Size of the Future Nuclear Force and Theater Capabilities in a Two-Peer Environment

  • Published
  • By AF/A10 & AFNWC/AFGSC LNO for NC3

 

With China quickly building up its nuclear forces and Russia maintaining a large and capable nuclear arsenal, the United States will likely face two nuclear peers for the first time in history. What does the overall nuclear force of the future need to look like in order to ensure deterrence holds in this new environment?

Within this broader force structure, what specific mix of U.S. theater nuclear capabilities is required when deterrence must hold simultaneously against Russia and China, while also accounting for North Korea’s regional nuclear arsenal?

A strong paper could compare current capabilities, proposed future capabilities, and supporting enablers to assess which combinations best improve regional deterrence, reassure allies, and complicate adversary strategies of limited nuclear coercion in line with the current and future threat environment.

(Reference: 2026 Posture Statement of the Commander of US Strategic Command)

 


  • Bergin, Capt. Connor T., "Beyond Brinksmanship: How Evolving Nuclear Deterrence Endangers Strategic Stability," AFGC thesis, 2025, 43 pgs. 
    • Bergin asserts that to maintain deterrence against two nuclear peers, the future nuclear force must feature: A Fully Modernized Triad: The U.S. must visibly modernize all legs of its nuclear triad (submarines, bombers, and ICBMs) to maintain overlapping capabilities that guarantee second-strike survival and reduce the chance of total disarmament in a single strike. Resilient and Separated Command and Control: The force requires updated nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3). This includes building multiple redundant command and control systems protected from cyber intrusion, as well as developing conventional-only command and control systems in parallel to nuclear ones to prevent "entanglement" and inadvertent escalation. Enhanced Survivability Measures: Traditional defense methods like physical hardening, dispersal, and mobility are no longer enough; the future force must augment these with new deception tactics and novel rapid repair capabilities. Advanced Technological Defenses: The force must integrate new technological countermeasures into its protection, specifically deploying counter-drone, counter-hypersonic, and counter-space capabilities to defend against modern asymmetric threats. Ultimately, Bergin argues that in today's complex strategic environment, deterrence is "not sustained through weapons alone, but through the survivability and credibility of the systems that back them".