Transnational Threats, Cybercrime, and Non-State Actors

  • Published
  • By USAWHC & USCYBERCOM
  • US Cyber Command

 

How can the U.S. military enable regional partners within the Western Hemisphere to counter the growing influence of transnational criminal organizations and terrorist organizations effectively? This study should develop a comprehensive analysis of ways and means for regional partners to address these transnational threats over the next three to five years.

As part of this analysis, what does restraint look like in cyberspace against these non-state actors? To posture on every issue of concern to a command, domain, and the larger society is tempting, but given limited resources, most decisions involve trade-offs. Under these circumstances, what should be emphasized or de-emphasized in U.S. cybersecurity policy, particularly regarding the allocation of military versus civilian resources?

Specifically, how should the military and its partners approach the growing threat of cybercrime and ransomware operations conducted by these transnational organizations? What is the relationship between these cybercriminal groups and state actors, and is there a command and control or tasking relationship? Ultimately, how should policymakers define the boundaries of restraint, and when do cybercrime and ransomware operations reach a threshold that constitutes a national security risk requiring a military response, rather than remaining just a law enforcement matter?