Current nuclear weapon acquisition protocols are not sufficiently agile to meet the present geopolitical threat environment. History has shown weapon acquisition taking more than a decade to complete (e.g., the B61-12). To keep pace in a two-peer environment, the military needs to rethink how it designs, produces, and fields future weapon systems.
A major institutional and policy constraint to this effort is that current U.S. policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft. This old Cold War practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm, creating a specific operational constraint that must be overcome. To navigate these barriers and successfully field dual-capable bombers and fighters, how does the future Air Force Integrated Capability Development Command develop and field platforms that are both conventional and nuclear, and how do they prioritize requirements for these dual-capable platforms?
In examining this process, do current governance arrangements, acquisition practices, certification processes, and infrastructure constraints—such as the weapons loading policy—impose strategic costs that are increasingly difficult to accept? Without arguing against foundational safety or security standards, how can the nuclear enterprise adapt its capability development and acquisition processes quickly enough to meet modern threat conditions without sacrificing reliability, accountability, or stewardship?