Operationalizing Strategic Influence and Shaping the Information Environment

  • Published
  • By JSOU & PACAF/PA
  • PACAF/PA

 

The term ‘strategic influence’ describes how the Joint Force can project soft power around the globe. How can we measure this strategic influence, who are we seeking to influence, and what are we seeking to achieve? What does strategic influence imply in terms of military strategy, how do measures of influence inform operational design, and how can the military's operational objectives be nested within larger U.S. government strategic initiatives? A core component of this strategic influence is credibility. How can U.S. forces build and maintain persistent, meaningful relationships with partners and allies, minimize the disconnect between rhetoric and reality, and effectively counter adversarial strategic influence efforts? Furthermore, how do you achieve balance between accountability and ‘speed of need’ when seeking influence?

Information has a critical role to play within this strategic competition. How can the Joint Force achieve an information advantage throughout the competition continuum, and how can the military better understand, apply, and integrate information across operations to achieve its objectives? At the operational level, what are proven effective ways to shape the information environment during Phase 0/Phase I operations, specifically regarding near-peer competitors? Do tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) exist that PACAF/PA should be aware of to dial up and down the amount of deterrence and pressure messaging to effectively deter adversaries and avoid escalation? Furthermore, how can information strategies be tailored to address mission-specific needs, and what is the balance between attributable and nonattributable operations that provides the highest probability of success while minimizing political and operational risk?

To ensure the success of these operations, what are the best methods and practices to assess the effects of operations in the information environment? How do we measure and assess results from information campaigns, and how do we communicate these results to stakeholders and authorities? Finally, what types of organizational structures and resourcing would best set the conditions to integrate these efforts across the Services and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial (JIIM-C) partners? Are there capability gaps across the DOTMLPF-P framework that need to be addressed, and how can the Joint Force work with centers such as the Global Engagement Center or NATO's Strategic Communications Center of Excellence to enhance these strategic influence operations?

 


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