Why have strategic nuclear forces failed to deter some aspects of conventional aggression in the recent past? To address this gap, would integrated deterrence architectures involving other non-nuclear capabilities—such as cyber, hypersonics, AI, conventional forces, and space—better address concerns around theater-level conventional aggression? Within this framework, what potential uses of the latest space technologies can serve as a credible deterrent, and how do these emerging space-based capabilities interact with and affect broader nuclear deterrence strategies?
In building these integrated architectures, how can the U.S. manage the complex cross-domain escalation dynamics between the United States, Russia, and China? This research must identify adversary thresholds and explore methods for controlling escalation to understand how actions in one domain (such as deploying or employing space technologies) might unintentionally trigger an escalatory response in another. Ultimately, what must be included in future integrated deterrence strategies to successfully deter conventional aggression while managing these delicate cross-domain risks?
- Cassidy, LtCol Michael R., "Space Electronic Warfare: Role of the United States Space Force in Integrated Deterrence," AWC Strategic Studies Paper, 2022, 34 pgs.
- Dougherty, Lt. Col. Matthew J., "Integrated Deterrence for the 21st Century: More Threats, Many Options," SAASS thesis, 2023, 108 pgs.
- Soesanto, Stefan, "Cyber Deterrence Revisited," Published as an AU Press Perspectives on Cyber Paper, 2022, 49 pgs.
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- Adams, Lt. Col. Jason M., "Deterrence and Norms of Behavior in Space," AWC West Space Seminar, 2023, 26 pgs.
- Adewunmi, Maj. Adekunbi H., "Evolving Deterrence: Preventing Destruction in Outer Space," AFGC thesis, 2025, 48 pgs.
- Adewunmi explains that the integration of modern commercial space technologies, particularly proliferated satellite constellations, serves as a powerful form of deterrence by denial. By leveraging networks of hundreds of commercial satellites to supplement military architectures, the U.S. can achieve a level of redundancy and resilience that makes it nearly impossible for adversaries like the PRC or Russia to successfully degrade U.S. capabilities through a targeted attack, fundamentally removing the incentive for them to initiate hostilities in the space domain.
- Baumeister, Maj. D. Harry, "Failure to Launch: Gray Zone Conflict in Space," AFGC thesis, 2026, 50 pgs.
- He asserts that against gray zone aggression, "deterrence by punishment" (like sanctions) often fails because adversaries intentionally avoid red lines; instead, the USSF must rely on "deterrence by denial". Technologically, he highlights proliferated low Earth orbit (pLEO) constellations—networks of hundreds or thousands of satellites—as a prime deterrent mechanism. This technology denies adversaries a tactical advantage because jamming or destroying individual satellites becomes meaningless when there are countless others to immediately replace their functionality.
- Goodman, Maj. Brian, "Offensive Dominance in Space," AF Fellows Paper (2024), subsequently published in Aether (Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2024): 66-80.
- Roche IV, Lt. Col. James Francis, "Laser Weapons and Space Deterrence," AWC PSP, 2020, 32 pgs. Prize Winner: Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Carpenter Award