Typical U.S. military methodologies for quantifying and categorizing risk are not well-suited for some outlier risks. For example, the very low probability, but very high consequence, of a deliberate nuclear attack is a different type of risk compared to a violent extremist organization’s attack. Other examples of low-probability, high-consequence events include the assassination of a world leader or the destruction of a physical item with great cultural significance, such as an irreplaceable religious artefact. How might risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation be characterized to best plan for low-probability, high-consequence events? In addition to characterizing such events, how can the SOE and SOF prepare for the follow-on effects of such an event? What does a campaign of de-escalation look like following an event that could be considered an existential threat?
- Carter, Lt. Col. Mark A., "Critical Reactions: The role of Crisis in Advancing Nuclear Science and Technology," SAASS thesis, 2025, 103 pgs.
- Carter answers how the military and nation should prepare for the follow-on effects of severe, high-consequence radiological events by emphasizing proactive resource allocation in emergency preparedness and radiation safety infrastructure. To mitigate the catastrophic impacts of mass radiation exposure incidents, he recommends that decision-makers ensure military units, emergency responders, and hospitals have guaranteed access to radiation detection equipment, decontamination facilities, and medical countermeasures. Additionally, to prevent critical supply chain disruptions following a disaster, he argues that nations must establish redundant isotope production facilities and improve radiological waste disposal protocols.