Mankind Beyond Earth: The History, Science, and Future
        of Human Space Exploration by Claude A. Piantadosi.
        Columbia University Press, 2012, 279 pp.
         
        In Mankind Beyond Earth, Claude A. Piantadosi, MD,
        director of the F. G. Hall Environmental Laboratory at Duke University
        and 30-year consultant to NASA, examines the plausibility of humankind
        living beyond Earth. To that end, Piantadosi states that the purpose
        of the book is to establish evidence supporting a return to the moon.
        While there is no paucity of literature related to space
        exploration’s past and futuristic examinations of life in space,
        Piantadosi’s work is one of the first to ground the argument
        firmly in an extensive body of scientific evidence. Despite heavy
        doses of biology, physics, and chemistry, Piantadosi’s work is
        readily accessible to many readers due to his straightforward
        explanations.
        Given Piantadosi’s overarching thesis that argues for an
        American return to the moon, one might surmise that he would take a
        purely scientific argumentation. Piantadosi surprises the reader. In
        building up to his major proposition, Piantadosi reviews the state of
        US space activity and shows that the technological lead the nation
        once held is quickly eroding. Moreover, he suggests that
        America’s “scientific illiteracy” tends to devalue
        science and results in confusion on how to evaluate new science (p.
        3). This confusion has led, in his opinion, to the expensive detours
        of the 2010 National Space Policy’s asteroid missions (p. 40).
        Furthermore, Piantadosi suggests that such shortsightedness may well
        lead to the United States relinquishing its lead in the space sector
        to the up-and-coming Chinese space program. In fact, he states that if
        the nation continues “busily chasing asteroids” and allows
        the historical trend of space programs to continue, then China will
        likely beat the United States to the moon, where it will develop the
        necessary follow-on technologies to voyage to Mars (p. 205).
        Still, while there is urgency in Piantadosi’s words, he does
        not conflate aimless activity with deliberate, careful planning
        designed to further American space power. To wit, he not only cautions
        against frivolous space excursions but also warns that attempting to
        be the hare in the next space race could prove unbearably expensive.
        Instead, the nation must be the tortoise.
        Throughout the book, Piantadosi balances between highlighting the
        urgency of going to the moon, and eventually Mars, with the reality
        that nothing comes easily in space. In fact, much of the book takes
        great care in making the case for a return to the moon. Piantadosi
        takes the first steps in walking this tightrope in his second chapter,
        where he explains the realities of space and travel within the domain.
        While he acknowledges the usefulness of futuristic thought, he admits
        that there is too much to be accomplished now to spend time dreaming
        of what could one day be (p. 44).
        Chapters 3 and 4 provide an historical overview of
        humankind’s space endeavors and, given the author’s
        medical background, the history of the study of physiology in space.
        Piantadosi uses these two chapters to build the case as to why the
        United States must return to the moon, which he argues in detail in
        chapter 5. Importantly, he does more than merely make the case for a
        return to the moon; he offers ways to do so with current technology
        and lists what would be needed to establish a settlement on the lunar
        surface, which he believes is a requirement for follow-on deep-space
        exploration.
        After offering convincing arguments for returning to the moon,
        Piantadosi spends the next five chapters discussing the challenges of
        deep-space exploration. Whether discussing cosmic radiation in chapter
        9 or the dilemmas of producing sustenance using indigenous resources
        in chapters 6 and 7, Piantadosi methodically works towards the
        culminating point of the book’s second part, which is chapter
        10’s discussion of how humankind will travel to and set foot on
        Mars.
        Such a discussion on the challenges of interplanetary travel leads
        to part 3, where the author argues why the United States
        should travel to Mars. Much of the argument hinges on the
        fact that few other planets provide hospitable environments in which
        explorers could even venture. Indeed, Piantadosi concludes his final
        chapter by hearkening back to John von Neumann. He admits that maybe
        von Neumann was correct in his assessment that the best humanity could
        do to explore outer space was to send robotic probes. To wit, as
        humankind learns more about the cosmos, it has discovered the
        uniqueness of Earth; while there are many potential planets out there,
        so far, few exhibit the qualities of Earth. Many are inhospitable, and
        those that may be friendly to humans are sufficiently far away that
        even relativistic speeds (fractions of the speed of light) make such
        travel essentially improbable due to concerns over resources, genetic
        bottlenecking aboard spacecraft, and myriad other reasons. For that
        reason, Piantadosi states, “Our own uniqueness and space’s
        insuperability are the best incentives we have to take the best
        possible care of Spaceship Earth” (p. 250).
        Overall, this book provides reasonable arguments for an American
        return to the moon and a follow-on mission to Mars. The biggest
        critique of the book is the unstated assumption that the United States
        will go to Mars. In other words, it appears that Piantadosi takes it
        as a foregone conclusion that the United States will attempt to go to
        Mars. That is not to say that he builds a straw man argument for
        returning to the moon. Indeed, his argument for going to the moon is
        compelling based on its merits without the consideration he gives for
        subsequent Martian endeavors. Nevertheless, he never fully questions
        the aim of a US space program. Such a critique has troubled NASA since
        the United States beat the Soviet Union to the moon in 1969. Back
        then, national prestige powered our efforts. Today, it seems (and
        Piantadosi’s arguments support this supposition), the nation
        continues its space program to benefit from the ways that space
        science can be used to detect problems on Earth, and the nation goes
        for pure research (pp. 5–6). In other words, the United States
        continues its largely scientifically focused space program for
        science’s sake. Yet as recently as February 2016, Congress
        questions the “science for science’s sake”
        approach.
        To be fair, Piantadosi does touch on other reasons for returning to
        the moon. Specifically, he discusses the economic potential of mining
        and suggests that economic incentives may be the necessary carrot to
        drive the establishment of a moon settlement (p. 102). He is a medical
        researcher and not an economist; his argument for bolstering the
        American space program may gain more traction when combining
        scientific and commercial reasons for a lunar return. If “flag
        follows trade,” as many scholars have suggested, then it may be
        the merchants who lead the nation to Mars and beyond.
        The student of strategy can take away three points from this book.
        The first two points deal with preparation. First, as Piantadosi
        asserts, space technology requires long lead times. The same might be
        said of war-fighting capabilities. The strategist, therefore, must
        account for those lead times in crafting strategy. As J.F.C. Fuller
        attested, strategy should precede force structure, planning, and
        expenditure. Yet, if technology is the long pole in the tent, the
        strategist must accord proper consideration to its development during
        the formulation of strategy. Second, preparation is also paramount for
        the strategist in another fashion. The strategist cannot simply select
        the strategic conditions that are just right but must prepare for
        those conditions that are wrong (p. 48). Concerning Piantadosi’s
        book and this reviewer’s earlier allusion to economic
        development being the primary driver of future space power
        development, the strategist cannot solely focus on military matters
        but must also have a finger on the pulse of the greater environment in
        which the military operates. Thus, if space development “takes
        off,” then it is reasonable to suggest that the nation will need
        to protect its space merchants. When combining this assertion with the
        first takeaway highlighting technology’s long lead time, one can
        conclude that waiting until the time is right equates to tardiness.
        National defense can ill afford sleeping on the watch.
        Third, Piantadosi’s final observation may prove the most
        relevant for the student of strategy. By reminding the reader that
        careful stewardship of our current planet should out-prioritize
        seeking other planets, Piantadosi highlights the fact that resources
        are neither inexhaustible nor invulnerable. In fact, the National
        Security Strategy and the Air Force Strategic Master Plan espouse
        these ideas. Accordingly, the strategist should consider new ways of
        using the resources one has. One can only build strategy’s
        bridge with the materials available. Game-changing technologies like
        space-based solar power provide one way that the nation can exploit a
        new development. In the same breath, many discuss third offsets and
        game-changing weapons. What if a third offset were, instead, a
        capability that obviated adversary attempts to influence (such as
        petroleum is now) or interfere with (such as they were during
        Operation Enduring Freedom) our resources and their concomitant supply
        chains? Piantadosi does not discuss such ideas, but his ideas lead to
        such extrapolation and discussion. The scientific material found in
        Piantadosi’s work will not appeal to every reader, but because
        he forces the reader to think critically about the nation’s
        space program and because his ideas have basis in strategy writ large,
        this book is highly recommended.
         
        
        Maj Ryan Sanford, USAF