The rapid proliferation of commercial and state-of-the-art drone technology has fundamentally impacted the character of armed violence, whether employed by terrorist, insurgent, or conventional military forces. To secure and improve control links, drone manufacturers are navigating away from traditional Wi-Fi (2.4GHz and 5.8GHz) frequencies and incorporating cellular bands (700MHz, 800MHz, PWS, and AWS) due to their increased reliability, encryption, further connection range, reduced interference, and remote connection capability. Because current military counter-unmanned systems operate primarily by jamming common Wi-Fi frequencies and GPS signals—and some drones are now equipped with multiple layers of GPS making GPS denial increasingly difficult—this technical shift directly challenges legacy defensive capabilities.
In this evolving unmanned systems battlespace, how does the industry shift of utilizing high-density consumer and private cellular bands for control and communications affect military counter-drone technology and capabilities? Does the need for military security warrant the ability to disrupt critical public communication infrastructure if we introduce cellular denial options into our countermeasures, and how would cellular and GPS denial disrupt important public services such as 911, the monitoring of utilities, transportation communication, and medical monitoring?
Furthermore, what counter-drone strategies have been adopted to increase force protection, deny adversary surveillance, and attack through the employment of drones? How and to what degree did the use of drones by the adversary impact existing partner, coalition, and U.S. forces operating models? What old or newly adopted tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) emerged to successfully confront adversary use of drones, and how specifically did the use of high-technology drones during the recent conflict in the Karabakh region impact intelligence, fires, command and control (C2), and the conduct of operations? Ultimately, what counter strategies and technical mitigations must emerge to confront these concurrent unmanned and electronic threat profiles?
- Adams, Lt. Col. Nicholas, "Killing Drones, Saving Bones: Cost-Effective Counter Small UAS Options for an Agile Force," GCPME paper, 2024, 44 pgs.
- Acosta, Capt. Alan A., "The Drone Dilemma: Leveraging Existing Technologies to Counter the Threat of Low-Cost Combat Drones," GCPME paper, 2024, 42 pgs.
- Fogarty, Maj. Trennart M. Barillas, "Tilted ACE: Optimizing Mission-Ready Airmen for CV-22," AFGC thesis, 2025.
-
Fogarty addresses counter-drone strategies by arguing that CV-22 formations must be equipped with organic, multi-layered defensive capabilities—specifically including counter-UAS kits and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS)—when operating deep within enemy territory without larger force package support. He suggests that MRAs act as the subject matter experts for this ground-based defense, ensuring the effective employment of counter-drone systems to protect the formation during ground laagers. To streamline this strategy and guarantee interoperability across joint forces, Fogarty recommends the use of "Amazon-like" procurement portals for counter-drone equipment, which would lower the barrier to entry for individual units while ensuring that sensors and effectors seamlessly integrate into the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) network to detect, track, and mitigate threats.
-
Godoy, Maj. Luis M., "UAS Threats in Asymmetric Warfare," AFGC thesis, 2025, 34 pgs.
- Godoy addresses this by proposing a comprehensive, layered counter-UAS strategy for U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to mitigate the risks posed by Group 1 and 2 drones in asymmetric warfare. Grounded in the Joint Risk Analysis Methodology, his strategy features five distinct layers: early detection and tracking through radio frequency (RF), radar, and optical sensors; AI-enhanced identification and classification; non-kinetic mitigation such as RF/GNSS jamming and cyber payloads to preserve tactical surprise; kinetic mitigation for direct, physical neutralization when non-kinetic means fail; and continuous assessment to dynamically adjust tactics based on telemetry and engagement data.
- Williams, Maj. Cody G. "Unlocking the Sky: Integrating Remotely Piloted Aircraft into the National Airspace System," AF Global College, 2024, 51 pgs.