mobility capabilities. Considering the demonstrated effectiveness of landmines in recent Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), such as the Russia-Ukraine War, what specific and comprehensive DOTMLPF-P changes are required to field a modernized, multi-echelon landmine warfare capability? To prevail in combat against both near-peer and regional competitors, the Joint Force must find ways to offset its reliance on exquisite and expensive systems or munitions.

How must the military balance the development of low-cost, expendable, and attritable systems for employment en masse against the continued quest for advanced, networked munitions to achieve intended obstacle effects? Across both the air and ground domains, the integration of high volumes of low-cost unmanned systems presents a potential solution to shape all-arms maneuver operations on the modern battlefield. What is the optimal operational concept for integrating unmanned systems—specifically one-way attack and loitering munitions—into maneuver formations to offset this reliance on expensive legacy systems?

Simultaneously, recent research and projects have demonstrated the feasibility of launching large numbers of small, potentially long-range combat air vehicles from cargo aircraft. How can these cargo-launched vehicles be used across a wide range of roles to support defense-in-depth and the National Defense Strategy? Ultimately, how do the operational utility and financial costs of these parallel approaches—integrating loitering munitions into ground maneuver units versus utilizing these airborne-launched systems—compare to traditional, exquisite alternative approaches to the same military requirements?

To successfully field this high-low capability mix, what policy adjustments, industrial base mobilization, and training adjustments in the context of deliberate transformation are required to regain dominance in this critical war-fighting area for future conflicts? This analysis should provide actionable recommendations for fielding a modernized, multi-echelon, counter-mobility capability that can effectively disrupt, turn, fix, and block a peer adversary and enhance the effectiveness of military fires and maneuver along NATO's Eastern Flank.

• Allen, Lt. Col. Zachary S., "Invisible to the Drone's Eye: Leveraging New Concepts and Technology to Safeguard Marine Aviation against the Unmanned Threat," AFGC thesis, 2026.
  • Details the vulnerability of distributed operational concepts—such as Distributed Aviation Operations (DAO), Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and Stand-In Forces (SIF)—to cheap, mass-produced UAS swarms on the modern battlefield. It argues that while these distributed concepts provide a necessary framework for survival, true survivability requires highly mobile, organic C-UAS capabilities integrated directly into tactical units to successfully execute the four steps of the air defense kill chain (Detect, Track, Identify, and Engage). Because relying exclusively on expensive and scarce Stinger missiles is fiscally and logistically unsustainable, the paper recommends the modernization of Low Altitude Area Defense (LAAD) units with cost-effective kinetic and directed-energy countermeasures. Furthermore, it advocates for a shift in logistics toward pre-positioned supplies and autonomous resupply platforms to sustain distributed forces in contested areas.
• Armfield, Capt. Richard et al, "Asymmetric Warfare with Palletized Effects: Enabling Taiwan Air Force C-130Hs," SOS AUAR 2025.
  • Evaluates the strategic role, operational utility, and financial costs of launching palletized, standoff munitions from standard cargo aircraft. It analyzes the Rapid Dragon system, which allows standard transport platforms like the C-130H to deploy large numbers of long-range standoff munitions, transforming cargo fleets into highly survivable, mass-firepower bombers. The paper also discusses the deployment of non-kinetic systems like the Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD) and MALD-Jammer (MALD-J) from cargo planes to mimic radar signatures, jam adversary sensors, and complicate the enemy's find-fix-track-target cycle. This cargo-launched approach is compared to alternative asymmetric approaches, demonstrating that while Rapid Dragon provides the most significant operational impact and flexibility, it carries higher acquisition costs and experimental risk compared to cheaper counter-sea or counter-land alternatives like sea drones and HIMARS.
• Azan, Daniel E., "No Safe Haven: The Rise of Drones and USAF Vulnerabilities," AFGC thesis, 2026.
  • Addresses the cost-balance between low-cost attritable systems and advanced, exquisite munitions, detailing the optimal concept for integrating unmanned systems into maneuver formations. It highlights how the proliferation of cheap, precision-guided one-way attack (OWA) and loitering drones has inverted the cost-exchange ratio of traditional air defenses, forcing the U.S. to expend multi-million dollar Patriot PAC-3 interceptors against $20,000 Shahed drones. To offset reliance on expensive legacy systems, the paper details Ukraine’s "combat stack"—an optimal, drone-centric combined-arms concept where reconnaissance drones map defenses, FPV kamikaze drones provide suppressive fire, machine-gun-equipped drones (Rys Pro) and land-based kamikaze drones (Ratel S) execute the assault, and cargo drones (TerMIT) sustain the logistical and casualty-evacuation tail. The paper recommends that the Joint Force expedite the acquisition of low-footprint, non-kinetic, and reusable C-UAS platforms (Coyote Block 3NK, Medusa, Ninja, and SkyFall P1-SUN) to restore a favorable cost-kill ratio, and equip expeditionary forces with SMASH 2000L smart scopes to decentralize base defense.
• Behrens, Maj. Mikkel Nymann (RDAF), "Trouble in Niflheim? Elements of a NATO Arctic Strategy," SAASS thesis, 2015. 
  • Reinforces Eastern Flank deterrence by outlining how NATO can maintain geostrategic control and establish credible conventional deterrence by denial to prevent Russian territorial gains by force. The paper emphasizes that conventional deterrence must be anchored on a foundation of credible nuclear deterrence to maintain escalation dominance and keep conflict below the nuclear threshold. Deterrence credibility consists of both military capability and political resolve. To operationalize this strategy, NATO must permanently deploy combat forces—prioritizing highly flexible airpower for rapid reach and speed—and establish robust, multi-discipline air and maritime C4ISR networks (combining ground, air, and space-based sensors) to monitor Russian military activity, reduce the risk of misinterpreting adversary intent, and enable a swift operational transition from peace to conflict.
• Blackmun, Maj. Ross W., "Jack of All Trades: Expanding the Mission of the Combat King II," AFGC thesis, 2025.
  • Analyzes how the Joint Force can integrate advanced capabilities into existing cargo airframes to support defense-in-depth while avoiding the high costs of dedicated exquisite systems. It focuses on expanding the mission of the HC-130J Combat King II by integrating roll-on, roll-off combat systems (such as SABIR, Harvest HAWK Plus, and Rapid Dragon). This programmatic transformation allows standard transport aircraft to perform long-range strike, electronic warfare support, and communications relay missions. By dual-purposing existing cargo assets, the military can partially fill capability gaps left by retiring specialized platforms at a fraction of the cost, thereby maximizing the utility of its air mobility fleet in contested Great Power Competition.
• Burns, Capt. Patrick, "Comparing the Military Posture of NATO Forces with That of Russian Forces in and around the Baltic Region." SOS AUAR 2021.
  • Directly addresses how NATO must posture its defenses along the Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative, arguing that current forces are insufficient to defend the Baltic states from a traditional Russian invasion. The paper notes that NATO's current Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) troops serve primarily as a "tripwire" rather than an effective denial force. To establish credible conventional deterrence without risking nuclear escalation, the Baltic states must invest heavily in "Total Defense" (a whole-of-society approach) and Unconventional Warfare capabilities (such as protracted civilian-led resistance, sabotage, and subversive activities) to raise the cost of Russian aggression. Furthermore, the paper recommends that NATO permanently commit larger forces forward—such as establishing up to seven brigades in Poland—while aggressively developing non-kinetic capabilities in the cyber and information domains to degrade Russian Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) and minimize their A2/AD bubble.
• Cosker, Maj. Nathan, "Quantity Still Has a Quality: Building Scalable Airpower for Peer Conflict," ACSC 2025.
  • Addresses the tension of balancing low-cost, mass-producible systems against exquisite munitions, arguing that the military must transition its acquisition mindset from "few and exquisite" to "fast, affordable, and abundant" to sustain pressure in prolonged peer conflicts. Cosker advocates for Acceptable Loss Technologies (ALT) like loitering munitions, UAV swarms, and networked weapons that can achieve mission objectives at a fraction of the cost of traditional systems. He details specific programs that bridge these gaps: QUICKSINK (converting existing 2,000-lb JDAMs with precision seekers), RAPID DRAGON (palletized cruise missiles launched from C-130 and C-17 cargo bays), the Enterprise Test Vehicle (ETV) (flying testbeds for cheap cruise missiles), and Golden Horde (networked collaborative autonomous munitions that communicate in-flight to adjust targeting). This high-low capability mix integrates massed uncrewed systems to overwhelm advanced air defenses.
• Cumming, Maj. Evan A., "Unleashing Air Fore Offensive Ground Operations in ACE against Near-Peer Adversaries," AFGC thesis, 2025.
  • Details the deliberate organizational and doctrinal transformation required to integrate specialized ground offensive units (AFSPECWAR, TACP, CCT, SR) into Agile Combat Employment (ACE) to conduct deep infiltration, sabotage, and sensing missions behind enemy lines. It argues that while dispersing aircraft and support elements complicates adversary targeting, merely evading attacks is insufficient; the Joint Force must actively dis-integrate enemy A2/AD networks. By deploying highly mobile, low-signature ground teams to sense, identify, and sabotage mobile SAM sites and radar complexes, the Air Force can create temporary "windows of opportunity" for joint fires. The study recommends formalizing ground-based offensive operations in ACE doctrine, scaling deep infiltration training and resourcing, and strengthening decentralized C2 with multi-layer, jam-resistant communications.
• Damota, Cody A., "The Conventional-Nuclear Dilemma: Concepts for Fighting Limited Nuclear War from the Cold War to Today," SAASS thesis, 2022.
  • Provides a comprehensive historical foundation for defense-in-depth, layering of fires, maneuver, and reconnaissance by analyzing the Pentomic Division (late 1950s) and AirLand Battle (early 1980s) eras. The paper details the conventional-nuclear dilemma, where tactics that enhance survivability in a nuclear conflict (such as dispersion, unit autonomy, and redundancy) directly degrade the ability to concentrate mass for a conventional fight. In the Pentomic era, the Army developed "amorphous" area defenses spread 100 miles deep, separating small mobile units by miles and relying heavily on organic nuclear artillery to destroy advancing formations. In the AirLand Battle era, which incorporated conventional lessons from the Yom Kippur War, the doctrine shifted toward "seeing deep" into the enemy's rear to coordinate fires and destroy massive Soviet second-echelon forces before they could reach the battlefield. Ultimately, this historical analysis proves that rapid battlefield mobility (armored vehicles and air transport) and highly flexible, "netted" command and control are vital to balancing the competing demands of dispersion to survive and concentration to strike.
• DeMaio, Col. Douglas, "Electromagnetic Defense Task Force," Air University, 2018.
  • Outlines a comprehensive DOTMLPF-P framework for policy adjustments, industrial base mobilization, and training reforms required to maintain operational capability in severe, degraded electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) environments. Policy recommendations include issuing presidential directives to establish clear EMS management, making EMP/GMD survivability standards non-waiverable and independently audited, and declaring any HEMP attack an act of war. Industrial base mobilization should prioritize writing EMS resilience standards directly into the acquisition requirements for future systems, establishing hardened microgrids at critical facilities, and leveraging the natural attrition of obsolete components to systematically introduce hardened, software-defined systems. Training adjustments require incorporating realistic, degraded EMS scenarios into major joint exercises, establishing an EMS Center of Excellence, and training "every soldier as a sensor" to ensure spectrum survivability.
• Gipper, Daniel P., "Innovate with Caution: Culture, (Mis)calculations, and (In)capacity," SAASS thesis, 2022.
  • Historically analyzes defense-in-depth through the French army's development of the "Methodical Battle" in World War I, highlighting the vulnerabilities that emerge from rigid centralized control. Designed to counter the stalemate of intense firepower, Methodical Battle focused on grinding down enemy lines through relentless, centrally controlled artillery and step-by-step infantry advances. Centralized control of both troop movement and artillery was paramount, which ultimately bred an instinct where subordinate units rarely solved their own problems and instead waited for orders from higher command. This extreme centralization created a critical vulnerability: the entire machine would grind to a halt after a loss of contact with reconnaissance troops or neighboring formations. Adversaries can exploit this communication dependency to bypass or degrade defensive lines, demonstrating that rigid, slow-paced planning fails to adapt to dynamic, decentralized battlefield maneuvers.
• Goodman, Brian R., "Offensive Dominance in Space," AF Fellows, 2024.
  • Establishes that countermobility innovations—such as moats, barbed wire, tank traps, and landmines—historically favor the defense by significantly increasing the cost and decreasing the probability of success for an offensive force. Geography further shapes this dynamic, as rugged terrain, natural cover, and vast distances inherently strengthen defensive lines by slowing enemy momentum and straining their logistical networks. To operationalize these concepts, Goodman advocates for investing in high-lethality, short-range, and low-maneuverability defensive weapons to establish point fortifications and defense identification zones that disincentivize surprise attacks.
• Heistuman, Tom J., "Dusting off the Defensive Playbook: Analyzing Cold War Defense Strategies for Modern Threat Environments," SAASS thesis, 2024.
  • Explains how historical defensive concepts are used in mutually supportive roles to alter an adversary's cost-benefit calculus, particularly regarding base and asset survivability. By examining Cold War experiences of securing strategic bomber forces under threat of Soviet long-range fires, the paper analyzes the individual and overlapping effects of three defense mechanisms: hardening, dispersal, and escalation control. Hardening (both active and passive) increases the cost of striking a target while lowering the probability of success, but can inadvertently raise the perceived value of remaining hardened assets. Dispersal (central to Agile Combat Employment) spreads forces among smaller, dispersed locations to decrease the benefit of a strike on any single node, but must be balanced against the risk of retaliation. Escalation control manipulates the risk of retaliation by communicating clear, capability-backed "red lines". These three concepts combine to manipulate the adversary's perceived costs, benefits, and willingness to strike.
• Jemmett, Maj. Justin, "Logistics Support in the Modern Era: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Automation Supporting Air Mobility Operations," ACSC EL 2023.
  • Highlights how unmanned aerial vehicles and automation can protect manned aircraft and personnel while sustaining forward defensive lines. He highlights Silent Arrow (GD-2000), an airdropped, non-reusable tandem-wing precision glider capable of autonomously delivering up to 1,500 lbs of cargo via GPS from a 40-mile standoff range. Additionally, Jemmett details DARPA's Gremlins (X-61A) program, which successfully demonstrated the in-air launch and recovery of reusable UAVs from C-130 platforms. This swarm concept allows a cargo carrier to deploy groups of Gremlins that can carry smaller attack UAVs or loitering munitions deep into denied areas to deliver payloads, spoof defenses, or execute strikes, before returning to the carrier for recovery.
• Jenkins, Maj. Phillip R., "War, Wounds and Strategy: Patient Movement Lessons from the World Wars for Great Power Competition." SAASS thesis, 2025.
  • Examines how historical large-scale combat operations (LSCO) stress-tested defensive and supportive structures, such as the German army's Meuse-Argonne defensive system in World War I, which successfully layered machine-gun nests, trenches, and reinforced concrete bunkers across three defensive belts to slow the Allied advance and inflict heavy casualties. Conversely, when offensive breakthroughs occur, as seen during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II, operational surprise, severe weather, and disrupted communication lines instantly overwhelm static command boundaries. Jenkins argues that surviving such operational shocks requires defensive systems to prioritize preplan structural redundancy, provisional support units, and lateral command relationships that allow local commanders to make independent decisions when centralized control collapses.
• Kazanis, Alexander K., "Closing the Loop: Timely Battle Damage Assessment Evolution for the Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenge," AFGC thesis, 2020.
  • Provides specific DOTMLPF-P recommendations to evolve Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) to support fast-paced, multi-domain fires and maneuver along NATO's Eastern Flank. In highly contested A2/AD environments, traditional, high-confidence ISR platforms are severely restricted, creating a dangerous feedback loop lag in the joint targeting cycle. To resolve this, the study recommends JADC2 integration featuring common data sharing, AI/ML predictive analytics, and automated Project Maven image processing to accelerate the dynamic targeting cycle. It advocates for strategically reducing BDA resource demands by utilizing the battle damage estimates (BDE) of high-use munitions (like the GBU-38 JDAM) as a surrogate for BDA, allowing commanders to accept an "80 percent solution" to make decisions within the limited timeframes of localized superiority windows.
• Lange, Lt. Col. Patrick Duane, "Fighting Words: Rhetoric, Narrative and Doctrinal Innovation," SAASS thesis, 2021.
  • Answers how armies historically layer fires, reconnaissance, and maneuver in defense-in-depth, while detailing how static linear defenses are bypassed. It explains how the static, attritional "Active Defense" doctrine of 1976 aimed to stop Soviet armor breakthroughs at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) using terrain and concentrated firepower without holding reserves. However, this linear defense was highly vulnerable because it failed to account for Soviet second-echelon forces, whose mass and velocity would eventually overwhelm the target-servicing capacity of depleted defenders. To arrest this momentum, the successor "AirLand Battle" doctrine reoriented the military to the operational level, introducing the "extended battlefield" concept. This framework synchronized deep-strike fires, reconnaissance, and maneuver to "see deep, strike deep" using joint sensors and assets (including tactical air assets). By engaging follow-on forces in their assembly areas, commanders disrupted enemy momentum and created "windows of opportunity" to seize the initiative.
• Lemmen, Maj. Kurt A., "Air Mobility's Untapped Potential to Meet combat Airpower Requirements during Great Power Competition," AFGC thesis, 2024.
  • Evaluates the operational utility and cost-benefit of cargo-launched systems, demonstrating that palletized effects like Rapid Dragon allow military cargo aircraft to employ standoff munitions in mass, augmenting fighters and bombers while drastically reducing munition transportation and reloading burdens at forward operating locations. This cargo-launched approach is highly cost-effective, with C-17 operations costing $30,000 per hour and C-130 operations costing $20,000 per hour compared to the B-52's $88,000 per hour. Lemmen also discusses Silent Arrow, an airdropped precision glider resupply vehicle that enables standoff logistics for forward units without requiring the aircraft to land. To successfully field this high-low capability mix, Lemmen notes that military munition management policies and regulations must be updated to account for aircraft that employ munitions internally from cargo compartments.
• Lin, Lt. Col. Bayshen (Taiwan AF), "The Gambit beyond the Chessboard," AWC RTF, 2025.
  • Explores the specific operational employment of cargo-launched munitions in support of defense-in-depth and the National Defense Strategy. It outlines a "pragmatic air operation approach" that utilizes C-130H aircraft equipped with Rapid Dragon palletized munitions operating from overseas bases beyond the First Island Chain. This capability allows for mass missile deployment from a safer distance, minimizing exposure to robust adversary anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems. By coordinating these cargo-launched strikes with manned F-16 fighters, the Joint Force can execute multi-axis, layered saturation attacks that overwhelm enemy Surface Action Groups (SAGs) and amphibious fleets inside the weapons engagement zone. This outside-in force projection concept directly supports strategic deterrence and ensures the survivability of combat aviation assets.
• McCaughan, Lt. Col. Ryan et al, "Strengthening Taiwan's Asymmetric Defense: The Strategic Role of the C-130H in Aerial Sea Mine Deployment," Air University RTF, 2025.
  • Provides modern context to the effectiveness of low-cost counter-mobility capabilities, specifically through the employment of mine warfare. It highlights how sea mines have historically demonstrated disproportionate cost-benefit advantages during asymmetric warfare, such as in the Korean War where Russian-made mines halted a 250-ship amphibious fleet for over a week, and Desert Storm where cheap Iraqi mines caused millions in damage to high-value U.S. warships. The paper argues that the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates the continued viability of mines to shape naval warfare, protect key ports, deny access to coastal areas, and impose massive economic and operational costs on adversaries. To successfully apply these lessons defensively, the military must integrate cost-effective mine systems with versatile deployment platforms, such as standard C-130H cargo aircraft, to execute rapid, high-volume aerial mining campaigns that disrupt, turn, fix, and block peer adversaries.
• McDonald, Lt. Col. Brough, "Mission--Go Win: Codifying Mission-Type Orders for USAF Joint All-Domain Operations," AFGC thesis, 2025.
  • Addresses the critical C2 and training adjustments required to transition from rigid, centralized Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) to decentralized execution in contested environments. He advocates for the codification of pre-issued, 120-hour Mission-Type Orders (MTOs) that articulate clear commander's intent, key tasks, and desired end states rather than prescriptive instructions, allowing dispersed forces to operate autonomously during communication blackouts. This deliberate transformation requires transitioning command authority to Air Expeditionary Task Forces (AETFs) and establishing a JADO Mission Command Course to train 1,000 leaders annually. Subordinate elements must routinely validate these concepts and build mutual trust by participating in realistic, contested large-force exercises such as Bamboo Eagle and Steel Knight.
• Padgett, Lt. Col. Nathan E., "In Search of a Good Host: A Study of Airborne Aircraft Carriers," SAASS thesis, 2020. 
  • Provides a historical and strategic analysis of launching large numbers of small, long-range combat air vehicles (referred to as parasites) from larger cargo aircraft, known as Airborne Vehicle Launch Platforms (AVLPs). It evaluates historical concepts (such as the B-36 FICON and Lightning Bugs) to identify key operational and administrative challenges in implementing cargo-launched combat vehicle systems. Proponents can utilize these AVLPs to project power, achieve concentration, and launch modular suites of effects (e.g., Gremlin drones or expendable sensors, jammers, and decoys) from a safe distance. However, the paper warns that such systems are highly vulnerable to competing programs—such as advanced aerial refueling, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and satellite networks—which can rapidly render the AVLP concept obsolete and result in program cancellation.
• Stoll, Maj. Viktor, "Fortress on the Azov: Re-learning Strongpoint Defense of Urban Terrain in LSCO," WBY, 2022.
  • Examines how adversaries historically bypass defensive lines and offers a resource-efficient model for modern defense-in-depth along NATO's Eastern flank by analyzing "strongpoint defense" during the Ukrainian defense of Mariupol. The paper notes that strongpoint defense originally evolved from German experiences defending against large-scale, massed Soviet mechanized attacks on the Eastern Front. In large-scale combat operations (LSCO) where off-road maneuver is heavily restricted by underdeveloped road networks and seasonal climatic conditions (such as the Rasputitsa muddy season), maintaining a linear defense-in-depth is highly resource-intensive and unfeasible. Instead, an infantry formation can hold a limited number of concentrated strongpoints on key terrain central to lines of communication (such as major rail crossings and port facilities) to disrupt, turn, and block much larger enemy mechanized units for extended periods. The paper validates Carl von Clausewitz's maxim that the defensive form is the stronger form of war, demonstrating how a motivated defender can leverage the fortified concrete of industrial complexes (like Azovstal) to force a demoralized, conventional adversary into a costly battle of attrition.
• Taylor, Capt. John, "BBP on Rapid Aerial Delivery of Ground Based Air Defense," SOS AUAR, 2023.
  • Directly extends the "Rapid Dragon" concept to defensive counter-mobility and defense-in-depth operations by proposing the rapid aerial delivery of ground-based air defense systems. The paper suggests that cargo aircraft (such as C-17As or C-130Js) can airdrop modified air defense modules—specifically MIM-104 Patriot missile launchers and radar modules—separately into remote, austere, or contested environments. Once deployed, these remote modules can operate autonomously using secure tactical data links and Friend-or-Foe (IFF) interrogators, providing rapid, persistent, and wide theater coverage to fill defensive gaps along contested flanks. Furthermore, these remote launchers can integrate directly with manned fighter aircraft for target cueing, handoff, and missile supplementation, creating a highly resilient and distributed air defense network that denies adversary objectives.
• Thomas, Lt. Col. Kevin T., "Out of Broken Dreams: The Ushering in of Second Drone Age Warfare in Ukraine," AWC SSP, 2025.
  • Focuses on the upscaling of low-cost FPV kamikaze drones at the tactical edge to offset the scarcity of exquisite systems and artillery munitions, demonstrating how they have become the primary reason behind 80% or more of frontline enemy losses. In Ukraine, FPV drones costing around $400 are integrated directly into platoon-level maneuver formations, effectively serving as aerial artillery that targets enemy armor, vehicles, and personnel up to six miles away. Thomas explains that this decentralized concept of operations bypasses static defenses and applies the joint principles of mass, maneuver, and economy of force to inflict heavy enemy casualties at a fraction of the cost of traditional, exquisite systems.
• Varga, Lt. Col. Jennifer L., "Breaking the Cycle: Delivering More Stable and Predictive Funding for Rapid Acquisitions," AWC SSP, 2019.
  • Complements this acquisition policy analysis by critiquing the rigidities of the PPBE system for its inability to evolve fast enough to deliver capabilities within the timeline of emerging, dynamic threats. It explains that due to PPBE constraints, rapid acquisition programs are often funded through temporary, reactive budget authorities that are late-to-need and result in haphazardly designed equipment, citing the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program as a primary example. To break this cycle, the paper recommends implementing a predictive and stable funding mechanism that permits rapid prototyping, experimentation, and technology transitions. It asserts that integrating commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and establishing agile software development practices are essential to bypass bureaucratic bottlenecks and deliver timely solutions to the warfighter.
• West, Maj. Timothy W., "More than Paying Lip Service: Three Keys to Solving USAF EW Culture Problems," AF Fellows (Idaho National Lab), 2022.
  • Outlines critical training and policy adjustments required to regain dominance on the modern, hyper-contested battlefield, arguing that the joint force must "train like it fights" in tactically and operationally relevant scenarios. It recommends removing unrealistic exercise restrictions (such as electromagnetic "handcuffs" or "ceasebuzzers" in major exercises) and accepting that blue forces must be allowed to fail, debrief, and iterate in realistic, dense electromagnetic and cyber attack environments. The paper proposes fielding more realistic opposing force (OPFOR) electromagnetic attack systems and leveraging realistic virtual, constructive, and live-fly training environments. It also advocates for normalizing previously "exquisite" or advanced non-kinetic capabilities, including electromagnetically delivered cyber payloads, and protecting them at lower, more appropriate classification levels so that a broader range of cleared personnel can routinely train with and develop them.
• Williams, Lt. Col. Kevin D., "Notes from the Russian-Ukraine War," AWC RTF, 2025.
  • Illustrates how the Russia-Ukraine War has seen a return to grueling, attrition-based trench warfare where offensive maneuver fails, compelling both sides to dig deep, layered defensive front lines reinforced with minefields, barbed wire, dragon's teeth, anti-tank ditches, and rear-echelon artillery to deny enemy breakthroughs. To survive intense multi-domain fires, forces have adapted by storing critical tactical data on the cloud, concealing command posts in the basements of destroyed buildings, and deploying experienced reserves only after initial conscript waves are broken. Furthermore, this defense-in-depth is augmented by low-cost, decentralized technologies, including thousands of first-person-view (FPV) drones that cause up to two-thirds of battlefield casualties, and a $500 acoustic sensor network of 10,000 devices used to detect and shoot down incoming threat systems.
• Wright, Maj. Jeremy A. "Attack of the Drones! U.S. Military Application of Counter Small UAS Operations," AFGC thesis, 2025.
  • Examines adversaries' drone tactics from the Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts to recommend a multi-layered joint C-sUAS defensive posture. This defense layers wide-area EW jamming to disrupt control links, medium-range directed-energy "soft-kill" weapons to disable onboard electronics, and close-in "hard-kill" kinetic interceptors to destroy surviving threats. To ensure a favorable cost-exchange ratio, Wright advocates for low-cost, scalable interceptors like the Raytheon Coyote missile or the $30,000 laser-guided APKWS rocket rather than multi-million dollar SAM systems. Furthermore, Wright stresses that defensive systems alone are insufficient against massed drone swarms; the Joint Force must execute "left-of-launch" targeting through Special Operations Command, focusing on disrupting supply chains, striking storage facilities, and directly neutralizing drone operators.
• Yount, Capt. Dick D., "SOF Swarm: Special operations Air Assets and Autonomous Systems," SOS AUAR, 2021.
  • Outlines the optimal operational concept for integrating unmanned systems directly into maneuver formations through the "Tactical Onboard Sensor (TOBS)" concept. It evaluates Raytheon's "Coyote UAS" (used in the Office of Naval Research's Low-cost UAV Swarming Technologies [LoCUST] program), which features a range of over 50 miles, 1 hour of loiter, and can carry an electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor or a counter-UAS warhead while being deployed from a Common Launch Tube (CLT). In this concept, a small swarm (such as 5-10 Coyote UAS) provides ground maneuver teams with a constant 360-degree view of the battlespace while manned aviation assets remain at safe standoff distances. This approach emphasizes the principle of simplicity, suggesting that the datalink and control interface must be streamlined (e.g., typing in coordinates to execute the tasking as a swarm) so that tactical-level operators can utilize the capability organically without complex software overhead.
• Zemler, Lt. Col. Jason, "The Loss of the Warfighter in the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System Acquisition Strategy," AWC SSP, 2021.
  • Provides crucial insights into DOTMLPF adjustments by arguing that acquisition programs must be re-scoped beyond raw connectivity to include the full DOTMLPF spectrum—focusing on training, organizing, and equipping. The paper critiques the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) acquisition strategy for focusing too narrowly on basic machine-to-machine connectivity (the "Internet of Things") while neglecting the human-in-the-loop and broader operational battle management requirements. It argues that acquisition programs must be purpose-built around the operator (rather than trying to fit the operator around the system), integrating warfighter requirements directly from Combatant Commands and Air Combat Command. It concludes that connecting every sensor to every shooter will result in battlefield chaos without smart, human-led battle management systems that are trained and equipped to process massive data flows in real-time.