Most COCOMs and services are involved in discussions on NEXUS or TRIAD and the synthesis of space-SOF-cyber in IW to deter conflict and crisis, and, if necessary, used effectively in conflict. Within these discussions, the technical, tactical, and perhaps operational needs are relatively clear and already demonstrated. The discussion at the strategic level is lagging, however, especially in terms of the integration of key allies and partners (beyond temporary and tactically aligned task organizations) and has become mired in discussions on information sharing, clearances, etc. How can USSOCOM rapidly synthesize and implement to enable the strategic-level space-SOF-cyber, including with allies and partners, to deter conflict, deal with crisis, and, if necessary, operate in conflict?
- Arfman, Maj. Dane, "Controlling Chaos: Deterring Irresponsible Chinese Space Behavior," AFGC thesis, 2025, 40 pgs.
- Directly targets the clearance and information-sharing roadblocks that stall strategic integration with allies in the space domain. It also points to USSOCOM as the model for rapid implementation. How it answers the question: To rapidly synthesize and acquire new capabilities, the paper recommends the Space Force adopt the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) acquisition model, which places operators and acquirers together to bypass traditional bureaucracy and field resources at the "speed of need". To solve the strategic lag caused by clearances and information sharing, it recommends transitioning to a service-wide baseline security posture where personnel are vetted for Secret, Top Secret, and Special Access Programs (SAP) simultaneously. Furthermore, it suggests utilizing Artificial Intelligence to properly portion-mark classified documents—reducing the overuse of "NOFORN" (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals) classifications—and integrating allied exchange officers directly into operations to streamline data sharing prior to conflict
- Baker, Capt. Melissa, "Countering the PRC's A2/AD Strategy: Adapting U.S. Military Operations and Strategy for the Indo-Pacific," AFGC thesis, 2025, 39 pgs.
- Provides a concrete operational concept for the synthesis of SOF and cyber/electronic warfare and details how to integrate allied networks at the strategic level to secure space-based assets (like ISR and satellite communications) during a crisis. How it answers the question: The paper highlights the "SOF SEAD" concept, which physically and tactically integrates Special Operations Forces with cyber and electronic warfare capabilities to degrade adversary networks and bypass Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) defenses. To scale this to the strategic level and integrate allies, the author recommends building "resilient, redundant ISR and communication networks" by establishing data-sharing agreements, co-developing secure communication networks, and sharing satellite launch capacities with partner nations. To cut through red tape, it advocates for institutionalizing this integration via permanent allied liaison teams embedded in headquarters and the establishment of regional multinational ISR fusion centers.
- Meehan, Maj. Brian M., "More than Laptops in Tents: How Deployed Communications Can Support Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)," AFGC thesis, 2024, 43 pgs.
- Provides a technical and structural solution to the bureaucratic nightmare of sharing multi-domain (space, cyber, air, etc.) data with allies, enabling rapid strategic-level integration without getting mired in traditional clearance bottlenecks. How it answers the question: The paper recommends abandoning rigid, hierarchical coalition networks in favor of Federated Mission Networks (FMN) and the Mission Partner Environment (MPE). Under these frameworks, the U.S. and its partners can quickly establish trust-based networks using pre-negotiated arrangements. Because each partner retains control of their own capabilities and only contributes information as they see necessary, the FMN framework bypasses traditional security procedure lags. This data-centric approach gets the right space and cyber data to the right coalition forces at the speed of relevance, creating an interoperable battle network that adversaries cannot easily replicate or counter
- Tompkins, Lt. Col. William M., "NATO Intelligence Sharing: Lessons Learned from the Ukraine-Russian War," AWC SSP, 2025, 26 pgs.
- Focuses purely on the strategic-level lag caused by the "need to know" mentality versus the "need to share" mentality, specifically addressing how legal frameworks and security concerns impede the integration of allies during a crisis. How it answers the question: Using the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a blueprint, the paper demonstrates how the U.S. can successfully operationalize unprecedented declassification and bilateral intelligence sharing to mobilize military aid and build a unified coalition front. To permanently overcome legal hurdles like the National Disclosure Policy-1 (NDP-1), the author argues for long-term reform to streamline bureaucratic procedures, standardize data formats across member states, and establish secure communication channels that allow for the seamless, rapid dissemination of critical space, cyber, and operational intelligence.