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Battlefield Airman for Duty in the Pacific AOR

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  • By PACAF A9L

TOPIC SPONSOR: PACAF/A9L

Over twenty years of duty in the Middle East has not prepared AF personnel for combat in the islands of the Pacific. How do Battlefield Airman integrate with USMC forces and Navy SOF?  What measures should be taken to make Battlefield Airman better prepared for the Pacific AOR?

  • Acker 2022
    • Addresses the integration of Air Force personnel with the USMC and Navy, arguing that the Air Force cannot execute Agile Combat Employment (ACE) in the South Pacific alone due to severe logistical and personnel footprint vulnerabilities. To solve this, the paper proposes a joint-service approach where the Air Force integrates directly with Marine Corps Forward Area Refueling Point (FARP) teams for aviation-delivered ground refueling and relies on Navy Seabees for airfield preparation in contested environments. To ensure forces are truly prepared for the Pacific AOR, Acker recommends placing these integrated assets under a single Air Force commander and conducting large-scale joint exercises that force units to transport assets over realistic Pacific distances while managing their own ground security.
  • Altman 2022
    • Addresses the need to prepare Air Force personnel for the Pacific by noting that the past twenty years of counterterrorism operations from safe, centralized bases will not suffice for Agile Combat Employment (ACE) against China. To better prepare the force for this environment, the authors recommend implementing a foundational Basic Military Skills (BMS) training program for all Airmen. By focusing on hands-on training in tactical communication, land navigation, weapons proficiency, troop leading procedures, and survival skills, the Air Force can build a necessary "warrior ethos" and ensure its personnel can operate effectively in contested Pacific environments.
  • Cooper, 2024
    • Addresses the premise that two decades of counterinsurgency in the Middle East have left SOF facing an identity crisis and unprepared for the strategic challenges of the Pacific. To better prepare SOF for this theater, the author recommends establishing a new joint SOF unit to conduct irregular warfare and sensitive activities in the South China Sea. Taking lessons from the multi-branch MACV-SOG units in Vietnam, this proposed organization would formally integrate Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps SOF to act as a combined think tank and operational body to apply emerging techniques against near-peer adversaries.
  • Crawford 2019
    • Warns that the days of operating from "safe havens in the Middle East with complete air superiority" are over, requiring a drastic shift to prepare for Pacific environments where bases will become battlefields in the first days of a war. To better prepare Air Force personnel for this reality, Crawford advocates for the rapid expansion of Forward Area Refueling Point (FARP) qualifications across the force, noting that currently, only a tiny fraction of Airmen possess these skills. By combining these capabilities within Contingency Response Squadrons to support fighter, mobility, and rotary-wing operations, the Air Force can deploy small, multi-functional teams capable of turning aircraft at dispersed locations and maneuvering effectively to support joint mission success.
  • Garrison et al 2019

    • Explicitly mentions Battlefield Airmen, but it does so strictly through the lens of medical training. The authors note that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have created a deep level of combat-earned trust because "Battlefield Airmen have fought and died beside our sister service forces". To weave these integration lessons into the military's DNA and prepare for future high-end conflicts, the authors recommend establishing a centralized Joint Medical Readiness Training Site at Camp Bullis so Air Force medical personnel can train consistently alongside the Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. It does not, however, detail combat integration or Pacific-specific tactical preparation for Battlefield Airmen.

  • Lenell 2025 
    • Discusses the evolving nature of combat and notes that while the majority of Air Force personnel now conduct remote operations from a distance, "battlefield Airmen" remain among the few who still engage in in-person combat. To prepare all Airmen—including those who must forward-deploy to austere locations in the Pacific—the paper recommends completely updating the Air Force's warrior ethos to strongly emphasize both physical and moral courage. Implementing an updated ethos and training programs based on ethical and moral decision-making scenarios will ensure that personnel are prepared to make difficult choices and face physical danger in modern conflict.
  • Montgomery, Gerald, "Air Force Self-Sabotage: Cutting Combat Airmen from Command and Control," AFGC thesis, 2024, 43 pgs. 
    • Partially addresses the topic of Battlefield Airmen but does not directly answer how they integrate with USMC and Navy SOF or how to better prepare them for the Pacific AOR. The paper focuses on the Air Force's decision to cut nearly 50% of its Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) jobs. While TACPs are Air Force Special Warfare personnel (Battlefield Airmen), the provided text focuses on the negative impacts of cutting these personnel from command and control roles rather than specific Pacific integration tactics.
  • Savage 2025
    • Does not discuss joint tactical integration, but it does address logistical measures currently taken to equip and prepare Battlefield Airmen. The paper highlights the Battlefield Airmen Rapid Refresh & Replenishment (BARs) program, which provides a secure, low-cost supply chain for Air Force Special Warfare (AFSPECWAR) personnel. By utilizing government-approved vendors, physical warehouses, and a custom online ordering system, the BARs program ensures that these specialized Airmen securely receive the customized kits and equipment they need for their missions while mitigating the risks associated with vulnerable supply chains.
  • Smith, Dynamic
    • Answers the question by examining how the Air Force's elite Special Tactics (ST) teams (which include Combat Control, Pararescue, and Tactical Air Control Party operators) must pivot from the combat pace of the Middle East to prepare for Great Power Competition in the Indo-Pacific. To better prepare these forces, Smith argues the Air Force must revamp readiness and training standards to focus on contested, degraded, or operationally-limited (CDO) environments rather than permissive ones. As measures for improvement, the paper recommends forging a culture change where overseas bases are treated as fighting positions, formally developing Multi-Capable Airmen (MCA) to reduce the operational footprint, and innovating new tactics for austere integration—such as ST teams using their organic SCUBA tanks to recharge fifth-generation fighters. Ultimately, ST's specialized skills act as a critical enabler for integrating the joint force's Dynamic Force Employment strategy.
  • Spader ISR
    • Addresses the shortfall in preparedness by noting that Airmen whose careers have been defined by counterterrorism operations in the semi-permissive Middle East must now make a deliberate shift to prepare for non-permissive, multi-domain conflicts against adversaries like China. To overcome this gap and improve joint operations, Spader recommends that the Air Force conduct tactical and operational integration exercises with the United States Marine Corps and Navy to practice continuity of operations. Furthermore, the paper suggests adopting the U.S. Navy carrier airwing's model of cross-functional readiness, ensuring that Airmen are trained in multiple specialties so they can sustain decentralized operations independently when Chinese or Russian forces inevitably disrupt or deny traditional command and control networks.
  • Strabley Contested
    • Discusses how the past twenty years of fighting non-state actors in the Middle East has left the U.S. military accustomed to permissive environments and robust supply hubs, which does not translate well to the vast, water-separated distances of the Pacific. However, rather than focusing on Battlefield Airmen, this paper addresses the logistical challenges of Agile Combat Employment (ACE) and recommends relying on Navy long-range sealift and Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) afloat to support dispersed operations.
  • Wyche, Col. Michelle, "Comparing Air Force and Army Training Programs for Indo-Pacific Conflict Readiness: An Assessment and Strategic Recommendations," AWC Strategic Studies Paper, 2024, 24 pgs. 
    • Does not answer the question regarding Battlefield Airmen, though the paper does address joint training for the Pacific AOR. Instead of Battlefield Airmen, this paper evaluates the readiness of Air Force and Army medics for a future conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific. To better prepare these forces, Wyche recommends augmenting training opportunities and establishing collaborative joint training avenues between the Air Force and Army medical communities.
  • Young, Hiding in the White Noise 
    • Addresses the challenges facing Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the Pacific AOR, noting that SOF cannot expect to operate with the same unchallenged access they had in past conflicts. Instead of tactical integration with the USMC or Navy SOF, this paper focuses on mitigating logistical vulnerabilities by creating distributed networks of hidden supply caches and utilizing modified civilian fast ferries to stealthily resupply forces.