The twenty-first century's most destructive military conflict in Ukraine has dramatically affected the global perception of modern warfare, highlighting the urgent need for rapid adaptation in wartime. How has the mass proliferation of unmanned systems used in the Russia-Ukraine War impacted how both nations wage war? This research should move beyond the tactics of new technologies to explore the strategic implications of these changes. Specifically, the persistent surveillance and firepower provided by unmanned systems, their low cost (which allows widespread proliferation), and advances in electronic warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War seem to have shifted the offense-defense balance significantly.
Do the emergent technologies developed in the Russia-Ukraine War mark a return to overwhelming defense dominance in war, or have they shifted the balance toward the offensive? What might shift the balance toward offensive dominance (or weaker defense dominance)? Furthermore, are these characteristics of contemporary war generalizable beyond Ukraine to wars the United States may fight in the future, and what are the larger strategic implications?
To address these strategic implications, how should the United States structure its force in this environment? Based on the lessons of commercial technology integration and emerging capabilities seen during this conflict, what is the appropriate mix of high-end yet costly capabilities (e.g., advanced tanks and attack helicopters) and low-end, affordable, and attritable systems (e.g., first-person-view unmanned systems) across the Joint Force? Answering this requires an assessment of current force structure and an understanding of how these emerging, attritable capabilities can neutralize core war-fighting doctrinal competencies.
What are the doctrinal implications of a high-low-mix force, and what broader institutional changes and adaptations across the DOTMLPF-P framework—such as law, policy, manning, training, and force development processes—are required to accelerate this adaptation to ensure warfighting lethality and readiness? Beyond the tactical platform mix, this conflict also introduced new technological paradigms, such as Ukraine's use of cloud computing and the first battlefield use of hypersonic missiles. Ultimately, what lessons can the DoD learn from these innovations to resolve key issues related to crisis instability, thereby directly informing resourcing, capability allocations, and force-structure changes in future military transformation decisions?
- Bauman, Maj. Nicholas J., "Reaper Retirement: Why the Air Force Should Reconsider Plans to Cut the MQ-9," AFGC thesis, 2023.
- Answered by Bauman's examination of how mass-proliferated unmanned systems have impacted modern combat dynamics and redefined the high-low mix. Utilizing the real-world application of the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone in Ukraine, Bauman shows that medium-altitude long-endurance drones can successfully penetrate advanced air defense networks to strike tanks, mobile rocket systems, and depots deep within enemy lines. However, as Russia adapted by employing heavy electromagnetic countermeasures and denser surface-to-air missile systems, the TB2's effectiveness was reduced, forcing operators to fly outside of weapons engagement zones to gather intelligence or strike minimally defended spaces. Bauman argues that because traditional platform stealth is reaching its physical limits against advanced radars and AI computing, future warfare will shift away from a small quantity of expensive, exquisite stealth assets. Instead, militaries must prioritize a high-low force mix that integrates large quantities of cheaper, low-tech, and attritable unmanned systems (such as the MQ-9 or the MQ-9B Skyguardian) to overwhelm enemy air defenses, absorb risk, and execute operations where loss of life is unacceptable.
- Bordeau, Capt. Adam et al, "BBP on Engineering Support to Deployable Combat Wings," SOS AUAR, 3 pgs. and slides, 2025.
- Bordeau addresses this prompt by specifically highlighting how the Ukraine-Russia conflict has demonstrated the outsized impact of rapidly adapting commercial and battlefield technologies, such as drones. To replicate this success and accelerate adaptation, he argues that the Air Force must change its manning and force development processes by establishing a long-term, embedded construct for engineers within Air Task Forces and DCWs rather than relying on short-term pilot programs. By placing engineers at the tactical edge, the Air Force can ensure a continual flow of expertise and foster deliberate collaboration with academia, commercial industry, and research labs, ultimately reducing response times for critical operational needs to hours or days.
- Gillis, Maj. Michael, "Clear Skies over Taiwan: Alternatives to Air Superiority in a Conflict with China over Taiwan," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- Gillis explains that the Russia-Ukraine War demonstrates how a comprehensive air denial campaign combining Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) with cyber-attacks can successfully prevent a superior attacking air force from achieving air superiority, shifting defensive operations toward defense dominance. To optimize the joint force structure, Gillis argues against relying solely on exquisite, high-end "blue skies" manned platforms like the F-35, NGAD, or massive carrier strike groups. Instead, he advocates for a high-low capability mix that pairs these traditional assets with thousands of low-cost, attributable autonomous systems (such as the Pentagon's Replicator program) and loitering munitions. This mass of attritable systems can saturate the lower "air littoral," conducting decoy, electronic jamming, and persistent targeting missions that frustrate the adversary's offensive counter-air operations.
- McCaughan, Lt. Col. Ryan, "You Can't Just 'Ukraine' Taiwan: The Imperative to Strengthen Taiwan's Defense Posture," AWC RSS paper, 2025, 18 pgs.
- Thomas, Lt. Col. Kevin T., "Out of Broken Dreams: The Ushering in of Second Drone Age Warfare in Ukraine," AWC SSP, 2025, 46 pgs.