Strategic Airlift: 2029-2041 Major Conflict Scenario

Given the air and especially ground threat density in the FIC and SIC, to what extent will the JFACC be able to sustain operations using inter-theater (strategic) airlift for a DPS 2.1 scenario in the 2029-2041 timeframe?

• Adams, Maj. Michael D., "New Age for the ACE Era," AFGC thesis, 2022, 50 pgs. 
  • Answers how threat density in the First Island Chain constrains strategic lift by highlighting that Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities force the U.S. into Agile Combat Employment (ACE) and distributed operations. Because of the vast distances and the inability to safely spend months building up bases, the military must rely heavily on pre-positioning equipment to reduce the massive inter-theater airlift burden on deploying wings, noting that strategic assets like the C-17 will be heavily taxed just moving combat support and sustaining distributed operations.
• Aglubat, Maj. Eric J., "Enhancing C3 for Mobility Aircraft: The Promise and Pitfalls of Starshield," AFGC thesis, 2025.
  • Answers the question by highlighting that current Mobility Air Force (MAF) assets, which execute the strategic airlift mission, suffer from a critical lack of connectivity that prevents them from tying into current Joint battle networks in contested, degraded, and operationally limited (CDO) environments. To ensure operations can be sustained in the Indo-Pacific against Chinese A2/AD threats, the paper emphasizes that airborne mobility assets must be modernized with advanced satellite communication systems. Upgrading this Command, Control, and Communication (C3) infrastructure will allow inter-theater airlift assets to act as connected force multipliers, sustaining situational awareness and operational agility while transiting vast distances to and from the combat zone.
• Bagnall, Dustin et al, "Mobility Air Force and Agile Combat Employment: Recommendations on Unit Type Codes, Multi-Capable Airmen, Sustainment Challenges and Distribution Solutions," SOS AUAR, 2021, 29 pgs. 
  • Addresses the limitations of airlift sustainment by arguing that logistics will quickly become a crippling constraint in contested environments. The paper explains that current supply chains rely on uncontested, static environments and will be unable to keep pace with the dynamic, unpredictable demands of dispersed ACE operations; consequently, the JFACC's operational reach will rapidly erode as consumption rates exceed the inter-theater supply chain's ability to safely deliver parts and personnel through adversarial attacks.
• Barry, Capt. Zachary M., "MAF Support to the Integrated Combat Turn," SOS AUAR, 2021, 13 pgs. 
  • Answers the question by illustrating the extreme limitations placed on C-17 strategic airlift when conducting Integrated Combat Turns (ICT) in A2/AD environments without organic base support. Due to the threat density, the paper notes that vulnerable strategic mobility aircraft must transport all necessary fuel and live munitions on specific trailers to austere locations, which drastically limits the cargo space of the C-17 and demonstrates that sustaining fighter sorties via inter-theater airlift will be highly restricted by cargo capacity, slow transfer speeds, and aircraft survivability.
• Carroll, Lt. Col. Benjamin, "Redistributing Rapid Global Mobility Control: Air Mobility Command & Control for the Future," AWC SSP, 2022, 70 pgs. 
  • Answers how sustainment will be impacted by examining the immense strain placed on the air mobility command and control (C2) system when deploying forces into contested environments. The paper explains that as global lines of communication become fiercely contested by peer adversaries, the demand for air mobility will far exceed its capacity; consequently, the JFACC and USTRANSCOM will face severe tension balancing competing requirements, leading to an anticipated decrease in overall strategic airlift capacity and sustainment capability during crisis execution.
• Chhen, Maj. Dalin, "Optimizing Airlift: Sustaining Agile Combat Employment Airfields in USINDOPACOM," AFGC thesis, 2024, 34 pgs. 
  • This paper focuses on the massive logistical undertaking required to supply dispersed ACE airfields via airlift during major combat operations with China. Chhen asserts that the air and ground threat density—with Chinese missile ranges now threatening the first, second, and potentially third island chains—makes traditional centralized strategic airlift deliveries highly vulnerable. To sustain operations, the paper concludes that the USAF must heavily rely on allied partnerships for joint base access, fortify primary logistical hubs like Hawaii and Guam, and aggressively integrate Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to alleviate the burden and risk placed on manned cargo aircraft flying resupply missions into heavily contested zones.
• Evans, Maj. Jason R., "Right-Sizing the C-17 Air Refueling Force," AF Fellows (TACC), 2014, 42 pgs. 
  • Addresses the extent of strategic airlift capabilities by pointing out that the A2/AD environment in the Pacific will force Mobility Air Forces to rely on "island hopping" to survive. The paper warns that because tanker capacity will likely be entirely consumed by combat fighters and bombers, the C-17 fleet will face massive range and payload limitations without reliable en-route infrastructure, leading to a considerable decline in the joint force's ability to sustain operations via inter-theater airlift.
• Frizzell, Capt. Matthew E., "Strategizing Air Mobility Support in an operationally Challenging Indo-Pacific Environment," AFGC thesis, 2024, 36 pgs. 
  • This paper evaluates the U.S. Transportation Command’s air mobility enterprise against the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the First and Second Island Chains (FIC and SIC). Frizzell argues that without significant organizational and technological transformations, the joint force will fail to project power and sustain operations because the PRC’s long-range strike capabilities can target aircraft across the vast distances required for inter-theater transit. To survive and successfully sustain forces using strategic airlift, Frizzell concludes that C-5 and C-17 aircraft must be outfitted with advanced threat awareness and defensive systems—such as tactical data links, radar warning receivers, and Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM)—to operate independently without relying on scarce fighter escorts.
• Hagardt,, Maj. Benjamin, "Artificial Intelligence and Agile Combat Employment," AFGC thesis, 2022, 48 pgs. 
  • Answers the question by proposing that Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning must be integrated into logistics planning to optimize inter-theater transportation in the face of dynamic A2/AD threats. The paper points out that global operations relying on Agile Combat Employment (ACE) complicate Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), requiring AI-driven third-party logistics to predict supply movements and determine the most efficient delivery methods. By processing threat profiles and asset availability, AI systems can assist commanders in redirecting strategic airlift and supporting assets to surviving hub-and-spoke locations, thereby sustaining operations even when primary airfields within the island chains are compromised.
• Hall, Capt. Michael J., "Operating Distributed Command & Control and Logistics Networks with Agile Combat Employment," SOS AUAR, 2021, 13 pgs. 
  • Answers the question by asserting that the JFACC must delegate command authority to lower echelons to effectively utilize Mobility Air Forces (MAF) assets—like the C-17 and C-130—within the highly contested Indo-Pacific theater. The paper explains that traditional, centralized hub-and-spoke logistics networks are too vulnerable to Chinese long-range missiles, forcing inter-theater and intra-theater airlift to depend on a distributed network of bases. By pushing tactical control to distributed Mission Planning Cells, MAF assets can be attached directly to Combat Air Forces or Special Operations Forces to provide rapid repositioning and logistical support without waiting for centralized commands that may be degraded or denied.
• Harrill, Steven, "Addressing the Tyranny of Distance and Capacity in Air Mobility Operations in INDOPACOM," AFGC thesis, 2025, 47 pgs. 
  • This research examines how the "tyranny of distance" and an aging inter-theater airlift fleet will hinder sustainment efforts against a near-peer adversary. Harrill notes that because the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) possesses intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of striking the SIC, strategic airlift will be forced to employ Agile Combat Employment (ACE) hub-and-spoke maneuvers to survive. However, the study concludes that sustaining operations will be incredibly difficult due to the finite number of available C-5 and C-17 aircraft, competing global airlift requirements, crew duty limitations, and the lack of robust, survivable enroute infrastructure across the Pacific.
• Kroll, Maj. Steven J., "A Novel Solution to Power Generation on Austere Air Bases," AFGC thesis, 2024, 54 pgs. 
  • Answers the question indirectly by addressing how the military can alleviate the immense burden on inter-theater strategic airlift by reducing the demand for diesel fuel required to power austere bases in the contested Indo-Pacific. The paper notes that China's A2/AD strategy specifically targets critical supply routes, making traditional fuel supply chains highly vulnerable to disruption. Because transporting fuel and water has historically accounted for 70-90% of all logistical operations, transitioning contingency bases to alternative energy sources like small modular reactors and solar arrays frees up limited strategic airlift and sealift capacities, ensuring those assets can instead be used to transport weapons and sustain combat sorties.
• Lemmen, Maj. Kurt A., "Air Mobility's Untapped Potential to Meet Combat Airpower Requirements during Great Power Competition," AFGC thesis, 2024, 44 pgs. 
  • This paper highlights that the immense scale of materiel required to support distributed forces in the Indo-Pacific will rapidly overwhelm traditional inter-theater airlift capabilities. Lemmen argues that trying to sustain fighter and bomber forces from safe distances like Hawaii using traditional methods is highly impractical due to flight times and air-to-air refueling constraints. To overcome these logistical constraints, the author recommends delegating inter-theater airlift to commercial carriers operating outside the contested zones (from the U.S. to safe hubs), thereby freeing up military C-17s and C-130s for the dangerous intratheater distribution into the FIC and SIC. Furthermore, Lemmen suggests utilizing these freed-up strategic airlift assets to aggressively drop palletized munitions (like Rapid Dragon) to supplement the combat air forces.
• Olguin, Capt. Amanda M., "Command and Control Evolution in Response to Distributed Airlift Operations within Contested Environments," SOS AUAR, 2021, 11 pgs. 
  • Answers the question by focusing on the need to decentralize command and control for airlift assets operating within the range of adversary advanced threats and missiles. The paper argues that maintaining a single centralized Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) to task airlift missions leaves U.S. forces vulnerable to long-haul communication disruptions. To sustain strategic and tactical airlift operations, the Joint Force must shift to decentralized planning and execution, standing up distributed "mini AOCs" at the wing level to ensure tactical commanders can continue to generate sustainment missions even when cut off from the JFACC and the JAOC.
• Persons, Lt. Col. Eli U.S., "Examining Air Mobility in a US-PRC Theater Conflict Scenario," AWC SSP, 2024, 42 pgs. 
  • This study addresses the question by utilizing Salmi’s Model of Air Mobility Utility to analyze the fragility of inter-theater strategic airlift in a contested Pacific environment. Persons highlights that the PRC's ability to hold bases as far out as Guam (in the SIC) at risk will likely deter civilian and commercial airlift carriers—which have historically provided massive lift capacity—from operating in the theater. Consequently, the sustainment burden will fall entirely on an aging and reduced fleet of military strategic airlift assets (C-5s and C-17s), leading to severe capacity strains and inefficiencies. The author concludes that sustaining operations will require transitioning from a "pull" to a "push" logistics system and relying heavily on pre-positioned war reserve materiel (WRM) to mitigate the extreme vulnerability of strategic airlift flows.
• Strabley, Maj. Joseph A., "A Contested Horizon: Conducting Logistics against A Near Peer Adversary," AFGC thesis, 2023, 37 pgs. 
  • Answers the question by examining the profound threat to mobility assets and logistical hubs within the First and Second Island Chains, highlighting that Chinese long-range ballistic missiles severely threaten strategic staging areas like Guam. The paper argues that sustaining a Joint Forces Air Component Commander's (JFACC) Air Tasking Order will be exceptionally difficult because inter-theater strategic airlift relies on aging mobility assets, such as the C-17, which have consistently failed to meet mission-capable goals. To mitigate the risk of these mobility assets being attrited by near-peer anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the author emphasizes the need to pre-position assets across the theater and utilize long-range sealift to ease the burden on vulnerable strategic airlift.
• Weinberg, Matthew, "Between Scylla & Charybdis: The Airlift Odyssey," SAASS thesis, 2021, 131 pgs. 
  • Answers the question by asserting that the current airlift force is critically unprepared for the attrition expected in major combat operations against a peer adversary like China. The paper highlights that China's strategy involves actively targeting supply depots, bases, and cargo aircraft to prevent the U.S. from sustaining operations; because the U.S. has prioritized peacetime capacity over combat survivability and training, the strategic airlift fleet will likely suffer heavy losses, severely limiting the JFACC's ability to sustain the fight.