FY28-32 Space Based ISR Capabilities

Can projected space-based ISR capabilities fielded in the FY28-32 timeframe provide sufficient bandwidth and data throughput to meet joint force targeting timelines and battlespace awareness requirements in contested environments, or do fundamental capacity limitations necessitate alternative architectures/airborne operations?

• Aglubat, Maj. Eric J., "Enhancing C3 for Mobility Aircraft: The Promise and Pitfalls of Starshield," AFGC thesis, 2025.
  • This paper highlights that while current MILSATCOM systems cannot meet the massive data requirements of modern warfare, commercial PLEO systems like SpaceX’s Starshield offer a potential solution with estimated capacities reaching up to 210 Terabits per second (Tbps). However, the study concludes that fundamental concerns regarding physical security, cybersecurity, and operational control mean these systems should only augment a hybrid architecture. The author suggests that reliance on space-based commercial systems alone is insufficient for high-intensity conflict, requiring a terminal that can switch between secure MILSATCOM and bandwidth-rich commercial carriers/
• Arnold, Maj. James, "The Aging Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft Fleet in United States Indo-Pacific Command: The Challenges and How to Face them," AFGC thesis, 2025, 39 pgs.  
  • Arnold observes that while technological advancements in reconnaissance satellites have increased decision advantage, a "significant portion" of intelligence still must come from airborne platforms to counter the reliability challenges and capability shortfalls of current space-based systems. The paper highlights that the divestiture of specific airborne assets, such as the E-8 JSTARS, has created gaps in providing a "bird's eye view" of the battlefield in near-real time that projected space assets have not adequately filled. Consequently, the research recommends a continued investment in replacing or upgrading airborne ISR airframes to maintain the sortie rates and intelligence fidelity required in regions like USINDOPACOM.
• Bava, Capt. Daniel A., "Background Paper on ISR and Artificial Intelligence," SOS AUAR, 2025, 7 pgs. 
  • This paper identifies a critical "data problem" where the sheer volume of ISR collection from increasingly proliferated satellite constellations is projected to outpace the military’s ability to process and disseminate it over the next 5 to 10 years. The author argues that the current tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TCPED) cycle for space-based ISR is "prohibitively too long" to meet the near real-time, actionable requirements of tactical warfighters. While the paper notes that commercial solutions and AI-driven onboard processing are beginning to offer faster timelines—such as BlackSky’s 90-minute imagery delivery—it emphasizes that institutional and technological gaps in automation must be closed for space ISR to become a reliable primary capability over airborne platforms.
• Bibow, Lt. Col. Lars, "Space System Architecture: How to Improve the Resiliency of the German Armed Forces Space Communications Services," AWC SSP, 2022, 45 pgs.
  • Focusing on the modernization of German space capabilities, this paper suggests that Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations can provide a "revolutionary jump" in performance, with commercial enterprise sectors already demonstrating bandwidth speeds up to 7.5 Gbps—thousands of times more performant than current military terminals. The author posits that implementing technologies such as optical inter-satellite links (OISLs) and onboard AI processing could cut the reconnaissance-to-targeting cycle from hours down to minutes. This suggests that projected space-based architectures could provide sufficient throughput for dynamic targeting if they leverage these high-capacity commercial models.
• Conatser, Lieutenant Commander, Brian P., "Digital Eyes on the Water: Using Unmanned Technology to Gain an Asymmetric Advantage in the South China Sea," AFGC thesis, 2023, 37 pgs. 
  • Similar to Crawford, this paper argues that the U.S. military’s historical asymmetric advantage in battlespace awareness, facilitated by satellites, would be "moot" in a conflict with a near-peer like China due to their space warfare capabilities. The author contends that the Navy will likely find itself in an environment where it "cannot utilize satellites for ISR". To bridge this gap, the paper recommends a fundamental shift toward non-satellite technology, specifically survivable and scalable unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (USV/UUV), to maintain presence and intelligence gathering in contested maritime domains.
• Cosker, Maj. Nathan, "Quantity Still Has a Quality: Building Scalable Airpower for Peer Conflict," ACSC, 2025.
  • Cosker highlights that major defense acquisition programs for high-cost "exquisite" systems often take over a decade to deliver, which is insufficient for the rapidly evolving demands of peer conflict. The paper recommends that fundamental capacity limitations be addressed by reallocating funding toward mass-producible "Acceptable Loss Technologies" (ALT) and Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). These uncrewed airborne systems act as distributed sensor and payload nodes that complement existing platforms, offering a resilient architecture for future air campaigns that can provide persistent overwatch and sensor-to-shooter linkages in environments where space or manned assets may be denied.
• Crawford, Capt. Cody, "Attritable Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Concepts and Employment,"  SOS AUAR, 2022.
  • This source highlights fundamental capacity and survivability limitations, noting that peer-adversary anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities could render LEO ISR constellations entirely unusable in a conflict. The author argues that relying solely on doubling down on space resilience is insufficient, as the loss of exquisite satellites would lead to strategic paralysis. Instead, the paper necessitates alternative architectures composed of "attritable ISR" platforms—such as mass-produced drone swarms and high-altitude balloons—to provide redundant coverage and battlespace awareness when space-based assets are targeted or destroyed.
• Daviscourt, Capt. Joshua, "COTS and Space Based Missile Defense," SOS AUAR, 2021, 11 pgs. 
  • This paper highlights the Space Development Agency's (SDA) pursuit of a proliferated LEO architecture as a way to circumvent the slow, expensive development of legacy monolithic satellites. By launching hundreds of smaller, highly networked data transport and infrared (OPIR) satellites, the SDA aims to create a more resilient and responsive network with significantly shorter acquisition timelines. The author argues that this agile, batch-produced approach allows the military to utilize the latest technology and space power tactics to maintain a tactical advantage that monolithic U.S. Space Force systems cannot match.
• Dunn, Maj. Michael G., "Goldilocks, Kill Chains & The Three Acronyms: JADO, F2T2EA & DIKW," AF Fellows (DARPA), 2023, 34 pgs. 
  • Dunn asserts that in future contested environments, "high bandwidth, low latency" communication cannot be guaranteed, meaning that simply increasing the number of sensors will not satisfy targeting requirements. The analysis points to the "tyranny of scale" and the untenable cost of pursuing near-perfect sensor coverage for every unique target signature across the electromagnetic spectrum. Instead, the paper advocates for an alternative data management architecture—using commercial strategies like "object-based storage"—to allow for rapid, cross-domain data calling and processing to keep kill chains functional despite the fundamental capacity and communication limitations of projected military systems.
• Gustafson, Maj. Trevor A., "Flexible Employment of Multirole Assets," ACSC/Wright Flyer, 2021, 31 pgs. 
  • This paper concludes that typical ISR platforms will not survive in highly contested A2/AD environments, leading to a "dearth of ISR" unless nontraditional ISR (NTISR) from multi-role stealth fighters like the F-35 is utilized. The author advocates for a paradigm shift that treats every airborne platform as a sensor node capable of near-real-time self-collection and data fusion, bridging the divide between kinetic strike and ISR to maintain battlespace awareness when dedicated space or OTH assets are unavailable.
• Hannan, Maj. Abdul, "Preparing for the Future: Forging the Fundamentals of Space Superiority by Leveraging Lessons from Airpower," AFGC thesis, 2023, 64 pgs. 
  • This research notes that although space-based sensors provide a unique global viewpoint, current intelligence community (IC) workflows are "not optimal" for the fast distribution of intelligence, with analysis sometimes taking weeks or months. To meet the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) requirement for near-real-time information, the paper suggests that the space domain must adopt a more resilient and scalable architecture, moving from a few "exquisite" satellites to proliferated constellations of smaller, cheaper satellites. The author concludes that achieving the necessary "continuous and scalable information flow" will require significant infrastructure expansion and a more responsive reallocation of space resources than currently exists.
• Holston, Joel S., "Building the Neighborhood Watch: Partnered Integration of Airborne ISR for INDOPACOM Competition," AFGC 2024, 39 pgs. 
  • This paper argues that the anticipated replacement of airborne ISR with space-based capabilities remains "either unrealized or less versatile than was hoped," noting that current satellite sensors lack the ability to maintain a real-time "fix" on mobile targets as effectively as loitering airborne assets. It identifies fundamental limitations in projected space sensor networks, such as inadequate mission duration and platform vulnerability, which necessitate alternative architectures—specifically a mix of larger airborne platforms for presence and low-cost, expendable uncrewed "swarms" to provide persistent awareness in contested domains.
• Huynh, Maj. Christopher, "AI on the Edge of Space: Securing Space Superiority and Avoiding Surprise in Orbit," AF Fellows, 2025, 25 pgs. 
  • Major Huynh identifies that bandwidth and data throughput constraints in contested or remote environments remain a critical hurdle for space-based ISR, particularly as the number of orbital objects reaches record levels. The paper argues that fundamental capacity limitations necessitate a shift in architecture toward "AI on the edge," where satellites process imagery autonomously and downlink only relevant detection data (such as bounding boxes), which can reduce bandwidth requirements by up to 93%. While miniaturization of radiation-hardened processors like the BAE Systems RAD 5545 is advancing, the author emphasizes that these onboard processing strategies are essential to meet the near-real-time decision cycles required for orbital warfare and targeting.
• Lutz,Conrad, "Next Generation ISR Dominance: Utilizing Lessons Learned from SOF ISR TTPs in the Global War on Terror for a Near-Peer Conflict," SOS AUAR, 2021, 11 pgs. 
  • This research contends that timeliness in targeting becomes "unattainable" the moment space-based communications are interrupted by a near-peer adversary. To counter this, the author argues for a shift away from over-reliance on over-the-horizon (OTH) analysis and toward forward-deployed joint intelligence nodes. These alternative architectures would use pre-packaged analysis teams capable of utilizing line-of-sight (LOS) communications to provide flexible support and informed targeting when space-based pathways are degraded or disabled.
• McLamb, Capt. Elizabeth E., "Integrating Artificial Intelligence to Joint All-Domain Command and Control for the 2030 Fight," SOS AUAR, 2020, 21 pgs. 
  • This study discusses the "Sensing Grid," an assemblage of all-domain sensors designed to deliver a predictive characterization of the battlespace for 2030. It notes that legacy C2 architectures lack the speed and scale to handle thousands of mobile and long-range threats, and while the Sensing Grid leverages space sensors, the resulting volume of data necessitates AI-enabled processing and machine-to-machine connectivity to maintain decision advantage. The author emphasizes that true integration requires connecting these space assets with legacy platforms and airborne sensors in a resilient, cloud-based mesh network.
• Merkle, Capt. Thomas, "SATCOM: Lines of Communication or Extended Positions," AWC SSP, 202, 41 pgs.  
  • The author argues that while radically cheaper space launch is enabling "infinite Line of Sight" and global coverage for observations and communications, these satellites are better understood as vulnerable "extended positions" rather than stable lines of communication. The paper asserts that fundamental capacity and vulnerability limitations in orbit require a strategy that includes non-SATCOM methods, such as modernized HF radio and mesh-networked airborne relays (Joint Aerial Layer Network), to reduce the strategic risk of space-based denial.
• Morrell, Capt. Stefan, "Optimizing Joint All-Domain Command and Control for Low Observable Strike Assets in the Indo-Pacific Area of Responsibility," SOS AUAR, 2020.
  • The author argues that current airborne C2 and space-based datalinks will be negated or pushed back by advanced adversary A2/AD weapons, making centralized control from an AOC impossible. The paper proposes an alternative architecture of distributed, decentralized control where unit-level personnel perform intelligence and targeting duties traditionally held by higher headquarters. This model relies on a redundant mix of mobile SATCOM, LOS communications, and airborne nodes to ensure combat effectiveness despite the likely disruption of space and OTH links.
• Santostefano, Maj. Luke A., "C2ISR Doctrine: Modern Problems Require Modern Solutions," AFGC thesis, 2025, 42 pgs. 
  • Santostefano addresses the "Next Generation ISR Dominance Flight Plan," which aims to transition to a multi-domain sensing grid by 2028, but he references RAND research indicating that current ISR capabilities face significant limitations in processing, exploiting, and disseminating data. The paper notes a lack of integrated capabilities to fuse data from diverse sensors without highly manual workflows, which prevents the delivery of timely, actionable intelligence to decision-makers within tactically relevant timelines. It concludes that doctrinal and architectural updates are needed to move beyond linear C2ISR processes and enable the "speed and scale" of data distribution envisioned for future peer-to-peer military engagements.
• Tucholski, Maj. Heidi M., "Closing the Knowledge Gaps on Future Command and Control: Three Implications the Air Force Must Consider Today", ACSC ACTS 2.0 RTF, 2020, 20 pgs. 
  • This research project notes that while hardware development for a persistent, proliferated sensing grid appears to be on pace, the Air Force faces significant "knowledge gaps" in how to integrate this capability into operations. The author warns that merely increasing access to massive amounts of data through new space hardware often leads to "analysis paralysis" and worse decision-making if not supported by appropriate software and human-centric processing. Therefore, bandwidth alone is not the solution; the Air Force must deliberately organize and train to manage the information glut that projected space systems will produce.
• Wallis, Maj. Alex M, "Challenging Command Seeking Control: Evaluating the USAF's Current C2 System Assumptions and Posture in the South China Sea," AFGC thesis, 2021, 45 pgs. 
  • This paper offers a more cautious assessment, arguing that while space-based sensor constellations are growing rapidly, the command and control (C2) networks required to support them remain largely unchanged and antiquated. In contested environments like the South China Sea, space-based communications (SATCOM) are highly vulnerable to jamming and interference, which can disrupt the delivery of critical sensor data to decision-makers. Consequently, the author maintains that airborne nodes, such as the E-7 Wedgetail, are essential as flexible relays and backups to ensure "degrees of line of sight" when space-based systems are compromised.