The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy both direct a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain. Conceptually, does deterrence by denial apply as equally to geographies like Oceania and Diego Garcia as it does to the First Island Chain?
To answer this, this project should analyze how geography, force posture, and strategic culture shape deterrence and nuclear signaling in the Indo-Pacific. With particular attention to the political and military meaning of U.S. presence, exercises, dispersal, and consultative mechanisms, how do the varying geographic constraints of the First Island Chain versus more distant locations like Oceania or Diego Garcia alter the effectiveness of this denial strategy?
Furthermore, rather than presuming that specific bases should automatically host specific nuclear or conventional missions, the paper should assess how location, vulnerability, alliance politics, and operational reach interact across these diverse Indo-Pacific environments to influence both deterrence and escalation risk.
- Gillis, Maj. Michael, "Clear Skies over Taiwan: Alternatives to Air Superiority in a Conflict with China over Taiwan," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- Gillis details how the "tyranny of distance" and China's dense A2/AD conventional missile coverage require a geographically stratified deterrence by denial strategy. Because First Island Chain bases (such as those in Okinawa) are highly vulnerable to initial, high-yield PLARF missile barrages, they must host agile, forward-deployed Stand-In Forces (like Marine Littoral Regiments) that utilize mobile "kill webs" to track and target the Chinese navy from within the contested zone. Conversely, distant geographies like Oceania (such as Palau) and Diego Garcia provide indispensable strategic depth. The U.S. can leverage Palau for over-the-horizon radar sensing and project heavy standoff firepower using strategic bombers (B-1, B-2, B-52) stationed safely outside China's immediate tactical reach. This geographic pairing—combining forward-deployed stand-in forces to disrupt C2 with rear-echeloned forces to project mass power—credibly signals to China that an invasion of Taiwan will be logistically choked and physically repelled.