This research seeks to assess Russia's ability to continue its war against Ukraine, modernize, and regenerate its military. What are Russian industrial strengths or adaptations, and will they improve manufacturing capacity in support of established initiatives? Are there systemic weaknesses and to what extent are Russian leaders addressing (or exacerbating) these issues?
Russian Defense Industry (RSI EUCOM): What are the domestic and export capacities of Russia's defense industry, the effects of sanctions, and the role of the wartime economy?
What Russian Defense Industry Initiatives Lead to Competitive Advantage? (RSI EUCOM): Analyze these initiatives
- Ballard, Major Maggie, "Russian AeroNet Market: A Case Study of Russia's National Technical Initiative," ACSC Russia RTF, 2020, 24 pgs.
- In her case study on Russia’s AeroNet (small unmanned aerial vehicle) market, Maggie Ballard answers the research question by arguing that while Russia has historical strengths in aerospace and a willingness to heavily fund state-sponsored research for military and energy technologies, its ability to modernize and regenerate is severely hampered by crippling systemic weaknesses. Ballard highlights that Russia’s authoritarian government, command economy, lack of property rights, and suppression of intellectual freedom stifle the innovation necessary to improve manufacturing capacity and technological development. Rather than addressing these issues, Russian leaders exacerbate them by maintaining state ownership over the vast majority of large companies and research institutions, directing them solely toward state security interests rather than fostering a dynamic commercial industrial base. Regarding sanctions and the ability to continue the war, Ballard notes that Russia historically relied heavily on international cooperation for its technology sectors, but the invasion of Ukraine and the resulting severe Western sanctions have deeply endangered these relationships. Ultimately, she concludes that the loss of global interconnectedness and the weight of sanctions will cause Russia's technology sector to decline sharply, potentially reducing the country to the economic utility of North Korea and sealing its fate to suffer "for another generation."
- Lancaster, Maj. James, "The Future of Indo-Russian Arms Transfers: Diverging Interests and a Future Model for Joint Ventures," ACSC paper (Russia Research Task Force), 2024, 23 pgs.
- Based on Lancaster's research, Russia's ability to regenerate its military and sustain its war in Ukraine is severely strained by massive equipment losses and Western sanctions that have severed access to critical high-end technologies. To adapt and maintain domestic manufacturing capacity, Russian leaders have increased 2024 defense spending by 70 percent and established illicit smuggling networks through countries like China and Turkey to acquire dual-use goods and commercial-grade microchips. However, these adaptations reveal profound systemic weaknesses; substituting military-grade microelectronics with inferior commercial alternatives requires time-consuming software and hardware redesigns, ultimately rendering the resulting weapon systems less accurate and reliable. Furthermore, the wartime economy's singular focus on domestic reconstitution has crippled Russia's export capacity, making it doubtful that defense corporations can simultaneously meet wartime demands and fulfill foreign contracts without major compromises. Consequently, Russia's inability to deliver quality weapons has led to significant logistical delays and the abandonment of major aircraft and helicopter deals by primary customers like India, signaling that while Russia can continue to churn out retrofitted equipment, its defense industry is deteriorating in advanced technological innovation and global export dominance.
- Pärn, Maj. Tõnis, "The Western-Made and Fed Beast: Russian Military Industry," ACSC paper (Russia Research Task Force), 2024, 23 pgs.
- Parn assesses that while Russia manages to sustain its war effort by maximizing its pre-war production capacities and leveraging illicit adaptations, its defense industry suffers from severe systemic weaknesses that prevent true modernization or the expansion of its manufacturing capabilities. A critical industrial adaptation has been a heavy reliance on imported raw materials, such as cotton pulp from China and Turkey, to outproduce the West in artillery shells, as well as rebranding cheap commercial electronics and drones from platforms like AliExpress to circumvent Western sanctions. However, Russia's domestic capacity is severely hamstrung by a massive labor shortage of 400,000 skilled workers—forcing the use of inexperienced personnel and prison labor—and a heavy dependence on wearing, Western-made precision tools and computer numerical control (CNC) machines that it cannot domestically replace. The effects of Western sanctions on high-end optics and semiconductors mean that "modernized" or resurrected tanks are actually retrofitted with older, inferior sensors, reflecting a steady decline in the overall sophistication and reliability of the Russian military. Furthermore, the wartime economy, which currently consumes a third of the national budget and rapidly depletes the National Wealth Fund, has devastated Russia's export capacities. By prioritizing its own domestic wartime needs, Russian leaders have drastically reduced foreign arms sales, suspended the production of export equipment like helicopters for Argentina, and even asked allies to return previously sold weapons, exacerbating the long-term degradation of Russia's global military-industrial standing.
- Szczepanski, Lt. Col. John, "The Russian Defense Industry: Problems and Prospects," AWC paper (Russia RTF), 2023, 4 pgs.
- Szczepanski assesses that Russia's defense industry faces difficult prospects in regenerating its military and sustaining its war effort due to the compounding effects of Western sanctions, severe supply chain vulnerabilities, and the reputational damage caused by equipment failures in Ukraine. While Russia traditionally maintained a massive defense sector that ranked just behind the United States in global arms exports, it has long suffered from systemic weaknesses, including slow production, limited capacity, and quality control issues that predated the 2022 full-scale invasion. The severing of critical supply chains—such as losing access to Ukrainian aviation engines and Western semiconductors—has forced the Russian wartime economy into desperate adaptations, including repurposing microchips from consumer appliances like refrigerators and dishwashers. Consequently, Szczepanski concludes that Russia will struggle to produce high-end equipment in sufficient quantities to meet both its domestic wartime demands and its export contracts, driving the nation to rely on less profitable, politically driven barter agreements—such as exchanging fighter aircraft for Iranian suicide drones—to maintain its diminishing share of the global arms market.
- Tittinger, Maj. James E., "Preparing for the Rain: Defending USAFE from Russia's Standoff Capabilities," AFGC thesis, 2025, 43 pgs.
- Tittinger notes that Western sanctions have entirely failed to halt Russian munition manufacturing, as Russia continues to source Western microelectronics through alternative channels. Transitioning quickly to a wartime economy, Russia has ramped up production to roughly 60 cruise missiles per month. Furthermore, Russia struck a $1.75 billion deal with Iran to domestically manufacture the Shahed-136 at the JSC Alabuga facility, which is on track to produce over 5,000 drones annually. He concludes that planners must accept that Russia will not "run out" of standoff munitions.