Russian Expeditionary Operations

TOPIC SPONSOR: Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM)

How and why does Russia execute expeditionary operations? Analyze Russian expeditionary operations.

• Abravanel, Maj. Ran, "The Three-Dimensional Conflict: Understanding Russia's International Alignments," ACSC EL (The Russian Mind), 2023, 12 pgs. 
  • Analyzes the ideological and cultural reasons why Russia conducts expeditionary operations, using its intervention in the Syrian civil war as a prime example. The paper argues that Russia views itself as a metaphysical "Katechon" (restrainer) tasked with countering Western hegemony and the spread of liberal values. By deploying forces to keep the Assad regime in power and halt the "Arab Spring" domino effect, Russia executes these operations to restore regional stability on its own terms, present the Muslim world with a strong alternative to the West, and actively enforce its vision of a multipolar international system.
• Child, Justin, "Rebuilding Russia's Military: Trying to Spin Straw into Gold," ACSC Russia RTF, 2024, 21 pgs. 
  • Describes how Russia heavily relies on Private Military Companies (PMCs)—such as the Wagner Group, Patriot Group, Fakel, and Playma—to conduct expeditionary operations "in the grey" where traditional Russian military forces cannot openly operate. The paper explains that Russia uses these proxies to supplement its conventional forces because it provides the Kremlin with plausible deniability and allows state and corporate entities to secure resources in foreign territories. Most importantly, utilizing PMCs mitigates the domestic political instability and public backlash that would result from relying solely on the mass mobilization of regular Russian citizens for overseas conflicts.
• DeArco, Angelo, "Russian Hybrid Threats during the Libya Civil War," SOS AUAR, 2020, 9 pgs. 
  • Addresses how Russia conducts expeditionary operations by highlighting its strategic reliance on Private Military Companies (PMCs) in foreign conflicts, such as the Libyan Civil War. The author argues that utilizing PMCs allows Russia to establish a physical military presence early in a conflict to exert political and economic influence while maintaining plausible deniability. This method of executing out-of-area operations serves a specific purpose: it masks the Kremlin’s true global objectives and prevents domestic public outcry by circumventing the deployment of uniformed military personnel in drawn-out wars, deliberately avoiding the negative domestic perceptions associated with the Soviet Union's protracted 1980s war in Afghanistan.
• Driggers, Maj. Paul, "Intrigue and Influence: The Bear, the Crescent and Transcaucasia," ACSC 2024 Russia RTF, 38 pgs. 

  • Answers the question by analyzing how Russia utilizes expeditionary "peacekeeping" operations and forward military bases to project power and maintain its privileged sphere of influence in the South Caucasus. The paper details how Russia leverages troops stationed in separatist regions like Abkhazia (via the 7th Military Base) and South Ossetia (via the 4th Guards Military Base) to deter NATO expansion and manipulate regional politics. By maintaining this military footprint and controlling the flow of peacekeeping interventions, Russia secures geopolitical leverage over nations like Georgia and Azerbaijan, dictating the terms of territorial disputes to serve Kremlin interests and ensure compliance from neighboring states.  

• Lesperance, Col. Jeffrey, "Great Power Competition with Russia in the Gray Zone," AWC SSP, 2021, 20 pgs.

  • Argues that because Russia cannot match the United States in a conventional armed conflict, it executes expeditionary operations through "Gray Zone" warfare to increase its influence and fracture U.S. alliances. The paper breaks down Russia's global expeditionary campaigns across regions like Syria, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, analyzing how Russia synthesizes proxy support, state-controlled paramilitary forces, and aggressive disinformation campaigns. By using these subversive tactics to destabilize nations from the inside and secure access to natural resources or basing rights, Russia can compete effectively on the global stage without crossing the threshold into outright war.

• Morris, Lt. Col. Paul, "Russian Deep Operations: A Contemporary Application" AWC PSP, 2020, 20 pgs.
  • Answers the question by analyzing modern Russian expeditionary operations through the historical lens of Soviet "Deep Operations" doctrine and "Reflexive Control". The paper explains that Russia executes these operations to penetrate the depths of an adversary's defenses, create strategic dilemmas, and retaliate against U.S. presence in former Soviet states. To execute this, Russia utilizes multi-echelon approaches, leveraging ethnic Russian diasporas, armed civilian separatists, and criminal elements to create initial breakthroughs without conventional forces. Furthermore, the author highlights how Russia is expanding its expeditionary footprint into the Western Hemisphere—such as deploying nuclear bombers to Venezuela and establishing a counterdrugs facility in Nicaragua—to build illicit networks and project power directly into the U.S.'s geographic proximity.
• Owen, Maj. Christian R., "Will China Invade Taiwan? Lessons from Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," GCPME paper, 2024, 59 pgs. 
  • ​​​​​​​Owen's paper, "Will China Invade Taiwan? Lessons from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine," partially answers the question by examining the specific indicators and motivations behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine, rather than analyzing broader global Russian expeditionary operations. Owen explains that why Russia invaded was heavily influenced by Ukraine's strengthening relationship with NATO, its anti-corruption reforms, and President Putin's realization that he could no longer exert political control over the Ukrainian government. Regarding how Russia executed its preparation for the conflict, the paper outlines five key actions: experiencing political shifts, creating a Jus ad Bellum narrative claiming Ukraine threatened ethnic Russians, relying on the perceived readiness of its modernized military, attempting to harden its economy, and conducting massive troop buildups on the border. Ultimately, Owen analyzes these Russian actions to argue that observing similar political, economic, and military indicators can provide the United States with crucial advance warning of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
• Pearson, Capt. Benjamin, "Russia: Applying the Low Cost, High Return Syrian Strategy to Africa," SOS AUAR, 2021, 10 pgs. 
  • Explains that Russia executes expeditionary operations to challenge Western supremacy and become a political powerbroker while avoiding high military casualties and maintaining plausible deniability. The paper analyzes how Russia successfully implemented a cost-effective strategy in Syria by utilizing Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) and lucrative arms deals. After successfully reinforcing the Syrian autocrat and projecting power in the Middle East, Russia is now adapting this low-cost, high-return proxy strategy to project power and expand its influence across Africa.
• Pickart, Col. Damien, "Privatizing Russian Geopolitics: Understanding the Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Hybrid Warfare," AWC Strategic Studies Paper, 2019, 40 pgs. 
  • Explains that Russia executes its expeditionary agenda to regain superpower status and push back against Western encroachment while minimizing the risk of a direct conflict with a peer competitor. The author analyzes how Russia achieves this through a hybrid warfare strategy that heavily relies on Private Military Contractors (PMCs)—such as the Wagner Group—and "little green men" (unmarked regular forces). These proxy forces allow Russia to operate in the "gray zone" below the threshold of war, keeping official Russian military death tolls artificially low to prevent domestic backlash, while simultaneously securing lucrative trade markets, natural resources, and basing rights in regions like Syria, Ukraine, and Africa.
• Pomaro, Lt. Col. Nicholas, "Russia's Application of Military Power in the Syrian Conflict: 2015-2017," AWC elective paper, 2019, 11 pgs.
  • Analyzes Russian expeditionary operations by examining its military intervention in the Syrian civil war, demonstrating how Russia executes these operations to showcase its technological prowess, test new equipment, and project power into the Mediterranean. To achieve these strategic benefits, Russia deployed a complex mix of capabilities across multiple domains, including launching Kalibr cruise missiles from submarines and warships in the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas to hit targets 1,500 km away without an aircraft carrier. The paper highlights how Russia also executed electronic warfare to jam U.S. drones and leveraged information operations—releasing strike footage to both domestic and international audiences—to distract from the conflict's violence and advertise its military precision for future arms sales.
• Tarman, Col. Gürhan (Turkish AF), "Is Russia in the Middle East to Stay?" AWC Strategic Studies paper, 2018, 31 pgs. 
  • ​​​​​​​Explains that Russia executes expeditionary operations—most notably its intervention in Syria—primarily to rebuild its international image as a great power and secure its strategic and economic interests. The paper notes that Russia views itself as a vulnerable nation and uses expeditionary operations to support existing allied governments against insurgencies and Western intervention, while concurrently securing vital military bases in the Mediterranean to challenge U.S. influence. Rather than pursuing rigid, large-scale regional conquests, Russia operates opportunistically; it executes these operations through limited, carefully managed interventions to maximize political prestige and economic ties while avoiding the massive military commitments and adverse consequences of a full-scale war.
• Torrentez, Maj. Mariani B., "Assessing the Character of Modern and Future Warfare: A Defense Proposition," AFGC thesis, 2025, 39 pgs. 
  • Explains that Russia executes expeditionary operations, such as its direct military involvement in Syria and Libya, primarily to reduce Western influence and extend its own geopolitical goals on the global stage. Torrentez analyzes how Russia employs a strategy of "coercive diplomacy"—aligning its military activities with political threats—and utilizes hybrid warfare tactics to achieve these ends. By deploying unmarked proxy forces, such as the "little green men" used during the annexation of Crimea, Russia executes these operations through irregular, unconventional means that provide plausible deniability, allowing it to act aggressively while blurring the line between peace and war.
• Verroco, Lt. Col. Phil, "The Impact of Soviet Military Space Strategy, Doctrine and Operations History on Renewed Great Power Competition with Russia," AWC SSP, 2019, 27 pgs. 
  • Examines the country's unprecedented 2015 military intervention in Syria, which demonstrated a resurgent Russian force with renewed power projection capabilities. The paper highlights that modern Russian expeditionary operations execute an updated form of "hybrid war" that intricately integrates terrestrial forces with orbital operations. Specifically, Russia leverages its space architecture to provide critical support to its deployed forces, utilizing advanced "reconnaissance-strike complexes" to sense and shoot mobile targets rapidly and accurately across the battlefield. By coordinating its space assets with expeditionary operations, Russia aims to achieve its tactical objectives while demonstrating to the West that it possesses the technological capacity to project power and restrict U.S. strategic options globally.
• Weiss, Maj. J. Hunter, "Russian A2/AD Battlefield Lessons Learned and AFSPECWAR's Tactical Solution to a Strategic Problem," ACSC Cyber Specialization Track paper, 2023, 13 pgs. 
  • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Highlights how Russia uses expeditionary deployments as operational testing grounds to refine its modernized Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) and Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities. Analyzing Russia's intervention in Syria, the paper explains that Russian forces execute these operations to test systems like the Leer-3 and Zhitel against live targets. By conducting GPS spoofing, degrading coalition satellite links, and jamming VHF/UHF communications, Russia uses these expeditionary environments to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for contesting the electromagnetic spectrum against technologically advanced adversaries like the United States.
• Wilkinson, Maj. Carlos G., "Russia's Failure to Effectively Employ Airpower in the 2022 Ukraine Conflict," GCPME thesis, 2023, 39 pgs. 
  • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Wilkinson analyzes Russia's performance using Colonel Phillip Meilinger's "Ten Propositions Regarding Airpower" and concludes that the Russian military failed to effectively wield its aerospace forces. The paper details several operational failures, demonstrating that Russia was unable to gain and maintain air superiority, proved incapable of executing large, complex, and integrated air operations, and failed to simultaneously integrate its tactical, operational, and strategic campaigns. Furthermore, Wilkinson highlights critical vulnerabilities in Russia's execution, such as inadequate Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, inefficient Command and Control (C2) networks, and domestic production shortages that eventually forced the military to rely on unguided munitions and foreign assistance, such as Iranian-made drones.