Given rapid advancements in communications technology, the intense competition for talent, and the global shortage of cybersecurity professionals, what does a framework for effective talent management look like for the cyber and communications enterprise? Specifically, how can the military leverage existing talent for emerging requirements without risking the degradation of current missions? This research should examine which military specialties related to communications are already—or will soon become—legacy positions, and how servicemembers and civilians in these specialties could be upskilled with new skills and aptitudes.
To achieve this, what strategic changes must the military implement across its DOTMLPF-P framework to recruit, train, and retain a cyber and communications force capable of maintaining overmatch against peer adversaries through 2040? If possible, this analysis should weigh the benefits of reclassifying or retraining existing servicemembers and civilians against deliberate new recruiting efforts.
- Kaloostian, Col. Michael R., "DoD's Cyber Workforce: Strength through Retention and Volunteerism," AWC Strategic Studies Paper, 2020, 21 pgs.
- Kidd, Maj. Stephen M., "The Role of Digital Transformation in Air Force Artificial Intelligence Workforce Strategy," AFGC thesis, 2025, 71 pgs.
- Kidd addresses this by developing a structured taxonomy for AI practitioners to fill current classification gaps, establishing "AI Creator" and "AI Maintainer" as distinct work role categories within the Air Force. He notes that the Air Force's current talent management systems rely heavily on commercial-off-the-shelf products and are not fully configured to support a specialized AI workforce. However, he highlights the upcoming introduction of the Data Engineering Air Force Specialty Code (1D7X4)—with specialized shred outs for Data Operations and Software Development—as a vital first step in providing a framework for managing personnel across the entire AI lifecycle.
- Banner, Maj. Jeffery A., "Hunt Forward Operations as a Diplomatic Arm of the United States," AF Fellow Op-Ed (University of Texas, San Antonio, Cyber Warfare), 2025, 3 pgs.
- Banner identifies a critical shortfall in current cyber education: while U.S. cyber operators are highly skilled technically, they lack formal education in international diplomacy. Because Hunt Forward Operations (HFOs) require operators to interact directly with foreign diplomats and military leaders, a lack of diplomatic training risks causing cultural insensitivity or friction. To resolve this, Banner recommends leveraging external resources—specifically partnering with the Foreign Service Institute, National Defense University, and academic think tanks—to develop a formalized "Cyber Diplomacy Curriculum". This would equip the cyber workforce with vital skills in cultural competency, protocol, foreign policy context, and negotiation.
- Bond, Maj. Cash, "Redefining the Cyber Edge: Operational Technology Should be Foundational to Cyber Training Pipelines," AF Fellows, 2025.
- Bond addresses this by highlighting that current Department of Defense (DoD) cyber training pipelines focus almost exclusively on Information Technology (IT), leaving operators unequipped to defend the Operational Technology (OT) that controls critical physical systems. To close this educational gap without reinventing the wheel, he argues the military should formally leverage existing external resources, industry partnerships, and commercial providers. Specifically, Bond recommends sending cyber operators to specialized, free training courses provided by the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory (INL), which offer hands-on, world-class instruction on evaluating, monitoring, and securing industrial control systems.
- Golosov, Maj. Zack, "US Military Cyber Operations: Forced to Do More with Less," ACSC course paper (Cyber Concentration), 2024, 11 pgs.