The operational challenges DoD must confront, in the face of an ever-changing operating environment and changing character of war, require us to develop compelling and relevant concepts that link U.S. strategic objectives, policies, and capabilities. As adversaries develop capabilities to contest the United States in traditional warfighting domains, U.S. advantages will increasingly require building strengths in areas traditionally seen as supporting efforts, as well as in those areas where responsibility falls between existing organizations. Examples include, but are not limited to, digital modernization, autonomy, contested logistics, communications, electronic warfare, and integrated air and missile defense.
ARC submissions should develop a new concept that addresses one or more of the operational challenges we face and discuss needed supporting capabilities. Submissions may also consider the barriers to developing and implementing new concepts and how senior leaders can overcome them. Key questions include: What concepts and supporting capabilities are needed to fill gaps? What barriers currently stand in the way of these potential solutions being fully examined, and what levers are available to senior leaders to support change in this space? How can we improve concept development, experimentation, training, and other enablers to ensure the Joint Force can execute with new technologies?
- Acres, Maj. Bryce D., "'Strategic Narratives for Sentinel:' How Minutemen and Peacekeeper Narratives Can Influence Force Design," SAASS thesis, 2024, 87 pgs.
- Acuna, Maj. Fernando Suito, "The Missing Link: A Path Forward for Integrating Remotely Piloted Aircraft within Joint All-Domain Operations," AFGC thesis, 2025, 43 pgs.
- Acuna points to institutional inertia and a stagnant acquisition culture as the primary barriers preventing RPAs from adapting to JADO. Because the Air Force traditionally prioritizes long-cycle, multi-billion-dollar manned aircraft acquisitions, iterative upgrades to unmanned systems have been delayed or deprioritized. To overcome these barriers, he recommends reforming acquisition timelines to support rapid, incremental modernization, and explicitly establishing Group V RPA representation in Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) design and planning billets so that unmanned operational experience directly informs future joint force design.
- Anderson IV, Maj. Raymond A., Protecting the Human Link: Joint Terminal Attack Controller Survivability in the Age of Unmanned Systems and Advanced Air Defenses," AFGC thesis, 2026, 50 pgs.
- Anderson identifies a critical capability and training gap created by the divestment of the A-10 fleet without an equivalent, dedicated CAS replacement. He notes that fifth-generation fighters prioritize air-dominance and deep-strike missions, leaving JTACs without the high-volume, live-fly CAS training repetitions they need to maintain combat proficiency. To address this, he recommends that the DoD must either advocate for a legislated A-10 replacement or explicitly modify existing manned or unmanned platforms to ensure JTACs can sustainably train and coordinate fires.
- Barger, Maj. Abby, "The Evolution of JP 3-0: How Doctrine Development Influences Strategy and Policy," SAASS thesis, 2021, 93 pgs.
- Bowers, Adriana M., "ONE STEP AHEAD: A U.S. Focus to Advance Logistics Footprint," GCPME thesis, 2024, 49 pgs.
- Castle, Maj. Nicklas A., "So Many Targets, So Little Time: Overcoming Airpower's Struggle to Win in Future Joint Fight," GCPME, 2024, 60 pgs.
- Davis, Maj. Eric A., "If It Flies, It Dies: Implications and Opportunities in Army Air Defense Investments," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- Davis answers this by examining the unresolved doctrinal gap in Air Base Defense (ABAD) between the Army and the Air Force, a vulnerability that has persisted since their foundational Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) lapsed after 1984. He warns that the Air Force's shift toward Agile Combat Employment (ACE) will disperse operations across numerous smaller locations, exponentially increasing the number of vulnerable airbases requiring Army active air defense protection. To resolve this interservice friction and fill the capability gap, Davis recommends revitalizing a formal MOU to explicitly allocate resources for ABAD, integrating Air Force and Army command and control networks (like ABMS and IBCS) to prevent fratricide, and retaining Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) to manage real-time airspace deconfliction between Army maneuver elements and dispersed Air Force units.
- Endicott, Maj. Kenneth M., "USMC Force Design 2030 in Historical Context," GCPME 2023, 58 pgs.
- Hancock, Maj. Nicholas, "Marines: Maintaining the Modernization Momentum," AFGC thesis, 2025, 54 pgs
- Hancock tackles this by evaluating the Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 alongside the modernization strategies of the Army (Project Convergence), Navy (Project Overmatch), and Air Force (Air Superiority 2030). He identifies command-and-control interoperability as the most critical gap hindering joint force execution, particularly when integrating small, distributed Marine Littoral Regiments with broader naval and joint networks. To improve training and execution with new capabilities across cyber, space, and information domains, he suggests the Marine Corps emulate the Army and Air Force by utilizing large-scale joint exercises to gain repetitions in delegating authorities, testing digital kill chains, and building operational confidence in contested environments.
- Johnson, William R., "Peering into the Future of Operational Planning," SAASS thesis, 2022, 100 pgs.
- McQuade, Lt. Col. John, "An Argument for the Resurgence of Strategic Attack," AWC Strategic Studies paper, 2019, 27 pgs.
- Miller, Maj. Rachel J., "Families in the Fight: AFFORGEN's Impact on Dual-Career Families," AFGC thesis, 2025, 37 pgs.
- Miller evaluates the USAF's transition to the AFFORGEN model, which was designed to provide the Joint Force with consistent and predictable capabilities for strategic competition. She highlights that a major barrier to the new model's success was that it was implemented without data-driven development, clear implementation guidance, or defined measures of success. Instead of using official Air Force instructions, guidance was communicated informally through briefings and emails, causing widespread confusion across the force and negatively impacting readiness. To overcome these barriers, she recommends that senior leaders reissue explicit, standing guidance on AFFORGEN to establish clear milestones and immediately implement tangible levers—such as the congressionally approved increase to the Family Separation Allowance (FSA)—to support the families enacting these new concepts.
- Pickett, Lt. Col. Bryan, "Clausewitz's Trinity: From Theory to Application in Joint Planning," AWC Strategic Studies Paper, 2020, 34 pgs.
- Powell, Maj. Erin K., "Who's on First? Defending U.S. Critical Infrastructure against Cyber Attacks," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- Noting that current voluntary guidelines from CISA are ineffective and lack enforcement mechanisms, Powell argues that the CRMP concept would mandate civilian operators to design scalable, risk-informed cybersecurity plans while relying on federal sectoral agencies (like the Department of Transportation or Department of Energy) for compliance audits and penalties. She identifies several barriers to implementing this solution, primarily the lengthy legislative and rulemaking processes required to enact it, as well as the financial and technical strain it would place on smaller infrastructure operators who lack dedicated cybersecurity expertise. To overcome these barriers and leverage change, Powell recommends that senior leaders pursue enabling legislation while providing supporting capabilities—such as federal grants, standardized CRMP templates, subsidized commercial tools, and free technical assistance from CISA—to offset operational costs and build private-sector capacity.
- Sliger, Lt. Col. Jill N., "Airline Pilot or Air Reserve Technician? The Impact of the Mobility Pilot Retention Crisis on the Department of the Air Force," AFGC thesis, 2026.
- Sliger answers this by identifying the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and its cadre of ART mobility pilots as a critical supporting capability required to maintain Total Force surge capacity and project global power during contingencies. She notes that bureaucratic inefficiencies within the dual-status civil service system—such as the disjointed UTAPS and AROWS pay systems and exceedingly slow hiring processes—act as major barriers that degrade this capability and drive pilot attrition. To support change and fill these readiness gaps, Sliger argues that senior leaders must utilize legislative levers to consolidate and modernize Reserve pay and order processing into a single, unified platform, while simultaneously expanding access to AGR billets for vital command and instructor positions to provide greater hiring flexibility.
- Stewart, Lt. Col. Michael F., "'Force Design 1930': The United States Marine Corps and the Doctrine of Organizational Survival," SAASS thesis, 2023, 83 pgs.
- Tindall, Maj. Aaron, "From the Wallow to the Air and Beyond: The History of the Wild Boars of the 390th," SAASS thesis, 2025.
- Tindall answers this by detailing how the 390th ECS directly fills the Air Force’s critical capability gap in dedicated airborne electronic attack (AEA) following the 1990s divestment of the EF-111A Raven. The 390th fills this gap by embedding USAF Combat Systems Officers and pilots directly into Navy expeditionary EA-18G Growler squadrons, ensuring the Air Force maintains the ability to execute the full spectrum of EW. This joint support capability allows the Air Force to provide the tactical jamming and offensive electromagnetic attack capabilities required to disrupt adversary detection systems, command and control, and networks. Tindall emphasizes that this inter-service integration is a vital supporting capability that grants the joint force freedom of maneuver in increasingly congested and contested electromagnetic environments.
- Tittinger, Maj. James E., "Preparing for the Rain: Defending USAFE from Russia's Standoff Capabilities," AFGC thesis, 2025, 43 pgs.
- Tittinger highlights a decades-old, unresolved doctrinal dispute between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army over Air Base Air Defense (ABAD) responsibility. Because the Army operates the theater's primary kinetic defense systems (like Patriot and M-SHORAD) to protect its maneuvering units and specific strategic assets, USAFE is left with thousands of bases and geographically separated units that it cannot organically defend. To fix this critical vulnerability, he recommends explicitly changing doctrine to grant USAFE the authority, funding, and responsibility to procure its own organic self-defense capabilities against cruise missiles and large UAVs.