The Human Dimension of the PLA: Personnel, Morale, and Command Culture

The Human Dimension of the PLA: Personnel, Morale, and Command Culture (CASI): While the physical modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) across its core aerospace, maritime, and nuclear mission sets is highly visible, the ultimate combat effectiveness of a modernized PLA depends fundamentally on its human capital. Technology and advanced hardware represent only one half of the military equation; the other half is composed of the personnel who operate these systems, their psychological readiness, and the organizational command structures that direct them. To fully evaluate how the PLA will perform in a future high-intensity conflict, researchers must move beyond hardware-centric analysis and conduct a comprehensive investigation into the "human dimension" of Chinese military power. This requires synthesizing the structural realities of the PLA's personnel enterprise, the psychological and political drivers of individual and collective morale, and the institutional dynamics of its command culture.

The PLA's ongoing professionalization efforts and talent-management reforms are designed to cultivate a highly technical, educated force capable of waging "informationized" and "intelligentized" multi-domain warfare. However, these personnel reforms must navigate a highly centralized and politically monitored command culture. The traditional Chinese Communist Party (CCP) model of dual-command and pervasive political work internally within the military ranks creates an enduring tension between top-down political control and the operational necessity for tactical initiative and decentralized execution. Furthermore, the psychological strain of preparing for a high-intensity conflict, coupled with conscription realities, intense political scrutiny, and far-reaching anti-corruption campaigns, heavily influences the overall state of morale and the ultimate "will to fight" of PLA officers and enlisted personnel. Only by analyzing these three pillars—personnel, morale, and command culture—as an integrated system can the Joint Force accurately predict how the PLA makes decisions, handles operational stress, and executes combat operations.

To guide rigorous research into the human and organizational factors shaping the PLA's combat readiness, projects should focus on the following core questions:

• What is the overall demographic, structural, and educational state of the PLA's personnel enterprise, and how effectively do its ongoing professionalization, recruitment, and talent-management reforms meet the operational demands of a modern, multi-domain force?
• What is the overall state of morale within the PLA, and how is it influenced by intense internal political work, the dual-command system, conscription realities, anti-corruption campaigns, and the prospect of fighting a high-intensity, peer conflict?
• How do the organizational structure and highly centralized command culture of the PLA affect its military decision-making processes, and how does the PLA attempt to reconcile the tension between rigid, top-down political oversight and the operational requirement for decentralized initiative on the modern battlefield?
• How do personnel quality, command culture, and individual/collective morale interact to shape the PLA's overall "will to fight" and its capacity to sustain prolonged, contested combat operations against the United States, its allies, and partner nations?
• How do the Chinese Communist Party and PLA senior leadership perceive these human and organizational vulnerabilities, and what institutional safeguards are they implementing to mitigate them during crises or rapid escalation?

• Ahern, John J., "Memo on the Chinese Warfighter," AWC elective paper (Chinese Warfighter), 2021, 2 pgs.
  • Highlights how PLA senior leadership is attempting to systematically rebuild its personnel enterprise and break historical Army-focused paradigms. To prepare for "informationized" and "intelligentized" multi-domain warfare, the 2016 reforms replaced the seven traditional, ground-centric military regions with five Joint Theater Commands that are no longer exclusively Army-led. PLA leaders are attempting to build a highly professional joint force by improving professional military education (PME), enhancing housing and incentive packages to reduce turnover, and deliberately targeting university graduates and high school seniors during recruitment. The paper notes that the PLA is focused on cultivating cadres and NCOs who possess the "right personality," political loyalty, strategic awareness, and adaptability to ensure these structural reforms endure.
• Altman, Maj. Amanda et al, "American Airman, Wingman, Warrior," ACSC EL 2022.
  • Argues that the human factor is the United States' primary competitive advantage over China, identifying deep-seated vulnerabilities in the PLA's personnel makeup and political training. It notes that the PLA's two-million-strong force is conscript-based, with rank progression historically influenced by bribery and purchase rather than merit. Basic training is highly politicized, with only 60 percent dedicated to military training and the remaining 40 percent consumed by political indoctrination, which reflects the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) persistent distrust of its own military. Additionally, the NCO corps serves strictly as technical experts with no decision-making authority or direct interaction with the officer corps. The paper notes that recruit quality is further compromised by societal factors, such as severe air pollution and sedentary lifestyles, which have forced the military to lower its entrance standards due to declining lung strength, high obesity rates, and 23% of applicants failing basic eyesight exams.
• Amico, Maj. Brandon J., "Words as Weapons: Counterintelligence-Driven Rhetoric in US Defense Strategy," SAASS thesis, 2024, 73 pgs.
  • This paper evaluates how the PLA’s internal human and organizational shortfalls impact its combat readiness and decision-making processes. Amico highlights the PLA's own self-identified operational weaknesses, specifically the "two inabilities" and the "five incapables". The "two inabilities" emphasize the developmental limitations of PLA officers in executing modern operations, while the "five incapables" reflect a pervasive institutional lack of trust in the ability of operational commanders to execute decentralized mission command effectively on the battlefield. The paper also identifies the Political Work Department Liaison Bureau (PWD/LB) as a key organizational node dedicated to political warfare and monitoring the alignment of senior military officials with the political interests of the CCP.
• Anderson, Lt. Col. Kelly, "The Chinese Warfighter," AWC EL 2021.
  • Directly addresses the personnel and command challenges of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by evaluating the quality, recruitment, and development of its enlisted force compared to the United States. The author notes that the PLA relies on a two-year conscription system, which faces serious macro-level economic and cultural barriers, such as a strong civilian aversion to military service due to historical controversies like the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, perceived internal corruption, and cultural stigmas summarized by the saying, "good iron is not forged into nails". Structurally, the PLA has struggled to build an effective Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps; NCOs are treated merely as technical experts rather than leaders, do not regularly interact with officers, and are often characterized as "afraid," "unwilling," or "incapable" of taking independent action. The paper highlights that the highly centralized PLA command culture, driven by deep trust and party loyalty issues between officers and enlisted personnel, leaves the force marginalized, undeveloped, and highly restricted in its ability to adapt to dynamic battlefield conditions without direct officer oversight.
• Babcock, Maj. Christopher, "Cyberwar Theories for Conflict in the Indo-Pacific," ACSC PACAF, 2026.
  • Analyzes the C2 and policy structures of the PLA, emphasizing how the dual-leadership system hampers tactical agility and decentralized execution in high-intensity conflicts. The paper details how the "one unit, two lines" system jointly subordinate to a commander and a political commissar prioritizes political control and regime security over military efficiency. Under this consensus-based framework, the decision-making of the commissar is privileged over the commander, constraining operational options to courses of action strictly consistent with political guidelines. While this highly centralized C2 system allows the CCP to enforce rapid, unified actions across civilian-military divides, it fundamentally discourages risk-taking, slows response times, and stifles tactical initiative at lower echelons. Babcock concludes that this structural rigidity is a critical vulnerability; a coordinated U.S. cyber or kinetic campaign targeting C2 links could easily disrupt the fragile communication channel between CCP leadership and forward commanders, paralyzing the PLA's operational tempo.
• Cassidy, Lt. Col. Michael R., "Space Electronic Warfare: Role of the United States Space Force in Integrated Deterrence," AWC WEST 2022.
  • Examines how the PLA's highly centralized command culture and decision-making processes are driven by the assumption of absolute information superiority. Because Chinese military doctrine dictates that "war control depends on information dominance," its leaders train under the expectation that they will operate with crystal-clear, perfect information while completely isolating the enemy. This deep reliance on information dominance creates a major psychological and structural vulnerability: should information be inaccurate, degraded, or denied, centralized leaders are forced into decentralized command and control, a condition for which they do not regularly train. The paper emphasizes that because the PLA does not routinely train its tactical leaders to operate independently using mission-type orders, any friction in the electromagnetic spectrum will severely disrupt their highly centralized, control-oriented hierarchy.
• Danko, LTC Eric, "Officer and Enlisted Quality Comparisons in the US and PLA," AWC EL 2021.
  • Provides a detailed examination of the psychological, structural, and political factors that degrade PLA morale and operational command. Danko highlights that a lack of full-scale combat experience since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War has left the PLA with a persistent "peace disease" and complacency during peacetime exercises. The command culture is highly centralized and burdened by a co-equal dual-leadership structure at the company level and above, where a military commander and a political officer must reach consensus on all decisions, stripping tactical commanders of the ability to exercise unilateral initiative. This rigid, consensus-oriented system fails to foster decentralized decision-making or train personnel in mission command, leaving commanders vulnerable to the "Five Incapables" (or "Five Cannots") critiqued by their own senior leadership. Furthermore, the PLA suffers from exceptionally low morale and a massive 20% annual turnover (400,000 personnel exiting its two-million-strong force each year) driven by a corrupt "pay to play" promotion system where bribery often supersedes merit, poor quality of life, and physical health shortfalls among recruits.
• De La Barrera, Maj. Mario Enrique, "Confronting China's Military Modernization: Understanding the People's Liberation Army Structure, Command Culture and Threat to US Interests," AFGC thesis, 2025.
  • Performs a comprehensive assessment of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) organizational structure and command culture, highlighting how the integration of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at every level of military operations shapes the force. The paper illustrates that the PLA’s personnel system is governed by a complex cadre system of 15 organizational grades rather than formal military ranks, which aligns military authorities with the civilian bureaucracy. This centralized top-down structure enforces strict party loyalty and political conformity, but it severely restricts tactical flexibility on the battlefield. Under the "double-headed" dual-command system, commanders must share equal authority with political commissars who act as "managers of risk" to monitor ideological alignment. While this dual-command structure guarantees absolute CCP control, it introduces systemic command-and-control (C2) inefficiencies, administrative delays, and a reluctance to delegate decision-making authority. Ultimately, de La Barrera concludes that while the PLA has made strides in joint-force modernization, its operational capability remains heavily restricted by ideological rigidity, high-level corruption Purges, and a profound lack of modern combat experience.
• Fairfax, LTC Patrick, "Comparison of Chinese Army Militia and the US Army National Guard," AWC elective paper, 2021, 12 pgs. 
  • Addresses the personnel and morale dimensions of the PLA's reserve components by evaluating the Chinese Army Militia, which operates under the Central Military Commission (CMC) via the National Defense Mobilization Department (NDMD). Militia members must maintain strict physical and political health standards to serve. While the primary militia is integrated into joint training exercises alongside active PLA components—such as Hubei engineering units practicing rapid runway repairs under simulated bomb attacks—Fairfax highlights a critical human capital vulnerability: a severe combat experiential disadvantage. Because the Chinese military has not fought a major conflict since 1979, the paper concludes that even highly realistic training cannot replace or compensate for the actual mobilizations, deployments, and operational combat experience lacking across the militia ranks.
• Fritz, Maj. Matthew H., "China's Irregular Mace: An Undetected War with the US," AFGC thesis, 2024, 38 pgs. 
  • This paper analyzes the centralization of power and political control mechanisms under General Secretary Xi Jinping, highlighting how these dynamics shape the PLA's command culture and exacerbate principal-agent vulnerabilities. Fritz details how Xi Jinping has utilized the "CMC chairman responsibility system" and far-reaching anti-corruption campaigns to eliminate autonomy and consolidate absolute personal command over the military. To stunt potential military opposition and prevent senior officers from building entrenched personal networks, the CCP frequently "shuffles" and rotates commanders across different regions and has removed dozens of senior officers on corruption allegations. This extreme centralization limits the autonomy of operational commanders, creating a severe principal-agent problem where civilian leaders with no military experience tightly control professional military agents, leading to decision-making bottlenecks and a culture that discourages decentralized initiative.
• Hinckley, Maj. Eric W., "Troops-in-Contact: Utilizing the A-10C in Contested South China Sea Airspace," AFGC thesis, 2024, 36 pgs.
  • A cultural shift within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air defense forces has decentralized tactical strike authority, granting local surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery commanders the autonomy to engage targets without waiting for top-down divisional approval. In his paper, Troops-In-Contact: Utilizing the A-10C in Contested South China Sea Airspace, Major Eric W. Hinkley explains that this cultural change, documented in PLA reports from late 2020, explicitly targets the operational decision-making of tactical commanders. By authorizing SAM battery commanders to fire on their own initiative, the PLA has adopted a faster, more impulsive command structure designed to compress sensor-to-shooter timelines and challenge Joint Force aircraft. This deliberate evolution in command culture highlights a transition toward decentralized tactical execution, showing that the PLA is actively training and trusting its junior officers to make critical combat decisions independently in contested areas like the South China Sea. 
• Hockersmith, Maj. Brian, "The Asia Rebalance in US Strategy: Geopolitical Challenges," ACSC EL 2020.
  • Examines the severe friction and divided loyalties between the PLA's military commanders and the CCP's political leadership, which heavily compromises the credibility of the Chinese government. The paper discusses how the one-party system has fostered a climate of deep suspicion, prompting President Xi Jinping to initiate sweeping anti-corruption campaigns to purge high-ranking generals and replace them with personal loyalists. This trust gap is so profound that Chinese military commanders have occasionally acted independently of political leadership, causing severe diplomatic embarrassments. For example, in 2014, the PLA executed a predawn military encroachment deep into India's northern region of Ladakh on the exact day Xi Jinping arrived in India for a state visit. Hockersmith argues that this internal C2 discord and lack of unified political-military control represents a major strategic vulnerability that the United States can exploit.
• Hou, Jiemin, "Avoidable War or Destined for War: Conflict between the United States and China," SAASS thesis, 2023, 101 pgs. 
  • Hou’s thesis, Avoidable or Destined for War, addresses the human and command dimensions of Chinese military power by exploring how the highly centralized decision-making culture of the CCP—historically under Mao Zedong and currently under Xi Jinping—shapes the military’s threat perceptions and strategic resolve. Hou explains that Chinese command culture is deeply influenced by the interplay between foreign crises and domestic politics, where the subjective beliefs of senior leadership dictate military action. Historically, this command culture was driven by a distinct 'military romanticism'—an ideological belief in the superiority of human willpower and morale over advanced technology—which predisposed leaders like Mao to accept extreme operational risks and massive casualties against a technologically superior adversary to bolster national prestige. During crises, the CCP relies on institutional and state organizations, such as the CPPCC, to rally public support, manage domestic morale, and frame military escalation as an act of defensive survival. Ultimately, Hou highlights that the PLA's 'will to fight' is tied directly to these top-down narratives, warns that centralized cognitive biases can easily trigger miscalculations over Taiwan, and notes that a conflict can escalate quickly if the U.S. misjudges how deeply Chinese leaders prioritize national political goals over purely objective material calculations.
• Hulshizer, Lt. Col. Eric D., "Every Wallet a Target: Fusing Financial and Military Targeting in Strategy for the Decisive Decade," SAASS thesis, 2024.
  • This study outlines the demographic composition of the PLA's personnel enterprise and details the financial factors influencing recruit attraction and retention. Hulshizer notes that the PLA is a massive force of approximately 2 million active personnel, consisting of 700,000 enlisted troops, 850,000 NCOs, and 450,000 officers and civilians. Despite enacting major pay raises to improve recruitment, the PLA struggles to attract and retain highly skilled technical talent because candidates with high-demand skills consistently choose higher-paying jobs in the private sector or emigrate abroad. This thrifty compensation model relative to the West raises questions about individual morale and suggests that Chinese soldiers may be highly susceptible to disruptions in their military payment systems.
• Martin, Jeremy A., "Dispute Resolution with Chinese Characteristics: People's Liberation Army Legal Warfare and Chinese Legal Culture," SAASS thesis, 2023, 129 pgs. 
  • This paper details the dual-command structure and political work system that define the PLA's centralized command culture. It explains that the PLA operates not as a state military, but as the "Party-Army" of the CCP, placing the military under the absolute control of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Under this Leninist system, the PLA implements a dual-command structure where political officers co-lead units alongside commanders. Peacetime decisions must be funneled through a consensus-based party committee. This model places heavy administrative and ideological oversight on tactical actions, requiring unit commanders to justify their immediate tactical decisions to the party committee after execution, thereby cementing political dominance over operational commands.
• Mitchell, Lt. Col. Eli G., "Comparing the Chinese and US Militaries," AWC elective paper (The Chinese Warfighter), 2021, 10 pgs.
  • ​​​​​Compares the human capital and command climates of the Chinese and U.S. militaries, identifying the low quality of junior enlisted conscripts and a deep-seated lack of trust between officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) as major weaknesses in the PLA. Unlike the U.S. all-volunteer force, the PLA relies on a draft-style system that conscripts young males for short, two-year tours, meaning that a massive 40% of basic training is dedicated strictly to political indoctrination rather than technical or tactical proficiency. While recent talent reforms allow enlisted personnel to transition to NCO academies to build technical expertise, PLA NCOs are not trusted with significant leadership responsibilities. This is because PLA officers are always members of the CCP, whereas strict quotas limit the number of NCOs who can join the Party, establishing a rigid cultural and social barrier that stifles NCO autonomy and prevents the execution of mission command at the tactical edge.
• Peacock, Col. Robert, "China's Three Warfares: Breaking Ideological Boundaries," AWC SSP, 2019.
  • Explores the strategic integration of political work and the "Three Warfares" strategy (psychological, public opinion, and legal warfare) within the PLA's command ideology. Tasked formally under the PLA Political Work Regulations, the military serves as the "armed wing" of the CCP, executing these non-kinetic operations in both peace and war to shape global perceptions and weaken an adversary's will to fight. Peacock details how the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF) is charged with executing these psychological and information operations to establish "discursive power" over competitors. Under this strategic paradigm, the PLA utilizes extensive domestic media control, international student networks via the United Front Work Department, and aggressive maritime coercion to confuse Western decision-makers and secure territorial claims below the threshold of conventional armed conflict.
• Pierce, Joseph R., "Decisive War Theory: The Pursuit of Final Victory through War," SAASS thesis, 2024.
  • This paper examines the tension between the PLA's highly centralized command culture and the modern operational necessity for individual initiative and adaptability. Pierce highlights that the PLA's lack of recent combat experience—having not engaged in a large-scale conflict since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War—creates severe training deficiencies. This lack of real-world experience, coupled with the increasing politicization of the officer corps, raises concerns within the CCP regarding the potential erosion of professionalism and a distinct lack of individual adaptability under fire. To mitigate these human and organizational vulnerabilities, the PLA is investing heavily in advanced simulation technologies and emphasizing war-gaming within Chinese professional military education (PME) to hone the decision-making and operational planning capabilities of its officers.
• Roberts, Lt. Col. James E., "Red vs. Blue: A Comparison between PLA and US Military Command Climates and Joint Doctrines," AWC elective paper (The Chinese Warfighter), 2021, 11 pgs. 
  • Directly addresses the CASI questions on PLA personnel and command culture by contrasting the rigid, party-controlled Chinese system with the trust-based U.S. model. Roberts asserts that the PLA's command culture is deeply constrained by its subordination to the CCP's Central Military Commission, which structures the military to prioritize regime preservation over operational flexibility. Consequently, critical leadership traits such as innovation, improvisation, and critical thinking are suppressed in favor of Party-approved consensus and an absolute expectation of loyalty and obedience. This lack of mutual trust concentrates decision-making in the hands of a very small group, encouraging groupthink, under-utilizing available human capital, and rendering the PLA's planning process too rigid to permit junior echelons to adapt to real-time operational variables on the battlefield. Furthermore, Roberts highlights that because the PLA lacks modern combat experience and lags decades behind the U.S. in joint operations, it faces a significant gap in translating its recently written joint doctrines into fluid, effective combat performance.
• Sheffield, LTC James D., "The US Army NCO Corps vs. the PLA NCO Corps," AWC elective paper (The Chinese Warfighter), 2021, 13 pgs.
  • Evaluates the development of the PLA NCO Corps, demonstrating that its short history and narrow technical focus prevent it from functioning as an empowered leadership echelon. Sheffield notes that the PLA did not establish a formal NCO system until 1978, leaving it more than two centuries behind Western counterparts. Although the PLA NCO Corps has grown to nearly one million members to meet the demands of high-tech warfare, NCOs are completely excluded from decision-making or command roles. Instead, the CCP’s unit party committee system retains absolute command authority, leaving junior officers and NCOs with virtually zero tactical autonomy. Combined with an entrenched cultural divide between officers and enlisted personnel, the PLA's ultimate combat readiness is further compromised by a complete lack of modern, real-world combat experience, having not engaged in a major conflict since its high-casualty, unsuccessful invasion of Vietnam in 1979.
• Stinson, Joshua S., “Stubborn Giants: Assessing Resolve between the US and China,” SAASS thesis, 2020. 
  • Touches on the command culture, decision-making, and political constraints of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA by analyzing their actions during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. Applying Joshua Kertzer's interactionist resolve framework, Stinson evaluates how "the Taiwan question" is deeply tied to the CCP's domestic legitimacy, noting that the Party remains fragile, insecure, and fearful of domestic regime change. This internal political anxiety heavily shapes how the PLA utilizes strategic military action; during the crisis, the PLA went to great lengths to communicate its intentions clearly while meticulously restricting its military maneuvers to mitigate catastrophic trade and political risks. Ultimately, the paper highlights a key vulnerability in military decision-making: both Chinese and American senior leaders repeatedly misinterpreted the constraints and domestic constituencies of the other, illustrating a lack of strategic empathy during escalating crises.
• Sullivan, Lawrence, “Teaching Bitter Lessons: How Analogy and Prospect Theory Predict Chinese Risk Tolerance during Crisis Response,” SAASS PhD Dissertation, 2020.
  • Sullivan highlights that the PLA's command culture enforces a tight, top-down chain of command that deliberately coordinates military operations with specific political objectives. When the PLA fights, its goal is rarely to conquer territory, but rather to deliver a psychological shock and "teach a bitter lesson" to deter future aggression. Decision-makers perform highly calculated risk assessments—such as ensuring superpowers will not intervene—before authorizing sudden, surprise attacks followed by unilateral ceasefires. However, the paper notes that the heavy politicization of the PLA (such as during the Cultural Revolution) degraded its actual warfighting proficiency. This caused the PLA to rely on outdated, rigid "human-wave" tactics during its 1979 invasion of Vietnam, resulting in poor tactical execution and massive casualties.
• Towell, LTC Justin E., "The PLA Army NCO: Strength or Weakness?"  AWC elective paper (The Chinese Warfighter), 2021, 12 pgs.
  • Investigates the specific developmental and cultural limitations of the PLA Army (PLAA) NCO Corps, describing it as an institutional weakness. Towell details how the NCO corps, which comprises 42% of the force alongside 23% officers/cadre and 35% conscripts, is severely under-utilized, lacks standardized professional military education, and receives minimal trust from officers. Rather than being trusted with tactical leadership or officer mentorship, PLAA NCOs are relegated to technical or administrative tasks, and Chief NCOs are often treated like "secretaries to pass on information". Furthermore, because NCOs spend their entire careers at a single unit and installation, they are highly vulnerable to skill stagnation and "peace disease". The centralized command system deeply discourages decentralized execution; tactical commanders who take independent initiative—such as a company commander who took action when communications were lost during an exercise—are severely penalized, reinforcing a highly risk-averse climate that paralyzes the force on a dynamic battlefield.
• Waldrip, Erik, "Has the Ukraine War Influenced China's Calculus for an Invasion of Taiwan?" AFGC thesis, 2024.
• This paper explores the demographic realities, conscription challenges, and systemic corruption that impact the PLA’s personnel enterprise and overall combat readiness. Waldrip notes that approximately 35 percent of the PLA’s force is composed of conscripts serving mandatory two-year terms, creating continuous retention and training challenges. Additionally, the PLA has historically struggled to develop a well-trained, disciplined, and respected professional Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) corps. These structural human resource limitations are further compounded by deep-seated corruption. The author highlights Xi Jinping’s aggressive anti-corruption campaigns, which resulted in the removal of nine generals and four aerospace executives due to egregious operational failures, such as replacing strategic rocket fuel with water and constructing nonfunctional missile silo doors.
• Wentink, Mark A., "America's Mission Command Advantage," AWC EL 2021.
  • Analyzes the command culture of the PLA, defining it as a product of organizational structures and restrictive societal biases that impede successful decentralized operations. Wentink outlines how co-equal leaders—the Commanding Officer and the Political Commissar—must work with a unit Party committee to make all major decisions, creating a slow, consensus-heavy process that limits creativity and tactical initiative on the battlefield. This power dynamic is heavily weighted toward the Political Commissar, who acts as the secretary of the Party Standing Committee (PSC) and writes the operational commander’s performance reviews, which effectively discourages open debate. Intangible cultural and societal values, such as "Harmony and Cohesion" (modeled on parent-to-child relationships) and "Obedience and Self-Discipline," create communication barriers that prevent NCOs and lower-status enlisted members from voicing dissent or advising officers. To mitigate these human vulnerabilities and address the "Five Cannots" of leadership, the PLA relies on Myers-Briggs personality screenings to weed out politically or socially problematic candidates while attempting to professionalize its still-evolving senior NCO rank.
• Williams, Maj. Eric M., "Warfare by Attrition: Why China Could Win a Conventional Conflict," AFGC thesis, 2025, 49 pgs. 
  • Addresses the human dimension of the PLA by analyzing its sheer numerical scale, its reorganized command structure, and the qualitative limitations of its inexperienced force. Regarding personnel, Williams highlights that the PLA's total active, reserve, and quasi-service composition exceeds three million personnel—comprising approximately one million ground forces, 250,000 navy/marines, 350,000–400,000 air force, and 120,000 rocket force members—which forces U.S. troops to prepare for an opposition ratio of at least 2:1 despite possessing "superior training". To modernize its command culture, the PLA executed an extensive reorganization of its geographically focused Theater Commands between 2015 and 2017 to emphasize joint interoperability, optimize regional anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and enhance joint combat readiness. However, the paper flags a critical vulnerability in PLA morale and readiness: the Chinese military has not engaged in a major war since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Williams concludes that while joint exercises add value, "many hard lessons remain unlearned by Chinese military personnel in actual combat," leaving their ultimate ability to handle the psychological and operational stressors of a prolonged, high-intensity Great Power Conflict highly uncertain compared to their combat-tested U.S. counterparts.