We have ample evidence that Russia is learning, adapting, and innovating from its war with Ukraine. Beyond Russia itself, other strategic competitors—namely China, Iran, and North Korea—are studying the war and making changes as well. What are the command authorities and decision-making processes within these adversary militaries, such as the PLA, and how are their respective industry actors connected to the state and military to support new military requirements?
Furthermore, what are these adversaries' views of U.S. and foreign military operations? This research should specifically incorporate lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War with respect to sanctions, operational endurance, and military reconstitution. What overarching lessons could U.S. adversaries—including the PRC, as well as non-state actors and weak states observing unmanned systems development—be learning from the Russia-Ukraine War?
How might these diverse actors be implementing changes across the DOTMLPF-P framework in response to their observations? In light of these structures and capabilities, how long can adversaries like the PRC sustain a protracted conflict? Ultimately, how will these internalized lessons inform and influence these adversaries' decision-making, and how will these lessons impact how they may fight the United States in the future or limit U.S. involvement in a regional crisis?
- Barry, Lt. Col. Tonya N., "The Silent Deterrence Failure: Hospital Power Loss in a Prolonged Blockade," AWC RTF, 2026.
- Answered by Barry's evaluation of the Russo-Ukraine War, which provides critical lessons on how modern conflict forces rapid medical adaptation and reshapes the protection of fixed healthcare facilities to maintain operational endurance. She warns that Russian actions have upended the historical assumption that the Geneva Conventions and the Red Cross emblem provide protection, noting that by the end of 2022, Russia had conducted 1,000 attacks on Ukraine's healthcare system, targeting 399 hospitals. To survive this hostile environment and prevent targeting, Ukrainian forces had to deliberately harden and disperse Role 1 and 2 facilities, remove Red Cross insignia from structures and uniforms, and coordinate medical logistics through the crowd-sourced "KOROVAI" registry. Barry highlights that the early use of whole blood, Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC), and Prolonged Field Care (PFC) dramatically improved survival rates. Ultimately, she underscores the strategic lesson that modern medical personnel and planners must adapt their training and decision-making to be fully prepared to "work in war situations without water, facility, electricity, or medical materials."
- De La Barrera, Maj. Mario Enrique, "Confronting China's Military Modernization: Understanding the People's Liberation Army Structure, Command Culture and Threat to US Interests," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- De La Barrera addresses this by detailing how ultimate authority flows directly from the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Joint Staff Department, but execution is uniquely complicated by a dual-command structure where political commissars operate alongside military commanders. He highlights that while recent reforms established five joint Theater Commands to improve multidomain coordination, the overlap of military and political responsibilities introduces ambiguity and slows rapid decision-making, particularly during expeditionary or high-stakes operations where commissars might issue guidance that conflicts with a commander's operational judgment.
- Ching, Capt. Joey L., "The Enemy of My Enemy: What China Will Learn from the Russia-Ukraine Crisis," SOS AUAR (ISR section), February 2022, 13 pgs.
- Williams, Maj. Eric M., "Warfare by Attrition: Why China Could Win a Conventional Conflict," AF Global College, 2025, 49 pgs.
- Diamond, Mary E., "From Prosperous-Nation-Strong-Military to China Dream: Securing China's Interests through Logistics Modernization," SAAS thesis, 2023, 101 pgs.