The Work of Empire: War, Occupation, and the Making of American Colonialism in Cuba and the Philippines by Justin F. Jackson. University of North Carolina Press, 2025, 398 pp.
The 1898 Spanish-American War proved a relatively quick and victorious military engagement for the United States. Yet arguably, other than the rallying “Remember the Maine” slogan, the 1st Volunteer Calvary known as the Rough Riders, and Commodore George Dewey’s “You may fire when ready, Gridley” line following the United States’ takeover of Manila Bay, most events of the war and its aftermath have faded into the background of America’s collective memory. In particular, the interactions between American forces and the people of Cuba and the Philippines following Spain’s ejection from those countries do not garner near as much attention as the actual fighting or the counterinsurgency between US forces and various Filipino militant groups. To that end, in The Work of Empire, history professor Justin Jackson analyzes aspects of the US presence in Cuba and the Philippines, especially the military’s administration of those countries during the postwar period.
Jackson divides the book into three sections with two chapters in each. The first section, “Knowledge,” focuses on how American forces sought to leverage indigenous support in its fight against the Spanish, and how those relationships evolved, usually to the local residents’ detriment. American forces, primarily the Army, used their contacts with these populations to establish friendly political and economic climates. Yet, these same American forces also brought in their own biases and beliefs that would eventually undermine the earlier attempts to win over the local populations of Cuba and the Philippines to America’s side in their fight against the Spanish. Eventually, American actions would come to alienate the Cuban and Filipino populations, creating new and more complex conflicts and issues for America to resolve.
The second section centers on how US occupying forces used the development of infrastructure projects to help solidify their holds on Cuba and the Philippines and on the influence of the philosophies of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century on its efforts for improvement. The second chapter in “Infrastructure” focuses on US road-building projects in the Philippines, primarily on the island of Mindanao, initiated amid attempts to leverage local workers and authorities and deal with various insurgency groups.
The final section, “Bodies,” looks at two different groups of people. The first chapter covers the United States’ use of Chinese laborers in occupied areas, believed to be more reliable than other workers even as they faced extensive racism from their American employers and resentment from the local populations. The second chapter looks at the interactions between US forces and the local women, examining how friendships and sexual relationships played a part in local perceptions of American postwar efforts.
Throughout his analysis, Jackson notes the contradictions in the responses and actions of American leadership—particularly military commanders, including Major General Leonard Wood of the Rough Riders—as the United States established its authority over the regions. Many commanders held the view that they were more enlightened and thus intellectually and morally superior to the people they controlled.
In the early stages of US occupation, when the military needed tactical intelligence and support to overcome Spanish forces, US commanders engaged the local populations in positive ways. Yet once armed conflict against the Spanish ceased and Cuba and the Philippines came under American control, the opinions and concerns of the local populace took a back seat to US objectives and mindsets. Supposed American superiority permeated much of US postwar actions and policies. This is not to say that American forces and leaders regarded the populations as savages—a stereotype often seen in early analyses of colonial interactions—but they felt that to fully develop those lands and increase the quality of life and value to the United States, the government, economy, and social structures needed to fall in line with American beliefs.
In short, Work of Empire is not particularly optimistic about American actions in Cuba or the Philippines. In particular, American forces found themselves engaged in the years-long counterinsurgency against various factions on Mindanao that was more devastating than any conflict they faced at the hands of the Spanish. Much of the animosity from insurgent groups stemmed from the American forces’ lack of cultural understanding of the indigenous population.
In Cuba, where the fighting against the Spanish was more intense, the United States did not find itself immediately in a counterinsurgency environment, but there were significant instances of the Cuban population pushing back against American forces, either passively or violently, especially when involving the assault or violation of Cuban women by American troops. Efforts at developing infrastructure and a political-economic structure in the American mold would face uphill struggles as the amount of time since the armed conflict between the Americans and Spanish passed.
The usefulness of this work and the lessons that it seeks to impart are subject to question. When the United States engaged in the counterinsurgency wars of the 2000s, some attention was paid to the counterinsurgency in the Philippines, if for no other reason than to offer an example of where US forces could eventually overcome an armed insurgency to set up a stable, US-friendly subordinate governing structure. Yet, not much of that literature focused on the period of occupation or the issues that the United States faced in dealing with Cuba and the Philippines in the years the Spanish-American War. While Cuba effectively remained under US control until the 1930s and the Philippines until post-World War II, errors in how the United States ran those nations proved to be the basis for future tensions between America and those countries.
Cuba proved the most problematic, as it went from a vassal state to the perceived biggest regional threat to American stability and security when it fell under the Soviet sphere of influence. The Philippines maintains only slightly better relations with America, but often due to totalitarian rulers who align with some of America’s political stances at the expense of the welfare of their own people. Perhaps some of these lessons might have offered some insight into what the United States should have avoided in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq after their respective invasions. The United States did not want to portray itself as a conquering force, and for good reason. While this work was published long after the end of American occupation/nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq, it can offer future lessons for American forces, should they find themselves in another situation like that in Cuba, the Philippines, Afghanistan, or Iraq.
Overall, the book is a solid academic work that—while filled with extensive footnotes and references—is also quite readable. While Jackson does not suggest that the United States return to the “Empire Game,” he does offer some insight into what it should and should not do if it finds itself in a situation where it must help to rebuild/reestablish a nation after a conflict.
Individuals interested in foreign relations or engaged in training for foreign forces may gain some insight from the work. If nothing else, Work of Empire highlights that American forces must be open and receptive to the requirements and differences of another country, and that a lack of understanding and detailed knowledge can lead to significant issues down the road, for both American forces and those living under the authority of those forces.
Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Martin, USAF, Retired