Several potential adversaries possess a number of mobile ICBMs that cause an F2T2EA (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess) problem for the United States. Contending with two near-peer competitors and other nations increasing their nuclear arsenals raises a vital question: does the U.S. need to develop a road-mobile ICBM system as part of its own strategic nuclear arsenal? Furthermore, what legal, safety, or political constraints exist when deploying such a mobile system within the continental United States (CONUS)?
These strategic considerations are deeply tied to the physical realities of nuclear logistics. The process of moving nuclear assets presents major sustainment and tactical security challenges. For example, the Air Force relies on the new Transporter Erector Replacement Program (TERP) and Payload Transporter Replacement (PTR) vehicles to facilitate Minuteman III (MMIII) missile movements. To ensure long-term viability, the defense enterprise must determine what logistic supply and support chains are required to maintain these key vehicles beyond 2050.
Tactical security must also be evaluated during transport. At times, nuclear movements must be made on trailers that lack the ballistic protection of the PTR or the Safeguards Transporter (SGT). The core operational challenge is balancing transport speed and freedom of movement with security and safety from emerging land and air threats. What specific methods exist to move nuclear weapons in a way that deters and degrades adversary capabilities while minimizing exposure for maintenance and operations crews? Ultimately, is concealment a superior strategy to advanced security measures when transporting these strategic assets, or can the maintenance and operations footprint be better optimized?
- Acres, Maj. Bryce D., "Strategic Narratives for Sentinel: How Minuteman and Peacekeeper Narratives Can Influence Force Design," SAASS thesis, 2024.
- Directly answers the question regarding the constraints of deploying a mobile ICBM system within the continental United States (CONUS) by examining historical attempts to do so. Acres details the development of the MX/Peacekeeper missile and the proposed "Midgetman" truck-mounted mobile missile, noting that efforts to utilize a random mobile basing strategy or a "Multiple Protective Shelters" concept faced severe domestic hurdles. The constraints included immense land requirements, massive pushback from local residents and Congressional representatives over environmental impacts, and strict regulatory hurdles imposed by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which opened the door for legal complaints. Ultimately, these intense domestic and environmental constraints forced President Reagan to abandon the mobile basing concept in favor of placing the missiles in existing, fixed super-hardened silos.
- Adsit, Maj. Lance, "The Case for Nuclear Modernization," AF Fellows (Department of Energy), 2021.
- Implicitly argues against the need for a new mobile ICBM by defending the strategic value of keeping the U.S. ICBM force in geographically separated, fixed silos across the CONUS mainland. Adsit asserts that retaining the current silo-based Minuteman III replacement, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), is crucial because the widespread 400-silo network acts as a "missile sponge". This fixed, distributed footprint vastly complicates the enemy's targeting calculus by requiring them to commit one or more warheads to each individual silo just to neutralize the threat. Consequently, Adsit's analysis suggests that the current geographically dispersed silo model effectively provides the necessary stability, survivability, and initial strike capability required to deter near-peer competitors, negating the necessity for the U.S. to develop a complex road-mobile ICBM alternative.
- Benson, Maj. Alex, "Hypersonic Changes: Reassessing the Nuclear Triad in a New Arms Race," AFGC thesis, 2020.
- Addresses the severe logistical and physical constraints of developing a road-mobile intercontinental system within the continental United States (CONUS). Benson notes that if the U.S. sought to field Conventional Intercontinental Hypersonic Missiles (C-ICHMs), placing them in fixed CONUS silos would avoid the warhead ambiguity associated with forward-deployed ballistic launches, but relying on a road-mobile platform for survivability would be highly problematic. Because placing objects into low-earth or ballistic orbits requires the rocket mass to be approximately 96% solid propellant, a 2,000-kilogram payload would require roughly 50,000 kilograms (55 tons) of fuel. Transporting such massive rockets would require vehicles that are so slow and unwieldy that their supposed maneuverability and survivability advantages would be negated, pushing planners to consider deploying smaller, non-ICBM theater weapons outside of CONUS instead.
- Johnson, Lt. Col. Benji L., "Options for ICBM Modernization," AF Fellows (CRS), 2021.
- This paper addresses the divergence between U.S. and adversary ICBM basing strategies, explicitly noting that the United States has refrained from deploying mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, whereas countries like Russia and China actively utilize road or rail-mobile launchers. Rather than developing a mobile system, the U.S. approach relies on silo-based ICBMs buried in protective launch facilities across five CONUS states (North Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska). The author evaluates U.S. modernization options and emphasizes continuing with the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program to replace the aging Minuteman III in these existing silos, arguing that the current siloed ICBM force remains highly survivable against anything short of a massive, precisely coordinated nuclear attack.
- Kerns, Maj. Ryan O., "Strategy in the Automation Age: Strategic Weapons Theory and Hypersonic Implications," SAASS thesis, 2023.
- Addresses how the United States can solve the F2T2EA (find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess) problem caused by adversary mobile targets without necessarily developing its own road-mobile ICBM. Kerns argues that adversaries' abilities to conceal, bury, or mobilize assets challenges U.S. escalation management, but posits that precision-guided hypersonic weapons are the optimal solution. By utilizing hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles—supported by advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) paired with machine learning algorithms—the U.S. can significantly compress the F2T2EA kill chain. This capability allows the U.S. to rapidly hold highly mobile and previously untargetable adversary assets at risk, providing a credible strategic deterrent without the explicit need for the U.S. to field a matching road-mobile nuclear ICBM force.
- Kessler, Matthew J., "The US Nuclear Triad: Effects on the US Government Interagency," AFGC thesis, 2020.
- This paper discusses the modernization of the U.S. Nuclear Triad in response to the growing capabilities of near-peer competitors, specifically highlighting China's deployment of new road-mobile ICBMs as a recognized threat to strategic stability. The author outlines the U.S. response to these evolving adversary capabilities, which involves fielding the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) by 2029. However, instead of pursuing a U.S. road-mobile system to counter the adversary's mobility, the modernization plan focuses on upgrading 450 existing, fixed launch facilities to house 400 new silo-based ICBMs.
- Stutzriem, Maj. Stephen E., "Fending Off: How Nuclear Modernization is Critical to Deterrence in an Era of Multi-Polar Great Power Competition," AFGC thesis, 2024.
- Addresses the necessity of adapting the U.S. nuclear arsenal to contend with two near-peer competitors who are actively expanding their own road-mobile ICBM systems. Stutzriem notes that the current U.S. modernization plan relies on a one-for-one replacement of legacy systems (such as fielding the fixed-silo Sentinel ICBM to replace the Minuteman III) and argues that this status quo may be insufficient to deter the coordinated threat of China and Russia. To counter adversaries' asymmetrical advantages and diverse arsenals, he recommends an "expansion strategy" that diversifies U.S. nuclear capabilities, delivery technologies, and platforms to hedge against uncertain risks. While Stutzriem does not explicitly mandate the creation of a U.S. road-mobile ICBM, he argues that the U.S. must expand beyond its traditional Cold War-era force structure to provide a wider range of flexible and tailored response options to ensure strategic stability.
- Varilek, Lt. Col. John D., "United States Hypersonic Weapons and China Deterrence Effects," AWC SSP, 2019.
- Outlines the operational environment and geographic constraints of fielding mobile strategic weapon systems. Examining the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon program—a road-mobile system—Varilek emphasizes that mobile launch vehicles face inherent weapon stability concerns during transport across austere terrain and must be engineered to endure extreme temperature variations, ranging from freezing conditions to hot tropical environments. Additionally, from a deterrence perspective, holding a near-peer competitor like China at risk from CONUS is essentially like aiming a long-range gun at an adversary from their backyard. Because of this, Varilek suggests these mobile systems would realistically need to be deployed on island chains or peninsulas in the Indo-Pacific, which fundamentally limits their mobility to confined geographic spaces and creates a simplified targeting problem for the adversary.
- Vesey, Lt. Col. Brian P., "End of a Cold War-Era Treaty: Why the US Should Not Leverage INF Treaty Withdrawal to Deploy Theater Missiles to Asia," AWC SSP, 2019.
- Highlights the spatial and strategic security risks associated with mobile land-based missiles. While analyzing theater-range rather than intercontinental ballistic missiles, Vesey points out that mobile missile launchers demand immense physical space to execute the tactical maneuvers necessary to guarantee their survival. Within constrained geographies, such as islands or confined bases, operating these mobile systems would be extraordinarily difficult without also constructing hardened shelters and silos. Furthermore, deploying mobile systems introduces a significant risk of miscalculation; whenever the U.S. might move these mobile missile launchers for routine training or exercises, adversaries could misinterpret the movement as preparation for an imminent strike and accidentally provoke an armed conflict.