Organizing SOF for Irregular Warfare: Networks, TSOC Restructuring, and Collaboration

  • Published
  • By JSOU/USASOC

The genesis of the great power competition has created an operational environment that demands greater collaboration and synthesis between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the interagency to enable future Support to Resistance and Resilience (SRR). Does the Special Operations Enterprise (SOE) require organizational changes to better carry out these irregular warfare campaigns and operations? Specifically, is the current global SOF network optimal and organized to support future SRR, and what is the most appropriate global SOF network configuration to support SRR from an allied or U.S. Department of State perspective?

Because most irregular warfare problems have at least some transregional element, and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) have a regional focus, should the structure and focus of TSOCs be examined? Is there a need for additional TSOCs under U.S. Space Command or U.S. Cyber Command, or would it be helpful to create a transregionally focused irregular warfare headquarters? Within this potential restructuring of USSOCOM organizations, what would the advantages and disadvantages be? Furthermore, how can the SOF Liaison Network to the interagency be more integrated and responsive to the collective threat across geographic commands and TSOCs, and should the current network include specific training for SRR activities?

To operate successfully against peer adversaries, are purpose-built SOF organizations and capabilities needed to successfully wage irregular warfare campaigns? How should the Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) enterprise restructure to include opportunities in the convergence of the space-special operations-cyber realms—the space-SOF-cyber triad and NEXUS constructs? Finally, how do allies, partners, and adversaries conceptualize and organize for irregular warfare, and are there elements from other operations that USSOCOM could incorporate to be more effective? Should the relationship with allies and partners be coordinated or institutionally integrated, and what lessons can be drawn from the global war on terror about allied approaches that can be repurposed for SRR today?

 


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    • Moreno directly addresses this by recommending the creation of a "Joint Conventional and SOF Combat Group (JCSCG)," which would forcefully integrate elite SOF warriors with conventional forces under a unified command structure led by general officers from both forces. He emphasizes that USSOCOM must move away from Cold War-era stovepipe doctrines, shed excess capacity, and enforce top-down institutional shifts to prepare purpose-built units capable of conducting unified operations in the military strategic environment against China.
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  • O'Gwin, Lt. Col. Christopher W., "Any Challenge, Any Time, Any Place: Special Operations Forces and Full Spectrum Competition," AWC Strategic Studies Paper, 2020, 31 pgs.