240702-F-EK405-1067

Chief Master Sgt. of the Air Force David Flosi points out aspects of an ICBM to Chief Master Sgt. Edwin Ludwigsen, command chief for Air Force Personnel Command, during a visit to the Alfa-06 launch facility near Pine Bluffs, Wyoming, July 2, 2024. Flosi visited the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, and the missile field to witness how Airmen continue to provide 24/7 strategic deterrence, standing ready to respond at a moment’s notice in support of the most responsive leg of the nuclear triad. (U.S. Air Force photo by Glenn S. Robertson)

Asymmetric Core: Axiomatic Instability in a Peer Triad with Regional Nuclear Peripheries

Published June 13, 2026
By AFSTRAT A5

This research applies Cooperative Game Theory to the current strategic environment: a "Peer Triad" of three major nuclear powers and a secondary tier of regional asymmetric players. Utilizing Lindelauf’s (2020) call for an axiomatic foundation of deterrence, the study demonstrates that the presence of asymmetric regional players effectively "empties the Core" of stable nuclear coalitions, making simultaneous, global stability mathematically impossible. References: Lindelauf, R. (2020). Nuclear Deterrence in the Algorithmic Age. Zagare, F. C. (2024). Two Against One: Deterrence in the Triad. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 30(1), 1-25. Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2011). A new model for predicting policy choices: Preliminary tests. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 28(1), 65-87. Capraro, V., et al. (2024). Language-based game theory. Snyder, G. H. (1984). The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.