From Dominance to Partnership: U.S. Strategic Interests in Poland and Eastern Europe Published April 13, 2026 By Lt. Col. Sean Kenneth Matthews Poland’s central security challenge is the threat of Russian coercion or military aggression against a frontline NATO state. If the United States fails to defend Poland, it could fracture NATO's credibility and weaken American extended deterrence worldwide. Therefore, the U.S. faces a dual strategic challenge in Poland: deter an increasingly revisionist Russia while sustaining a transatlantic alliance under strain from shifting U.S. priorities, growing European strategic autonomy, a dearth of leadership, and rising political tensions between Poland and the European Union (EU).[1] Russia’s war in Ukraine and consistent hybrid, or “grey zone attacks on NATO nations have cemented confrontation with the West as a defining feature of its political system, while simultaneously accelerating European defense investment and raising questions about long-term U.S. commitment.[2] At the same time, internal dynamics within Poland, particularly nationalism, democratic backsliding, and unresolved identity tensions, create vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit.[3] To secure U.S. interests in Poland and Eastern Europe as a whole, the United States must transition from a model of dominance to one of competitive partnership, strengthening military deterrence, enabling allied capacity, and shaping political and economic conditions that reduce opportunities for Russian influence while sustaining democratic resilience. Background Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine marked a structural shift in Western-Russian relations. Confrontation is no longer situational but systemic.[4] The Kremlin has institutionalized anti-Western narratives, domestic repression, and strategic alignment with China, making traditional assumptions about Russian reintegration largely unrealistic.[5] Even if active hostilities subside, Russia will remain a long-term competitor committed to fracturing NATO and undermining democratic systems across Eastern Europe. The conflict has also demonstrated that Russia consistently leverages ethnic minority politics as a pretext for intervention, a pattern unlikely to diminish regardless of the conflict's outcome.[6] Eastern Europe's post-communist political development compounds these challenges. Rapid transitions away from communism produced uneven democratic consolidation and persistent susceptibility to populism, while nationalism continues to function as a force capable of reinforcing either democratic resilience or authoritarian drift.[7] Poland illustrates this tension clearly. It is simultaneously one of NATO's most significant military contributors and an example of "illiberal democracy," marked by the erosion of independent judicial oversight and institutional checks on executive power. Such contradictions are not unique to Poland, and they create openings for adversarial actors to exploit internal divisions wherever governance is weak or political legitimacy is contested.[8] For example, Russia has worked to exploit Polish identity politics by forcing the illegal immigration of Middle Eastern and African migrants through the Belarus border.[9] The tactic to attack Poland’s stance on illegal immigration is designed to form a wedge between them and the EU and divide the country internally between liberal and conservative ideologies. In addition, Russia has sought to test Polish and EU political resolve by conducting cyberattacks on their infrastructure.[10] NATO is reconfiguring. The United States no longer occupies a position of uncontested alliance leadership, driven by both international structural changes and shifting domestic priorities. In response, European states have grown more serious about strategic autonomy.[11] A good example of this phenomenon is the implementation of the Security Action for Europe, or SAFE, Act.[12] This act provides billions of dollars in loans to member states for defense spending, which must be spent primarily within the EU.[13] This creates a central paradox: Europe is becoming more capable as a security actor, yet the political alignment underpinning the post-World-War II transatlantic relationship is under strain. Broader skepticism in U.S. foreign policy toward multilateral alliances is accelerating the erosion of American influence and the liberal international order it helped construct, leaving a partnership that is simultaneously more self-sufficient and less certain in its long-term coherence.[14] Recommendations The United States must reorient its European military posture around four interdependent strategic imperatives. First, the Department of War (DOW) should transition from a forward dominance model to a distributed deterrence framework, emphasizing prepositioned equipment, rotational forces, joint exercises, integrated NATO command-and-control structures with expanded European operational responsibility, and multi-domain capabilities spanning cyber, ISR, and long-range fires. This shift sustains credible deterrence while reducing strategic overextension.[15] Second, the U.S. Commander in Chief, through the National Security Strategy (NSS), should designate Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, as the decisive theater of NATO deterrence. Achieving this requires expanded joint exercises focused on rapid reinforcement, deeper integration of air and missile defense across eastern member states and strengthened logistics corridors from Western Europe to the flank states bordering Russia. Poland's history as a “model ally,” growing military capacity, and geographic centrality position it as the natural hub of this effort.[16] Third, the United States Department of State (DOS) should actively enable European military autonomy while deliberately shaping its trajectory. Co-developing defense systems to preserve interoperability, tying incentives to frameworks that will work with the entire NATO force rather than independent structures, and aligning European procurement with U.S. standards through security cooperation funding will prevent a scenario in which Europe grows strategically stronger but divergent. Poland is leading the way here as one of the largest purchasers of U.S. weapons systems, and by ensuring that its local defense industrial base develops systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from WB Group, that are compatible across NATO.[17] Finally, American military planning must reflect on the geographic implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, putting its mainland right up against Poland’s border. This is of grave concern to Polish military planners.[18] The DOW and American lawmakers must plan to sustain support to Ukraine as a forward defense player, investing in counter-hybrid capabilities, including cyber defense and information operations, and preserving escalation management options to deter horizontal expansion. Together, these recommendations constitute a coherent strategic architecture, one that distributes the burden of deterrence without ceding American influence over its execution. Additionally, an effective U.S. DOS strategy in Poland and greater Eastern Europe requires a comprehensive interagency and coalition-based approach that extends beyond conventional military instruments. Addressing the region's political vulnerabilities demands sustained investment in rule-of-law institutions, independent media, and anti-corruption measures, as internal fractures rooted in elite capture and ethnic nationalism remain among the most exploitable weaknesses that adversarial powers leverage.[19] Complementing these governance efforts, interagency coordination should prioritize energy diversification, strategic communications, and investment in digital infrastructure to systematically erode Russian economic and informational influence, recognizing that economic security and national security are functionally inseparable in this operational environment.[20] At the alliance level, the United States must reconcile its strategic posture with the emerging realities of a multipolar order: rather than anchoring regional security to U.S.-centric frameworks, Washington should empower European leadership, cultivate flexible coalitions across NATO and EU structures, and accept a more distributed burden-sharing architecture in which cooperation is sustained even absent dominant American leadership.[21] This coalition-building imperative must nonetheless be calibrated to the distinct strategic value of individual partner states.[22] For example, Poland serves as the region's primary military hub and a growing economic and political anchor, while Germany provides the industrial and logistical backbone essential to sustained European defense.[23] Tailored bilateral engagement with each of these partners, rather than uniform NATO-wide policy, maximizes strategic effectiveness and reinforces the layered, resilient security architecture that enduring regional stability demands.[24] Conclusion The United States is entering a new era in Eastern Europe, one defined not by uncontested leadership but by competition, uncertainty, and shared responsibility. Russia will remain a long-term adversary. They’ll continue exploiting political divisions and systematically challenging the regional security order, while a more capable and increasingly autonomous Europe compels Washington to fundamentally reconsider its strategic role. This evolving landscape demands a deliberate transition across three dimensions: from dominance to partnership, from unilateral reassurance to shared deterrence, and from direct control to sustained influence. Successfully navigating these shifts requires the United States to simultaneously strengthen deterrence, empower allied capabilities, and reinforce democratic resilience among partner nations. Should Washington achieve this balance, it can preserve both its strategic position in Eastern Europe and the broader foundations of the transatlantic alliance. Failure to do so, however, risks eroding allied cohesion and creating a more permissive environment for adversarial actors. The path forward is neither retrenchment nor the perpetuation of Cold War-era dominance, but rather an adaptive posture that embraces shared responsibility as the cornerstone of durable, collective security. Lieutenant Colonel Sean K. “Pub” Matthews is a resident student at Air War College, Air University. He is a command pilot with more than 4,000 flight hours in the C-17, MQ-1, and MQ-9 and has served in operational, instructional, and command roles across the active-duty Air Force and Reserve, most recently as commander of the 429th Attack Squadron. He earned his B.S. from the U.S. Air Force Academy and his M.B.A. from Trident University International. This research was part of the AY26 Air War College Regional Security Studies Field Study. [1] “National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland,” 2020, 6; John R. Deni, "Washington's Expectations, American Strategy, and Germany's Role," in Assessing the Zeitenwende: Implications for Germany, the United States, and Transatlantic Security, ed. by John R. Deni and Jeffrey D. Rathke (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2025), 18; Celeste A. Wallander, “Beware the Europe You Wish For,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2025, Vol 104, no. 4, 24; Wolfgang Ischinger, “Europe’s Moment of Truth,” Foreign Affairs, March 2, 2025, 4; “Expeditionary Culture Field Guide: Poland,” AFCLC, 56. [2] Alexander Gabuev, “The Russia That Putin Made,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2025, Vol 104, #4, 40; Deni, “Assessing the Zeitenwende,” 43; Ischinger, “Europe’s Moment of Truth,” 3. [3] “Integrated Country Strategy: Poland,” U.S. Department of State, June 13, 2022, 4; Zsuzsa Csergo et al., Central & East European Politics Changes and Challenges, Fifth Edition, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022), 305; Jakub Romaniuk, “Different Shades of Democracy: The Political Landscape in Poland after the Presidential Election,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 14, 2025, 14; “Integrated Country Strategy: Poland,” 28. [4] Deni, “Assessing the Zeitenwende,” 18. [5] Gabuev, “The Russia That Putin Made,” 40; Angela Stent, Putin’s World Russia Against the West and With the Rest, (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2019), 6. [6] Anna Batta, The Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics Secession, Integration, and Homeland (New York: Routledge, 2022), 9. [7] Csergo et al., Central & East European Politics, Chapter 4 “Nationalism and Its Challenges to Democratic Governance.” [8] Krystyna Marcinek and Scott Boston, “Polish Armed Forces Modernization A New Cornerstone of European Security,” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2025), vi; Csergo et al., Central & East European Politics, 305. [9] Briefing from the Base Commander, Lask Air Base, Poland, March 4th, 2026. [10] Ibid. [11] Justyna Gotkowska, “A Strategy for Europe from National Perspectives: Poland,” DGAP Memo, German Council on Foreign Relations, March 2025, 2. [12] Briefing from Polish Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, Poland, March 3rd, 2026. [13] Ibid. [14] “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House, November 2025, 9. [15] Briefing from Polish Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, Poland, March 3rd, 2026. They emphasized the importance of joint exercises and consistent forward rotational presence to deter Russian aggression. [16] Briefing from U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, March 3rd, 2026. Briefers stated Poland was a “Model Ally.” [17] Brief from U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, March 3rd, 2026; WB Group VP Brief, Warsaw, Poland, March 5th, 2026. [18] Briefing from the Base Commander, Lask Air Base, Poland, March 4th, 2026. [19] “Integrated Country Strategy: Poland,” U.S. Department of State, June 13, 2022, 6-7. [20] “National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland,” 2020, 34. [21] “National Security Strategy of the United States", The White House, Washington DC, November 2025, 12. [22] Ibid., 1. [23] Krystyna Marcinek and Scott Boston, “Polish Armed Forces Modernization,” 1; Deni, “Assessing the Zeitenwende,” 4. [24] Government Resolution 1163/2020 on Hungary’s National Security Strategy, Magyar Kozlony, June 21, 2021, 18.