Ground-Based C2 in Forward Theaters

How can USAF leverage planned ABADS MD fielding to enable a resilient distributed ground-based command and control capability in forward theaters? What DOTmLPF-P changes are needed to support this?

• Adams, Lt. Col. Nicholas, "Killing Drones, Saving Bones: Cost Effective Counter-Small UAS Options for an Agile Force," AFGC thesis, 2024, 44 pgs. 
  • Adams discusses the necessity of ground-based air base air defense (ABAD) for protecting Agile Combat Employment (ACE) operations in highly contested regions like the Pacific. While not explicitly connecting this to command-and-control networks, the paper highlights necessary DOTmLPF-P changes, asserting that because ground-based ABAD is new territory for the USAF, the service will need to write new doctrine and tactics. Furthermore, the Air Force must make personnel and organizational decisions—such as utilizing Security Forces, Airfield Management, or creating an entirely new career field—and incorporate counter-UAS operations into large-scale training exercises like Red Flag.
• Carroll, Lt. Col. Benjamin, "Redistributing Rapid Global Mobility Control: Air Mobility Command and Control for the Future," AWC SSP, 2022, 70 pgs. 
  • Answers the question by proposing a restructured global air mobility C2 architecture that relies on distributed control and integration with ABMS/JADC2 to operate resiliently in forward, contested theaters. The paper details explicit DOTMLPF-P changes in a comprehensive table to support this capability: doctrinally, the USAF must update Air Operations Center (AOC) doctrine to codify distributed control standards; organizationally, it must deconstruct current Air Mobility Division (AMD) structures to build deployable air mobility task forces; and from a materiel standpoint, it must develop fly-away C2 kits that allow seamless connection to theater networks . Additionally, it calls for policy shifts that eliminate rigid AOC structure specifications and leadership training to prepare commanders to execute dynamic distributed control.
• Firestone, Maj. Gregory, "ADFORGEN: Generating Tomorrow's Air Defenders," AFGC thesis, 2024, 39 pgs. 
  • This study examines the training and organizational (DOTmLPF-P) changes required to generate combat-ready Battle Management Operators capable of executing distributed ground-based C2. Firestone focuses on the transition from centralized control models to distributed TOC-L networks for Agile Combat Employment, concluding that the USAF must establish a centralized training schoolhouse. This organizational change would standardize instruction, foster a mission command mindset, and effectively equip operators to handle joint interoperability and multi-domain threats in degraded environments.
• Hlavin, Maj. Scott, "The Air Force's Lack of Ground-Based Air Defense is Our Achilles' Heel," AF Fellow, 2023, 3 pgs. 
  • This paper addresses the air base air defense component of the query by arguing that the USAF must acquire organic Ground-Based Air Defenses (GBAD) rather than relying solely on the Army for missile and point defense. To achieve this, Hlavin suggests a materiel and organizational change where the USAF partners with the Marine Corps to acquire the MADIS Mk1 and Mk2 systems. Implementing this would require minimal but necessary adjustments in force structure and training within the Security Forces enterprise to protect forward bases and enable resilient operations.
• Kirk, Lt. Col. Troy A., "Review of Operation Inherent Resolve: Small Unmanned Aerial Systems and the Pursuit to Develop a Counter System," AWC SSP, 2020, 34 pgs. 
  • Examines the ABAD mission through the lens of countering small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) and emphasizes the need to field a scalable, sensor-agnostic C2 system that provides a near real-time kill-chain (from detection to defeat) to protect physical aerodromes. Highlighting a C-sUAS DOTmLPF-P Summit, the paper notes that leaders recommended the USAF take full functional ownership of the ABAD mission to close dangerous gaps between Defensive Counter Air (DCA) operations and local installation self-defense. From a DOTmLPF-P perspective, the author stresses that the Air Force must resolve critical doctrinal friction regarding when countering a UAS transitions from an Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) responsibility to a localized base defense mission. Clarifying this doctrine is essential for integrating new counter-UAS technologies with existing C2 systems so that forward forces can effectively secure their airspace in contested environments.
• Meehan, Maj. Brian M., "More than Laptops in Tents: How Deployed Communications Can Support Joint All-Domain Command and Control," AFGC thesis, 2024, 43 pgs. 
  • Meehan explores how the USAF can establish resilient, distributed ground-based C2 capabilities in forward theaters by evolving Theater Deployable Communications (TDC) units to support the ground-based TOC-L system. The paper highlights that deploying dozens or hundreds of these small, ground-based nodes creates a highly redundant "data fabric" that can replace vulnerable centralized Air Operations Centers (AOCs) and airborne C2 platforms (like AWACS). This decentralized approach ensures uninterrupted command and control and integration into the joint kill web during peer conflict.
• Tittinger, Maj. James E., "Preparing for the Rain: Defending USAFE from Russia's Standoff Capabilities," AFGC thesis, 2025.
  • Addresses how the USAF can enable a resilient, distributed ground-based command and control capability by establishing local Air Defense Operations Centers (ADOCs) at forward bases to manage Air Base Air Defense (ABAD) systems. Co-located with Wing Operations Centers, these ADOCs would allow specifically trained operators to recognize, prioritize, and engage incoming threats—such as cruise missiles and drones—while coordinating directly with host nations for a shared air surveillance picture. To support this architecture, the author outlines several DOTmLPF-P changes: doctrinally, the USAF must formally assume responsibility for its own organic base defense rather than relying entirely on the U.S. Army; materially, bases must be equipped with long-range early warning radars as well as kinetic and non-kinetic defeat options; and from a training and organizational standpoint, the Air Force must create localized training programs to prepare ADOC operators for decentralized, short-notice decision-making.
• Weiss, Maj. J. Hunter, "Russian A2/AD Battlefield Lessons Learned and AFSPECWAR's Tactical Solution to a Strategic Problem," ACSC EL, 2023, 13 pgs.
  • This paper addresses the resilient distributed ground-based command and control aspect. Weiss explains how the USAF can extend tactical and operational C2 in forward, degraded environments by pairing Agile Control Integration Teams (ACIT) with the Tactical Operations Center-Light (TOC-L) equipment package. This combination provides a highly mobile, survivable, ground-based C2 force that serves as a redundant node within an adversary’s A2/AD network, enabling decentralized execution, autonomous strike approval, and joint fires integration when cut off from centralized command.
• Woodruff, LTC Robert, "Soldiers, Satellites and Space: How Strategic Competition Is Reliant upon This Interdependency," AWC SSP, 2022, 28 pgs.  
  • Discusses how Joint Force Development must leverage the full DOTmLPF-P spectrum to generate the materiel and non-materiel solutions required for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) and JADC2. To enable resilient C2 at the tactical edge against Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) threats, the paper highlights that DOTmLPF-P changes must integrate advanced technological capabilities—such as space-based satellite platforms—with persistent forward-deployed ground forces. This holistic DOTmLPF-P approach ensures that decentralized Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) possess the situational awareness and communications architecture needed to act as the "tentacles" of the C2 network and win in complex future operating environments.
• Zemler, Lt. Col. Jason, "The Loss of the Warfighter in the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System Acquisition Strategy," AWC SSP, 2021, 27 pgs. 
  • Addresses the query by examining ABMS as the technological engine required to power Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) in contested environments. To enable a resilient, distributed 5th-generation C2 system, the paper argues that the Air Force must expand the scope of ABMS acquisition beyond a simple "internet of things" approach into a comprehensive DOTMLPF solution. The specific DOTMLPF changes needed include restructuring Air Staff organizations to better integrate operator input, conducting threat-representative demonstrations tailored to a 2035 environment, and prioritizing the organize, train, and equip considerations necessary to prepare the entire battle management community for decentralized execution.