Successful Resistance Movements

TOPIC SPONSOR: JSOU

What are the political-military parameters that lead to the success of resistance movements? What constraints (legal or otherwise) contribute to government failure in such conflicts? What government counterinsurgency approaches, methods, and objectives have proven to be most successful? Which have proven to be least successful or even counterproductive? In what ways could governments be more successful in countering armed resistance or insurgency? In what ways could governments be more successful in countering nonviolent civil resistance?

• Alter, William C., "The French Resistance: Learning from the Past to Improve Joint Doctrine," GCPME/ACSC, 2021, 58 pgs.

  • Alter explicitly answers the question by evaluating the French Resistance to recommend improvements to US military counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. The paper argues that successful resistance relies on a powerful unifying "catalyst" (such as foreign occupation) that overcomes the differences between highly diverse factions, alongside third-party support that provides both resources and global legitimacy. To successfully counter an insurgency, Alter advises governments to use Social Network Analysis (SNA) to weigh the strength of this catalyst rather than merely targeting network nodes, and to closely monitor foreign diaspora communities that may harbor or support insurgents. Furthermore, the paper warns that purely confrontational military actions and escalating reprisals—such as the cycle of executions between Germans and communists—are highly counterproductive because they generate popular resentment and create martyrs.

• Benson, Kari, "Role of Cognitive Change on Grief, Vulnerability and Reconciliation," ACSC elective paper (Revolutions of 1989), 2022, 12 pgs.

  • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Benson addresses the question by focusing on the cognitive dimensions of ideological transitions, showing that nonviolent civil resistance is most successful when it acts as a social movement focused on addressing people's actual needs rather than forcing a political ideology. For example, the Polish Solidarity movement peacefully succeeded by utilizing unions as spaces for free speech, which diffused anger and kept the movement below the threshold of violence. Conversely, violent conflicts emerge when a population has been subjected to totalitarian "tyranny of the mind" and subsequent politicians exploit the people's resulting grief and vulnerability by manipulating ethnic identities into weaponized ideologies, which was the primary catalyst for the violent wars in Yugoslavia.

• Bernero, Stephen R., "The Folly of Maslow's Hammer: Organizational Identity's Effect on US Strategy Assessment," SAASS thesis, 2024, 117 pgs.

  • ​​​​​​​Using U.S. interventions in 1960s Brazil and the War in Afghanistan as case studies, the author demonstrates that government agencies (like the DoD, CIA, and USAID) suffer from deep-seated organizational biases—referred to as "Maslow's Hammer"—and "bounded rationality." These biases cause agencies to generate overly optimistic or fundamentally flawed strategy assessments that ignore the on-the-ground reality of the insurgency, which directly contributes to recurring strategic failures.

• Brewer, Capt. Jonathan T., "Beyond the Endgame: Sustaining SOF Success with Infinite Game Tactics," AFGC thesis, 2025, 46 pgs. 

  • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Provides a deep analysis of what makes counterinsurgency and resistance efforts succeed or fail, contrasting "finite" strategies with "infinite" ones. Least Successful/Counterproductive Approaches: The author argues that traditional, finite military strategies—which focus on short-term tactical wins, metrics (like enemy body counts), and direct action/high-value target elimination—are ultimately counterproductive. In case studies of Afghanistan and the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, these approaches failed because they ignored the root causes of instability, such as governance deficiencies, social fragmentation, and civilian grievances. Most Successful Approaches: To successfully counter armed resistance or sustain a friendly resistance (like Ukraine against Russia), governments must adopt "infinite game" principles. This involves prioritizing long-term resilience, strategic patience, trust-building with local populations, and sustained partner capacity-building rather than purely kinetic military victories.

• Moncier, Lt. Col. Benjamin S., "The Least Worst Reality: Responsibly Ensuring Partner Conflict Civilian Casualty Mitigation," AFGC thesis, 2023, 37 pgs. 

  • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Directly addresses the constraints and parameters that lead to government failure in proxy or partner counterinsurgency conflicts. Constraints on Government Success: A major constraint leading to strategic failure in COIN is the infliction of civilian casualties (CIVCAS). The paper notes that twenty years of U.S. counterinsurgency warfare demonstrated that failing to protect populations in conflict zones undermines the entire military effort. Most Successful Approaches: To be more successful in countering armed resistance—especially when working through partner forces (e.g., Saudi Arabia in Yemen)—governments must prioritize civilian harm mitigation. The paper advocates for a whole-of-government approach that explicitly ties security cooperation, military sales, and training incentives to the partner nation's strict adherence to protecting civilians.

• Scott, Michael C., "Designing Genius: Design Thinking Education for Military Strategy," SAASS thesis, 2024, 110 pgs. 

  • ​​​​​​​Explores how governments can be more successful in countering insurgencies by utilizing empathetic "design thinking," using David Galula’s historical success in Algeria as a primary case study. Most Successful Approaches: Galula succeeded by rejecting standard military eradication strategies and instead framing the problem around population support. His successful COIN method involved building trust and providing the physical and societal infrastructure the population needed (e.g., building schools, establishing pharmacies, organizing self-defense forces). He concluded that victory is achieved when the counterinsurgent forces can safely withdraw because the local population can take care of itself. Least Successful Approaches: The paper contrasts this with failed approaches: the "warrior" approach that relies on relentless, destructive military force, and the "psychologist" approach that merely seeks to manipulate the population with puppet leaders.

• Swick, LCDR Collin D., "Resistance Movements: Studying the Past for Clues about the Future," GCPME paper, 2024, 41 pgs.  

  • ​​​​​​​Answers the question by identifying "enduring elements" of successful resistance movements across the American Revolution, the French Resistance, and the Viet Cong: effective messaging, proper organization, and crucial third-party support. The paper demonstrates that governments fail and inadvertently fuel insurgencies when they engage in oppressive actions—such as British troops firing on colonists during the Boston Massacre or the Diem regime displacing Vietnamese villagers into "Strategic Hamlets"—which provide the resistance with powerful propaganda to mobilize the population. To counter armed insurgencies successfully, Swick advises that military leaders must track where third-party support is coming from to understand the movement's goals, while continuously monitoring the information environment to avoid being outpaced by modern, instantaneous resistance messaging.

• Taylor, Stephanie, "The Moral Hazard and Coercive Capabilities of Drones in Insurgent Warfare," SAASS thesis, 2024, 99 pgs. 

  • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Examines the constraints and technological pitfalls that contribute to government failure in modern counterinsurgencies, focusing on the use of drones in Iraq and Syria (Ramadi, Mosul, Raqqa). Constraints on Government Success: The author highlights that coercing an insurgent group from the air is incredibly difficult because it relies on communicating through the local population. If an insurgent group (like ISIS) is indifferent to civilian suffering, punishing the population fails to coerce the insurgents and instead alienates the civilians. Counterproductive Methods: The paper argues that an over-reliance on drones and dynamic targeting cells drastically increases the "moral hazard" of an operation. As seen in the battle of Raqqa, relying heavily on remote strikes escalated the use of brute force and civilian harm, ultimately hindering the coalition's ability to apply effective, long-term coercive pressure to defeat the insurgency.