92nd Air Refueling Wing demonstrates strategic deterrence readiness for Titan Fury 24-2

A KC-135 Stratotanker takes off from the runway during exercise Titan Fury 24-2 at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, March 22, 2024. During the exercise, Airmen demonstrated how Fairchild AFB generates and provides, when directed, specially trained and equipped KC-135 Stratotanker crews to conduct critical air refueling of U.S. Strategic Command-assigned strategic bomber and command and control aircraft. For decades, the KC-135 has been the backbone of Air Mobility Command’s air refueling capabilities around the world because of its ability to extend global reach and project U.S. air power. This exercise demonstrated how the 92nd Air Refueling Wing is engaged, postured and ready with a credible force to assure, deter and defend in an increasingly complex security environment. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Megan Delaine)

U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Posture and Historical Forms of Strategic Risk Management without Arms Control

Published April 21, 2026
By AF/A10/A10P

Strategic concerns continue to complicate Washington's relations with Moscow and Beijing, leading many security experts to doubt the near-term viability of formal arms control treaties as a tool for managing risk and maintaining strategic stability with peer and near-peer competitors. How might a U.S. withdrawal and renegotiation of nuclear-based treaties—along with the broader erosion or demise of formal treaties such as New START, Open Skies, INF, and CFE—impact U.S. deterrence strategy and force posture against nuclear adversaries? Furthermore, how might this absence of formal arms control impact the U.S. extended deterrence strategy and force posture in support of allies?

Recognizing that formal treaties may not be achievable in the present or near-term, some experts have proposed taking steps back to earlier approaches to risk mitigation. Is there value in reverting to politically-binding confidence-building and transparency measures as a means to bring Russia and/or China back to the agreement negotiating table? Specifically, instead of legally binding treaties, should U.S. negotiators focus on developing politically binding agreements similar to the nascent arms control agreements between the U.S. and USSR in the early days of the Cold War?

Ultimately, if the U.S. relies on this strategy, how would a reversion to these more basic confidence-building and transparency measures directly impact the Department of the Air Force (DAF) in terms of its treaty and agreement compliance and implementation missions? Furthermore, how would this historical approach to strategic risk management impact the Department's development of strategic capabilities and the overall posture of its strategic forces?

Crouch, Maj. Daniel W., "Rethinking Nuclear Crisis Management" ACSC Research Paper (SANDS), 2022, 54 pgs.
Douglas, Lt. Col. Jaime, "Dealer's Choice: The Likliehood of Multilateral Treaties, Bilateral Treaties or a Nuclear Arms Race," SAASS thesis, 2021, 196 pgs.
Eastin, CDR Anthony R., "Mitigating Critical Vulnerabilities in U.S. Nuclear Defense Strategy," ACSC thesis, 2020, 39 pgs.
Groher, Maj. Casey J., "Peace Through Strength: Why Anti-Nuclear Groups Must Embrace Nuclear Modernization to Achieve Goals," Air Force Fellow paper, 2021, 23 pgs.
Long, Maj. Devin A.J., "The Future of Arms Control: Transparency in a Fractured, Multi-Polar World," AF Fellows Paper, 2020, 45 pgs.
Smith, William, "A Sense of Purpose: The Bedrock of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent," AF Fellows Paper, 2020.
Steeves, George, "Ready, Set, Getting to Go: America’s Nuclear Test Readiness Posture," AF Fellows Paper, 2020. (Published in Strategic Studies Quarterly: SSQ, 2020-10-01, Vol.14 (3), p.22-48)
Vesey, Lt. Col. Brian P., "End of a Cold War-Era Treaty: Why the US Should Not Leverage INF Treaty Withdrawal to Deploy Theater Missiles in Asia," AWC Strategic Studies Paper, 22 pgs.
Wilson, Commander Jacob, "Fighting in a Canoe: The Balance of U.S. and Iranian Deterrence Post-JCPOA," AWC PSP, 2021, 33 pgs.