Enhancing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Nuclear Integration and U.S. Strategic Posture in Poland Published May 13, 2026 By Lt. Col. Jonathan F. Vogel (AWC) Background The bloody war in Ukraine and Russian nuclear saber rattling are driving Europe to re-examine its nuclear options. Poland, poignantly aware of its position on NATO’s eastern flank, is a leading advocate for expanded nuclear assurances and capabilities that could deter Russian aggression.[1] Representatives of the Polish MoD consider themselves already engaged in hybrid warfare with the Russians and treat escalation to full conflict as almost an inevitability.[2] Alarmingly, Moscow has positioned nuclear warheads in neighboring Belarus and Kaliningrad, placing every major Polish military installation within range of short-notice strikes.[3] The Poles have asked their allies, especially the U.S., for additional military support and capabilities that might constrain Russian military options and deter further aggressiveness. Poland’s predicament must be understood within U.S. extended deterrence and non-proliferation policy. Since the Cold War, the United States has extended its nuclear umbrella to allies to reduce the incentive for independent nuclear acquisition. That bargain anchored the NPT for over five decades. As Bradley argues, “A key driver for providing a nuclear umbrella for allies was to reduce the necessity for them to develop their own nuclear capabilities to meet their security needs,” enabling allies to “forgo their nuclear ambitions and accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nonnuclear states.”[4] Critically, assurance is not simply a byproduct of deterrence, it is a distinct strategic imperative. Stover defines assurance as “the process and product of actions taken to enhance an Ally’s or partner’s confidence in securities provided through the capability and will of the US government,” assessed primarily from the perspective of the assured.[5] Forward presence and power projection transform policy words into credible deeds. Bradley notes that Cold War extended deterrence “was made credible by forward-deploying nuclear weapons into Europe and the Pacific,” and that post–Cold War retraction now demands “renewed focus on ensuring the credibility of extended deterrence.”[6] Poland’s case is the sharpest expression of a systemic assurance gap that risks fracturing the non-proliferation construct. At this crucial moment, a crisis of trust has emerged among Polish elites regarding the long-term reliability of U.S. security guarantees. Rhetoric from U.S. politicians questioning NATO’s relevance and associated Article 5 obligations has left Warsaw concerned that American military support during a crisis in Europe might be unreliable, to include the nuclear umbrella once considered sacrosanct.[7] This has prompted a rare bipartisan consensus between the liberal coalition of Donald Tusk and the conservative opposition that conventional weapons alone are insufficient for Poland’s survival.[8] Concurrently, Poland is at unique cross-roads that offers a path to nuclear weapons. Acquisition of F-35A fighters, advanced battle management systems, and support infrastructure makes Polish participation in NATO’s nuclear mission practicable for the first time since it joined the alliance in 1999. Accordingly, Poland is exploring mechanisms by which it might leverage this latent nuclear compatibility, to include NATO weapon-sharing, European-led initiatives, and even independent acquisition of weapons. There is significant risk to U.S. national security interests herein. If U.S. security guarantees and its nuclear umbrella are perceived as unreliable, Poland’s advocacy for European or independently derived alternatives could fracture NATO cohesion, establishing a nuclear-haves and have-nots divide that impugns collective security. Furthermore, a Poland armed with nuclear weapons outside of American control would establish a precedent for proliferation among non-nuclear allies. That has the potential to undermine U.S. leadership, sap American coercive power, and make regional conflicts more likely to escalate to the nuclear level as control of weapons is disaggregated amongst a number of independent players. Military Recommendations The following recommendations are tailored for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reorganize the U.S. and NATO posture to establish effective deterrence on Europe’s eastern flank, assure allies, and avoid a regional arms race. Authorize Nuclear Certification and Weapon Sharing The JCS should recommend certification of the Polish F-35A fleet to deliver nuclear weapons. Currently, NATO nuclear sharing is restricted to five states; extending this to Poland recognizes its status as the exemplar ally it aspires to be.[9] Rather than permanent warhead storage, the U.S. should establish weapon sharing during conflict protocols.[10] This involves utilizing Polish bases as Dispersed Operating Bases (DOBs) where nuclear weapons can be rapidly transferred from existing European hubs during the pre-kinetic phase of a crisis. This complicates Russian targeting immensely, presenting additional attack vectors while acting as a visible expression of American commitment to defending Polish soil. It capitalizes on Warsaw’s investments in American technology, provides additional escalation and messaging options, and signals deep American commitment to Polish security. Operationalizing nuclear sharing with Poland demands enabling investments beyond aircraft certification. Polish dispersal bases require hardened Weapons Storage and Security Systems (WS3), NC3 connectivity to ensure Presidential release authority reaches forward-deployed assets, and Polish Air Force personnel certified in nuclear weapons loading and handling to NATO standards. The U.S. must also station dedicated personnel to maintain custody, security, and technical oversight of weapons. An available complementary pathway is expanded nuclear burden sharing short of delivery capability. Poland could openly participate in Conventional Support of Nuclear Operations (CSNO) exercises such as Steadfast Noon before full certification is achieved. Bradley observes that allies must be “actively involved in decisions affecting their security” through enhanced consultative mechanisms that increase “nuclear dialogue, information-sharing, and strategic planning.”[11] Stover frames burden sharing as central to effective assurance: “Only when a state has ‘skin in the game’ will it be fully committed to an assurance relationship.”[12] Publicly communicating Polish CSNO participation would demonstrate Warsaw’s integration into NATO’s nuclear mission, enhancing deterrent credibility while building the institutional foundation for eventual full certification. Expand Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) To offset Russian tactical nuclear superiority, the JCS must prioritize the deployment of next-generation missile-defense technology to Poland. The Polish Air Force is the first foreign customer for IBCS, which offers seamless interoperability with U.S. forces.[13] However, Poland lacks interceptor magazine depth and high-end defenses against Russian hypersonic and ballistic missile threats.[14] The JCS should recommend deployment of additional U.S.-manned Patriot batteries to Poland and the integration of THAAD systems into the Polish IBCS network. Additionally, the JCS should recommend deployment and sale of emerging capabilities like directed energy weapons developed as part of the Golden Dome program. These systems could exponentially increase Poland’s resilience against Russian missile and air attacks versus traditional interceptors.[15] This initiative seeks to deny Russia the ability to operate in or through Polish airspace, confounding conventional or hybrid air operations while making a limited Russian tactical nuclear strike impossible without overcoming deep-layered defenses. Reposition Tactical Air Forces from Germany to Poland The JCS should pursue a phased rebasing of U.S. tactical fighter assets from Germany to Polish airbases while retaining logistics, airlift, and command-and-control elements at their current German installations. This distinction is critical: Germany’s central European location and mature infrastructure make it the natural hub for sustainment and C2 functions, whereas Poland’s proximity to the threat demands forward-postured fighter forces. An initial rotational fighter presence at Łask or Powidz transitions to permanent stationing as Polish infrastructure matures. Each phase serves as a distinct strategic signal wherein rotation announces intent while permanent basing confirms resolve. As Stover argues, the decision to posture forces overseas “provides a crystal-clear signal about the importance of the inter-state relationship.”[16] Moving fighter assets closer to the border provides immediate response capability and ensures that a Russian strike on Poland would automatically involve U.S. forces, reinforcing Article 5 commitments. Permanent stationing supports rapid training of Polish crews into Western operational culture and would resolve challenges in Polish combat readiness, integration, and personnel retention.[17] Moreover, expanding infrastructure and support at these bases would permit hosting other powerful units, like Strategic Bomber Task Forces, that could be deployed for extended operations in Poland. This effort would significantly improve American operational capacity on Europe’s eastern flank, provide enhanced strategic signaling options, and constitute a compelling assurance of American resolve. Interagency and Partner Initiatives These initiatives require leveraging diplomatic, legal, and financial authorities external to the DoD to ensure Poland’s defense is sustainable and integrated. The U.S. National Security Council would be responsible for developing policy and directing coordination for implementation of weapons sharing with Poland. Expanding NATO’s nuclear posture into Poland must contend with the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, in which the Alliance declared that it would not extend nuclear weapons to new members. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered the strategic context, but the policy has not been formally rescinded and remains a reference point in Alliance deliberations. Reinterpretation requires consensus across all thirty-two members; a heavy diplomatic lift demanding extensive CHOD-level engagement. The Department of State (DoS) must lead consultations with NATO allies through the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) to reinterpret the Founding Act, ensuring that dispersal protocols to Polish DOBs do not violate the spirit of existing agreements.[18] The dispersal-during-crisis model in part 2 offers at least a temporary workaround. Polish fighters deploying to existing NATO bases to arm, or weapons transferring forward only during a confirmed pre-kinetic crisis, may be framed as consistent with the Founding Act’s peacetime intent. This line of effort must also include the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration to certify technical safety and transfer logistics for warheads.[19] This is a critical facet of the strategy from a political perspective. Maintaining U.S. custody until kinetic escalation mitigates proliferation risks while directly addressing the nervousness of Polish leadership regarding the reliability of the U.S. defensive umbrella. In conjunction with deployment of American owned and operated systems, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) should expand Golden Dome initiatives to integrate critical missile defense technologies within the Polish Air Force. DSCA must work with the Department of Commerce to prioritize export licenses for components such as THAAD interceptors, advanced radars, and cutting edge systems like high energy lasers.[20] Furthermore, the Treasury Department should explore allocating additional Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to subsidize Polish acquisitions.[21] While the U.S. already extends $15 billion in defense financing to Poland, this initiative deepens engagement with Warsaw and ensures that Poland maintains long-term, binding contracts for U.S. equipment.[22] The U.S. Defense Attache Office MILGROUP in Warsaw must oversee Polish investments in the infrastructure to permanently bed-down American tactical air forces at Łask and Powidz airbases.[23] MILGROUP advisors should guide construction of hardened aircraft shelters, specialized munitions storage, and runway extensions to meet U.S. Air Force operational requirements.[24] Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security’s Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency should engage to assess and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities in new facilities, ensuring they are resilient against current and future Russian hybrid threats.[25] NATO writ-large should support these initiatives through burden-sharing and political endorsement. As nuclear-sharing states, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Turkey, and the Netherlands should enable Poland’s certification through the NPG. The UK and France should be encouraged to maintain their nuclear arsenals at current levels and in a stable posture to avoid proliferation or messaging independent of U.S. influence. As France has remained particularly aloof from NATO nuclear planning and constraints, Poland should eschew President Macron’s recently announced “advanced nuclear deterrence” in favor of embracing stable, predictable American-backed weapons sharing.[26] The Baltic states should invest in American IAMD capabilities and systems that tie into those being deployed in Poland to broaden defensive depth across Eastern Europe. Germany should endorse a phased transfer of American tactical fighter assets to Poland while U.S. logistics, airlift, and C2 elements remain on German soil. This preserves a substantial American footprint that signals continued solidarity with Berlin. A complete withdrawal risks being misread as disengagement from Western Europe. Ramp space and infrastructure freed by departing fighter units should be repurposed for new Bundeswehr conventional capabilities acquired via “Zeitwende” initiatives, strengthening Germany’s own defense posture in parallel.[27] This approach converts a potential zero-sum redeployment into positive-sum reinforcement across NATO’s central and eastern European posture. Conclusion The United States stands at a decisive point on NATO’s eastern flank. Russia’s nuclear posturing in Belarus and Kaliningrad, combined with Poland’s rapid conventional modernization and deepening concerns about American military commitments, has created a narrow window in which Warsaw could pursue Euro-centric or independent nuclear options. If the U.S. does not act, it risks a fracturing Europe in which current non-nuclear states seek their own deterrents, proliferation norms erode, and American strategic influence diminishes at the very moment it is most desirable. By integrating the Polish F-35 fleet into nuclear operations, expanding layered, integrated air and missile defense across Poland, and establishing a permanent U.S. tactical air presence at Łask and Powidz, the JCS can deliver a coherent, visible, and credible response. Forward-deployed forces, shared nuclear responsibilities, and layered defenses place significant American skin in the game, preserving both U.S. custody of weapons and Alliance cohesion. They transform Poland from a vulnerable frontline state into a fortified pillar of collective defense, deter Russian adventurism, and close the assurance gap that currently tempts independent proliferation. Executed together, these recommendations reinforce NATO’s deterrent posture, uphold the non-proliferation bargain that has served U.S. interests for decades, and demonstrate to both allies and adversaries that American leadership in Europe remains resolute. Decisive action now will secure the eastern flank, preserve Alliance unity, and safeguard American security for the next decade and beyond. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan F. Vogel is an Air University Fellow and student at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL. During his Fellowship, he instructed students and conducted research in leadership, airpower strategy, innovation, contemporary operations planning, emerging technologies, and artificial intelligence. Lt Col Vogel received his commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps after graduating from Carnegie Mellon University in 2006. He has completed staff tours at Headquarters Air Force as the Chief of Combat Air Force O-6 Assignments, and as the Branch Chief for Battlespace Awareness and C2 at Air Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (AFTENCAP). He has deployed in support of operations ENDURING FREEDOM, INHERENT RESOLVE, and FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. Prior to this assignment, Lieutenant Colonel Vogel served as the 36th Operations Support Squadron Commander, Andersen AFB, Guam where he was responsible for flight operations at INDOPACOM's largest fighter, bomber, tanker, and airlift base supporting 16,000 sorties per year. Additionally, he led the Wing's JADC2 modernization efforts, oversaw Agile Combat Employment and Operations Plan readiness, and managed the Wing's intelligence enterprise. Lt Col Vogel is Command Pilot with more than 3000 hours in the B-1B, T-38C, and T-6A, to include 900 combat hours. He holds a Bachelor of Science from Carnegie Mellon University, Master of Arts from American Military University, Master of Technology and Strategy Integration from Air University, and a certificate in Artificial Intelligence Product Design from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [1] International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Poland’s bid to participate in NATO nuclear sharing," Strategic Comments 29, no. 26 (September 2023): 1. [2] Hybrid Warfare Official, Polish Ministry of Defense, interview by the author, Warsaw, Poland, March 3, 2026. [3] International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Poland’s bid,” 3. [4] Jennifer Bradley, “Preventing the Nuclear Jungle: Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Nonproliferation,” Joint Force Quarterly 112, 1st Quarter 2024, 72–73. [5] Luke R. Stover, “Effective Assurance: A Strategic Imperative,” Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower 3, no. 2 (Summer 2024), 75. [6] Bradley, “Preventing the Nuclear Jungle,” 71. [7] Florence Gaub and Stefan Mair, "Europe’s Bad Nuclear Options: And Why They May Be the Only Path to Security," Foreign Affairs 104, no. 4 (July/August 2025): 41. [8] Krystyna Marcinek and Scott Boston, Polish Armed Forces Modernization: A New Cornerstone of European Security? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025), vi. [9] William Courtney, "Instead of Nuclear Weapons, Give Poland a Nuclear Umbrella," RAND Research & Commentary, June 9, 2025, 5. [10] International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Poland’s bid,” 3. [11] Bradley, “Preventing the Nuclear Jungle,” 74. [12] Stover, “Effective Assurance,” 80. [13] ODC MILGROUP Rep, U.S. Embassy in Poland, interview by the author, Warsaw, Poland, March 3, 2026. [14] Marcinek and Boston, Polish Armed Forces Modernization, 48. [15] Alex Alaniz, "Directed Energy in Air Base Defense Can Save the Arsenal," National Defense, August 11, 2025, 14. [16] Stover, “Effective Assurance,” 80–81. [17] Commander, Lask Air Base, Polish Air Force, interview by the author, Lask, Poland, March 4, 2026. [18] Courtney, "Instead of Nuclear Weapons,” 8. [19] International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Poland’s bid,” 6. [20] Marcinek and Boston, Polish Armed Forces Modernization, 48. [21] Ibid, 44. [22] ODC MILGROUP Rep, U.S. Embassy in Poland, interview by the author, Warsaw, Poland, March 3, 2026. [23] International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Poland’s bid,” 7. [24] Marcinek and Boston, Polish Armed Forces Modernization, 47. [25] National Security Bureau, National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw: Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2020), 21. [26] Astrid Chevreuil, “Macron’s Île-Longue Speech: Updating France’s Nuclear Doctrine for a New Era,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 4, 2026, [27] Fabian Hoffmann, "The Future of the Zeitenwende: Scenario 5-Poland Becomes a Nuclear Power," Internationale Politik Quarterly, January 29, 2024, 21-22.