According to the UNCLASSIFIED 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States will continue to field flexible nuclear forces suited to deterring regional nuclear conflict, including the capability to forward deploy strategic bombers, dual-capable fighter aircraft, and nuclear weapons to the region and globally. The current B61-12 is a welcome and much-needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for U.S. dual-capable aircraft, but it is not the end. The U.S. and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now.
Given this directive and the urgent need to develop the next generation of weapons, how would the capability to deploy dual-capable aircraft (DCA) worldwide affect extended deterrence, and how would adversaries view the development of such a capability? More specifically, what is the continuing strategic value of forward-deployed theater nuclear instruments like the F-35A paired with the B61-12? Do these specific systems remain primarily a NATO burden-sharing mechanism, or do they offer a broader model for flexible, visible, and politically sustainable regional nuclear deterrence in other non-NATO theaters? Ultimately, are the strategic benefits of this worldwide deployment model worth the costs involved, and what specific capabilities must the next iteration of U.S. and NATO theater nuclear weapons possess to maintain this strategic advantage into the future?