Current nuclear weapon acquisition protocols are not sufficiently agile to meet the present geopolitical threat environment. History has shown weapon acquisition taking more than a decade to complete (e.g., the B61-12). To keep pace in a two-peer environment, we need to rethink how we design, produce, and field future weapon systems. How does the future Air Force Integrated Capability Development Command develop and field platforms that are both conventional and nuclear (like bombers and dual-capable aircraft), and how do they prioritize requirements for these dual-capable platforms? In examining this process, do current governance arrangements, acquisition practices, certification processes, and infrastructure constraints impose strategic costs that are increasingly difficult to accept? Without arguing against foundational safety or security standards, how can the nuclear enterprise adapt its capability development and acquisition processes quickly enough to meet modern threat conditions without sacrificing reliability, accountability, or stewardship?
References:
- Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020: https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter7.html