Human-Machine Teaming, AI Data Fusion, and Force Protection

The complexities of large-scale combat operations (LSCO) will severely test the military's ability to protect its rear areas and sustain combat power across multiple theaters. As adversaries increasingly utilize nontraditional methods to gain granular, real-time intelligence on force and supply movements, and critical assets like the nuclear enterprise, how can the Military Police (MP) Corps leverage AI and real-time data fusion to gain an edge in anticipating and neutralizing future threats and hazards?

This study should focus on the implications of protection-focused predictive AI tools and the development of AI target recognition to address the problem of protecting contested logistics during LSCO both on land and in the littorals. Specifically, how can independent data networks, sensors, and applications be fused to provide a real-time common operating picture (COP) with tailored views for protection forces? By focusing on these areas, how can future MP formations successfully identify threats in the rear area, and what optimal mix of capabilities must be integrated to ensure the point-defense of these vital logistics nodes?

Ultimately, operationalizing this fusion across the enterprise requires effective human-machine teaming. As the military integrates these predictive AI tools into the protection war-fighting function, how must the services redesign leader development models and cultural norms to cultivate a force that excels at human/machine symbiosis? What role does trust play in the successful adoption of this technology, when should security forces trust AI target recognition versus when should they not, and how can the military ensure personnel maintain appropriate control and autonomy to preserve trust and mitigate potential negative consequences?

• Acosta, Capt. Alan A., "The Drone Dilemma: Leveraging Existing Technologies to Counter the Threat of Low-Cost Combat Drones," AFGC thesis, 2024, 42 pgs. 
  • Acosta evaluates strategies for the USAF to establish robust point defense against the disruptive proliferation of low-cost combat drones. Rather than relying exclusively on highly advanced and expensive weaponry like hypersonic or stealth technologies, Acosta argues that the USAF must leverage cost-effective, commercial off-the-shelf counter-UAS systems to defend its installations. He specifically identifies the Raytheon Coyote system as an effective kinetic technology capable of neutralizing both individual drones and swarm attacks. Acosta recommends the USAF invest in an affordable, layered counter-drone strategy that integrates early detection, electronic warfare (EW) for long-range disruption, and kinetic options for close encounters to ensure operational readiness in contested environments.
• Adams, Lt. Col. Nicholas, "Killing Drones, Saving Bones: Cost Effective Counter-Small UAS Options for an Agile Force," AFGC thesis, 2024, 44 pgs. 
  • Adams addresses the need for effective and affordable point defense against the disruptive threat of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) that exploit the gap between airborne and ground-based air defenses. He evaluates various kinetic and non-kinetic solutions, noting that while advanced disruptive technologies like airborne Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) and High-Power Microwave systems offer future promise, they are currently too expensive and immature for near-term reliance. To ensure the USAF can protect its bases and Agile Combat Employment locations affordably, Adams recommends investing in a cost-effective, layered defense mix that utilizes cheaper air-to-air weapons to defeat larger UASs, while deploying ground-based systems equipped with multiple sensor types and both kinetic and non-kinetic kill mechanisms to neutralize smaller Group 1 threats.
• Allan, Lt. Col. Zachary S., "Invisible to the Drone's Eye: Leveraging New Concepts and Technology to Safeguard Marine Aviation against the Unmanned Threat," AFGC thesis, 2026.
  • Although focused on Marine Corps aviation, Allen answers the question by arguing that distributed military forces cannot survive without urgent investments in a layered portfolio of counter-UAS technologies. The author highlights the need for effective point defenses such as advanced drone interceptors and "next-generation" Directed Infrared Countermeasure (DIRCM) systems combined with high-energy lasers to kinetically defeat UAS. To make these disruptive technologies effective and affordable on a dynamic battlefield, the paper stresses the need to resolve technical issues like fratricide and false radar declarations, requiring intense collaboration with industry to field these laser defenses quickly.
• Anand, Capt. Joseph, "BBP on Agile Base Defense Sensors and Networks," SOS AUAR, 2025, 3 pgs. 
  • Addresses the need for effective point defense by focusing on the protection of Agile Combat Employment (ACE) forward operating sites. To ensure defense in a contested environment, the author asserts that the Air Force must invest in "light and expendable solutions" rather than solely relying on heavy, traditional systems. Specifically, Anand highlights that the exploration and acquisition of lighter, leaner sensors combined with more resilient networks will act as a massive force multiplier, revolutionizing base defense operations and giving small teams the competitive edge needed during short employment windows.
• Azan, Daniel E., "No Safe Haven: The Rise of Drones and USAF Vulnerabilities," AFGC thesis, 2026.
  • Azan addresses this by arguing that the traditional reliance on high-cost, low-density kinetic interceptors like the Patriot PAC-3 is economically unsustainable against the high-volume attrition tactics of cheap drone swarms. To establish a cost-effective means of achieving air superiority in the air littoral zone, he recommends that the Air Force pivot its procurement strategy toward low-footprint, non-kinetic, and cost-effective C-UAS platforms—such as the Coyote Block 3NK, Medusa, Ninja, and the Ukrainian SkyFall P1-SUN—which can restore a favorable cost-per-kill ratio and provide the munition volume necessary to defeat swarms without increasing the logistical footprint.
• Cahoon, LtCol Troy Lee, "The Military Might of Manufacturing: How Manufacturing Massive Fleets of Factories, eVTOLs, Drones, Robots, Weapons and Electrified Systems Will Re-Instate American Military Primacy," AWC SSP, 2021, 34 pgs. 
  • Answers the query by advocating for a radical shift toward commercial mass manufacturing technologies. Cahoon asserts that the current acquisition system produces hyper-expensive, tiny fleets; however, by investing in robotics, 3D printing, AI, and electrification, the military could drop the cost per unit exponentially. This investment in highly automated factories would allow the US to affordably produce massive fleets of drones, robots, sensors, and electrified weapons, effectively overwhelming adversaries and providing robust, low-cost defensive options.
• Caldwell, Lt. Col. James T., "Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control: Requirements to Distribute Missile Defense Information to the Tactical Edge," AWC SSP, 2021, 28 pgs. 
  • Answers the question by arguing that effective missile defense against asymmetric, hypersonic, and anti-satellite weapons requires investing in a robust CJADC2 architecture. Caldwell emphasizes that instead of relying on antiquated, centralized command structures, the Air Force must invest in resilient cloud technologies and data fusion that can rapidly distribute intelligence from multi-domain sensors directly to tactical edge units. By synergizing air, space, and cyber capabilities with emerging technologies like unmanned drone swarms and directed energy, this decentralized network allows forward-deployed forces to make life-saving point defense decisions at the speed of relevance.
• Davis, Maj. Eric A., "If It Flies, It Dies: Implications and Opportunities in Army Air Defense Investments," AFGC thesis, 2025.
  • Davis strongly advocates for the accelerated development and fielding of Directed Energy Weapons (DEW). He argues that relying on traditional, highly expensive kinetic interceptors—such as the half-million-dollar AIM-120 AMRAAM or Patriot missiles—is economically unsustainable when countering cheap, commercially available drones that only cost a few thousand dollars. To establish a more resilient and cost-effective defense posture, Davis recommends that the Air Force actively support the Army's Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) Increment 2 DEW initiatives, which offer precision targeting, reduced logistical requirements, and a significantly decreased cost per engagement. Additionally, he suggests evaluating and integrating successfully deployed DEW and point defense systems from allied nations to help bridge the gap between laboratory development and operational fielding.
• Daviscourt, Capt. Joshua, "COTS and Space Based Missile Defense," SOS AUAR, 2021, 11 pgs.  
  • Answers the question by arguing that the military must leverage agile startups and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) dual-use technologies to create an affordable global counter-missile defense grid. Specifically, Daviscourt recommends investing in space-based phased array targeting systems and revolutionary composite rocket motors that enable the fielding of micro-missile interceptors. By utilizing these disruptive industrial-scale technologies, the United States could field rocket pods containing 100 interceptors for the cost of a single conventional Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptor, providing a highly effective point defense against advanced hypersonic and ballistic threats.
• Evers, Capt. Braden, "How Should the USAF Defend against sUAS for Dispersed Agile Air Defense in Future Conflicts," SOS AUAR 2026.
  • Evers answers this by outlining a highly specific, multi-layered defense package tailored for dispersed locations. He suggests combining mobile, active systems—such as M-LIDS (which integrates electronic warfare and kinetic cannons), AI-powered Merops interceptor drones, and NINJA jamming software—with passive defense measures like drone netting and cables. Regarding disruptive technologies, Evers explicitly identifies directed energy weapons as an absolute imperative for future ACE C-sUAS operations that must be integrated into this multi-layered defense network.
• Guida, Maj. Christopher A., "Surprise! Strategies for Successful Military Advantages and Family Festivities," AF Fellows, 2024, 13 pgs. 
  • Guida answers the question by evaluating directed energy weapons (lasers) as an enormous force multiplier for defending assets against low-cost skiffs and drones. The author notes that lasers offer the distinct advantages of near-infinite magazine depth, immediate impact, and limited collateral damage, making them an ideal point defense option to protect critical domains. However, Guida cautions that while this disruptive technology is highly promising, current laser systems still struggle with beam control and environmental form factors, meaning the military must invest in overcoming these hurdles before treating lasers as an immediate strategic "offset" capability.
• Johnson, Capt. Kyna M., "The Threat of Unmanned Aerial Systems against Mobility Air Forces," SOS AUAR 2020, 10 pgs. 
  • Johnson answers the question by evaluating the evolving threat that drone swarms pose to Mobility Air Forces and identifying the Tactical High-Power Operational Responder (THOR) as a critical disruptive technology investment. She highlights that THOR—a mobile, directed-energy microwave system developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory—provides non-kinetic defeat of multiple targets and can be easily transported via a C-130 to be set up within hours. By investing in electromagnetic spectrum technologies like THOR, alongside existing Dronebuster and SkyNet systems, the Air Force can create a highly effective, adaptable point defense capability to protect both stateside installations and expeditionary locations from asymmetric UAS attacks.
• Kirk, Lt. Col. Troy A., "Review of Operation Inherent Resolve: Small Unmanned Aerial Systems and the Pursuit to Develop a Counter System," AWC SSP, 2020, 34 pgs. 
  • Kirk answers the question by evaluating the vulnerabilities of physical aerodromes to cheap, commercial off-the-shelf drones, recommending the USAF invest in scalable, sensor-agnostic command and control systems to complete the near real-time kill-chain. To provide an affordable and effective point defense against state-developed UAS swarms, the paper recommends investing in disruptive mechanisms such as microwave energy, cyber hacking, jamming, and spoofing. Employing these non-kinetic capabilities as an integrated C-sUAS architecture will neutralize the asymmetric advantages of adversaries and effectively shield coalition forces from drone saturation attacks.
• Klokun, Capt. Anton A., "BBP on Mobile Counter-UAV Weapon Technology," SOS AUAR, 2023, 3 pgs.  
  • Klokun addresses the question by emphasizing the urgent need to invest in research and development for a fully mobile counter-drone program to secure troops, military bases, and critical infrastructure. While praising the existing directed-energy THOR system, the author argues that its reliance on large transport aircraft like the C-130 limits its tactical agility. To create a truly effective and affordable point defense option, the paper recommends the Air Force invest in scaling down high-power microwave or laser technologies so they can be mounted on any armored vehicle and easily deployed alongside infantry units to counter modern UAS swarms.
• McGonegal, Maj. Jack, "High Power Microwave Weapons: Disruptive Technology for the Future," ACSC ACTS 2.0 RTF, 2020, 20 pgs. 
  • McGonegal answers the question by explicitly identifying pulsed-wave High Power Microwaves (HPMs) as the specific "game-changing" disruptive technology the Department of Defense must field within the next five to ten years to maintain a competitive advantage. The author notes that HPMs offer the unique ability to precisely engage targets with little to no collateral damage, directly aligning with the National Defense Strategy's goal of increasing joint lethality in contested environments. By investing in continuous-wave and pulsed-wave HPMs, military leaders will gain a revolutionary, non-kinetic point defense and coercive strike capability that can defeat adversary electronics across the range of military operations.
• Moriarty, Capt. Richard and Capt. Patrick Snyder, "The Use of Artificial Intelligence and Less Lethal Force in Installation Security," SOS AUAR, 2021, 11 pgs.  
  • Moriarty and Snyder address the question by proposing the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) with robotic assets and less-than-lethal force measures to secure Air Force installations. The authors suggest that deploying AI-enabled robotics equipped with crowd dispersion methods—such as tear gas, bean bag projectiles, or the microwave-based Active Denial System—can provide an effective, automated point defense option. This disruptive technology investment would enhance base force protection in austere environments while significantly reducing the physical risk and operational demands placed on human Security Forces personnel.
• Palchick, Lt. Col. Jesse C., "Countering First Person View Small Unmanned Aerial Systems with Airborne Electromagnetic Attack," AWC SSP, 2025, 49. 
  • Palchick analyzes how the USAF can counter the disruptive technology of highly lethal, first-person view (FPV) sUAS, which have fundamentally altered modern warfare. Noting that current point defense and counter-UAS solutions are entirely ground-based and limited to local area self-defense, Palchick argues that the USAF must invest in an offensive, airborne electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) attack platform. By equipping a Group 5 unmanned aircraft system with airborne electronic attack (AEA) capabilities and supporting it with a mature electromagnetic battle management infrastructure, the USAF can create a dynamic, enduring defense layer capable of mitigating FPV swarm threats before they reach critical assets.
• Taylor, Capt. John, "BBP on Rapid Aerial Delivery of Ground Based Air Defense," SOS AUAR, 2023, 2 pgs. 
  • Addresses the challenge of creating effective defense options against peer adversaries in the vast and complex Indo-Pacific area of responsibility. To overcome the severe time and distance disadvantages inherent in this theater, the author suggests that the United States must invest in and develop the capability for the rapid aerial delivery of ground-based air defense systems. By repurposing current equipment and formulating new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for aerial deployment, the military can rapidly project and establish flexible point defense solutions to protect forward-deployed forces.
• Tedder, Capt. Nathan L., "Research and Development Strategy: Next-Generation Technology Defeat Mechanisms," SOS AUAR, 2021, 7 pgs. 
  • Answers the query by advocating for a paradigm shift in acquisition rather than focusing on a single hardware solution. Tedder argues that as the Department of Defense pursues game-changing disruptive technologies—such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), hypersonic vehicles, and directed energy weapons—it must simultaneously invest in the parallel research and development of "defeat mechanisms". By proactively creating countermeasures alongside new US tech, the military will have affordable and viable point defense options ready before adversaries can field these same disruptive capabilities against US forces.
• Turley, Maj. Heath, "Use of Intermediate Force Capabilities in Defending Airbases in the 21st Century," ACSC EL, 2024, 12 pgs. 
  • Turley answers the question by examining how USAF Security Forces must adapt their point defense strategies against emergent 21st-century threats. To provide an effective and affordable alternative to purely lethal weapons, he recommends that the USAF invest in the procurement and employment of counter-personnel and counter-material Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFCs), commonly known as non-lethal weapons. By integrating these disruptive technologies, Defenders can effectively detect, deter, delay, and deny hostile actors—ensuring uninterrupted airpower generation and protecting both home stations and deployed agile combat employment operations without unnecessarily escalating conflicts.
• Wright, Maj. Jeremy A., "Attack of the Drones! U.S. Military Application of Counter Small UAS Operations," AFGC thesis, 2025, 36 pgs. 
  • Wright explores the need for affordable point defense by analyzing the disruptive force of inexpensive, commercially available sUAS in recent conflicts like the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Nagorno-Karabakh War. He identifies critical gaps in current U.S. counter-sUAS capabilities and argues that to prepare for near-peer conflicts with adversaries like China and Russia, the USAF must invest in the development of scalable, cost-effective C-sUAS systems. Wright emphasizes that an effective point defense requires a multi-layered approach integrating electronic warfare, kinetic measures, and passive countermeasures, all supported by robust, joint training programs to ensure the effectiveness of counter-drone operations.