What is the impact of increased accessibility to space (by actors such as schools, NGOs, and many foreign countries) on U.S. National Space Policy? In response to this growing accessibility, what are the pros and cons of government or further DoD regulation of space systems? This includes examining potential regulations such as requiring the registration of satellites, mandating on-orbit equipment for trackability or propulsion, establishing fees for launching and/or occupying an orbit, implementing disposal and clean-up fees, or adding regulations for broadcast signals.
As the domain becomes increasingly congested, if space has the potential to become the site of the next “arms race,” what historical lessons learned or not learned could be applicable to today? On an international scale, what potential Space Professional, Safe, or Responsible Behaviors would be acceptable and agreed upon by FVEY+2 nations? What process should be used to develop these norms of behavior, and what format should be used to codify them (such as a Memorandum of Understanding or a treaty)?
In addition to establishing broad norms, what specific level of regulation should be in place for complex on-orbit space activities—such as rendezvous and proximity operations and space debris removal—for both national and international space assets? When evaluating these activities, what is the threshold for determining when a space asset is considered a threat or when an action in space is considered aggressive? Finally, as exploration expands, what specific roles or responsibilities should the U.S. Space Force have on the Moon, in Lunar Orbit, or in Cis-Lunar Space, particularly when considering international agreements like the Outer Space Treaty of 1967?
- Adewunmi, Maj. Adekunbi H., "Evolving Deterrence: Preventing Destruction in Outer Space," AFGC thesis, 2025, 48 pgs.
- Adewunmi answers this by examining the dual-use nature of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs), which adversaries often disguise as benign inspection or debris-mitigation tools, but which can actively function as co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. To manage these ambiguous threats and avoid unintended escalation, she recommends that the U.S. update its space policy to establish clear "red lines" for aggressive actions and strengthen international norms by expanding agreements—like the Artemis Accords—among allied space-faring nations.
- Arfman, Maj. Dane T., "Controlling Chaos: Deterring Irresponsible Chinese Space Behavior," AF Global College thesis, 2025, 40 pgs.
- Baumeister, Maj. D. Harry, "Failure to Launch: Gray Zone Conflict in Space," AFGC thesis, 2026, 50 pgs.
- Baumeister points out that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is highly ambiguous and lacks a clear definition of an "armed attack" in space. He argues that instead of waiting for international law to catch up, the USSF should define these thresholds in its own doctrine to establish clear norms. Specifically, he recommends that dual-use RPO activities conducted without prior diplomatic notification should be doctrinally categorized as nearing or crossing the threshold of an "armed attack" to deter adversaries from using the guise of satellite repair to threaten US assets.
- Beard, Maj. John E., "New Space Race: Governing Commercial Power in an Overburdened LEO," ACSC GRISSOM 2026
- Answered by Beard's identification of severe policy and regulatory gaps in U.S. space oversight, where responsibility is currently segmented across the Federal Communications Commission (spectrum), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (earth observation), and the Federal Aviation Administration (launch services). He argues that this fragmented structure is a result of decades of policy prioritizing rapid commercial growth and competition without scaling oversight or establishing rules for on-orbit behavior. To establish responsible behavior, Beard recommends that the Space Force establish formalized, enforceable commercial integration standards for all private systems supporting national security by 2030. These standards must enforce binding operational priority rules to allocate assets to military missions during a crisis, mandate quantitative risk thresholds (such as 95–99% uptime), require periodic readiness certifications, and require joint contingency planning for contested scenarios.
- Beauchamp, Maj. Torry S., "Cleaning up Space: Reducing Orbital Debris to Reduce Risk and Make Space Operations Safer," AFGC thesis, 2025, 36 pgs.
- Beauchamp points out that current space debris mitigation guidelines (such as those from the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee) have no direct incentives or penalties, and adversarial nations frequently ignore them—evidenced by massive debris fields created by Chinese and Russian anti-satellite tests. Because it only takes one bad actor to render space unusable, he argues that voluntary guidelines are insufficient. He recommends replacing the current unregulated environment with a Global Space Organization that can impose universally accepted, mandated rules on all space-faring nations (and commercial entities) regarding debris mitigation and removal, similar to how the world coordinates to control airspace.
- Brown, Lt. Col. Rhett, "Legal Property Rights in Space: Implications for the US Space Force and the Outer Space Treaty," AWC PSP, 2020, 22 pgs.
- Garcia, Maj. Jaime, "The US Must Lead the Establishment of International Norms within the Space Domain," ACSC paper, 2020, 16 pgs.
- Rees, Maj. Michael "Tonic" J., "Interstellar Jurisprudence: Legal Challenges in Applying Traditional Frameworks to Space and Cyber Warfare," GCPME paper, 2024, 46 pgs.
- Tirado, Major Jessica M., "International Laws of War and Grey Zone Space Warfare: How International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict will Challenge the United States' Ability to Compete against Grey Zone Warfare in the Space Domain," ACSC Schriever Scholars paper, 2022, 20 pgs.
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- Adewunmi, Maj. Adekunbi H., "Evolving Deterrence: Preventing Destruction in Outer Space," AFGC thesis, 2025, 48 pgs.
- Adewunmi answers this by examining the dual-use nature of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs), which adversaries often disguise as benign inspection or debris-mitigation tools, but which can actively function as co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. To manage these ambiguous threats and avoid unintended escalation, she recommends that the U.S. update its space policy to establish clear "red lines" for aggressive actions and strengthen international norms by expanding agreements—like the Artemis Accords—among allied space-faring nations.
- Arfman, Maj. Dane T., "Controlling Chaos: Deterring Irresponsible Chinese Space Behavior," AF Global College thesis, 2025, 40 pgs.
- Baumeister, Maj. D. Harry, "Failure to Launch: Gray Zone Conflict in Space," AFGC thesis, 2026, 50 pgs.
- Baumeister points out that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is highly ambiguous and lacks a clear definition of an "armed attack" in space. He argues that instead of waiting for international law to catch up, the USSF should define these thresholds in its own doctrine to establish clear norms. Specifically, he recommends that dual-use RPO activities conducted without prior diplomatic notification should be doctrinally categorized as nearing or crossing the threshold of an "armed attack" to deter adversaries from using the guise of satellite repair to threaten US assets.
- Beauchamp, Maj. Torry S., "Cleaning up Space: Reducing Orbital Debris to Reduce Risk and Make Space Operations Safer," AFGC thesis, 2025, 36 pgs.
- Beauchamp points out that current space debris mitigation guidelines (such as those from the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee) have no direct incentives or penalties, and adversarial nations frequently ignore them—evidenced by massive debris fields created by Chinese and Russian anti-satellite tests. Because it only takes one bad actor to render space unusable, he argues that voluntary guidelines are insufficient. He recommends replacing the current unregulated environment with a Global Space Organization that can impose universally accepted, mandated rules on all space-faring nations (and commercial entities) regarding debris mitigation and removal, similar to how the world coordinates to control airspace.
- Brown, Lt. Col. Rhett, "Legal Property Rights in Space: Implications for the US Space Force and the Outer Space Treaty," AWC PSP, 2020, 22 pgs.
- Garcia, Maj. Jaime, "The US Must Lead the Establishment of International Norms within the Space Domain," ACSC paper, 2020, 16 pgs.
- Rees, Maj. Michael "Tonic" J., "Interstellar Jurisprudence: Legal Challenges in Applying Traditional Frameworks to Space and Cyber Warfare," GCPME paper, 2024, 46 pgs.
- Tirado, Major Jessica M., "International Laws of War and Grey Zone Space Warfare: How International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict will Challenge the United States' Ability to Compete against Grey Zone Warfare in the Space Domain," ACSC Schriever Scholars paper, 2022, 20 pgs.