As the fight in Ukraine is years old and Russia has taken staggering losses in conventional capability, most notably tanks and APCs, and their performance on the battlefield has not measured up to the early analysis of how the war would go, does this push them to be more likely to use nuclear weapons in the future? Specifically, in light of this current conflict where Russia has explicitly threatened tactical nuclear use, how does deterrence actually work in a tactical nuclear scenario? Because most U.S. deterrence models are based on high-yield nuclear exchanges, does deterrence theory need to be addressed or modified for tactical nuclear use? Furthermore, what is the current deterrence policy in place regarding tactical nuclear use, what would be the response, and is that policy practically applicable in execution?
- Bowron, James, "Russian Battlefield Losses: Why Russia Will Rely on Nuclear Threats When Dealing with the West in the Future," Russia RTF, 2023, 35 pgs.
- Juarez, Maj. Carlos, "Russia's Nuclear Weapon Use in Modern Times," AFGC thesis, 2025, 44 pgs.
- Juarez concludes that while Russia's conventional struggles in Ukraine have led to a massive increase in nuclear "saber-rattling" and blackmail, the war itself is not pushing Russia to automatically escalate to nuclear war. Instead, Russia uses nuclear threats tactically whenever its conventional forces suffer setbacks or lose territory, specifically to intimidate adversaries and delay Western military aid from reaching Ukraine. He assesses that Russia's decisions remain calculated political tactics tied to state survival rather than an immediate disposition to launch a tactical nuclear strike, which would cause severe international backlash.
- Waldrip, Erik, "Has the Ukraine War Influenced China's Calculus for an Invasion of Taiwan?" GCPME thesis, 2024, 48 pgs.