The Joint Force faces a critical methodological and cognitive challenge in conducting and evaluating operations within the information environment, where human behavior is complex and Information Warfare (IW) effects are largely non-kinetic, non-physical, and non-tangible. Because these effects are often non-observable, traditional military assessment models are fundamentally unequipped to measure them. This analytical gap manifests most acutely in the epistemological dilemma of "proving the negative"—knowing with certainty whether a strategic influence campaign successfully prevented an adversary from executing a planned action. To overcome these barriers, the Air Force must establish modern, data-driven frameworks that can accurately translate intangible cognitive influence into measurable operational indicators. Specifically, research must determine how the military can integrate new tradecraft, data science, behavioral analysis, and physical or virtual sensors to build a comprehensive, multi-dimensional common operating picture in the information domain.
To guide rigorous research at the intersection of operational assessment and cognitive influence, projects should address the following core questions:
- Given the complexities of human behavior and decision-making, how should the Joint Force approach operational assessment in the information environment, and how can the Air Force enable that approach through the application of new tradecraft, data science, behavioral analysis, and sensors?
- How can the Air Force and Joint Force adapt Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs) to account for the often non-tangible and non-observable nature of IW effects?
- How do we solve the persistent problem of "proving the negative" in strategic campaigns—specifically, if we leverage IW to influence an adversary and it successfully deters them from committing a given action, how do we mathematically or observationally verify that U.S. operations caused that prevention?
- What measurable factors currently exist within the information environment that are unaccounted for in current assessment models?
- How can the Joint Force best isolate and measure the specific "influence" of Information Warfare on an adversary actor's decision-making calculus?
- Buckley, Maj. Brian L., "Enabling Faster Battlespace Decisions through GEOINT Managed Battle Damage Assessment," GCPME/ACSC, 2022, 31 pgs.
- Mokrovich, Lt. Col. Justin P., "The SOODA Loop," AWC Strategic Studies Paper, 2020, 35 pgs.
- Reddy, B. Karthik Narayan, "Reformulating the Center of Gravity from Airpower's Perspective: Understanding Airpower's Quest for Credible Operational Effect through Targeting," SAASS thesis, 2025.
- He strongly warns against applying EBO at the operational level, demonstrating through historical case studies like World War II fuel-refinery campaigns that predicting complex, cascading second- and third-order effects is highly unreliable because adaptive adversaries will always dynamically shift resources and find ways to bypass targeted areas. To resolve this unpredictability, Reddy proposes using EBO strictly at the tactical level, where direct, physical, and time-bound effects (such as the temporary degradation of a specific radar site) are highly predictable and measurable. For higher-level operational assessment, he recommends transitioning away from abstract effects and instead utilizing robust, data-driven metrics powered by big data, data analytics, and AI-enabled tools to verify whether tactical-level degradations are successfully compounding to weaken the adversary's central nodes of power.
- Schiess, Maj. Leisha, "Closing the OODA Loop: Operational Assessment in the US Air Force," SAASS thesis, 2023, 107 pgs.
- Smith, Maj. Chance, "The 'Replicator Dilemma: When Mass Isn't Enough," originally work for Air Force Fellows (CSIAC, Stanford University), published on C4ISRNet, November 20, 2023.
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- Jenkins II, Maj. Kenneth M., "In Search of Will: How Has the Concept of Will Evolved in Conflict," SAASS thesis, 2025, 72 pgs.
- Jenkins answers this by noting that the Information Environment is now a primary mechanism for eroding morale, manipulating perceptions, and shaping national will long before a war begins, achieving effects that once required direct military action. Because "will" involves non-tangible aspects, Jenkins argues that influence can only be accurately measured by observing changes in an adversary's "empirical character"—their physical actions, behaviors, and reactions to intolerable conditions. He asserts that to successfully measure the influence of information warfare on an adversary's will, strategists must create MOEs and MOPs that link these unobservable psychological shifts directly to observable material and behavioral outcomes.
- McFarlane, Maj. Brandon L, "Precision vs. Strategy: Evaluating the Joint Targeting Enterprise's Role in Achieving U.S. Long-Term Objectives," AFGC thesis, 2025, 42 pgs.
- McFarlane criticizes the JTE's reliance on flawed, quantifiable performance metrics—such as "enemy combatants killed" or "targets struck"—arguing that they create a distorted picture of progress and act as a substitute for meaningful evaluation. He points out that current models fail to account for the most crucial factor in modern warfare: civilian harm, which actively undermines U.S. credibility, alienates local populations, and fuels insurgent recruitment. To meaningfully measure effectiveness, he recommends formally integrating "strategic-level impact assessments" into the targeting cycle. This would require dedicated teams to evaluate second- and third-order effects—such as civilian displacement, local political reactions, and adversary information exploitation—to ensure tactical strikes actually advance long-term objectives.