TOPIC SPONSORS: HQ USSF/SEK & USSF/S5I & SPOC, 3 SES/MAF
What are potential Space Professional/Safe or Responsible Behaviors that would be acceptable and agreed upon by FVEY+2? What process should be used to develop them and what format should be used to codify them (MOU, treaty, etc.)? (USSF/S5I) What level of regulation should be in place for on-orbit space activities such as rendezvous and proximity operations and space debris removal for both national and international space assets? What is the threshold when a space asset is considered a threat or when an action in space is considered aggressive? (HQ USSF/SEK) What roles or responsibilities should the USSF have on the Moon, in Lunar Orbit, or in Cis-Lunar Space? (consider International Treaties, i.e. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967) (SPOC, 3 SES/MAF)
- Adewunmi, Maj. Adekunbi H., "Evolving Deterrence: Preventing Destruction in Outer Space," AFGC thesis, 2025, 48 pgs.
- Adewunmi answers this by examining the dual-use nature of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs), which adversaries often disguise as benign inspection or debris-mitigation tools, but which can actively function as co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. To manage these ambiguous threats and avoid unintended escalation, she recommends that the U.S. update its space policy to establish clear "red lines" for aggressive actions and strengthen international norms by expanding agreements—like the Artemis Accords—among allied space-faring nations.
- Arfman, Maj. Dane T., "Controlling Chaos: Deterring Irresponsible Chinese Space Behavior," AF Global College thesis, 2025, 40 pgs.
- Baumeister, Maj. D. Harry, "Failure to Launch: Gray Zone Conflict in Space," AFGC thesis, 2026, 50 pgs.
- Baumeister points out that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is highly ambiguous and lacks a clear definition of an "armed attack" in space. He argues that instead of waiting for international law to catch up, the USSF should define these thresholds in its own doctrine to establish clear norms. Specifically, he recommends that dual-use RPO activities conducted without prior diplomatic notification should be doctrinally categorized as nearing or crossing the threshold of an "armed attack" to deter adversaries from using the guise of satellite repair to threaten US assets.
- Beauchamp, Maj. Torry S., "Cleaning up Space: Reducing Orbital Debris to Reduce Risk and Make Space Operations Safer," AFGC thesis, 2025, 36 pgs.
- Beauchamp points out that current space debris mitigation guidelines (such as those from the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee) have no direct incentives or penalties, and adversarial nations frequently ignore them—evidenced by massive debris fields created by Chinese and Russian anti-satellite tests. Because it only takes one bad actor to render space unusable, he argues that voluntary guidelines are insufficient. He recommends replacing the current unregulated environment with a Global Space Organization that can impose universally accepted, mandated rules on all space-faring nations (and commercial entities) regarding debris mitigation and removal, similar to how the world coordinates to control airspace.
- Brown, Lt. Col. Rhett, "Legal Property Rights in Space: Implications for the US Space Force and the Outer Space Treaty," AWC PSP, 2020, 22 pgs.
- Garcia, Maj. Jaime, "The US Must Lead the Establishment of International Norms within the Space Domain," ACSC paper, 2020, 16 pgs.
- Rees, Maj. Michael "Tonic" J., "Interstellar Jurisprudence: Legal Challenges in Applying Traditional Frameworks to Space and Cyber Warfare," GCPME paper, 2024, 46 pgs.
- Tirado, Major Jessica M., "International Laws of War and Grey Zone Space Warfare: How International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict will Challenge the United States' Ability to Compete against Grey Zone Warfare in the Space Domain," ACSC Schriever Scholars paper, 2022, 20 pgs.