Golden Dome's Innermost Layer: Low-Tech, Close-In Defense for the Small Drone Threat Published June 17, 2026 By Maj. Charles "Bull" Burgess, USAF Shooting Team A New Character of Warfare Battlefield tactics have evolved since the Russian Federation’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Early war, with neither side being able to establish air superiority and the limited availability of effective stand-off weapons and available tactical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), spurred the battlefield introduction of a new weapon: the small Unmanned Aerial System (s-UAS). Since their introduction, videos have proliferated online showing small drones chasing Russian soldiers and destroying emplacements and armored vehicles. The March 20, 2025, drone attack on Belaya Air Base left no doubt as to their capabilities. With no warning, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) delivered strategic-level effects, striking nuclear-capable Tu-95 bombers over 4,000 kilometers from the front lines with 117 small drones.[1] A determined adversary could easily conduct a similar strike anywhere in the US without effective C-sUAS capabilities, potentially holding critical infrastructure, launch facilities, and strategic assets at risk. s-UAS platforms are being employed for a variety of missions with diverse munitions given their high loiter time, high-definition cameras, and small size have made these drones ideal for scouting, reconnaissance, and artillery spotting while keeping the observer safe from enemy fire. These traits also make them ideal for carrying small payloads for attacks on personnel and vehicles. Early in the conflict, rudimentary release systems were included to drop hand grenades and other explosives on trench lines and into open vehicle hatches. As the conflict progressed, anti-tank warheads from shoulder-fired weapons were mounted underneath the drones to turn them into miniature quasi-cruise missiles. The wide proliferation of anti-shaped-charge cages on tanks attest to the effectiveness of these drones despite their miniscule payloads. Ukraine’s Chairman of the Defense and Intelligence Committee reported that s-UAS and other uncrewed aerial platforms have accounted for about 70% of all Russian and Ukrainian casualties.[2] The use of s-UAS platforms has spread beyond formal battlefields. Narco-terrorist organizations have adopted FPV drone tactics from Ukraine for their own operations. The Atlantic Council highlights this trend, stating, “There are already signs that cartels are adapting their FPV tactics... In their long-running arms race, the Sinaloa cartel and the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación are reportedly testing FPVs... eerily echoing the battlefield adaptations of Russian and Ukrainian forces.”[3] The remote command signal required to pilot s-UASs presents a key vulnerability to their capabilities. However, this is not a simple solution. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces use electronic warfare (EW) systems to counter s-UASs, but jamming requires knowing the correct frequencies to target, which can be easy enough with jury-rigged commercial drones, but purpose-built drones with frequency hopping command signals become more difficult without barrage jamming. Furthermore, power requirements tie the systems to fixed emplacements or vehicles leaving detached infantry patrols vulnerable. Additionally, drones are evolving to counter EW measures. A new threat is the fiber-optic guided FPV drone. This s-UAS uses a 10-kilometer-long (or longer) fiber optic cable to transmit signals. Despite its limited range and fragile tether, its increased video fidelity and immunity to EW have proven lethal. The fiber-optic cable provides drones reduced latency, higher resolution cameras, and increased flight control responsiveness. Additionally, these drones can fly where radio-controlled models cannot. CEO of Ukraine’s 3DTech, Oleksiy Zhulinskiy, says, “Fiber optic communication lets drones operate in environments where radio signals don’t penetrate-lowlands, enclosed spaces. On the battlefield, this has shown great effectiveness: we have confirmed targets in closed spaces, bunkers, or areas with poor radio visibility like dense forests.”[4] The danger of these drones is highlighted in videos showing them navigating under anti-drone nets and through obstacles to destroy infantry dugouts.[5] Faced with drones that EW cannot repel, Ukrainian and Russian forces have turned to an old technology—the shotgun. However, without formal training, this success is isolated and depended on individual talent rather than institutional skill. Recognizing this, the Ukrainians have since created a training program, providing soldiers with shotguns to teach them the fundamentals of engaging flying targets.[6] As demonstrated in Ukraine, shotguns provide an ideal, flexible kinetic-kill capability for close-in defense. While systems like the Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) are effective, they are designed for fixed sites and lack tactical flexibility. Their long range also increases the risk of collateral damage when rounds miss, a significant concern for stateside bases near civilian infrastructure. In contrast, shotguns are man-portable, allowing a defender to respond to threats anywhere on a base. This flexibility is evident in footage from Ukraine showing shotgun armed soldiers providing effective close-in defense on foot, mounted in vehicles, and in patrol boats. Crucially, shotshell ammunition loses momentum quickly, with stray pellets typically falling harmlessly. While it’s limited to a range of 50-100 meters, the shotgun is perfectly suited for this role. The low flight altitude and fragility of s-UAS platforms allow an Airman to shoot down drones with minimal risk to civilians, aircraft, or base infrastructure. Critically, shotguns and training ammunition are already in inventory and cost a fraction of major weapon systems. The only missing element, however, is training. Without it, the shotgun remains a tool of potential rather than a ready capability. The White House's Golden Dome initiative seeks to defend America against advanced aerial threats like drones. Within this framework, properly trained Airmen armed with shotguns can form the critical innermost layer of a base's defense-in-depth. Current Air Force shotgun training consists mostly of weapon familiarization and firing at static ground targets, a methodology completely unsuited for engaging small, fast-moving aerial targets. Fortunately, Air Force history provides a proven solution: clay target sports. Clay Pigeons and Flying Fortresses The Air Force has a long history of using clay target shooting to train aircrews and anti-aircraft gunners, a practice dating back to the dawn of military aviation. As early as World War I, military aviation pioneers recognized the challenge of hitting fast-moving aerial targets. Gunnery training included skeet shooting to teach pilots and gunners the fundamentals needed to combat the Fokker scourge. After the war, however, training resources disappeared during the force drawdown. Funding for clay target ammunition was eliminated, leaving only basic qualification training for aircrews. General Curtis LeMay described a bleak training environment for bomber gunnery in the inter-war years. When discussing crews’ readiness for World War II, he said, “Another weakness of ours right from the start was our terrible gunnery... Gunnery was pretty low on the totem pole in peacetime. You could never get enough ammunition.”[7] This sentiment reflected a training environment that was rudimentary and based more on theory than practice. When describing the state of training, it consisted of “ground instruction which comprised nomenclature, stripping and assembling of guns, range practice, and lectures on sights” followed by flying training with a camera gun, and prior to 1941 there were no specialized flexible gunnery schools.[8] Frustrated by this inaction, LeMay took matters into his own hands, and gathered all remaining ammunition for a demonstration. First, he had his crews establish a baseline by completing the standard aerial gunnery course. After his Airmen expended all the shotgun ammunition at the skeet field, they re-attempted the course. According to LeMay, “they increased their scores by 300 percent.” Despite this dramatic improvement, the peacetime Air Corps remained unmoved and refused to reinstate funding for training ammunition. LeMay lamented, “Our gunnery was terrible. We had no airplanes to train with, and nobody knew how to shoot well enough to train our people. We were just terrible.”[9] The impact of this lack of training was felt acutely during the daylight bombing campaigns of early World War II. During the European campaigns, the 8th Air Force, tasked with destroying the German war machine, lost more than 26,000 Airmen, largely to enemy aircraft. In 1942, then-Colonel LeMay and other bomber commanders raised the issue with the chain of command and the gunnery school, but to no avail. Skeet shooting was criticized by some instructors at the flexible gunnery training schools and preferred moving-base shotgun training for ground familiarization. The primary point of contention was that stationary firing did not teach deflection involved with a moving shooting platform taught in Waller and Jam Hendy Trainers. As loses mounted, the considerable furor from bomber commanders became impossible to ignore. In response, gunnery school leadership decided to investigate the complaints firsthand. LeMay recalled, “We raised such a fuss about it... that the commanders at the six or seven AAF gunnery schools were sent over to see what all the fuss was about. We sent all of them out on a combat mission, and on their first mission four of them got shot down. That emphasized our point.”6 After becoming Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General LeMay continued his mission to ensure the USAF had the best gunners in the world. He established the Air Force Marksmanship School after a sobering incident at Kimpo Air Base during the Korean War revealed critical training gaps: he saw the bodies of Airmen who had tried to fit 1911 handgun magazines into their M1 carbines in combat.[10] In addition to the school, he ordered every Air Force base to field a five-man skeet team. These teams were to compete at base and national levels to maintain a core of excellence in aerial gunnery. Tragically, this commitment did not outlast his tenure. Not long after Gen LeMay’s retirement, the USAF shut down the Marksmanship School as part of budget cuts, and support for the shooting teams and facilities subsequently dwindled. Relearning the Lessons Today, the bomber gunnery school is a distant memory, and most recreational skeet and trap fields on military installations have been decommissioned. While the threat has evolved from Messerschmitts to drones, the fundamental principles of aerial gunnery remain unchanged. Crucially, the old doctrinal argument against stationary shooting is now moot. Unlike the bomber gunners of the past, firing from a stationary position most replicates the types of engagements Airmen will face when countering drones, making clay shooting sports an ideal training analog, not a flawed one. Hitting a flying target requires two key elements. The first principle is lead (i.e. the distance one must shoot ahead of the target). This skillset is drastically different than shooting at static or slow-moving ground targets, marking a fundamental shift in approach. The shooter, in effect, must fire where the target will be, not where it currently is. This requires a "both-eyes-open, heads-up" technique, where the shooter maintains focus on the target while intuitively swinging the weapon to apply correct lead while maintaining lead or pulling through the target. The second element is delivering a sufficient volume of projectiles to the target. Traditional, aircraft cannons and anti-aircraft artillery achieve this with multiple guns or high cyclic rates to maximize the number of projectiles sent toward a target, increasing the probability of a hit. The shotgun, however, accomplishes this with a single trigger pull, spreading dozens of pellets towards the target. While a rifleman could fire a similar number of projectiles in a burst over several seconds, a shotgun allows a defender to do so instantly. However, simply handing an Airman or Guardian a standard-issue shotgun is not enough. To be effective in the C-sUAS role, the weapon system must be optimized. Weapon success in aerial shooting depends on two key factors: range and pattern density (which is the concentration of the shot pattern at a given distance). These factors can be controlled with a combination of barrel configuration, choke selection, and ammunition choice. Barrel length is the first consideration. To a point, longer barrels provide extended range retaining propellant gases longer, providing an extended period of acceleration for the shot column. Secondly, lengthened forcing cones, a common competition shooting modification and key feature of Benelli’s counter-drone shotguns, provides a smoother transition from the chamber to the bore, resulting in less pellet deformation and resistance when traveling down the barrel. The reduced deformation and uniform pressure curve aids in improving shot patterns by reducing stray pellets, directly increasing pattern density at range. The most critical factor for controlling pattern density is the choke, which is a constriction of the bore at the muzzle enabling control of pattern spread over distance. Modern shotguns offer interchangeable choke tubes which allow a shooter to tailor the size of their pattern for different engagement distances and ammunition types. This presents a challenge, as most combat shotguns currently in inventory are equipped with fixed, cylinder-bore chokes (no constriction). Constriction can be added, however, by swapping barrels with threads for chokes, cutting threads for existing barrels, or adding external choke devices. Because most shotgun barrels are user-changeable, modification is simple, rapid, and can be performed at the unit level. Ammunition selection is crucial for providing optimal damage for downing drones. The ideal cartridge must maintain velocity at long range, dense and hard enough to damage electronics and control surfaces, and numerous enough shot to create a dense pattern. To meet these requirements, companies like Norma have developed and produced dedicated C-sUAS ammunition. Their Anti-Drone Long Effective Range (AD-LER) cartridge is high-velocity 2 ¾-inch shell filled with #6 tungsten shot.[11] Their research found that #6 tungsten shot provided ideal balance of pellet count and density to achieve lethal effects out to 100m. By using a standard shell length, it remains compatible with all existing shotguns. The primary tradeoff for this performance is cost as it is an expensive process to manufacture very hard, dense metals such as tungsten. However, costs can be reduced by utilizing standard sporting ammunition already in inventory to facilitate training and mastery. An optimized shotgun is only half of the equation; without specialized training, the weapon is not useful against a dynamic aerial target. Ukrainian forces have already learned this lesson, incorporating clay target shooting to teach their forces the fundamentals C-sUAS gunnery.[12] This stands in stark contrast to current USAF small arms training, which focuses on static ground targets and fails to impart the necessary skills for aerial engagement. To build a truly effective capability, the Air Force must relearn the lessons of its own history and integrate the proven training methodologies of clay target sports. The foundation of this training program should be skeet shooting. The skeet field, with high and low trap houses and 8 stations present targets from a wide variety of repeatable angles. The highly structured environment is perfect for teaching a shooter the fundamental relationship between target path, speed, and required lead. The repeatable nature of skeet allows an Airman or Guardian to master the core mechanics of barrel swing, target focus, and follow-through, building the essential muscle memory for aerial engagement. Once foundational skills are mastered, training can progress to sporting clays. Originally designed to simulate live-game hunting, the discipline is the ideal analog for dynamic C-sUAS engagement. Unlike the rigid structure of skeet, a sporting clays course can be configured to present targets that mimic the erratic flight path of drones–targets that roll, bounce, loop, cross, and fly at various altitudes and speeds. This dynamic environment provides perfect opportunity for advanced C-sUAS training, allowing course designers to create realistic and challenging scenarios to test a shooter’s skills and adaptability. The Air Force does not need to create this training capability from scratch. A deep well of expertise already exists within civilian organizations like the National Skeet Shooting Association (NSSA) and the National Sporting Clays Association (NSCA). The Air Force can leverage their certified instructors to build a foundational curriculum. Internally, the armed services still maintain competitive shooting teams whose members possess the elite technical skills needed for this mission. These shooters, from the USAF's own team and sister service units like the Army Marksmanship Unit (AMU), can form the initial instructor cadre. The AMU provides a powerful model: its competitors hone their skills on the world stage and then transfer that expertise directly to soldiers, ensuring institutional lethality. A partnership with the AMU or, ideally, the re-establishment of the Air Force Marksmanship School would be the critical first step in building a sustainable training pipeline. The training program must culminate in a realistic, live-fire capstone exercise. After mastering the fundamentals on the clay range, Airmen would face their ultimate test: engaging actual drones in a simulated combat environment. Using inexpensive commercial drones piloted by trained "aggressors," these exercises would force trainees to apply their shooting skills against unpredictable, three-dimensional targets. More importantly, this phase would develop crucial tactical skills, teaching Airmen to recognize hostile flight patterns and devise effective countermeasures on the fly. By conducting these scenarios on existing maneuver ranges, the Air Force can provide its defenders with practical experience and confidence needed to defeat the drone threat. Once the program is established, competition, both internal and interservice, is the key to sustaining excellence. The pressure and pride of competition spur a desire to improve and maintain skills at the highest level, creating a "Top Gun" spirit that translates directly into more lethal, combat-effective Airmen. This is not a new concept. The peak of military shooting in the 1960s, “was in large part due to the Air Force and its program which had a snowball effect. As the Air Force improved, the Army AMU at Ft. Benning improved along with the Navy shooters who in turn began to be a force to be reconned with.”8 This friendly rivalry builds esprit de corps and fosters a culture of continuous improvement that a simple qualification course could never achieve. Furthermore, advanced competitions, such as sub-gauge events where the margin for error is smaller, challenge marksmen to refine their skills to the highest possible degree. Formally integrating this capability requires the establishment of clear policy and doctrine. A new publication, such as DAFI XX-XXX, Kinetic Point-Defense for Small Unmanned Aerial Systems, would be needed to codify training standards, rules of engagement (ROE), and support responsibilities. On the logistical side, new Unit Type Codes (UTCs) with accompanying logistics details (LOGDETs) must be created. These UTCs would identify trained point-defense personnel and their specialized equipment, allowing Combatant Commanders to request, deploy, and sustain this vital capability for both home-station and expeditionary missions. This doctrinal and logistical framework is the essential final step to transform a good idea into an official, war-winning capability. Rebuttal of Counterarguments and Alternatives A shotgun-based C-sUAS program is not without legitimate criticisms, the most common being that it is a “low-tech” solution to a high-tech problem. This criticism, however, incorrectly equates sophistication to effectiveness. A second criticism is that it is not a stand-alone system that can counter all threats is not a weakness, but a correct definition of its intended roll. A combination of capabilities will be required to counter sUAS threats. While other, more sophisticated weapon systems can provide effective defense at longer ranges, the shotgun provides a critical close-in defense layer inside the range of most systems. A third criticism is the reliance on the human factor in an age increasingly dominated by automated, AI-driven solutions. This perspective, however, misunderstands a core tenet of modern warfare: the human-in-the-loop is not a bug, but a feature. An alert, trained Airman is complimentary to automated systems, providing cognitive flexibility that cannot be reliably replicated. For example, a human operator can assess collateral damage risks beyond the immediate target, a nuanced, context-dependent judgement that remains a significant hurdle for AI. Furthermore, human defenders are more suited to counter threats such as fiber-optic guided drones which do not emanate electromagnetic signals which many automated systems rely on to acquire a target at range. A combination of human and system provides an irreplaceable layered defense. Alternative kinetic kill solutions for counter-sUAS present viable solutions that warrant consideration, though each comes with significant trade-offs. Drone-killing drones have been shown to be effective in Ukraine, but their increased cost and potential for failure are higher. The US Army has procured Raytheon’s Coyote drone to fill this role, spending somewhere below $100 million.[13] Similarly, advanced fire-control rifles such as the SMASH 2000L optic have much higher costs (US Army contract of $13M) than shotguns while still relying on bursts of single projectiles requiring significantly higher precision on the part of an operator.[14] At the highest end, directed energy weapons (DEW), while promising, present high costs combined with significant power requirements that restrict sustainability and portability in the field. System Est. cost per unit Cost per engagement training complexity portability Shotgun[15] ~$1,500 ~$5 Low-Moderate High Fire-control rifle[16] ~$10,000+ ~$2 Moderate High Interceptor drones Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Mobile Dew systems[17] ~$37,000 ~$15,000 High Low A final practical criticism centers on the perceived training burden, specifically the costs of facilities and the sourcing of qualified instructors. It is true that most on-base skeet ranges have been decommissioned, requiring new investment. However, the cost to establish a new range, estimated at $50,000 to $250,000[18], is negligible compared to the multi-million-dollar price of a single major weapon system. Targets are also readily and cheaply available on the commercial market. Similarly, the challenge of sourcing instructors is readily solvable. While current combat arms instructors may lack this specific expertise, a cadre of certified skeet and trap instructors already exists within the service shooting teams. To bridge any initial gap, certified civilian instructors from the NSSA, NSCA, and ATA can be contracted, providing a ready source of expertise until a self-sustaining Air Force instructor cadre is fully established. Conclusions The proliferation of sUAS platforms in global conflicts has enabled air power capability for even the smallest of combatants, providing a tool capable of achieving tactical and strategic effects at cost. This reality presents a clear and present danger to USAF personnel and assets at home and abroad. While high-tech solutions are developed, a critical point-defense gap remains. This is not a novel solution but a proven capability awaiting a return. The Air Force’s own history, driven by commanders like Gen Curtis LeMay, provides a blueprint. Clay target training and a culture of marksmanship once produced the world’s finest aerial gunners and greatest Air Force. By optimizing existing weapons, leveraging proven training methodologies, and establishing doctrine, this legacy can be revived to meet the modern threat. Other nations have been forced to learn this lesson through brutal, real-world combat. The USAF has the rare opportunity to prepare itself in peace. The need is clear, the solution is proven, the cost is low, and the price of inaction is unacceptable. The author is a member of the United States Air Force Shooting Team for American Skeet, National Skeet Shooting Association Certified Instructor, and 4-time Military First-Team All-American. [1] Samya Kullab, “A Surprise Drone Attack on Airfields across Russia Encapsulates Ukraine’s Wartime Strategy”, Associated Press, 2 June 2025. [2] Marc Santora, Lara Jakes, Andrew Kramer, Marco Hernandez, Liubov Sholudko, “A Thousand Snipers in the Sky: The New War in Ukraine,” The New York Times, 3 March 2025, [3] Stephen Honan, “Drug Cartels are Adopting Cutting-Edge Drone Technology. Here’s How the US Must Adapt”, Atlantic Council, Accessed 23 December 2025. [4] David Hambling, “Ukraine’s Upgraded Fiber Drones Are Deadlier At Longer Ranges”, Forbes, Accessed 23 December 2025. [5] Ukrainian fiber-optic drone destroys a Russian bunker by flying through a gap in the anti-drone net, https://www.youtube.com/shorts/S_mmcLw4HD4 [6] Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, “In Ukraine, Long Guns become Desperate Defenses against Small Drones”, The Defense Post, 11 December 2024, [7] Department of Defense, "Strategic Air Warfare: An Interview with Generals Curtis E. Lemay, Leon W. Johnson, David A. Burchinal, and Jack J. Catton.", 1988, 25. [8] Air Force Historical Research Agency, “Flexible Gunnery Training in the AAF”, 1. [9] Department of Defense, "Strategic Air Warfare: An Interview with Generals Curtis E. Lemay, Leon W. Johnson, David A. Burchinal, and Jack J. Catton.", 1988, 26. [10] TSgt Arnold Vitarbo, US Air Force Shooting Team, “Outline History of the United States Air Force Marksmanship School”, Accessed 9 December 2025. [11] Norma, Accessed 23 December 2025, “AD-LER”. [12] Prakash Nanda, “Small Weapon, Big Results! Ukraine’s Anti-Drone Arsenal Evolves; Shotguns Complement EW & AD Missiles To Hunt Russian UAVs,” Eurasian Times, 13 October 2025, [13] Colin Clark, “Army, Navy Buy Raytheon’s Coyote Drone Weapon”, Breaking Defense, 17 July 2018. [14] C-UAS Hub, Accessed 23 December 2025, “SMARTSHOOTER Secures $13M U.S. Army Contract for SMASH 2000L Fire Control Systems”. [15] Benelli USA, Accessed 18 March 2026, “M4 EXT” [16] C-UAS Hub, “SMARTSHOOTER”. [17] Jen Judson, “Here Are the Cheap Counter-Drone Solutions Tested in the Arizona Desert,” Defense News, 24 September, 2024. [18] Aden Tate, The Gun Zone, 11 March 2024, “How to Set up a Skeet Shooting Range?”.