The ‘American way of war’ is typically used to describe the United States’ use of exquisite technology combined with limited numbers of highly trained personnel, rather than relying on relatively low-technology capabilities wielded by large masses of personnel. As technology expands in both sophistication and reach, the Joint Force must adapt to keep up with, and take advantage of, these new capabilities. However, does this cultural bias lead the U.S. military into over-relying on technology, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of small-quantity, highly trained, and technologically sophisticated forces?
As the Department of Defense incorporates emerging technologies, it must assess their risks, opportunities, limitations, and overall trustworthiness. How will innovations like computer-to-brain interfaces, artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML), and large language models (LLMs) change military processes and operations? Will remotely piloted and/or autonomous systems change expeditionary logistics, maneuver, and the disbursement of resources and sustainment in a contested environment, and how might quantum computing affect offensive and defensive cyber operations? Furthermore, what are the legal and ethical standards for using such technology, and does this technology inherently encourage and enable micromanagement?
Finally, as we move into an era of strategic competition, there is a distinct risk in assuming that the Joint Force will always possess a technological advantage vis-à-vis an adversary. How can U.S. forces be effective in a conflict environment characterized by technological undermatch, and do they possess other competitive advantages to compensate for it? Against an adversary with comparable or better technological capabilities, how can the military best manage the virtual and physical signatures of personnel, platforms, organizations, operations, facilities, and data? Specifically, how can U.S. forces exploit existing infrastructure to cover their electronic tracks, how might adversaries use technology to track them, and does the global spread of technology correspond with an increasing difficulty for conducting covert or clandestine operations?
- Fox, Maj. Michael J, et al, "Optimizing the Alternate Targeting Methodology F3EAD," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (January-June 2024).
- Garver, Maj. Jonathan, "From Air to Ground: Introducing SOF SEAD Using DRFM Jamming," ACSC Cyber specialization paper, subsequently published in Wild Blue Yonder (February 1, 2024)
- Jones, LtCol Eric, "Quantum Advances in the Electromagnetic Spectrum and Electronic Warfare," AWC elective paper, 2023, 12 pgs.
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- McBride, Maj. Lukhma, "The Chadian Way of War: Implications for Operations in the Sahel," SAASS thesis, 2025, 138 pgs.
- McBride answers this by using the historical case study of the Chad-Libya conflict to demonstrate that forces can overcome severe technological undermatch by leveraging extreme mobility, asymmetric tactics, and an "unconditional will" to fight. He explains that while the Libyan military possessed conventionally superior, high-cost Soviet weapons like T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and attack helicopters, the Chadians achieved decisive victories by outfitting inexpensive, highly agile Toyota pickup trucks with heavy machine guns and anti-tank missiles. By pairing this vehicular mobility with an intimate indigenous knowledge of the harsh Saharan terrain and decentralized, front-line leadership, Chad successfully bypassed Libya's static defenses and destroyed hundreds of armored vehicles, proving that human judgment, audacity, and environmental adaptation can effectively neutralize an adversary's exquisite military technology.