Over the past two years, the security cooperation enterprise has had to respond rapidly to field demands from multiple partners in crisis, including Ukraine, Israel, and the Gulf states. Building on these recent events, how has the United States historically provided military assistance to foreign nations engaged in conflict without becoming a direct combatant?
Joint security cooperation response teams, like the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine, are one example of how security cooperation crisis response efforts are coordinated. What lessons can the experience of the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine or other security cooperation crisis response efforts provide the Joint Force concerning training, equipping, and coordinating allied aid to partners in a crisis? Furthermore, how do these historical and contemporary lessons of providing assistance apply differently to a land-locked country like Ukraine versus an island like Taiwan?
Finally, as the U.S. relies on these methods to support its allies, how can the United States prevent or mitigate the impact of adversarial or opportunistic actors from applying these same lessons to frustrate U.S. military operations?
- Brewer, Capt. Jonathan T., "Beyond the Endgame: Sustaining SOF Success with Infinite Game Tactics," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- Explores security cooperation lessons by highlighting how Special Operations Forces (SOF) prepared Ukraine for crisis response. The paper demonstrates that Ukraine’s ability to successfully absorb advanced weaponry and intelligence provided by NATO allies was not an overnight achievement, but rather the result of nearly a decade of international capacity-building and interoperability training prior to the 2022 invasion. The study provides the Joint Force with the lesson that effective crisis response and allied aid require "infinite strategies"—long-term investments in partner capabilities, trust-building, and governance reforms that establish a foundation of resilience long before a conflict actually begins.
- Ching, Capt. Joey, "The Enemy of My Enemy: What China Will Learn from the Russia-Ukraine Crisis," SOS AUAR, 2022.
- Answers the question by emphasizing the strategic messaging and diplomatic coordination required when providing allied aid to a partner in crisis. Ching observes that a unified North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response to support Ukraine serves as a critical signal of Western alliance strength to other strategic competitors. The paper warns that adversaries will actively use information warfare to drive apart alliances and circumvent economic sanctions. Consequently, a key lesson for security cooperation teams is that training and equipping efforts must be paired with deliberate actions to foster global partnerships, maintain a unified coalition narrative, and reassure other vulnerable allies.
- Dobre, Maj. Costinel-Viorel, "Integrated Deterrence: Department of the Air Force and NATO Space and Cyberspace Interoperability," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- Explores lessons from the Ukraine conflict regarding the coordination of allied aid and technological integration. The paper explicitly notes that the Ukraine War is "exposing NATO interoperability gaps". To ensure joint security cooperation response teams can effectively support partners in a crisis, Dobre asserts that the U.S. and its allies must overcome political, regulatory, and technical barriers to achieve seamless interoperability. The author recommends investing in dual-use technologies, standardizing communication protocols, and executing joint training programs to ensure the collective defense architecture remains agile and unified when coordinating multinational aid.
- Dorans, Maj. Larissa A., "Identifying Barriers to Empower Allies and Partners: What Are the Primary Barriers to Empowerment, Cooperation, and Interoperability for US Partners and Allies," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- Uses the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war as a central case study to identify critical lessons learned in coordinating, equipping, and training allied partners during a rapid crisis response. Regarding coordination, she highlights the unprecedented success of rapid, transparent intelligence sharing between the U.S., NATO, and Ukraine, as well as the effectiveness of the G7+ Donor Coordination Platform in mobilizing and streamlining international resources. However, she notes significant failures in equipping partners, demonstrating that the influx of weapons from nearly 60 different countries caused massive interoperability challenges and that NATO's standardization agreements (STANAGs) ultimately failed under the stress of mass equipment transfers. Additionally, outdated assumptions about U.S. supply chain resilience and defense industrial capacity led to severe production bottlenecks and delayed military aid deliveries to the front lines. Finally, concerning training, Dorans points out that communication obstacles—specifically a critical shortage of qualified interpreters who understand military and technical vocabulary—emerged as the primary barrier for multinational missions attempting to train Ukrainian forces on Western weapons and tactics.
- Firman, Lt. Col. Robert A., "Security Cooperation and Great Power Competition," AWC SSP, 2019.
- Addresses the bureaucratic and institutional challenges of coordinating security assistance. The paper highlights that while billions of dollars are invested in training and equipping partner nations to build capacity, the U.S. security cooperation enterprise often suffers from poor assessment and monitoring. Firman identifies a major coordination hurdle: the complexity of navigating different legal authorities, where the Department of State manages Title 22 Security Assistance while the Department of Defense manages Title 10 Security Cooperation. To effectively deliver aid in a crisis, the paper suggests the U.S. must streamline this complex web of authorities and funding mechanisms, which frequently exceed a local Office of Security Cooperation's ability to efficiently manage them.
- Kim, Lt. Col.. Daniel J., "Building Partner Capacity in Cyberspace to Enhance Deterrence," SAASS thesis, 2021.
- This paper addresses security cooperation in Ukraine by demonstrating how the United States successfully coordinates partner capacity building to signal commitment and deter Russian aggression. To rapidly address field demands in a crisis environment, the U.S. leveraged interagency funding alongside subject matter experts from organizations like SEI and MITRE. The paper highlights that the most effective method for equipping and training partners in a crisis is to deploy experts on the ground to conduct interviews, identify institutional gaps, and develop highly tailored training modules, which ultimately supported Ukraine's national cyber strategy and critical infrastructure defense.
- McWhirter, Maj. Matthew, "United States Embassy Operations in Security Cooperation: Assisting UAE Stabilization Efforts in the MENA," ACSC EL, 2019.
- McWhirter explores security cooperation concerning Gulf states, specifically detailing how the U.S. military and Department of State collaborate to assist the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in regional stabilization efforts. The research identifies that establishing Defense Cooperation Agreements and conducting consistent joint exercises are critical for building the interoperability necessary to coordinate allied aid and coalition actions during a crisis. By investing years of developmental assistance and training into the UAE’s military, the U.S. successfully paved the way for open communication lines and unified coalition operations (such as Operation INHERENT RESOLVE) across the Middle East.
- McCaughan, Lt. Col. Ryan, "You Can't Just 'Ukraine' Taiwan: The Imperative to Strengthen Taiwan's Defense Posture," AWC RSS, 2025.
- Directly addresses the query by examining the Ukraine military aid model and the specific roles of the Security Assistance Group – Ukraine (SAG-U) and the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG). The author notes that while the UDCG managed strategic coordination to prevent redundant shipments and SAG-U led the operational implementation of aid, this reactive crisis response succeeded primarily because Ukraine had already undergone years of NATO-standard training and enjoyed secure logistics routes through Poland. The critical lesson for the Joint Force is that the U.S. cannot rely on this type of reactive, emergency escalation for geographically isolated partners like Taiwan; instead, the security cooperation enterprise must reform the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process to pre-position weapons, accelerate deliveries, and integrate allied contributions before a crisis unfolds.
- Moncier, Lt. Col. Benjamin S., "The Least Worst Reality: Responsibly Ensuring Partner Conflict Civilian Casualty Mitigation," AFGC thesis, 2023.
- Addresses security assistance lessons derived from the Gulf states, specifically analyzing the U.S. defense industry's military sales to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The author assesses how early U.S. security assistance approaches hindered civilian protection and failed to mitigate civilian casualties during the crisis. To train and equip partners responsibly during future crises, the paper argues that the Joint Force and the wider defense enterprise must implement conditionally tailored Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and proactively integrate Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) standards into peacetime security cooperation. By establishing these standards early, the U.S. can incentivize partners to prioritize civilian harm mitigation even when the U.S. is not actively engaged in the combat operations.
- Poindexter, Col. Eugene, "US Military Leadership and Support of AMISOM: Are We Successful?" AWC SSP, 2019.
- Although focused on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), this paper provides highly applicable lessons for the Joint Force on how to coordinate allied aid and train multiple multinational partners simultaneously during a crisis. Poindexter demonstrates that when managing aid from various troop-contributing countries, the U.S. must prioritize teaching the military decision-making process to establish standard operating procedures and a common military doctrine across the coalition. The success of the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program illustrates that cohesive operational planning and standardized tactics are essential prerequisites for equipping and integrating allied forces to stabilize a fragile region.
- Stuard, Maj. Kathryn L., "Cooperate to Outcompete: Security Cooperation Impacts on Grey Zone Conflict in the Indo-Pacific," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- This paper evaluates the broader strategic implications of security cooperation and the limitations of waiting to engage with fragile nations until after a crisis has erupted. Stuard argues that to effectively train, equip, and coordinate aid, the Department of Defense must establish strong assistance frameworks, routine training, and technology-sharing processes long before partner nations are in crisis. By aligning DoD military efforts with Department of State policies to proactively build partner capacity and improve human security, the U.S. can ensure it remains the "partner of choice" and creates a resilient network of allies capable of deterring competitors without relying on ad hoc crisis responses.
- Tompkins, Lt. Col., "NATO Intelligence Sharing: Lessons Learned from the Ukraine-Russian War," AWC SSP, 2025.
- Contributes to the topic by focusing on the coordination of intelligence as a vital form of allied aid during a crisis. The research highlights that the speed, frequency, and unprecedented public disclosure of intelligence to support Ukraine was a novel success, yet the crisis also exposed significant limitations within NATO’s intelligence-sharing apparatus. The paper concludes that the Joint Force must analyze the successes and shortfalls of how intelligence was coordinated in Ukraine to reform its intelligence-sharing structures, ensuring the U.S. can rapidly develop and navigate complex, effective intelligence partnerships during future crises in theaters like the Indo-Pacific.
- Turner, Mark A., "China's War in Ukraine: The Sino-Russian Partnership and Great Power Competition," AWC Russia RTF, 2023.
- Provides insight into the massive equipping and logistical demands of supporting a partner nation in a major conflict. The paper highlights that the U.S. has had to reach "deep into its global ammunition stockpiles to help Ukraine," underscoring the sheer volume of materiel required for sustained crisis assistance. By tracking these support efforts and analyzing intelligence failures and successes, Turner emphasizes that the Joint Force must understand the immense logistical requirements and stockpile limitations associated with supplying allied aid during a protracted, full-scale war, utilizing these lessons to better prepare for broader great power competition.
- Woodruff, LTC Robert, "Soldiers, Satellites and Space: How Strategic Competition is Reliant upon This Interdependency," AWC West Space Seminar, 2022.
- Answers the question by illustrating the vital role of persistent presence and long-term training before a crisis erupts. Woodruff notes that the Florida Army National Guard and the 10th Special Forces Group trained the Ukrainian military on a rotating schedule beginning in 2015, which provided invaluable assistance that helped "turn the tide in Ukraine" against an invading force. To optimize security cooperation and crisis response moving forward, the paper recommends that the Joint Force heavily leverage specialized units—specifically Special Forces, Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), and the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP)—to establish continuous access, train partners, and affect the decision calculus of adversaries.