Within a global strategic competition, how can U.S. military forces compete for influence in South and Central America? How can the combatant command best assess the quality and nature of allied and partner relationships in the region, and, in particular, what are the indicators or warnings that U.S. strategic influence might be challenged or losing ground to an adversary?
To understand the biggest threats emanating from this adversarial influence, this research should apply an appropriate and standardized framework and methodology to develop a comprehensive analysis of the current and future capabilities of China to project military power in the Latin American and Caribbean region over the next three to five years. Focus countries should include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, and must comprehensively address potential dual-use infrastructure.
If U.S. influence has lost ground to this military projection, what are the best options for rebuilding influence to prevent or minimize adversarial entrenchment? Ultimately, can U.S. military forces mitigate the effects of this adversarial influence without directly competing against adversaries?
- Ackley, Maj. Rachel, "Chinese Soft Power Marshalling Military Might into USSOUTHCOM," GCPME 2024, 71 pgs.
- Addresses the indicators of lost strategic influence and the biggest threats emanating from adversarial entrenchment in South and Central America (the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility). Indicators/Warnings of Lost Ground: The research identifies China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a primary mechanism for expanding its footprint. Key markers that U.S. influence is being challenged include an increase in subaltern nations signing memorandums of understanding with Chinese companies for direct foreign investments, critical infrastructure projects, and communication initiatives like the Digital Silk Road. The paper utilizes the Theory of Subaltern Realism to explain that marginalized populations often welcome Chinese financial and political support because of their need for first-world assistance, signaling a vulnerability in U.S. influence. Threats of Adversarial Entrenchment: The expansion of Chinese economic and digital monopolies serves as political leverage that enables Chinese Communist Party agendas and facilitates the presence of the People's Liberation Army and Navy in the region. This directly threatens U.S. bilateral security collaboration, existing trade agreements, and access to critical byways between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.
- Burke, Maj. Eric, "Honduras: Political Corruption and Possible Solutions to Consider," ACSC EL (Combating Corruption), 2019, 9 pgs.
- Provides an example of how SOF can minimize adversarial entrenchment by combating internal instability and corruption, which are the exact vulnerabilities that adversaries exploit. Burke details how US Special Operations Forces deployed with Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B) successfully partnered with the Honduran national police (the TIGRES) to interdict drug movement and dismantle high-level criminal organizations. By directly addressing the region's rampant crime and drug trafficking, SOF helps to stabilize the nation's economy and governance, thereby preventing the creation of permissive environments where adversaries and malign actors thrive.
- Diaz, Lt. Col. Leria, "China in the Americas: Undermining Sovereignty through IUU Fishing in the High Seas," AWC SSP, 2021, 25 pgs.
- Directly answers how the US military and SOF can mitigate the effects of adversarial influence without directly competing against adversaries in armed conflict, specifically focusing on the gray-zone threat of Chinese Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. Diaz argues that Chinese IUU fishing threatens the sovereignty and economies of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. The military can mitigate this by building partner capacity to enforce their own sovereignty rather than confronting China directly. By providing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sharing satellite imagery for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), and conducting combined counter-IUU exercises (like Operation Southern Cross), the US can expose malign activities and make itself the enduring "partner of choice" in SOUTHCOM.
- Frost, Maj. Ryan S., "Collision Course with China: Consideration for Policymakers in the Western Hemisphere," AF Fellows (Department of State), 2021, 45 pgs.
- Provides a comprehensive overview of the biggest threats emanating from adversarial influence in Latin America, identifies warning indicators of lost US ground, and outlines strategic options for rebuilding influence against China, Russia, and Iran. Biggest Threats: It identifies the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the pacing challenge, utilizing the Belt and Road Initiative, "debt-trap diplomacy," and predatory lending to expand its foothold. It also highlights Russia's use of arms sales and cyber-based disinformation to disrupt democracies, as well as Iran's historical sponsorship of Hezbollah and drug trafficking in the region. Indicators of Lost Ground: Frost points to shifting trade volumes (China's trade with Latin America increased over 200% between 2006 and 2016 compared to a 38% US increase) and the region's heavy reliance on China for COVID-19 "mask diplomacy" as clear warnings that the US is losing its strategic advantage. Rebuilding Influence & Preventing Entrenchment: To rebuild influence, the author recommends shifting foreign military financing (FMF) and assistance away from the Middle East and toward the Western Hemisphere. It also suggests leveraging the private sector through programs like América Crece and the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to offer regional partners viable, transparent economic alternatives to Chinese investments.
- Martin, Maj. Zachary, "The Hydra: The Strategic Paradox of Human Security in Mexico," ACSC paper, 2019.
- Subsequently published as an AU Press Wright Flyer Paper, "The Hydra: The Strategic Paradox of Human Security in Mexico," (2020)
- "The Hydra," addresses the question by framing the region's primary threat not as a traditional military force, but as a severe human security crisis driven by violent cartels and the illicit narcotics trade that subverts state sovereignty and regional stability. While acknowledging that Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) initiatives can build influence by training partner forces, Martin argues that the current U.S.-backed "counter-network decapitation" strategy is fundamentally flawed because it fractures cartels and inadvertently exacerbates violence and corruption. He warns that this widespread cartel-induced instability directly threatens U.S. strategic interests by creating chaotic environments that foreign competitors could easily exploit for regional entrenchment. To successfully rebuild influence and prevent adversaries from gaining ground, Martin concludes that the U.S. must abandon its strictly militarized decapitation approach; instead, security assistance must be comprehensively targeted at the root causes of the human security threat, focusing on economic underdevelopment, public security, and anti-corruption reforms to meaningfully stabilize the region.
- Mathison, Alexander T., "SOF and GPC," SOS AUAR (ISR Section), 2022, 9 pgs.
- Mathison addresses how SOF can mitigate adversarial influence and compete in Great Power Competition without direct conflict through the core "advise-and-assist" mission. By training host-nation militaries—such as the historic efforts to train the Colombian military to combat drug traffickers—SOF builds internal stability, enhances local security capabilities, and fosters stronger ties with the United States. These training missions naturally spread U.S. influence, naturally restricting the space adversaries have to maneuver and providing a critical contribution to the strategic tug-of-war.
- Morris, Lt. Col. Paul, "Russian Deep Operations: A Contemporary Application," AWC SSP, 2020, 24 pgs.
- Morris examines the threats and indicators of Russian influence in the region through the lens of Soviet "Deep Operations" and reflexive control. Indicators of Russian encroachment include sudden shifts in foreign aid from food and medicine to military training and supplies, such as in Nicaragua, where Russia also established a counterdrug facility that local analysts suspect is actually used for intelligence gathering. Morris warns that the biggest threats from this influence include Russia operating alongside regional transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and potentially using concealed special forces to incite "weaponized mass migration" from Central America to the U.S. southern border. This strategy is designed to fix U.S. reserves in place, disrupt the homeland, and simultaneously run disinformation campaigns to stoke domestic extremism in the U.S..
- O'Gwin, Lt. Col. Christopher W., "Any Challenge, Any Time, Any Place: Special Operations Forces and Full Spectrum Competition," AWC SSP, 2020, 31 pgs.
- O’Gwin explains that SOF can compete for influence and mitigate adversarial effects without direct armed conflict by operating in the "gray zone" through Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions and cultural immersion. By engaging persistently with partners—such as helping Brazil with Olympic security, assisting Panama in the Darien Gap, and supporting Trinidad and Tobago against terrorist returnees—SOF builds partner capacity and makes host nations more likely to behave favorably toward U.S. interests. To prevent or minimize adversarial entrenchment, O'Gwin suggests SOF can execute "denial operations," which involve organizing, equipping, and training local resistance forces or displaced populations (such as those fleeing Venezuela) to indirectly thwart an adversary's aggression. Furthermore, placing highly experienced SOF liaisons within U.S. embassies and interagency missions allows the command to properly assess the capabilities of partner forces and regional influences.
- Perez, Maj. Lupersio, "The Dragon in the Backyard: Unveiling China's Strategy in Latin America," AFGC thesis, 2025, 52 pgs.
- Perez answers this by detailing China's expanding footprint in Latin America through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its strategy of weaponizing foreign direct investments and loans, which creates severe overreliance and indebtedness in unstable countries like Venezuela, Cuba, and Ecuador. He identifies direct national security threats emanating from this adversarial influence, including PRC-operated spy stations in Cuba capable of intercepting sensitive US military communications, the potential for the PRC to disrupt military and commercial maritime travel through the Panama Canal, and the exacerbation of the US border crisis by transnational criminal organizations taking advantage of regional instability to traffic fentanyl and humans. To rebuild influence, Perez recommends that the US and its G7 allies provide robust, sustainable economic alternatives (such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment), reinstate proactive USAID programs, and increase USSOUTHCOM's disaster-relief and security cooperation efforts.
- Pototschnik, CDR Mark, "The Latin America and Caribbean Security Environment and the Need for Coast Guard Transformational Change," AWC SSP, 2022, 28 pgs.
- Pototschnik highlights the overlapping threats emanating from adversarial influence and the 200+ Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) operating in the region. He points out that strategic competitors like Russia and China, as well as hostile nations like Iran, are increasing their diplomatic and economic ties to reduce U.S. influence. A significant threat in this environment is the linkage between regional criminal networks and foreign terrorist organizations, such as the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. Pototschnik argues that to address these high-hostility, low-capacity environments and prevent further destabilization, the U.S. must provide high levels of external capacity to increase regional stability, suggesting the Coast Guard as an ideal force multiplier for maritime stability operations to counter these intertwined threats.
- Raymond, LT. Col. Jennifer, "Impacts of Chinese Economic and Political Influence on South America and U.S. National Security," AWC RSS paper, 2024, 9 pgs.
- Discusses how to assess the nature of adversarial relationships in the region and provides options for the U.S. to rebuild influence and prevent further entrenchment without directly competing militarily. Indicators and Threats: China is shaping the region to its advantage by acting as a strategic partner to authoritarian regimes and utilizing predatory loans, trade, and binding infrastructure contracts. The biggest threat emanating from this is the creation of an "asymmetric economic dependence" that threatens the collective sovereignty of South American countries, fosters illiberal democracies, and undermines U.S. regional hegemony. Rebuilding Influence: To prevent adversarial entrenchment, the U.S. must recognize South American agency and autonomy and acknowledge the region's perception that the U.S. has neglected its relationship with them. Rather than directly confronting adversaries, the U.S. and its allies must offer attractive, affordable alternatives for regional economic development. By demonstrating deeper political and economic engagement, the U.S. can help partner nations build strong, inclusive, transparent, and anti-corrupt institutions that provide their own checks and balances against the nefarious effects of Chinese investments.
- Rempe, Captain David A., "Russian Influence Complicates Venezuelan Crisis," SOS AUAR, 2021, 11 pgs.
- Rempe highlights the indicators and threats of Russian influence specifically regarding military-technical ties and arms sales to Venezuela, which exacerbate corruption and give Russian energy corporations access to regional resources. A major warning sign of this influence is the sparking of a South American arms race, as neighboring countries purchase weapons in response to Venezuela's Russian-supplied advanced weaponry. Rempe suggests that the best option for rebuilding influence and minimizing this adversarial entrenchment is not direct U.S. military intervention, but rather strengthening regional partners like Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. By funding and facilitating combined military exercises and humanitarian training among these allies, the U.S. can help foster a self-policing region that serves as a beacon of independence from outside influence.
- Reyes-Diaz, Col. Mauricio, "Manta, Yes or No: An Ongoing Debate Revolving the Issue of a Foreign Military Presence in Ecuador," AWC EL (Dilemmas of Global Basing), 2019, 9 pgs.
- Answers how the US can assess the quality and nature of allied relationships—particularly regarding military basing and access—which is a critical indicator of US strategic influence. Using the history of the US Forward Operating Location (FOS) Manta in Ecuador (where SOUTHCOM stationed Special Operations units for counter-narcotics), the author highlights the concept of "base politics". It shows that assessing US influence requires looking beyond national-level politics to local and grassroots levels. Rebuilding influence and securing operational access requires ensuring that the host nation's local populations perceive tangible benefits from the US presence, such as economic growth and improved local security.
- Rizvi, Captain Natasha, "Improving AM&E in the Security Cooperation Field," SOS AUAR (MAF), 2020, 10 pgs.
- Rizvi directly addresses how commands can best assess the quality and nature of allied and partner relationships through the standardization of Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E) metrics. To objectively quantify the value and health of security cooperation programs, Rizvi recommends establishing "enterprise decision matrixes" with standardized evaluation criteria tailored to overarching priorities. By regularly reassessing these variables and rating programs based on qualitative and quantitative data, decision-makers can better allocate resources, simplify the evaluation of partner nation capabilities, and ensure that security cooperation initiatives align with U.S. strategic interests.
- Towal, Maj. Erik, "A Rheostat of Utility: The Value Proposition of Special Operations in Past, Present and Future Conflict," SAASS thesis, 2022, 121 pgs.
- Explores the core value proposition of SOF during strategic competition, explaining how SOF competes for influence and prevents adversarial entrenchment globally and historically in Latin America. The author asserts that SOF competes for influence by operating "by, with, and through" partner forces to build "access, placement, and influence through sustained partnership". By working closely with indigenous forces, SOF provides policymakers with an "economy of force" and "unorthodox approaches" that generate strategic advantages at a reduced cost and risk of escalation. The paper uses historical examples in SOUTHCOM, such as Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, to demonstrate how SOF's unique cultural awareness, language skills, and integration with local forces help stabilize regions and secure US interests.
- Zaimis, Lt. Col. John, "The Fentanyl Dilemma: US Military Superiority at Risk if Drug War is Approved," AF Fellows piece, 2024, 3 pgs.
- Zaimis argues against utilizing Special Operations Forces (SOF) to combat Mexican drug cartels, warning that such an intervention would jeopardize U.S. military readiness and undermine strategic interests in the Great Power Competition. Rather than offering a framework to rebuild influence or directly compete with regional threats, Zaimis asserts that authorizing military force would fracture hemispheric partnerships, threaten Mexican sovereignty, and counteract diplomatic and economic strategies like "nearshoring". Ultimately, he identifies military overextension as the greatest threat to the United States, emphasizing that fighting an asymmetric drug war would inappropriately divert critical SOF, cyber, and intelligence resources away from preparing for primary peer adversaries like China and Russia.