How can the Department of War (or the Department of the Army) most effectively adapt its force posture in the Arctic within the next five years to protect the high north and northern approaches to the homeland in great-power competition? To properly address this, research should not be limited by existing infrastructure and should consider changes in access to and within the region.
Within this evolving strategic posture, how can Special Operations Forces (SOF) best prepare for future operations in the Arctic? As geopolitical dynamics shift, what does the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden mean for the region, and what can U.S. SOF learn from allies and partners that routinely operate in the Arctic?
Furthermore, to effectively integrate these strategic approaches, what are the interoperability requirements between SOF and conventional forces operating in the region, such as Coast Guard icebreakers and Navy submarines? Are there new capabilities or technologies that are required for operations in this extreme environment? Ultimately, how might SOF best work with the USG interagency, as well as allies and partners, to understand and partner with Arctic peoples to secure the northern approaches?
- Bruehl, LCDR Jason L., "The Arctic Thaw: Examining US-Russian Arctic Relations and Balancing Military Competition with Cooperation," AFGC thesis, 2023.
- This paper argues that the United States should adapt its Arctic force posture by avoiding an aggressive conventional military buildup that could trigger an unnecessary and destabilizing regional arms race with Russia. Recognizing Russia's conventional force limitations and its primarily defensive posture in the region, the Department of Defense should instead focus its Arctic military efforts on strategic nuclear defense of the homeland. By leveraging Alaska’s geographic position for ballistic missile defense and early warning systems, the US can effectively protect its northern approaches from great-power threats while keeping avenues open for regional cooperation and dialogue.
- Carroll, Maj. Brianna C., "Peace in the Arctic: China's Ambition and US Fighters in Alaska," AFGC thesis, 2022.
- This paper highlights how the Department of Defense is adapting its force posture by consolidating fifth-generation aircraft in Alaska to serve as a strategic stronghold for homeland defense and power projection. Acknowledging that the US lags behind other nations in Arctic infrastructure, the military has compensated by building up the highest concentration of advanced fighters in the world—specifically F-22s at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and F-35As at Eielson Air Force Base. This fighter buildup allows the US to exert military dominance, project power into the Indo-Pacific, and deter China's growing ambitions to exploit changing regional access and new shipping routes in the Arctic.
- Collinge, Matthew, "Defending the ICE: United States Capabilities and Interests in an Evolving Arctic Region," AFGC thesis, 2024.
- Collinge addresses the need for the United States to adapt its Arctic posture to counter Russian and Chinese ambitions as melting ice rapidly opens new shipping routes and access to untapped resources. To overcome the U.S. military's limited existing infrastructure in the region, the paper recommends a hybrid approach that combines targeted investments in heavy icebreakers and strategic bases with a heavy reliance on technological innovation. By leveraging satellite monitoring, drones, and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), the military can establish a robust surveillance and operational presence to protect the northern approaches without requiring massive, resource-intensive physical footprints.
- Edlund, Maj. Christopher, "Arctic National Security Investment: Time to Outrun Russia," ACSC RTF, 2024.
- Edlund argues that the U.S. has a narrow window of opportunity to close the Arctic capability gap while Russia is distracted and financially strained by its war in Ukraine. To adapt its force posture and ensure effective deterrence, the paper recommends fully funding the Polar Security Cutter program and investing in dual-use infrastructure to support dispersed operating locations along the Arctic coast. Recognizing the austere conditions and limited existing infrastructure, Edlund suggests the military must rely heavily on expeditionary capabilities, push logistics, and stockpiling to project power, rather than depending solely on permanent bases.
- Fields, CDR Stan, "What Strategic Leaders Need to Know about Russia," AWC EL 2021.
- Addressing the lack of US presence and infrastructure in the region, this paper argues the US must adopt a joint-interagency approach to secure its northern borders during great-power competition. The author recommends leveraging the unique capabilities of the US Coast Guard to provide a dual military and constabulary presence, which successfully bridges the gap between high-intensity warfighting and diplomatic efforts. By utilizing the Coast Guard to project sovereignty and combining it with enhanced communications and ISR capabilities shared with Arctic allies like Canada, the Department of Defense can rapidly respond to threats and maintain a strong presence despite long distances and harsh environmental constraints.
- Fuerst, Andrew S., "Maximizing ISR Effectiveness in the High North," SOS AUAR 2021.
- To safeguard the homeland and adapt to changing regional access, this paper recommends executing a strategy of Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) supported by robust Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Rather than relying solely on new physical infrastructure, the US can posture land-based ISR assets near key strategic chokepoints—such as the Bering Strait and the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap—while investing in multi-domain remote sensing systems tailored for tracking dynamic sea ice in the high north. The paper also suggests using artificial intelligence and machine learning to rapidly process this sensor data, ensuring commanders maintain the situational awareness necessary to deter adversaries and protect northern approaches.
- Hodges, Maj. Daniel, "Competing in the North: Best Use for Special Operations Forces in the Arctic," AFGC thesis, 2024.
- Hodges explores how the deployment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) can provide an asymmetric advantage to secure the homeland's northern approaches against strategic competitors like Russia and China. Because traditional military power projection is constrained by the Arctic's harsh geography and a lack of established infrastructure, the paper recommends utilizing SOF as a primary, agile deterrent force. To achieve this, the Department of Defense must close its current capability gap by transitioning from infrequent exercises to year-round Arctic training, increasing interoperability with allied Arctic nations, and potentially creating a designated Arctic-focused SOF organization.
- Kelsey, Col. Aaron, "The National Guard's Role in Arctic Security," AWC SSP, 2022.
- Answers the question by proposing that the Department of Defense heavily rely on the National Guard to circumvent current infrastructure and personnel constraints in the Arctic. As climate change increases access to the region and invites great-power competition from Russia and China, the U.S. currently lacks the necessary infrastructure and active-duty expertise to quickly project power. To adapt its force posture without waiting for massive infrastructure developments, the military should utilize the National Guard as the primary force provider, as these members already live and work in extreme cold weather environments and possess deep-rooted local and international partnerships. This permanent, localized force structure eliminates the steep learning curves and capability gaps caused by two-to-three-year active-duty rotations, allowing the military to immediately safeguard the northern approaches to the homeland.
- Perez, Lt. Col. Christopher, "Lessons for a Marine Corps Arctic Regiment," SAASS thesis, 2024.
- Perez evaluates how the U.S. military can protect strategic maritime chokepoints, such as the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap, as melting sea ice transforms the Arctic into a viable naval corridor for great-power competition. To bypass the lack of established bases in this remote and contested region, the paper recommends leveraging the expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps to establish mobile, expeditionary advanced bases in the Arctic littorals. By expanding rotational deployments to the Nordic region, increasing participation in cold-weather training, and aligning closely with NATO partners, the military can project power and maintain sea-control and sea-denial capabilities despite significant environmental and infrastructure constraints.
- Randall, Lt. Col. Ryan L, "The Arctic Security Gambit: How Will the US Struggle for Advantage in the Arctic?" AWC SSP, 2021.
- Addresses the problem of infrastructure shortfalls by recommending that the U.S. military adapt its posture through deep integration with regional allies to protect its northern approaches against Russian and Chinese expansion. Recognizing that the U.S. currently possesses only one installation north of the Arctic Circle (Thule Air Base) and lacks a permanent military presence to deter adversaries, the paper suggests establishing a unified Arctic Command and leveraging the existing capabilities of NATO's Maritime Command (MARCOM) and Denmark's Joint Arctic Command (JACO). By utilizing allied outposts and partnerships in Greenland and the Faroe Islands, the U.S. can offset its own lack of infrastructure, project all-domain combat power, and secure the strategic Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK-N) gap despite changing regional access.
- Semke, LCDR Joseph R., "Arctic Power: Maintaining Stability in an Uncertain Environment," AFGC thesis, 2019.
- Answers the question by advocating for an integrated, whole-of-government approach to Arctic force posture that maximizes existing resources and intelligence gathering rather than relying solely on immediate infrastructure build-ups. To defend the northern approaches in a rapidly warming and increasingly contested environment, the paper recommends that the President direct USNORTHCOM to create a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). This JIATF would overcome operational seams by coordinating military, scientific, and law enforcement efforts, fusing intelligence to build domain awareness, and sharing information with regional allies to counterbalance peer competitors like Russia and China. By optimizing command and control structures and emphasizing diplomatic and informational instruments of power, the U.S. can establish an effective deterrent posture while long-term infrastructure and icebreaker acquisitions are still underway.
- Watson, Capt. John D., "Russia's Recent Conquests and Long-Term Strategy in the Arctic," SOS AUAR, 2021.
- To counter Russian military objectives and project power in the changing Arctic, this paper recommends adapting US force posture by establishing a significant, long-term contingent of bases in Scandinavian and Baltic nations. Posturing forces in countries like Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania would signal an enhanced commitment to deterrence near Moscow and provide opportunities to pre-position defensive materiel. Furthermore, the author notes that the US should continue expanding cold-weather training exercises, such as the Army's Arctic Warrior exercise, to increase service member readiness and resiliency so they can effectively operate in frigid environments without relying on massive new infrastructure.
- Bonomi, LCDR Eric J., "Falling Behind in the Arctic: The Inadequacy of the United States Military's Arctic Maritime Presence," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- To meet the interoperability requirements of the broader U.S. joint force, Bonomi argues that icebreakers must be equipped with state-of-the-art command and control (C2) and secure communications systems capable of seamlessly linking with any DOD asset or command structure. Furthermore, he asserts that a modernized fleet of 15 militarized icebreakers outfitted with flight decks for helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as the ability to rapidly deploy armed boarding teams, will provide the flexible, interoperable maritime infrastructure required to support joint operations and maintain regional stability in the austere Arctic environment.
- Collinge, Matthew, "Defending the Ice: United States Capabilities and Interests in an Evolving Arctic Region," AF Global College thesis, 2024, 44 pgs.
- The paper provides broad insights into U.S. military operations in the Arctic, noting that the NATO enlargement to include Finland adds critical Arctic territory, operational experience, and a deep understanding of Russian tactics that strengthens the alliance against adversaries. To prepare for regional challenges and improve interoperability, the U.S. military must expand joint military exercises with NATO allies focusing on cold-weather operations, joint surveillance, and search-and-rescue. To operate effectively in this harsh environment, new technologies and capabilities are required, specifically the expansion of the U.S. icebreaker fleet, low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite monitoring, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and drones. Finally, to successfully partner with Arctic peoples, the U.S. must collaborate with indigenous communities to leverage their generations of traditional ecological knowledge for conservation planning and sustainable practices.
- Hodges, Maj. Daniel, "Competing in the North: Best Use for Special Operations Forces in the Arctic," AFGC thesis, 2024, 61 pgs.
- Hodges argues that to best prepare for future operations, SOF must move beyond short-term "Arctic tourism" and commit to year-round, realistic training, potentially by establishing a dedicated joint special operations task force (JSOTF-Arctic). The enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden solidifies the organization as a dominant Arctic military alliance, encompassing all permanent Arctic Council members except Russia, which provides a massive geographic deterrent to Russian northern ambitions. Regarding interoperability between SOF and conventional forces, recent exercises have successfully demonstrated SOF inserting onto ice sheets, receiving airdrops from Air National Guard C-130s, and linking up with Navy attack submarines that broke through the ice. Because the U.S. lacks dedicated Arctic units, U.S. SOF must learn from and train alongside allies who possess inherent Arctic survival skills, specifically units like the Canadian Rangers and the Danish Sirius Patrol. To work with the interagency and Arctic peoples, SOF should utilize Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and integrate directly with local governmental and tribal agencies to build relationships and prepare the operational environment.
- Patel, Maj. Milan S., "Strategic Thaw: How Russian-Chinese Partnerships in the Arctic Challenge U.S. Interests and Alliances," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- He points out that the U.S. currently suffers from a lack of modernized icebreakers, deepwater ports, and year-round airbases necessary to maintain dominance in the High North. Because the U.S. is not adequately equipped to monitor and respond to Arctic challenges alone, Patel argues that integrating with these new NATO members allows the U.S. to project power, share intelligence, and establish a collective defense to successfully deter the growing Russian and Chinese regional military presence.
- Schneider, Maj. Scott, "Future of Thule Air Base: When Greenland Gains Independence," ACSC elective paper (Dilemmas of Global Basing), 2020, 10 pgs.