Organizing & Training for Counter Small UAS Operations

TOPIC SPONSOR: AFSFC

With the most likely/most damaging threat increasing rapidly is coming from Gp 3-sized sUAS capabilities, how should the AF organize and train appropriate operators and leaders (kinetic engagement authorities) to operate more complex C-sUAS/SHORAD-like capabilities in the future?

• Adams, Lt. Col. Nicholas, "Killing Drones, Saving Bones: Cost-Effective Counter Small UAS Options for an Agile Force," GCPME paper, 2024, 44 pgs.
  • Answers the question by arguing that countering larger Group 2 and 3 UAS threats requires integrating both airborne Defensive Counter Air (DCA) fighters and ground-based systems, which necessitates a new approach to Air Force organization and training. Because ground-based air base defense is relatively new territory for the Air Force, Adams emphasizes that the service must deliberately decide which career fields (such as Security Forces or Airfield Management) will officially operate C-sUAS systems, or if a dedicated new career field must be established. To train operators and leaders, the paper recommends leveraging the Multi-Capable Airman concept—where aircraft weapons loaders cross-train to assist Security Forces with ground-based C-sUAS operations, and vice versa—while rigorously evaluating kinetic engagement authorities and tactics by incorporating dedicated UAS aggressors into large force employment exercises like Red Flag.
• Allen, LtCol Zachary S., "Invisible to the Drone's Eye: Leveraging New Concepts and Technology to Safeguard Marine Aviation against the Unmanned Threat," AFGC thesis, 2026. 40 pgs. 
  • Allen argues that the Marine Corps currently lacks organic cUAS capabilities at the individual squadron level, leaving aviation assets highly vulnerable. To fix this, he recommends adjusting squadron Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) to create a new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for a "Squadron Air Defense Specialist". These specialists would be equipped with man-portable cUAS systems (like Skywiper or BlueHalo Titan) to provide immediate point defense for distributed units, while modernized Low Altitude Area Defense (LAAD) battalions handle broader area defense with larger systems like MADIS and Coyote interceptors.
• Anderson, Maj. Richard, "Exploiting Offensive Use of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS): Learning from Our Adversaries," AF Fellows paper (Department of Homeland Security), 2024, 2 pgs. 
  • Subsequently published in Wild Blue Yonder (August 24, 2024).
  • To train and prepare appropriate operators to counter the growing drone threat, Anderson argues that this new AFSC should expand upon the combat-tested model currently used by Task Force 99, which brings together Airmen from multiple existing AFSCs to build offensive skill sets in a combat environment. By establishing a dedicated career field, these specialized operators would be able to develop best practices for sUAS use and provide critical, dedicated insight on how to effectively counter enemy drones. Furthermore, organizing operators into this dedicated AFSC would serve as a force protection multiplier during Agile Combat Employment (ACE) by providing units with expanded ISR capabilities and the ability to carry out quick kinetic strikes against small threats.
• Godoy, Maj. Luis M., "UAS Threats in Asymmetric Warfare," AFGC thesis, 2025, 34 pgs. 
  • While this AUTL question specifically highlights Group 3 capabilities, Godoy directly answers how to organize and train SOF elements against the highly proliferated Group 1 and 2 threats. He recommends outfitting units with modular, commercial off-the-shelf (OTS) systems and embedding these counter-UAS capabilities directly into standard exercises and rehearsals. By procuring common enemy UAS and utilizing specialized operators to mimic projected adversary tactics during training, Godoy asserts that leaders and operators can proactively identify friction points, refine their engagement criteria under realistic conditions, and become proficient at rapidly selecting between non-kinetic and kinetic effects.
• Hickey, Col. Mark, "Inflection Point: A Study of Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems Usage in the Russia-Ukraine War," AWC SSP, 2024, 24 pgs.  
  • Asserts that the rapid proliferation of Group 1 through Group 3 sUAS requires the U.S. military to fundamentally adapt its doctrine, organization, and training. To properly organize the force, Hickey recommends expanding the Joint Counter-sUAS Office (JCO) to synchronize both offensive and defensive drone capabilities across all branches, eliminating the current siloed, service-specific approaches to C-sUAS development and engagement. Additionally, the paper advocates for the creation of dedicated sUAS and C-sUAS squadrons that can shepherd operational competence, test countermeasures, and develop tactics at the speed of relevance, ensuring that operators and leaders are fully prepared to integrate these complex capabilities into the broader joint force during a great power conflict.
• Johnson, Capt. Kyle M., "The Threat of Unmanned (UAS) against Mobility Air Forces (MAF)," SOS AUAR, 2020, 10 pgs. 
  • Explores how the Air Force must adapt its training and organization to counter UAS threats using emerging technologies like the Tactical High-Power Operational Responder (THOR) microwave system, Dronebuster, and SkyNet. To train operators and engagement authorities effectively, Johnson emphasizes the need to integrate C-sUAS capabilities into the early stages of the "Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess" (F2T2EA) kill chain to defeat threats before they launch. Furthermore, the paper highlights that leaders and operators must be specifically trained to navigate the complex Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and airspace restrictions found in expeditionary locations. By utilizing Operational Risk Management (ORM), trained personnel will be better equipped to quickly determine the appropriate and legal course of action when deciding whether to kinetically or non-kinetically eliminate a UAS threat in foreign environments.
• Kirk, Lt. Col. Troy A., "Review of Operation Inherent Resolve: Small Unmanned Aerial Systems and the Pursuit to Develop a Counter System," AWC SSP, 2020, 34 pgs.  
  • Answers the question by arguing that the Air Force must formally take ownership of the Air Base Air Defense (ABAD) mission, because legacy Army Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) doctrine has proven insufficient against the rapid proliferation of Group 1-3 UAS. To properly organize and train leaders for these advanced C-sUAS capabilities, Kirk recommends integrating C-sUAS operations and multi-modal sensor command and control directly into Defensive Counter Air (DCA) planning doctrine under the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and Area Air Defense Commander (AADC). Furthermore, the paper asserts that training programs must teach planners and engagement authorities to utilize a rapid "detect, identify, decide, engage, assess" (DIDEA) kill-chain that evaluates a full spectrum of non-kinetic and kinetic engagement techniques—such as electronic warfare or cyber hijacking—rather than relying solely on traditional destructive measures.
• Tittinger, Maj. James E., "Preparing for the Rain: Defending USAFE from Russia's Standoff Capabilities," AFGC thesis, 2025, 43 pgs.
  • Tittinger points out that currently, USAFE only operates small, non-kinetic counter-UAS systems that rely on RF or GPS interference, which are virtually useless against advanced systems like the Kh-101 cruise missile or Shahed-136. To properly organize for this threat, he recommends that USAFE bases must establish their own local Air Defense Operations Centers (ADOCs). These ADOCs must be manned by specifically trained operators who are educated to rapidly recognize, prioritize, and engage incoming threats using organic kinetic defense systems and long-range early warning radars.
• Wright, Maj. Jeremy, "Attack of the Drones! US Military Application of Counter Small UAS Operations," GCPME thesis, 2025, 36 pgs.
  • Proposes a joint, standardized approach to organizing and training C-sUAS operators and engagement authorities. Wright recommends expanding the Army-led Joint Counter-Small UAS University (JCU) into a comprehensive national training center to establish standardized, multi-service certifications, ensuring that an Air Force Security Forces Airman is seamlessly interoperable with joint counterparts. To effectively train commanders and kinetic engagement authorities, the paper asserts that complex, mass drone swarm scenarios must be woven into the fabric of operational-level exercises like Red Flag, forcing staffs to practice deploying assets, de-conflicting airspace, and coordinating rapid responses under realistic conditions. Furthermore, Wright argues that C-sUAS proficiency should be mandated and tracked as a unit-level readiness metric (similar to JTAC qualifications), and that Professional Military Education (PME) must integrate recent combat lessons so leaders treat sUAS as a core threat rather than a niche nuisance.